Research Articles (Philosophy)

Permanent URI for this collectionhttp://hdl.handle.net/2263/2333

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Philosophy of education as pluriversal : opening the dialogues
Davids, Nuraan; Simba, Precious; Metz, Thaddeus; Horsthemke, Kai; Noaparast, Khosrow Bagheri; Faruque, Muhammad U.; Memon, Nadeem; Kwak, Duck-Joo; Jackson, Liz (Routledge, 2026)
Despite the historical origins of philosophy from a richly diverse tapestry of thinkers, which cuts across geopolitical, cultural and religious traditions, and despite internationalising trends to develop both a more inclusive and authentic account of philosophical thinking, it remains largely unquestioned to equate philosophy of education with its western canon. These concerning biases are succinctly laid bare in Jackson and Kwak’s (2025) editorial, ‘Is philosophy of education western?’ They are correct in their assertion that the persistent perspective of philosophy of education as western suggests that the world beyond Western Europe and North America appears insignificant, holding negative implications for the development of curricula, research, scholarly discourse, and educational practice and outcomes in the field globally. Jackson and Kwak (2025, p. 2) are also correct that the unfolding epistemic framing is not only a continuing marginalisation of ‘non-western’ thinkers and philosophies, but also expectations of the latter to be ‘western facing in outlook’, and a preparedness to ‘sacrifice’ ‘internally oriented explorations and articulations of thought from other positions’. In this collective article, we seek to take Jackson (2025) thesis a step further – by acknowledging the colonial logic that has ensured the systemic subjugation, assimilation, or erasure of Indigenous and other ‘non-western’ philosophies, while also affirming philosophy of education as inclusively pluriversal. Our aim is not only to foreground marginalised voices and traditions, but also to restore the epistemic dignity of all philosophies. By bringing together the contributions in this article, we do not simply gesture toward ‘alternative’ knowledge systems as supplements to the dominant canon; rather, we affirm them as philosophies, constitutive of a genuinely pluriversal field of philosophy of education. The contributions offered here represent only fragments of what a pluriversal philosophy of education might become. They are offered as an opening of dialogues, which question the dominance of any single epistemic tradition, and as calls for recognising the pluriversality of philosophy of education as co-constitutive rather than derivative. Importantly, to affirm philosophy of education as pluriversal is not only to expand the margins of the western canon. It also involves disrupting its centre, and to insist that multiple traditions of thought stand in dialogue as equals not only in the discipline of philosophy of education, but in the day-to-day living in this world. It is, of course, impossible to capture within a single article the full range of philosophies that have shaped the world’s civilisations. Yet this impossibility is itself revealing. It confirms how little is known or even acknowledged beyond the confines of the western canon. At this point, it might be worth asking why it matters so much to de-normalise the westernisation of philosophy of education, and why it is important to recognise the offering of multiple philosophies. On the one hand, the response resides in ridding philosophy of education from self-impoverishment – philosophy of education is diminished by a denial of a plurality of insights and traditions. On the other hand, when we write and talk about philosophy of education, we are not only referring to educational programmes, principles, goals and outcomes. We are also referring to intellectual, spiritual and traditional heritages, which have shaped communities and societies, It matters, therefore, because restoring philosophy of education to its pluriversal roots is not simply a matter of inclusion or representation; it is also a liberatory act of epistemic reparation. We see epistemic reparation as crucial because in addition to restoring and recentering historically marginalised ways of thinking and being, it also diversifies knowledge by opening spaces for multiple ways of knowing and understanding the world. Without disruption, contestation, and dialogue, philosophy of education will persist in its trappings of narrow perspectives and exclusions. There are consequences not only for what, who and how we teach, but also for the kind of world that we ought to be co-creating.
Violence and African philosophy : beyond reaction and mimicry
Sanni, John Sodiq (Taylor and Francis, 2025-07-24)
The history of African philosophy often begins with the quest for legitimacy, by which I mean the desire for it to be recognised, accepted and considered as critical thinking in the real sense of the word. This starting point, on the part of many African philosophy scholars, was due to the historical epistemic violence that Africans experienced as a result of the encounter with the colonisers. The nature of this encounter resulted in the debasement, neglect, and marginalisation of African philosophical positions. Plunged in this epistemic doubt, uncertainty, and imposed decadence, for centuries, many African philosophers grappling with the question, ‘Is there an African philosophy?’ The question does two main things: on the one hand, it seeks to validate philosophical positions that are uniquely African, and on another hand, the question searches for prescriptive philosophical paradigms for addressing African problems and analysing issues. Most African philosophical engagements do the former. Shedding new light to the question, I argue that a disposition to African philosophy that stems from a need to validate its existence risks being a mere reaction and/or mimicry, and as such, further perpetrates epistemic violence by removing Africa from its lived realities.
A critical consideration of the effects of violence in Fanon
Hofmeyr, Augusta Benda (Taylor and Francis, 2025-08-01)
My aim in this paper is twofold: first, I aim to establish to what extent Fanon ascribes intrinsic value to violence or whether it would be more accurate to align his position with a constructive and instrumental conceptualisation of violence. From a close reading of his 1960 address ‘Why We Use Violence’ (Fanon [1960] 2018) and the first chapter of The Wretched of the Earth ([1961] 2004), a more nuanced understanding emerges that avoids the trap of the Arendtian binary scheme, which validates instrumental violence while dismissing Fanon’s conceptualisation as non-instrumental. Ascribing intrinsic value to violence in Fanon decontextualises violence, which cannot be understood outside of the end it serves in the struggle for decolonisation. The intrinsic necessity of violence in colonial contexts is wrongly conflated with the intrinsic value of violence beyond instrumentality. The necessity of violence upon which Fanon insists is not an unqualified advocation of violence ora call for violence ex nihilo. Instead, he is urging the colonised to make productive use of the violence that is already given to them. Violence as Fanon conceptualises it, it will be shown, is not merely instrumental and reactive, but is also creative and constructive. In the second instance, a critical assessment of Fanon’s creative and liberatory conceptualisation of violence is needed for the question remains, was Fanon right in his belief that violence in the context of the French-Algerian War would purge the African mind of the trauma colonisation inflicted, that violence is not endlessly self-perpetuating but would give rise to newly empowered subjects capable of postcolonial nation-building. To critically assess the effects of revolutionary violence, I confront Fanon’s conceptualisation with the lived wartime experiences of Algerian intellectual Feraoun as documented in his Journal 1955–1962: Reflections on the French-Algerian War (2000) in the conclusive part of this paper. Feraoun concurs with Fanon that violent retaliation is a necessary condition to bring about liberation, but his testimonial reveals that revolutionary violence did not cleanse the Algerian subjects of their psychological dehumanisation, but instead spawned violent, inhuman erevolutionary subjects who ended up wielding the violence they opposed against their own people.
Ubuntu and violence
Matolino, Bernard (Taylor and Francis, 2025-08-22)
Ubuntu in its essential outlook is committed to a humane and conciliatory interchange between moral agents and their environs. Yet the countries that have given ubuntu its name have had violence at the centre of their public spaces. This raises the question: what sort of engagement could there be between the violence inherent in these countries and ubuntu? And to what end would that engagement be? I examine ubuntu’s relationship with violence, looking at the enduring effects of the historical reality of the banality of the violence of oppression. In the second instance, I seek to demonstrate how ubuntu, which is characteristically postcolonial, has developed an identity that is antithetical to ubuntu. The routine production of these disasters, and the normalcy of the existence of absurdity that generates violence of all sorts, has become the sign and mode of modern postcolonial Africa. This identity appears intransigent. In the light of these two instances, I seek to explore what aspects of ubuntu render it unable to shape its home turf.
Intuitions about just public healthcare versus liberal political theory
Metz, Thaddeus (Jagiellonian University, 2025-04-30)
I argue that strong intuitions about how the state ought to allocate healthcare are incompatible with quite influential autonomy-centric and neutral strains of liberal political theory. Specifically, I maintain that it is uncontroversial that we should routinely distribute medical treatments in public hospitals in ways that have little to no bearing on patients’ ability to pursue a wide array of ends and further that we cannot easily avoid making judgments of which ways of life are good (or bad) when making such distributions. These intuitions tell against the principles that the state in general should aim merely to protect individuals’ rights to choose their own ways of life and should not take sides on which lives are good (or bad) when adopting policy or law. I show that this tension, which has not been addressed in the literature, manifests in at least three types of healthcare decisions, viz., which types of treatments should be offered to patients, how to prioritize among types of treatments, and who should receive a certain type of treatment. I do not prescribe how to resolve the tension, that is, whether to reject autonomy-centric and neutral forms of liberalism or revise judgments about how public medical facilities should allocate healthcare, but instead I establish the point that one must choose between them.
Duties to oneself in the light of African values : two theoretical approaches
Metz, Thaddeus (Oxford University Press, 2025-01)
I draw on ideas salient in African philosophy to construct two new theoretical ways of capturing the essence of duties to oneself. According to one theory, a person has a basic duty to “relate” to herself in ways similar to how the African field has often thought one should relate to others, viz., harmoniously, while, according to a second, one has such a duty to produce liveliness in oneself. Beyond articulating these two novel attempts to account for what all duties to oneself have in common and showing that each captures several intuitions about them, I offer reasons to favor the harmony theory, meriting consideration by a global audience as a rival to, say, the Kantian-rationalism common in the West and Confucianism in the East.
Deterrence and decapitation tactics as a strategy for counter-terrorism
Ofuasia, Emmanuel; Ben, Patrick Effiong (Routledge, 2025-10)
Some scholars have lauded “decapitation tactics” as a legitimate approach by countries such as Nigeria, the United States of America, and Israel in their struggle against the expansion and influence of terrorist groups. The decapitation tactic implies, basically, three routes: killing, capturing, or capturing and then killing the leader(s) of terrorist cells. Through a critical analysis of the arguments for such a tactic, this article contends that the approach will not stem the proliferation of terrorist groups. The elimination of the leader(s) of terrorist groups does not play a decisive role in mitigating terrorism but has rather contributed to its surge in places with links to cells like Al-Qaeda. Also, the article defends the position that it is morally unjustified to kill terrorist leaders without a fair trial in a competent court of law. Using Boko Haram and Hamas as illustrations, the article contends that targeted killings subvert the existence and essence of the criminal justice system. Taking inspiration from deterrence theory, this article suggests that the decapitation tactic has served as a basis for escalation and proliferation of terrorist groups rather than serving as deterrence against the possibility of recurrence.
The tragedy of the commons revisited : Hardin meets Ostrom
Hofmeyr, Augusta Benda (Routledge, 2025)
Hardin’s seminal 1968 essay, “The Tragedy of the Commons” has generally been interpreted as advocating the enclosure or privatisation of the commons as the only means of conserving it. It will be argued that this interpretation with its exclusive emphasis on “the commons” fails to address what is actually at stake for Hardin – “the tragedy” of the recalcitrant belief in limitless economic growth. This article revisits Hardin’s essay and its critical reception to refocus our attention on its actual object of critique: the limitless growth incentive. If it is this capitalist logic that leads to ruin, as Hardin maintains, he could not have meant to advocate this same logic with its emphasis on property rights as a way to avert the tragedy. Nobel Laureate in Economics, Elinor Ostrom’s research refutes Hardin’s draconian pessimism by unearthing how numerous communities across the world had been deftly avoiding the tragedy of the commons for centuries. She investigated collaborative management systems across the globe in which communities have successfully preserved a shared resource and provided for their members without relying on privatisation or top-down government control. More than merely providing empirical counter-evidence, Ostrom discovered that humans have a much more complex motivational structure and a far greater capacity to solve social dilemmas than posited in earlier rational-choice theory with its assumption of egoistic, self-interested individuals who maximise utility. Hence, rather than being diametrically opposed, it is argued that Ostrom discovered the solution to the problem that Hardin in part misdiagnosed.
Food production and Afrikan metaphysical thought in the time of polycrisis
Black, Mitchell-Ron (Routledge, 2025)
Increasingly, societies are becoming aware of the ecological impact of the industrial agricultural complex (IAC) and how it contributes to the deepening context of a polycrisis. However, its impact, and by extension, our impact on the soil microbiome in particular has received scarce attention in the field of environmental ethics, and even less so from an African thought perspective. As such, this article explores the question: how could we justify and then defend the moral value of microcosmic life in relation to other-than-human life from an African thought perspective? In order to do so, it will advance a framework for contemplating the problem of microcosmic harm, analyse two approaches for understanding our relatedness to the world in the literature on African environmentalism (complex relationism in the work of Mogobe Ramose and Afrispiritual relationism in the work of Laurenti Magesa), develop an account for understanding the moral status of microcosmic life between the two approaches, and use this account to respond to the problem of microcosmic harm. Here, it will be argued that an obligation to abandon our current IAC food system in favour of transitioning to an agroecological food system exists and that fulfilling this obligation offers African societies an opportunity for both righting historical injustices and preventing future ones. In doing so, this article proposes a link between how systems of food production are organised and how systems of subjectification are organised, or, that we are how we grow what we eat.
The parallels between process metaphysics and African metaphysics
Ofuasia, Emmanuel (University of Illinois Press, 2025-05)
African conceptions of reality have been judged by some African scholars to be starkly different from the mainstream and dominant substance metaphysics that operates in the Euro-American philosophic tradition. These scholars stress relationality and becoming with the understanding that reality is a web of interconnected activities. In addition, some of them also articulate how classical logic and laws of thought are not helpful for properly understanding the concepts of reality in African thought. In this article, I limit my assessment to four of these African scholars: Innocent Asouzu, Mogobe Ramose, Sophie Oluwole, and Ada Agada. I uncover how the two chief contentions among them—emphasis on reality as becoming and the limitations of classical logic—for expressing reality are neither entirely unheard of nor limited to African metaphysics, as these two themes are also present in Alfred North Whitehead's philosophy of organism. But none of these thinkers are familiar with Whitehead and his works. I argue for why process metaphysics and African metaphysics share a similar history of misrepresentation and rejection as well as how an alternative system of logic is central for making sense of the contentions of these traditions.
Agency and violence : an African philosophical approach
Villet, Charles M.; Sanni, John Sodiq (Routledge, 2025)
The articles in this special issue of African Studies were selected from papers and presentations presented at a conference on the theme ‘Agency and Violence: An African Philosophical Approach’ the philosophy department at the University of Pretoria hosted in 2023. Thought-provoking discussion and debate on a theme that is controversial but crucial within the African context and more broadly in the Global South characterised the small but lively conference. This special issue aims to engage with varying contexts across the continent where violence is a daily reality. This theme was the brainchild of John Sanni and the regular conversations that he and Charles Villet had in the years preceding the conference. Their academic partnership focuses on themes regarding violence, and it became clear in their own research that violence is not just a passive phenomenon that impacts the livelihood of ordinary citizens on the ground (although this is certainly the case for a great deal of people) but also an active response to oppression and the spectre of colonialism that still exists in society.
Applying Alex Broadbent's reverse counterfactual theory to the outbreak of World War I : a novel causal analysis
Hanssen, John (Springer, 2025)
This article applies Alex Broadbent’s reverse counterfactual theory of causation to the causes of World War I (WWI), providing a novel framework for historical causal analysis. According to Broadbent’s theory, which differs radically from the more familiar account of David Lewis, an event Q is a cause of event R only if, without R, Q would not have occurred. The hypothesis posited here is that understanding the causes of WWI lies in identifying them based on a well-motivated causal philosophical framework. After showing that Broadbent’s theory is prima facie plausible, this study employs it to re-evaluate the extensively debated causes of WWI. Through doing so, it becomes evident that the Russian mobilization, rather than other frequently cited events, was the pivotal cause of Germany’s declaration of war and, consequently, the broader conflict. This analysis not only simplifies the complex causal reasoning process but also offers fresh insights into the historical narrative of WWI as well as reveals how a philosophical account of causation can have a weighty bearing on debates in social science. The implications of this approach extend beyond historical inquiry, suggesting broader applications for reverse counterfactual theory in understanding causation in complex events.
Unexplored issues in the ethics of nudges
Calboli, Stefano; Metz, Thaddeus (Wiley, 2025-08)
No abstract available.
Three contexts of climate-induced cultural heritage devastation in Africa : implications for climate justice
Afolabi, Abiodun Paul (Informa UK Limited (trading as Taylor and Francis Group) and NISC (Pty) Ltd, 2025)
In this article, I contend that despite the high-level scholarly interest in the ethical implications of climate change, a comprehensive understanding of the impacts of climate change on cultural heritage values, particularly in Africa, has not been sufficiently addressed in climate ethics literature. What has been missing is the nature and significance of climate-induced cultural heritage devastation in Africa and the implications for climate justice. Through the method of philosophical argumentation, I show three important ways in which climate change threatens tangible and intangible cultural heritage values, particularly in Africa. I argue that climate change (a) damages, (b) denies and (c) ultimately contributes to the destruction of cultural heritage in subtle ways that need to be widely known. I further propose ways to address these three dimensions of climate impact on cultural heritage values, aiming to create an inclusive global climate treaty that is sensitive to the devastation of cultural heritage in Africa and beyond. I conclude that if there is reason to be concerned about the loss of cultural heritage values, as there plausibly is, then the negative impact of climate change on cultural heritage values should be taken seriously in climate ethics and policy discourse. Not doing this would amount to cultural injustice.
African environmental philosophy with(out) eco-phenomenology?
Afolabi, Abiodun Paul (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2025)
There has been relatively little reflection from African environmental philosophers on the specific contributions that eco-phenomenology, insofar as it constitutes a distinctive philosophical approach, might make to their field. In this article, I critically evaluate key approaches in African environmental philosophy and argue that the implicit aim of early African environmental philosophers appears limited to employing analytic and hermeneutic methods to rethink anthropocentric attitudes—those largely responsible for upsetting the balance of the natural environment—without any explicit engagement with eco-phenomenological principles or methods. I discuss possible reasons for this neglect and show how African environmental philosophy could benefit from adopting an eco-phenomenological perspective, particularly in revealing the problematic assumptions embedded in the ontological ideal of the interdependence of all things in nature. I conclude that eco-phenomenology has the potential to advance environmental thinking in Africa, provided its methodological insights are adequately taken up.
The challenge that war poses to Levinas's thought
Hofmeyr, Augusta Benda (Philippine National Philosophical Research Society, 2024-01)
War is a " state of exception" that not only left an indelible mark on Levinas's life but confronts Levinas with a series of "hard questions" that pose a fundamental challenge to some of the most foundational tenets of his ethical metaphysics. Starting with the sole sustained consideration of war in Levinas's thought, the Preface of Totality and Infinity (TI), this study critically unpacks what it considers to be the three core questions or challenges posed by war: Firstly, the pivotal question raised in the Preface of TI: Does war not render ethics ineffective, as it does not just oppose but suspends this ethical relation? Secondly, the inquiry extends to the notion of a just war: If war indeed involves a suspension of morality, what normative basis can justify the idea of a just war? Thirdly, the complexity arises from the fact that the judgment required for considering a war just implies that the initial ethical relation, which exists prior to reflective thought and morality, cannot remain isolated from political considerations. How can we make sense of this seemingly impossible connection between ethics and politics in Levinas's thought or the apparent gap between ethics and justice in his philosophy? This paper concludes that a simple, either/or binary scheme cannot resolve the tension between the oxymoronic couplets (Totality/Infinity; War/Peace; Politics/Ethics) that pervade Levinas's thought. Instead, they appear to be inextricably linked in a Derridean double-bind of both/and that affirms that the ethical aspect of humanity is not an unwavering state but rather an ongoing struggle to combat the inhumanity associated with Totality, War, Politics, and even at times, "Justice." The burning issue of today of the justice/injustice of the Israel/Palestine war currently dividing the global citizenry is a testament to the fact that "Justice" constantly risks becoming unmoored from its ethical foundation in the necessary distinction between Neighbor and Enemy.
Responsibility gaps and technology : old wine in new bottles?
Oimann, Ann-Katrien; Tollon, Fabio (Wiley, 2025-02)
Recent work in philosophy of technology has come to bear on the question of responsibility gaps. Some authors argue that the increase in the autonomous capabilities of decision-making systems makes it impossible to properly attribute responsibility for AI-based outcomes. In this article we argue that one important, and often neglected, feature of recent debates on responsibility gaps is how this debate maps on to old debates in responsibility theory. More specifically, we suggest that one of the key questions that is still at issue is the significance of the reactive attitudes, and how these ought to feature in our theorizing about responsibility. We will therefore provide a new descriptive categorization of different perspectives with respect to responsibility gaps. Such reflection can provide analytical clarity about what is at stake between the various interlocutors in this debate. The main upshot of our account is the articulation of a way to frame this ‘new’ debate by drawing on the rich intellectual history of ‘old’ concepts. By regarding the question of responsibility gaps as being concerned with questions of metaphysical priority, we see that the problem of these gaps lies not in any advanced technology, but rather in how we think about responsibility.
Jecker and Atuire's African reflections on being a person : more welcome non-western thought about moral status
Metz, Thaddeus (BMJ Publishing Group, 2025-04)
No abstract available.
Benatar and Metz on cosmic meaning and anti-natalism
Lougheed, Kirk (Springer, 2025-06)
David Benatar argues that one important consideration in favour of anti-natalism is based on the fact that all humans lack cosmic meaning; we will never transcend space and time such that we will have an impact on the entire universe, forever. Instead of denying Benatar’s claim that we lack cosmic meaning, Thaddeus Metz recently argues that our lack of cosmic meaning is not that significant because we ought not to regret lacking a good that we could not have in the first place. He explains the principle behind this idea in modal terms: “the closer the world in which one could access a benefit, the more reasonable are attitudes such as sadness, disappointment, regret when does not acquire it.” I argue that this principle faces a serious counterexample in the form of death. The possible worlds in which one doesn’t die are incredibly distant. Yet, it is appropriate to express deep sadness, disappointment, and regret at the fact that one must inevitably face death. Metz is wrong that we shouldn’t regret lacking a good unavailable to us in the first place. His criticism of Benatar therefore fails. While it might be objected that immortality is not good, my basic point still stands when considering the fact that our lives are not significantly longer. Benatar’s claims about the significance of our lack of cosmic meaning might not be true, but not for the reasons suggested by Metz.
Helen Verran and the question of African logic
Ofuasia, Emmanuel (Taylor and Francis, 2025)
Hitherto, the African intellect had been decimated by notable European scholars such as David Hume, Charles Darwin, Friedrich Hegel, Lucien Levy-Bruhl to name a few. The common denominator among these male scholars is that the African intellect is not yet developed to the extent that it can accommodate logical reasoning. Whereas notable African scholars have responded to these charges as misleading whilst exploring ways of coming up with a logic system that can mediate the theory, thought and practice peculiar to Africans yet applicable in other climes, the role of women in this journey has usually been downplayed. This research thereby seeks to fill this void by making a case for the contribution of the Australian Helen Verran who did not engage in armchair scholarship as most of her European male counterparts who deny the African the ability to reason logically, but journeyed to Nigeria to perform some experiments with the Yorùbá numerical system. She is persuaded that through the traditional Yorùbá numerical pattern, an underlying logic system is implied. Even when her conclusions are questionable on several fronts, this research concludes that her role in instilling confidence in the development of artificial logic in Africa must not go unmentioned.

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