Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda: Exploring the Tactical Utility of Terrorist Affiliations in Africa

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ABSTRACT

The study aimed to determine whether Al-Shabaab’s affiliation to Al-Qaeda contributes to its capacity to instigate mass casualty attacks. In doing so, the study analysed the number of attacks instigated by Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI), the Islamic Courts Union and Al-Shabaab between 1992 and 2017 in light of their respective attack, target and weapon type in comparison to Al-Qaeda from data obtained from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) by means of a statistical descriptive analysis. The performance of these terrorist organisations was considered against the absence of key members that constitute the affiliatory network between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda. Particular attention was paid to the social capital in the form of tactical skills Al-Qaeda imparted to AIAI members who proceeded to be members of ICU and Al-Shabaab, and the impact they had on their organisations. The study finds that members of Al-Shabaab with ties to Al-Qaeda from the early 90s became highly skilled militants who occupied prominent positions as founders and senior leaders of Al-Shabaab, with considerable influence in directing the nature of Al-Shabaab’s attacks to be similar to Al-Qaeda’s attacks. Not only did this provide evidence of the tactical impact of the affiliation between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda, but in the absence of these key members the former demonstrated increasing capacity to instigate mass casualty attacks. This indicated further distribution of Al-Qaeda inspired social capital from key members of the network to the rest of their affiliates, that continues to exist long after their elimination. The study therefore considered this to be a significant contributing factor to the capacity of Al-Shabaab to instigate mass casualty attacks.
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the dissertation titled *Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda: Exploring the Tactical Utility of Terrorist Affiliations in Africa*, has not been submitted by me at this or any other university; that it is my own work in conception and design, and that all material contained herein has been duly acknowledged.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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My thanks also goes to my family members: my grandmother and parents as well as my siblings, Paul and Deborah, for their unwavering love and support throughout this research project.

I would like to dedicate this research project to the victims of terrorism in East Africa as a result of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab’s operations for almost 30 years, and those who continue to make sacrifices to fight against the threat of terrorism in the region.
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<tr>
<td>AIAI</td>
<td>Al-Ithihad Al-Islamiya</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQAP</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula</td>
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<td>AQEA</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda East Africa</td>
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<td>AQI</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTS</td>
<td>Critical Terrorism Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIJ</td>
<td>Egyptian Islamic Jihad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGS</td>
<td>Federal Government of Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTD</td>
<td>Global Terrorism Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWoT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>International Institute of Counter-Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICCT</td>
<td>International Centre for Counter-Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Courts Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Inter-Services Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI</td>
<td>Jemaah Islamiya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIF</td>
<td>National Islamic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSCT</td>
<td>National Strategy for Counter-Terrorism</td>
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<td>OPT</td>
<td>Organisational Process Theory</td>
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PAIC.................................Popular Arab Islamic Conference
PIJ.................................................Palestinian Islamic Jihad
PLO..............................................Palestinian Liberation Organisation
SDDF.............................................Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SNA..............................................Social Network Analysis
SNA..............................................Somali National Alliance
START..National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
TFG..............................................Transitional Federal Government
UN..............................................United Nations
UNITAF......................................United Task Force
UNOSOM....................................United Nations Mission in Somalia
UNSC........................................United Nations Security Council
US..............................................United States
USC............................................United Somali Congress
VEO..........................................Violent Extremist Organisations
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1. BACKGROUND

The most prominent outcome of the 1979 Iranian Revolution that has largely influenced the practice of radical Islamic ideology in 20th and 21st century terrorism, was the creation of Al-Qaeda in 1988. The terrorist organisation led by Osama bin Laden, is said to have largely influenced the nature and course of events concerning terrorism in Africa, as merely two years after Al-Qaeda was founded, Bin Laden capitalised on Sudan’s political instability and established Al-Qaeda affiliates in East Africa (Aronson, 2013: 27). The most prominent attack at the time occurred on the 7th of August 1998 on United States embassies in both Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, where a car bomb attack led to over 200 casualties, which marked a watershed moment concerning the presence of Al-Qaeda in Africa.

Concurrently, a terrorist organisation by the name of Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI) formed in Somalia with the intention of replacing Somalia’s government under the Barre regime with an Islamic state. Following the collapse of the regime in 1991, the subsequent absence of government led to the creation of clan-based militias and insurgencies pitted against each other for control of resources, territory and potential positions in government, one of which was the result of a split within AIAI which became known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). Consequently, the regional decision first instigated by Ethiopia and endorsed by Kenya in 2006, to stabilise Somalia’s political situation through a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) triggered a further split within the ICU by a more radical faction which came to be known as Al-Shabaab. It is within this context of perpetual conflict and instability that Al-Qaeda is said to have found an audience for its radical Islamic ideology with which to expand its terror network.

Since 2006, the Global Terrorism Database (START, 2018) indicates Al-Shabaab has engaged in over 3 000 attacks beyond the borders of Somalia to include Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In 2011, it gained control of Somalia’s capital city, Mogadishu, and the vital port of Kismayo which prompted a joint military intervention of East African states known as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). In retaliation, Al-Shabaab has committed more than 150 attacks in Kenya, the most notable of which include the attacks on Westgate mall.
in 2013, Garissa University in 2015, and a Kenyan military camp in El Adde in 2016, all resulting in over 400 casualties. In its most recent prominent attack, Al-Shabaab initiated twin bomb attacks on the 14th of October in Mogadishu, killing over 500 people resulting in the attack being dubbed as “Somalia’s 9/11” (Reuters, 2017). Therefore, Al-Shabaab continues to destabilise the East African region by demonstrating its ability to instigate attacks of great magnitude and has been dubbed as the second deadliest terrorist organisation in Africa after Nigeria’s Boko Haram (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017: 104).

1.1. RESEARCH PROBLEM
De Albuquerque (2017) undertook a comparative study of Al-Qaeda and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) affiliated and non-affiliated African terrorist organisations by assessing the number of terrorist attacks instigated by the two categories before identifying specific terrorist organisations and countries most affected by their activities. The study found African terrorist organisations affiliated to Al-Qaeda or ISIS conducted the most terrorist attacks, and identified ISIS affiliated Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Shabaab in Somalia as the deadliest terrorist organisations in Africa (de Albuquerque, 2017: 39). Thus, the capacity of Al-Shabaab to conduct highly lethal attacks correlates with de Albuquerque’s (2017) findings that suggest Al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist organisations are disproportionally responsible for more terrorist attacks and casualties than non-affiliated organisations (Agbiboa, 2014: 586). In this context, the extent to which international terrorist organisations contribute to the capacity of terrorist organisations in Africa remains largely unexplored.

This study will venture in this under-researched area with a focus on Al-Shabaab’s affiliation with Al-Qaeda with the purpose to answer: How does Al-Shabaab’s affiliation to Al-Qaeda contribute to its capacity to conduct terror attacks? The study’s sub-questions include:

- Who are the individuals involved in the creation and sustained affiliation between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda?
- Are there similarities in attack, target and weapon type that demonstrate the tactical influence of Al-Qaeda on Al-Shabaab that contributes to the latter’s capacity to conduct terror attacks?
1.2. RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES
The study aims to determine whether Al-Shabaab’s affiliation to Al-Qaeda contributes to its capacity to conduct terror attacks. The study’s objectives are:

- To analyse the number of attacks instigated by Al-Shabaab, and their respective attack, target and weapon type in comparison to Al-Qaeda.
- To identify relationships between members of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda, and their respective roles contributing to the attacks instigated by Al-Shabaab.

1.3. LITERATURE REVIEW
Defining terrorism has been dubbed as the ‘Burmuda Triangle of terrorism’ studies, as much of the literature has been dedicated to establishing a wide consensus of its definition with no success (Schmid, 2011: 41). A key reason for this arises from the delegitimization associated with the term “terrorist”, as Schmid (2011: 40) notes the term carries enormous emotional weight and is often used to establish moral authority over one’s rivals similarly to the charge against communists by the West. Furthermore, few terrorists and their followers identify themselves as such, and opt for terms such as “martyr”, “freedom fighter” and “revolutionary”, which therefore presents a key dichotomy within the literature coined by notable terrorism expert Brian Jenkins as “one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter” (Kleinot, 2017: 273). Frequent debate in the literature regarding liberation movements and their leaders such as Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC) presents a clear demonstration of definitional interests. The power to delegitimize specific groups has therefore been the centre of this debate, as its definitional power has the ability to influence the formulation of policy, shape public discourse and achieve a wide variety of agendas. Therefore, the competing interest for definitional power over terrorism is well encapsulated by British historian and terrorism expert Bowyer Bell in stating, “tell me what you think about terrorism and I’ll tell you who you are” (Schmid, 2011: 42). Additionally, Greene (2017: 417) argues that the government in most cases holds definitional power in conflicts owing to its authority and claimed monopoly over the use of force. This influences its application of the term “terrorist”, and to an even larger degree the politics surrounding its use. Scholars present this argument against the backdrop of a widely recognised concept known as state terrorism, which refers to cases where the state uses military forces against civilians. The Israeli government’s
use of force against Palestinian civilians is a frequent case referenced within the literature to demonstrate this concept (Zeidan, 2006: 217-227). Meisels (2009: 332) therefore argues that governments conveniently define terrorism as acts of violence perpetrated exclusively by non-state groups, whereas the literature demonstrates, as stated by founder of the International Institute of Counter-Terrorism (ICT) Boaz Ganor, that terrorism manifests itself in different forms than certain actors would agree to acknowledge in order to avoid self-implication.

In spite of this, the literature over the years has produced a variety of attributes frequently mentioned by scholars and practitioners, one of which has come to include the use of indiscriminate violence against potential targets (Schmid, 2011: 39). One of its key propagators, political theorist Michael Walzer, placed a strong emphasis on this component of the definition of terrorism, as the ambiguity manifesting within society as to the next potential target of attacks is considered to be instrumental in establishing a sense of fear, as is the underlying goal of terrorist organisations in order to pursue political and ideological objectives. However, Walzer’s emphasis on indiscriminate violence is said to contradict the strategic component of terrorism in pursuit of particular outcomes, as it is argued that “terrorism…cannot be…both random and intentional at one and the same time” according to criminal and philosophical law professor George Fletcher (Meisels, 2009: 342-343).

Additionally, a second point of contention pertains to the frequently mentioned attribute of violence against non-combatants, and which actors fall into this categorisation. According to Sinai (2008: 9) the US State Department has attempted to clarify this by stating non-combatants “are [in] addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty.” However, scholars argue distinctions between civilians, the military and conflict periods are misplaced, citing cases such as the Al-Qaeda attack on the Pentagon in 2001 as well as the attack on the USS Cole in the Port of Aden in Yemen in 2002 (Meisels, 2009: 336), which both demonstrate a lack of discrimination between targets and conflict periods. This brings into question the accuracy of featuring “non-combatants” as a necessary component to the definition of terrorism.

According to Schmid (2011: 42), “scholars are sick and tired of discussing the definition issue” stating that it’s a “futile polemical exercise” contaminated with the
push and pull of politics (Hodgson and Tadros, 2013: 495). Therefore, in the absence of a widely accepted definition of terrorism, an academic consensus definition was reached (Schmid, 2012: 158)

_Terrorism refers, on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties._

The study will use the academically accepted definition of terrorism due to the academic nature of its enquiry.

A dominant theme within the literature are theories of terrorism influenced primarily by disciplines such as history, psychology, criminology, political science and international relations as well as military science. A major historical contribution to the terrorism literature is political scientist David Rapoport’s (2004: 50-61) four waves of terrorism, which asserts the existence of four major political movements that led to the emergence of various terrorist organisations. The first wave known as the Anarchist Wave which began in Russia between 1870 to 1920 oversaw the assassination of key political figures in response to the failure of political reform. It was proceeded by the Anti-Colonial Wave instigated by national liberation movements between 1920 to 1960, who sought independence from colonial rule, followed by the New Left or Marxist Wave between 1960 and 1980 which involved hijacking, kidnapping and assassinations targeted against Western governments in particular due to their involvement in the Vietnamese war which was considered to be an act of Western ideological imperialism. Finally, the fourth wave is known as the Religious Wave which began in 1970 continues to this present day. A major critique of the four-waves theory is the insinuation of precise periods within which specific terrorist organisations operated. Kaplan (2016: 229) as well as Parker and Sitter (2016: 198) argue terrorist

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1 The academic consensus was a further development of the 1988 academic consensus definition (ACD) of terrorism that involved 50 respondents in two rounds of questionnaires. The first round of the 1988 ACD produced 22 core definitional elements of terrorism and the second round produced 16 core definitional elements of terrorism. By considering existing critiques of the 1988 ACD, Alex P. Schmid consulted 90 academics and practitioners regarding the frequency of specific definitional elements of terrorism in the literature. The respondents arrived at 12 core definitional elements of a definition of terrorism by a majority.
organisations do not emerge in isolated periods of history, but instead are the amalgamation of the terrorist organisations that existed prior to their own establishment from which they have learned from through the increasing availability of communication and travel. However, Rapaport’s theory has been significant in contextualising the terrorism of the past and the present towards a greater understanding of the phenomenon.

Furthermore, various disciplines have contributed in large part to the formulation of theories looking at two major aspects: the agent level analysis which studies individual terrorists and the institutional level analysis which studies terrorist organisations holistically. The former level of analysis is dominated by the field of psychology in an effort to establish specific profiles attributed to individuals that become terrorists, as well as pathways of radicalising individuals towards extreme behaviour (Schmid and McAllister, 2011: 214-226). According to Englund and Stohl (2016: 36), the particular attention attributed to this segment of the literature is in response to the understanding that terrorism is an act perpetrated by individuals, which subsequently necessitates studies into how individuals construct their rationalities towards terrorism, especially in light of the narrative suggesting the abnormality of individual terrorists.

According to Kundnani (2012: 7), the literature before 9/11 ascribed the term ‘radicalisation’ to a more radical form of politics usually in response to socio-economic grievances neglected by governments, particularly in regions such as Africa where socio-economic challenges continue to be attributed to the rise of terrorist organisations such as Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Congressional Research Service, 2016: 9; Ostebo, 2012: 6). However, by 2004 ‘radicalisation’ came to be understood as the theological and psychological development of extreme views by Muslims. In an effort to update pre-9/11 terrorism studies, historian Walter Laqueur rejected the link between terrorism and poverty therefore suggesting a focus on the “cultural-psychological disposition” of individuals owing to their religious identity. As a result, despite attempts to methodically develop frameworks distinguishing moderate and extreme Muslims, intelligence agencies have in the past been accused of racial profiling as a counter-terrorism strategy, which has been said to have a radicalising effect on Muslims aggrieved by prejudicial practices (Kundnani, 2012: 9). Further inquiry into responses to prejudice and racial discrimination of Muslim communities, particularly by Western governments, has been
explored in the literature as a key contributor to radicalisation globally. The UN’s recognition of what it considered to be root causes of terrorism in 1987 citing “occupation, colonialism, racism…humiliation…and human rights abuse” saw a further revision by the literature following the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Newman, 2006: 763). According to Johnson, Mora and Schmid, (2016: 122) images arising from the Abu Ghraib prison incident in which US soldiers tortured and humiliated Iraqis were instrumental in radicalising individuals around the world to join the ranks of Al-Qaeda.

The literature further explores social and psychological pathways of individuals towards radical organisations. Frequent mention of individual desire to experience the bond of group identity and belonging as a result of a shared experience or grievance is evident in the literature (Kleinot, 2017: 275). Following one’s membership to a terrorist organisation, an expansion into this phenomenon presents the terrorist organisation’s contribution towards the radicalisation of an individual through propaganda and ideological control, whereby a member’s commitment towards extremism influences their rank within the terrorist organisation (Horgan, 2008: 87-89).

The literature goes further to explore the gradations of rewards either given or promised to individuals willing to make sacrifices of their time, expertise, and ultimately their lives in exchange from what is regarded as the simplest form of reward identified as a sense of belonging, to personal benefits in the form of financial enrichment, and the ultimate promise of an afterlife (Englund and Stohl, 2016: 36; Van Um, 2009: 19).

Studies and findings regarding individual radicalisation are often developed from a mere 24% of terrorism researchers who conduct interviews with actual terrorists for the purposes of obtaining primary data towards the enrichment of the literature (Horgan, 2012: 202). This brings into question the overall accuracy of this segment of the terrorism literature in representing the reality of factors that contribute to individual radicalisation.

Oppositely, deradicalization has failed to garner as much attention within the literature resulting in far less publications by think tanks, governments, academic journal publications and authors. Furthermore, existing studies on deradicalization are regarded as narrow due to their focus on Islamic extremists to the extent that findings are unable to develop theories applicable to right/left-wing and ethno-nationalist extremists. However, due to the preventative role deradicalization literature plays in efforts towards countering radical Islamic terrorism, Schmid (2013: 1-2) argues further
research ought to be undertaken in order to substantively contribute to the counterterrorism segment of the literature. For instance, in a study on countering Violent Extremist Organisations (VEO), the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland conducted a study of dominant hypothesis within the literature relating to counterterrorism, of which ten related to deradicalization. The study ranked deradicalization hypothesis according to the empirical evidence garnered in its favour and showed that positive incentives rather than negative inducements were more effective in deradicalizing individuals (START, 2011) The study indicated the necessity to further develop empirical evidence for the remaining nine hypotheses so as to further develop the accuracy of counterterrorism policies.

Findings within the literature on radicalisation and deradicalization have led to a variety of widely held assumptions, particularly that terrorists are deemed clinically normal although their acts are considered abnormal by moral standards. Evidence of their ability to rationalise their radicalisation and deradicalization by outweighing the costs and benefits of individual decisions has led to the prominence of the rational choice theory (Victoroff, 2005: 14). Its main assumption is that the collective behaviour of terrorist organisations is the mere aggregation of individual terrorists considering a configuration of preferences in alignment with a particular goal. In doing so, terrorists consider and anticipate likely outcomes of their actions in an effort to maximise their utility (Van Um, 2009: 10). However, economists and political scientist Herbert Simon’s bounded rationality theory critiques an individual’s ability to consider all possible alternatives, arguing individuals “limit their decision on what they perceive to be the most crucial aspects of the outcome” and “the search for alternatives is expected to go on until an option is found, perceived to be adequate and sufficient” (Van Um, 2009: 11-12). Therefore, what is widely believed as rationality within the terrorism literature continues to be debated as to the extent to which terrorists exercise rationality versus what Simon’s coined “satisficing”.

The second major aspect of terrorism theory is the institutional level of analysis, where terrorism expert Martha Crenshaw expanded on the applicability of the rational choice theory onto terrorist organisations in what is called the instrumental approach. Its key assumption regards terrorism as a rational strategy designed to affect the behaviour of opponents (Schmid and McAllister, 2011: 222; Englund and Stohl, 2016: 33). An
important study by Kydd and Walter (2006) sought to explore and categorise strategies of terrorism emergent in the literature and identified five: attrition is a strategy used by terrorists to persuade an opponent that it is capable of inflicting considerable harm so that its opponent yields to their demands (Kydd and Walter, 2006: 59). Secondly, intimidation involves terrorists demonstrating the consequences of failing to adhere to their demands in order to send cost signals aimed at influencing decisions of their opponents in their favour (Kydd and Walter, 2006: 66). Thirdly, provocation is aimed at inciting severe retaliatory attacks from governments in order to garner support from the domestic audience pertaining to the illegitimacy of the present government (Kydd and Walter, 2006: 69). Fourthly, spoiling is a strategy used to sabotage peace agreements between the government and moderate terrorists by capitalising on the mistrust between the two parties leading to a failure to sign or implement a settlement (Kydd and Walter, 2006: 72-73). Finally, outbidding is a strategy used where two terrorist organisations compete for the support of the general population (Kydd and Walter, 2006: 76).

Considering the strategic nature of terrorist organisations, Martha Crenshaw’s seminal work on Organisational Process Theory (OPT) asserts the instrumental approach by stating the “end goal of any organization is not a priori the ends for which it was formed, but rather the maintenance of the organization itself” (Schmid and McAllister, 2011: 226). The three main assumptions of OPT state that terrorist organisations, like archetypal organisations, comprise of a defined structure and systematic process through which decisions are made, secondly members are allocated roles according to their functions, and lastly that each terrorist organisation has recognised leaders (Ozdamar, 2008: 94). Further study of OPT has focused primarily on the organisational characteristics of Al-Qaeda, leading to the development of structural typologies of terrorist organisations such as hierarchical and networked structures (United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2007: 3-6). Furthermore, the OPT has contributed significantly to the counterterrorism literature, where a method for studying the structure of terrorist organisations, their individual members and respective roles within their organisation is applied to Social Network Analyses (SNA) (Burcher and Whelan, 2015: 106). SNA forms an essential part of the strategy known as decapitation, which has been widely recognised as an effective tool for weakening
terrorist organisations by terminating leaders and prominent figures within hierarchical and networked structures.

Further studies on OPT have sought to examine possible links between organisational structure and resilience to counterterrorism efforts. A seminal study by Piazza (2009: 77) found that “organizational … structures… help to explain the different tactical behaviours of the Islamist groups… and also yield some indication of the chances of the success of counterterrorism efforts.” Although this area of the literature is not fully developed, it may shed light into what is well documented within the literature as the restructuring of terrorist organisations in response to counterterrorism offensives, as the literature widely recognises the structural change of Al-Qaeda from a hierarchical to a networked structure post 9/11 (Hellmich, 2011: 117). Deliberations on terrorist organisational structure has been further advanced by former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations officer Marc Sageman and renowned terrorism analyst Bruce Hoffman, towards the idea that “Al-Qaeda is not only active but resurgent and more dangerous than it has been in several years due to its changing organisational structure” (Hellmich, 2011: 117). An exploratory study into this dominant hypothesis within the literature by Asal, Gill, Rethemeyer and Horgan (2015) examining the lethality of terrorist organisations with a specific focus on the Irish Republican Army (IRA) found that “organizational size [and] connections… had a significant impact on the lethality of terrorist organizations” (Asal, Gill, Rethemeyer and Horgan, 2015: 408). Early developments of possible theories regarding this finding suggest that the dispersion of roles and resources enables terrorists to attack more frequently and mitigate the risk of entire organisational collapse following the event of a successful counterterrorism offensive.

According to Stollenwerk, Dorfler and Schibberges (2016, 952) the literature has thus far focused on Al-Qaeda’s micro networks with respect to individual members, national and regional branches. However, few studies have begun to analyse the transnational nature of Al-Qaeda’s network with regards to its international affiliations. An emerging literature on this has been pioneered by Jones, Smith and Weeding (2003: 439-440) in analysing the link between Al-Qaeda and South East Asian terrorist groups, with an emphasis on the evolution of affiliatory relations between Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya (JI) between 1970 and 2002. Jones, et al. (2003: 451) primary motivation for the study arose out of recognition of the considerable threat JI posed to the stability of
the East Asian region, particularly after the Bali bombing on 2002 that led to over 200 casualties.

Similarly, the Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Shabaab has become an increasingly serious threat, as it has proved capable of planning and executing mass casualty attacks (Anzalone, 2017: 70; Jones, Liepman and Chandler, 2016: 35), in addition to recently demonstrating the capacity to do so simultaneously in both Kenya and Somalia (START, 2018). With numerous Al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist organisations from the West to the Horn of Africa, there is an increasing concern over the conflagration of international terrorism in the trans-Saharan region of Africa. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to contribute to a growing literature on African terrorism in recognition of a lack of empirical analysis of its terrorist organisations. Furthermore, the study will form part of a preliminary attempt at analysing Al-Qaeda’s wider network in Africa in order to identify the implications of terrorist affiliations on counter-terrorism efforts.

1.4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study will employ a Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) approach, which is a research orientation that is willing to challenge dominant knowledge and understandings of terrorism (Smyth, Gunning, Jackson, Kassimeris, Robinson, 2008: 1). Its epistemological underpinning is derived from post-positivism, which emphasises the importance of considering the surrounding context of objective data to derive meaning from a phenomenon. Therefore, the study will consider the statistically collated incidents of terrorist attacks instigated by Al Shabaab within the context of the evolving affiliation between Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab between 2006 and 2017. This is with the intention to inquire beyond existing empirical data on terrorist attacks and affiliations to determine the extent to which Al-Shabaab’s affiliation to Al-Qaeda contributes to its capacity to conduct terror attacks.

According to Creswell (2014: 15), an explanatory sequential mixed method entails the initial analysis of results from quantitative research proceeded by further supplementary explanation of the findings from qualitative data. Therefore, the study will initially analyse quantitative data obtained from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) by means of a statistical descriptive analysis. According to Schurman (2018: 5), it is a widely utilised method of analysis within recent terrorism literature that entails providing a description of a phenomenon as statistically presented in graphs, tables
and pie charts. The study will therefore analyse the GTD statistics presented in a graph regarding the number of terrorist attacks, corresponding target, attack and weapon type as well as subsequent casualties instigated by Al-Shabaab between 2006 and 2017. This will be analysed against the overall nature of the nature of Al-Qaeda’s terror attacks pertaining to target, attack and weapon type in order to identify similarities implying a degree of tactical influence of the latter on the former (Stevenson. 2015: 5).

The study will proceed to analyse the networked affiliation between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda by means of a SNA. According to Koschade (2006: 559), this type of analysis entails the modelling of links between actors within a particular network. The analysis for this particular study will take into consideration individual rankings within their respective organisations, roles, countries of residence, skills, and other resources in aid of their affiliation. This will be undertaken with regards to the relationships between members of the two terrorist organisations over the period of 2006 to 2017. According to Chadhary and Singh (2015: 27), SNA requires the use of SNA software, therefore the study will use Node XL Basic, an open source SNA software provided by the Social Media Research Foundation (2018). The overall analysis will entail a visual compilation of the GTD graph indicating the number of terrorist attacks instigated by Al-Shabaab between 2006 and 2017 as well as the model of the networked affiliation between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda. The analysis will compare, contrast and draw connections between Al-Shabaab’s key period of Al-Shabaab’s performance against the relationships it formed with Al-Qaeda within this period to establish whether their affiliation contributes to the effectiveness of Al-Shabaab.

1.5. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

Due to the nature of terrorism research, Leuprecht and Hall (2013: 292) as well as Stollenwerk, Dorfler and Schibberges (2016: 954) state that access to information pertaining to members of terrorist organisations and their affiliations are difficult to access, as they are typically classified by government intelligence agencies. Therefore, existing research publications that have undertaken a SNA have relied heavily on open sources such as media reports, interviews, and think-tank publications

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2 The Social Media Research Foundation is an organisation supported by academics predominantly from the disciplines of sociology and information technology (IT) dedicated to creating tools for research relating to social networking. The Foundation is funded by annual subscriptions to licenses for its social network analysis software Node XL Pro, which offers more features than its free Node XL Basic.
to construct their network of individual members in terrorist organisations. However, such data sources suffer from a lack of official credibility, therefore the study will rely on the high frequency of individual members mentioned across various texts to establish a degree of validity that the individuals identified positively form part of the network to be analysed.

1.6. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The study will conduct desktop research obtained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’s (START) Global Terrorism Database (GTD). This is considered to be one of the most comprehensive, up to date and widely used source of empirical data containing information of more than 170 000 terrorist attacks by domestic and international terrorist organisations between 1970 and 2017. Furthermore, the study will also utilise data obtained from leading think-tank publications such as The Soufan Group, RAND Corporation, and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), whose data provides a unique offering in that they are often obtained from classified material as a result of the think-tanks’ affiliation with key government departments such as the US Department of Justice. Furthermore, the study will rely on books, most importantly Gregory Alonso Pirio’s *The African Jihad: Bin Laden’s Quest for the Horn of Africa* (2007) which is a canonical text outlining the foundation of the Al-Shabaab-Al-Qaeda network on which the study will build onto using journal articles and think tank publications. Therefore, human subjects will not be engaged for the purposes of the study.

The South African Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 (Juta Law, 2007: 10) prohibits access to and possession of terrorism related materials. Therefore, the study will obtain its data from the findings of open source online publications, which allows the researcher to collect the necessary data without having any direct access to the publications and propaganda material of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda. It is assumed that the authors of the open sources used in the study have acquired the necessary legal and ethical clearance within their states’ jurisdictions to access classified and other ethically problematic publications to publish their findings.
1.7. STRUCTURE OF RESEARCH
The study will comprise of five chapters, beginning with the introductory chapter consisting of a brief overview of the study detailing the context of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda’s affiliation proceeded by a research problem with subsequent aims and objectives to be executed within the study. It will further address the existing literature pertaining to critical debates and theories before outlining the methodology, limitations of research and ethical considerations of the study. The second chapter will begin by deliberating on the study’s theoretical and analytical framework which will lay the foundations for further discussion on the SNA methodology and its applicability for the study. The third chapter will outline the data collection methods and the data obtained for the creation of the Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda network as well as statistics of Al-Shabaab’s terror attacks between 2006 and 2017 from the GTD. This will form the basis for the fourth chapter which will begin by providing a chronological account of events leading to the creation of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda affiliation before undertaking a statistical and SNA in determining the tactical utility of their affiliation. The fifth chapter will conclude with a summary of findings by revisiting the study’s main research question and sub-questions before offering recommendations on counter-terrorism strategies based on the key findings of the study.
CHAPTER TWO: SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY AND SOCIAL NETWORK METHOD

2. INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces social capital theory as a theoretical framework applicable to the development of terror networks by addressing ways in which its foundational premises apply to the theory and practice of terrorism. This will be proceeded by recognition of important studies that lay the methodological foundations of the study before further developing the social network method in terms of its crucial components of unit samples, relational form and levels of analysis.

2.1. SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY
According to Helfstein (2014: 364), terrorism at its core is considered a social phenomenon, as it seeks to engage in acts of indiscriminate violence within societies in order to advance socio-political ideals. In doing so, terrorism is said to be the result of various social factors from which political, economic, and social grievances arise. However, the proclivity of analysists to negate social dynamics is fathomable considering the methodological and theoretical complexities of evaluating the contribution social dynamics have towards terrorism. However, an integral part of understanding the phenomenon arguably resides in the understanding of social dynamics between individual members and their respective terrorist organisations.

An influential theory in the sociology discipline is James Coleman and Pierre Bourdieu’s social capital theory. This is used to describe the exchange of resources that contribute to the formulation of a network of individuals or organisations, whose size and role are dependent on the benefits accrued as a result of their relationships (Borgatti, and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011: 42; Hauberer, 2011: 38). The social capital theory is premised on three assumptions: firstly, social capital constitutes the exchange of resources such as assets, skills and services within a network of individuals or organisations. Secondly, the nature of the relationship determines the extent to which an individual or organisation can benefit from the relationship. Thirdly, the size of the network determines the quality and diversity of opportunities available for an individual or organisation. Social capital theory has been largely applied to the study of archetypal organisations, and individuals within them, however Asal, Nagar, and Rethemeyer (2014: 403) argue that few social capital theorists consider its applicability to the study of political extremism and more specifically terrorism.
One of the most evident outcomes of social capital theory is the cooperation amongst two or more actors (Asal et al., 2014: 405). Considering the theory is premised on the benefits accrued as a result of a relationship or participation within a wider network, it is assumed that individual terrorists and/or their organisations strategically establish affiliations in order to further their capacity (Horowitz and Potter, 2012: 404). Social capital theory is substantially supported by the rational choice theory appropriated to the study of terrorism by Martha Crenshaw, which demonstrates the ability of individual terrorists and their organisations to undertake a cost benefit analysis towards their advantage (Schmid and McAllister, 2011: 222; Englund and Stohl, 2016: 33). A further demonstration of their capacity to consciously select and engage in a variety of strategies in addition to the flexibility to restructure the organisation towards the fulfilment of particular aims reveals thoughtful consideration regarding the attainment of maximal utility of resources and relationships (Kydd and Walter, 2006: 59).

Horowitz and Potter (2012: 200-202) argue that terrorist organisations establish affiliations on the basis of substantial or complimentary capabilities, which demonstrates the influence power and identity has on the establishment of alliances. For instance, the international relations theory of realism provides further insight into the strategic nature of alliances that gives rise to social capital theory by conceptualising relations between states. Realism promulgates the notion that states aggregate their capacity in response to a common threat or cause as well as to establish mutual support in times of war, which establishes a relationship that encourages the exchange of cooperation and resources. Considering the realist assumption of the anarchic nature of the international environment perpetuated by war and self-interest, states establish relations based on the mutual benefit attributed to each actor’s strengths and weaknesses in order to survive or thrive. Relations with countries from particular regions offers a diversity of benefits ranging from military capacity, oil, mineral resources and technology from North America, the Middle East, Africa and Asia respectively. Similarly, the clandestine nature of terrorist organisations is considered to be a response to an international environment that presents a constant threat to their existence due to persistent counter-terrorism efforts. The diversity of capabilities enables the facilitation of collaboration amongst terrorist organisations to respond to aspects of strengths and weaknesses towards the goal to survive or thrive as suggested by the instrumental approach. Therefore, as realism
demonstrates collaboration between states to be in the interest of the parties involved based on a mutually recognised identity as an ally and the power each actor possesses, so are the relationships between individual terrorists and their organisations (Horowitz and Potter, 2012: 203).

An indication of the size of a terror network is considered to be its global reach, which constitutes the capacity of a terrorist organisation to establish affiliates or “franchises” in various locations across the globe. Frequent reference to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) and Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) indicates the significance of territoriality to the network of terrorist organisations (Hellmich, 2011: 123). According to Agheyisi (2017: 309) terrorist organisations obtain social capital from identifying safe havens that comprise of “forests, mountainous regions, peripheral rural areas that are not well police[d] and far from the reach of the state authority” in order to prevent hinderances to their operations and training. According to Stollenwerk, Dorfler and Schibberger (2016, 952), few studies have begun to analyse the transnational nature of Al-Qaeda’s network with regards to its international affiliations. An emerging literature on this was pioneered by Jones, Smith and Weeding (2003: 439-440) in analysing the link between Al-Qaeda and South East Asian terrorist groups that have become increasingly capable of instigating mass casualty attacks. Thus, the social capital accrued by terrorist organisations and transnational affiliates in geostrategic locations suggests a link between network positioning contributing to its size and the opportunity for terrorist organisations to thrive within specific environments.

One of the most significant demonstrations of the capacity of a terrorist organisation is lethality, which is the extent to which mass casualty attacks can be instigated. According to Asal and Rethemeyer (2008: 440), terrorist organisations with connections to other terrorist organisations are more lethal than terrorist organisations that operate independent of any assistance by other terrorist organisations. Horowitz and Potter (2012: 204) attribute this to the diversity of risk dispersed between the terrorist organisations, as well as the exchange of knowledge in the form of tactical skills in armed combat and resources such as weapons, capital and adherents. Further evidence of the link between lethality and affiliation is often mentioned within the

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3 Later known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) following a split from Al-Qaeda in 2013 (Ghosh, 2014: 3).
literature, for instance Horowitz and Potter’s (2012: 206-209) study of terrorist affiliations indicated a sharp increase in lethality by Hamas and Jemaah Islamiyah following the establishment of their affiliations with Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda respectively. Therefore, considering the emerging evidence of the link between social capital acquired by terrorist organisations as a result of their affiliations and their improved capabilities, this indicates the applicability of social capital theory to the study of the affiliation between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda.

Theories within the terrorism literature demonstrate the nexus between the individual and the organisation by developing an individual and institutional level of analysis to the phenomenon (Schmid and McAllister, 2011: 214-226). From theories of pathways to radicalisation to evidence of rationality, a comprehension of individual terrorists is considered the genesis of understanding the behaviour of terrorist organisations. Similarly, the social capital accrued by terrorist organisations by means of establishing networked affiliations is the amalgamation of individual terrorists establishing networks amongst themselves. Considering existing studies using social network analysis (SNA) to the study of terror networks, social capital theory allows for further inquiry into the exchange of capital amongst individual terrorists that contributes to the enhanced capabilities of terrorist organisations following the establishment of affiliations. For instance, Omar Shafik Hammami, an American citizen who moved to Somalia in pursuit of jihad⁴, joined Al-Shabaab in 2006. His networking with Al-Shabaab militants revealed an opportunity for the group to utilise his knowledge of English and computer skills towards online recruitment (Malm, Nash, and Moghadam, 2017: 221). Therefore, for the purposes of this study, the degree of social capital attributed to each individual member of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda identified in the study will substitute the commonly used metric of analysis known as actor centrality, measures by the individual with the most amount of ties in the network, to identify key individuals within a terrorist network whose elimination may weaken the operations of a terrorist organisation. In doing so, social capital theory emphasises attributes such as individual roles, skills, knowledge, and resources which may contribute to furthering the capabilities of their organisation and affiliates.

⁴ According to Knapp (2003: 88), jihad constitutes a struggle against those who are considered to be enemies of Islam. A common interpretation by radical Islamic terrorist organisation consider any individual or state that does not subscribe to the fundamentalist interpretation of the Qu’ran to be enemies of Islam.
2.2. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS METHOD


2.2.1. Methodological Foundations

Beyond developing a narrative of the transnational nature of Al-Qaeda’s affiliates in East Asia, a focal point of Jones et al. (2003: 445) study was the presentation of a timeline where every stage of affiliatory developments were accounted for in various years between 1970 and 2002. Similarly, a timeline will be a focal part of the study in relation to two critical aspects: Firstly, with regards to the relations developed between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda members between 2006 and 2007 in order to provide a genealogical narrative of their widely recognised affiliation. Secondly, a key feature of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is the statistical data of terror incidents presented on a timeline, which is where the study will identify and analyse years in which Al-Shabaab instigated the most and least attacks, as well as the years in which the most and the least casualties occurred. Hence, time will be critical in developing a narrative regarding the tactical utility of terrorist affiliations using a comparative evaluation of Al-Shabaab’s performance against it’s the establishment of relations between individual terrorists.

Furthermore, because social capital cannot be measured directly, the study’s identification of the evident manifestation of social capital will be the degree of Al-Shabaab’s lethality which will be measured according to the gap between terror attacks and casualties demonstrating the high impact of single terror incidents (Asal et al., 2014: 410). Factors contributing to lethality such as attack, weapon, and target type will be taken into consideration as demonstrated on the GTD, as it provides insight into the dominant operational strategies of the terrorist organisation, and the extent to which it is similar to that of Al-Qaeda. In doing so, the study will be able to identify the specific capital necessary for Al-Shabaab to instigate attacks and in what areas Al-Qaeda has been resourceful in this regard. This particular aspect of the study is largely attributed to the development of Boko Haram’s capacity to instigate mass casualty attacks since its inception in 2009. Merely 5 years later, Boko Haram was named “the
world’s deadliest terrorist group… responsible for killing a total of 6 118 people in Nigeria” (Global Terrorism Index, 2015: 22).

A cursory glance at the GTD (START, 2018) of attacks instigated by Boko Haram, particularly in 2014, indicates the terrorist organisation is seen to drastically reduce the use of its usual weapon type of firearms to the use of explosives. Significantly, these weapons are considered to be widely used by ISIS, which Boko Haram established an affiliation with that year. Consequently, this lead to increased bombings which enabled Boko Haram to increase its lethality, therefore becoming the deadliest terrorist organisation of 2014. Evidently, the capital exchanged between the two organisations may be bomb-making expertise or resources. Either of which could be investigated by the SNA considering the individual members involved prior or during the establishment of their affiliation depending on their attributes and role contributing to the relationship between the two terrorist organisations.

The study aims to further develop Asal et al. (2014) approach of analysing the Israeli terrorist organisation the Underground, in its application of social capital theory and SNA. In essence, Asal et al. (2014: 404-405) studied the manner in which cognitive capital which constitutes beliefs and values as well as how structural capital such as forms of social organisation which constitute how roles of individual members within a network and the rules that govern it “contribute[s] to…mutually beneficial collective action” amongst individual members. Evidently and similar to various studies using SNA, Asal et al. (2014) study is limited to individual members of a singular terrorist organisation. Similarly, the study will be underpinned by the cognitive capital held by both Al-Shabaab in their ideological subscription to radical interpretations of Islam. Furthermore, to a large degree the study will focus on individual members of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda to construct its network, with the cognisance of structural capital such as the roles of individual members that determine ties within the network. In applying the two facets of social capital identified by Asal et al. (2014), the study will further develop its applicability to the study of two terrorist organisations, which is unlike many studies, including Asal et al. (2014)
2.2.2. Social Network Method

According to Knoke and Yang (2008: 9) there are three components of a SNA: sampling units to which the study will apply key methodological insights from the study by Asal et al. (2014), as well as relational form and level of analysis.

2.2.2.1 Sampling Units

Data collection from open sources such as websites, books, academic or media articles, official government documents or statements, and in the case of Asal et al. (2014: 403) testimonies and court rulings, is a widely recognised form of data gathering contributing to the inclusion of actors that constitute the network in question. It is with these sources the researcher is able to obtain information of members of terrorist organisations and consult widely to derive information that may be unclear or missing from one or more sources. However, considering the clandestine nature of terrorist organisations, profiles of individual members and the accuracy of the network presented may be incomplete. However, the initial application of SNA by Valdis Krebs in identifying members of Al-Qaeda responsible for the 9/11 attack demonstrated the insignificance of completing a network, as Krebs was still able to identify prominent members of Al-Qaeda involved in the incident (Malm, et al., 2017: 224).

However according to Asal et al. (2014: 411), an integral part of developing a network is establishing boundaries regarding which individual members the network will comprise of. The study will undertake a nominalist strategy which constitutes a formal criterion by which individual terrorists should meet in order to form part of the network (Scott, 2013: 43). Due to the study’s emphasis on affiliation between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda, the network boundaries will be defined as verified\(^5\) members of either one of the terrorist organisations, as well as any indication of interaction or ties between individuals of the two organisations as the minimal criterion. Further development of individual profiles will constitute aspects of Asal et al. (2014) structural capital with additional aspects more applicable to the purposes of the study:

- **Role:** An individual’s role indicates the contribution they make to either the continued affiliation between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda or towards furthering the capabilities of Al-Shabaab.

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\(^5\) Confirmed by three or more sources.
• **Organisation**: This indicates which terrorist organisation an individual is a member of.
• **Rank**: This indicates the extent of influence the individual has as a result of their position within Al-Shabaab.
• **Skill**: This indicates the social capital contribution to the affiliation and capabilities of Al-Shabaab.
• **Year of Affiliation**: This indicates the year in which the individual established links with the other organisation or its members as well as the duration of the relationship if data is available.
• **Membership History**: This is an indication of an individual member’s experience and skills acquired as a consequence, which would be useful to their present organisation and its members.
• **Nationality**: A significant indication of the affiliation between the two organisations, as Al-Shabaab is predominantly comprised of Somali nationals.
• **Travel History**: Travel is not only a further indication of affiliatory activities but offers insight into possible opportunities for furthering capacity in terms of training and networking with prominent members.

Although a SNA will only represent connections between individual members of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda, the abovementioned attributes are critical to understanding the substance of relations that contribute to the increased capacity of Al-Shabaab.

### 2.2.2.1.1. Data Management

According to Scott (2013: 51-53) raw data collected on individual members are obtained from sources such as books and articles, their names and any relevant data must be manually collated into a table. In addition, the names of individual members of Al-Shabaab (A) and Al-Qaeda (a) will be codified in two colours, green and red respectively, in the columns in order to easily identify which organisation individual members belong to (Asal et al., 2014: 411).

**Table 1: Individual Membership Profile of Al-Shabaab/Al-Qaeda Members**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Skills</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Year of Affiliation</th>
<th>Membership History</th>
<th>Travel History</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

22
For the purposes of organizing data to meaningfully demonstrate the connections between the individual members of each terrorist organisation, Scott (2013: 57) states that data ought to be represented in an adjacency matrix. This is typically used to represent a graph, which in this case will be a sociogram generated by Node XL Pro, which indicates where pairs of vertices meet (see Sociogram 1). For this study the two vertices will be individual members of Al-Shabaab (A) represented on the vertical axis and Al-Qaeda (a) represented on the horizontal axis with the number 1 indicating where vertices meet.

**Adjacency Matrix 1: Member-by-Member**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Member a</th>
<th>Member b</th>
<th>Member c</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member B</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sociogram 1: Member-by-Member**
2.2.2.2. Relational Form and Level of Analysis

At an individual level Knoke and Yang (2008: 11) state relational form constitutes the strength of relations between actors measured by mutuality of their relationship. However, the study will consider relational form in terms of the type of relationships held between two or more individuals, e.g. brother-in-law, personal secretary, or deputy in light of the skills and experience each individual possesses. In doing so an analysis can be made of important relationships and the way in which their profiles complement each other in a way that contributes to the lethality of Al-Shabaab. Furthermore, by undertaking a macro level of analysis, the study can holistically analyse the impact of relationships between individual members of both terrorist organisations on the capacity of Al-Shabaab by taking into account social capital exchange within the context of relational form.

2.3. CONCLUSION

Social capital theory is premised on the exchange of resources such as assets, skills and services between individual members and their terrorist organisations. Terrorism and international relations theory of rational actor and realism respectively, indicate the strategic nature of individual terrorists and their organisations to establish affiliations that contribute to their survival or capacity with an awareness of the social capital required for the establishment of mutually beneficial relations. Furthermore, social capital theory was found to be applicable to the expansionist strategy of terrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda, which has been able to establish franchises and affiliates globally and contributed to the capacity of regional terrorist organisations. Because studies indicate increased lethality following the establishment of affiliations, lethality is considered the most evident outcome of social capital exchange between terrorist organisations. Additionally, social capital theory is shown to account for the amalgamation of social capital exchanged between individuals to be analysed at the level of the organisation by considering how individual social capital contributes to the increased lethality of terrorist organisations.

In establishing the social network method, the study drew methodological guidance from Jones et al. (2003) and Asal et al. (2014) with regards to foundational aspects of the social network method. Jones et al. (2003) study premise of time was applied to the study by the use and nature of the GTD concerning the number of terrorist attacks and casualties instigated by Al-Shabaab between 2006 and 2017. In doing so, the
development and analysis of the network for the study will be considered with respect to time by corresponding the nature of Al-Shabaab’s terror attacks with respect to attack, target, weapon type contributing to its lethality against the backdrop of ties its members established with Al-Qaeda during this period. Additionally, the study draws on important methodological considerations evident in Asal et al. (2014) study, with regards to cognitive and structural capital, sampling units, and data management. Furthermore, completeness of individual profiles and networks was considered immaterial, as the collation of data of individual members irrespective of their quantity would still provide significant information towards the objectives of the study.

However, ways of establishing boundaries regarding the inclusion of individual terrorists was established using the nominalist strategy where verified members of either one of the terrorist organisations with an indication of interaction was established as the minimal criterion. Furthermore, for the purposes of the study, the social network method undertakes the creation of individual member profiles by addressing attributes such as role, name of organisation, rank, skill, year in which affiliations are established between members, nationality, membership history and travel history. Additionally, Asal et al. (2014) led the study to consider its data management approach, resulting in a systematic method of codifying data in tables and matrices in preparation for the creation of a network. This study reached its methodological conclusion by paying particular attention to relational form in analysing key individuals within the network in relation to the capacity of Al-Shabaab across time. This forms part of a macro level analysis that holistically evaluates the impact of relationships with consideration of the social capital exchanged amongst individual members that contributes to the capacity of Al-Shabaab to instigate mass casualty attacks.
CHAPTER THREE: DATA COLLECTION AND PRESENTATION

3. INTRODUCTION
This chapter begins by outlining the data collection and processing methods undertaken for the construction of the network consisting of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda members. It will focus on the utility of the key texts chosen for the study and supplementary sources used in the data collection stage before outlining the data management process of codifying categories of data for presentation of key findings. Furthermore, unanticipated challenges that arose during the data collection and verification stages will be addressed as well as how the study adapted the utility of the data collected. In addition, this chapter will outline methods used to obtain statistical data from the Global Terrorism Database and provide a brief statistical analysis of its key findings.

3.1 NETWORK CONSTRUCTION OF AL-SHABAAB AND AL-QAEDA MEMBERS
The network construction of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda members followed a process of data collection, verification, management, as well as reconsideration of the utility of the data collected in light of the challenges that occurred during this process.

3.1.1 Data Collection
The study used Gregory A. Pirio’s (2007) *The African Jihad: Bin Laden’s Quest for the Horn of Africa* and Stig J. Hansen’s (2013) *Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group* as baseline texts from which to construct a network of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda members. Both texts were purposely selected due to their focus on the creation of Al-Shabaab and the years of their publication which coincided with key developments of the terrorist organisation’s history, as *The African Jihad* was published in 2007 at a time when Al-Shabaab was said to be officially established and *Al-Shabaab in Somalia* was published in 2013 at a time when the terrorist organisation was approaching its peak. Furthermore, *The African Jihad* was expected to provide insight into the individuals involved in the creation of Al-Shabaab from its infancy involving Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI) and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) until its official establishment as Al-Shabaab, whereas *Al-Shabaab in Somalia* was expected to expand the network of identified members by providing insight into newly formed relations with individuals not previously identified in *The African Jihad*. 
However, both books complimented each other in ways not previously expected. *The African Jihad* was instrumental in providing a context for the relationship between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda, as well as the individual members involved in both terrorist organisations. Information such as why, when, and how members of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda formed relations against the backdrop of a wider Pan-Islamic agenda developing in the North and East of Africa was found to be the focus of the book. Therefore, due to its historical and contextual nature, the study obtained 18 names of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda members from *The African Jihad*. Oppositely, *Al-Shabaab in Somalia* was predominantly focused on individual members and the roles they played towards the establishment and resilience of Al-Shabaab. In doing so, *Al-Shabaab in Somalia* contributed significantly to the study’s network of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda members, as 65 names were obtained alongside key information pertaining to their roles, skills and rank. In total, 83 names of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda members were obtained from *The African Jihad* and *Al-Shabaab in Somalia*.

### 3.1.2. Data Verification

The study proceeded to confirm the names obtained from *The African Jihad* and *Al-Shabaab in Somalia* were legitimate and verify the existence of the individuals identified as members of Al-Shabaab and/or Al-Qaeda by two more sources. In addition, the data verification process sought to add potentially useful descriptions of individual members such as terror attacks they were alleged to have been involved in, previous memberships to other terrorist organisations, sworn allegiances, and the nature of relationships with other member, as well as complete any missing data concerning individual profiles in terms of role, rank, skills, nationality, year of affiliation and past travel. Therefore, names obtained from both books were searched on Google, and widely recognised news sources like the Nation Media, the New York Times (NYT), Al Jazeera, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), as well as publications from government and intergovernmental organisations like the US Department of Justice (DoJ) and the United Nations (UN), as well as articles from leading think tanks such as the Council on Foreign Relations, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the Long War Journal and the RAND Corporation, and open source intelligence from Strategic Intelligence, Global Security and Critical Threats, were used for the verification process.
During this process the study obtained 17 names not mentioned in either *The African Jihad* or *Al-Shabaab in Somalia* resulting in a total of 100 names once the study had reached data saturation, as sources ceased to provide names of individual members not previously identified. Furthermore, the study encountered two considerable verification challenges, the first concerned the variety of English spellings of Arabic names that would result in data duplications only to be confirmed as the same individual. Furthermore, some members possessed aliases which would further contribute to a duplication of entries that would be later corrected during the verification process. Secondly, some names identified in *Al-Shabaab in Somalia* could not be verified as they were obtained exclusively from former Al-Shabaab members through interviews (Hansen, 2013:159). Therefore, no online sources were available to confirm the validity of some of the names provided.

### 3.1.3. Data Management

The study proceeded to codify names in the colours green, yellow and red to represent verified\(^6\), not fully verified\(^7\), and unverified\(^8\) with corresponding in-text references where applicable (see Annexure A). The data collected for the construction of the Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda network as follows:

#### Table 2: Total Data Collected for Social Network Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verified</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Fully Verified</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unverified</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The study considered a total of 71 verified and not fully verified names for inclusion into the Node XL Pro SNA software, however only names and descriptions that indicated direct relationships with specific members were entered into Node XL Pro. Following a process of elimination by this criterion, the following data as follows:

---

\(^6\) Confirmed with a total of three different sources.

\(^7\) Confirmed with only two sources.

\(^8\) No sources available to confirm the validity of the names other than the sources they were obtained from.
Table 3: Categories of Verified and Not Fully Verified Network Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entered into Node XL Pro</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left over data</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A table of individual membership profiles of the 27 Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda members coded green and red respectively entered into the Node XL Pro was compiled as follows:

Table 4: Individual Membership Profiles of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda Members: Roles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mukhtar Robow/Abu Monsoor</td>
<td>Spokesperson and military commander.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Hansen, 2013: 13; Jones, Liepman and Chandler, 2016: 10; Gettleman and Schmitt, 2009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ibrahim Haji Jama Mee'aad 'Al-Afghani'</td>
<td>Ideological propagandist and played a key role in structuring Al-Shabaab.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Hansen, 2013: 20; Jones, Liepman and Chandler, 2016: 11; Horadam and Sorhaindo, 2011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Fu'ad Mahamed Khalaf Shongole</td>
<td>Religious education, financial management, religious teaching, played a key role in structuring Al-Shabaab.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Hansen, 2013: 37; Jones, Liepman and Chandler, 2016: 13; Horadam and Sorhaindo, 2011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Abu Ubaidah al-Banshir</td>
<td>Centre of military operations in Somalia, military chief of Al-Qaeda East African</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>(Global Security, 2006; Pirio, 2007: 136; Combating Terrorism Centre, 2011: 4)</td>
<td>cell and Osama bin Laden’s personal secretary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ahmed Umar /Abu Ubaidah</td>
<td>Succeeded Ahmed Aw Abdi Godane as the current leader of Al-Shabaab. (Mohamed, 2016; Cleaves, 2015; BBC, 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Aden Hashi Ayro</td>
<td>One of the founding members of Al-Shabaab, instigated terror attacks. (Hansen, 2013: 21; Jones, Liepman and Chandler, 2016: 10; Smith and McCarthy, 2014; Pirio, 2007: 78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Osama bin Laden</td>
<td>Founder of Al Qaeda, established Al-Qaeda East Africa and provided recruits as well as military training in Afghanistan and Sudan in the 90's. (Allen, 2011; Council on Foreign Relations, 2007; Al Jazeera, 2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Sheikh Ali Warsame</td>
<td>Founder of AIAI and recruited Aweys who gained experience in AIAI and was soon to be a senior member of Al-Shabaab. (Hansen, 2013: 16, Stanford University, 2018; The Mackenzie Institute: Security Matters, 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Hassan Dahlíir Aweys</td>
<td>Former colonel in the Somali army, used to lead the military wing of AIAI and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Names and corresponding numbers with * indicate individual members of Al-Shabaab who were previous members of Al-Qaeda.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 Ayman Zawahiri (BBC, 2015; CNN Library, 2018; Al Jazeera, 2009; Pirio, 2007: 55)</td>
<td>Osama bin Laden’s deputy and current Al-Qaeda leader, was in communication with Al-Shabaab senior leader ‘Al-Afghani’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Ahmed Aw Abdi Godane (Hansen, 2013: 20; Jones, Liepman and Chandler, 2016: 11; Horadam, Cleaves and Sorhaindo, 2011)</td>
<td>Had direct control over Maktabatu Amniyat which was Al-Shabaab’s wing responsible for instigating terror attacks, was the leader of Al-Shabaab until 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Sahal Iskudhuq (Jones, Liepman and Chandler, 2016: 64; Roggio and Elkaim, 2014; Al Jazeera, 2014)</td>
<td>Served as a high-ranking member of the Amniyat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Mohammad Saddiq Odeh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Ngotho, 2008; Pike, 2006; Gisesa, 2013; Pirio, 2007: 55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Wadih el Hage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Pirio, 2007: 2; Zill, 2001; US Department of Justice, 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Sheikh Aboud Rogo Muhamed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Hansen, 2013: 127; BBC, 2012; Gisesa, 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21*</td>
<td>Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Hansen, 2013: 26, Jones, Liepman and Chandler, 2016: 63; Gettleman and Schmitt, 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22*</td>
<td>Issa Osman Issa*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Thiessen, 2011; Grace, 2008; Ombati, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Rajah Abu Khalid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Hansen, 2013: 74; Roggio, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24*</td>
<td>Khattab Al-Masri/Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Hansen, 2013: 75; Goldman, 2016; Gunaratna, 2002: xxxi; Pirio, 2007: 56 and 137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Ashif Mohamed Juma</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* indicates deceased or suspected deceased.
Mohammed Atef (Pike, 2006; The Telegraph, 2001; Pirio, 2007: 55; Gunaratna, 2002: 154-155) One of the Al-Qaeda members on Al-Ridi’s plane to Somalia where he went to provide military assistance to Somali militants.

Essam Al-Ridi (Pirio, 2007: 1; ABC News, 2018; Berger, 2011: 103) Purchased a jet for Osama bin Laden in 1992 that was later used to carry Al-Qaeda members involved in the Kenya/Tanzania bombings, including Atef in 1993 to Somalia in support of AIAI

The following table follows the abovementioned individual membership profiles, where the numbers represent corresponding names in Table 4.

**Table 4.1. Individual Membership Profiles of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda Members: Rank, Skills, Nationality, Year of Affiliation, Membership History and Travel History**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Skills</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Year of Affiliation</th>
<th>Membership History</th>
<th>Travel History</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>AIAI/ICU/Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>1979-1989</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Combat and Islamic Theology</td>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>N/A&lt;sup&gt;11&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>ICU/Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>Egyptian</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>AIAI/Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>10</sup> Year of affiliation represents the year in which an Al-Shabaab member made contact with an Al-Qaeda member which may coincide with the year in which they travelled, before or after.

<sup>11</sup> N/A against corresponding names and categories indicates where data was Not Available.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Terror Attacks</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda/Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Terror Attacks</td>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>AlAI/Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>Saudi Arabian</td>
<td>1979-1989</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Sudan, and Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>ICU/Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>1984-1997</td>
<td>AlAI/Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>90s</td>
<td>AlAI/ICU/Hizb al Islam/Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>Egyptian</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Chechnya, Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>AlAI/ICU/Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>Afghanistan and Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Chemicals Expert</td>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Islamic Theology</td>
<td>Libyan</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Combat and Medicine</td>
<td>Comorian</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda/Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kenya, Sudan and Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Explosives and Architecture</td>
<td>Palestinian/Jordanian</td>
<td>90s</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>90s</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
<td>Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Kenya, and the US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Recruitment</td>
<td>Kenyan</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Recruitment</td>
<td>Kenyan</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21*</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Military Strategist and Combat</td>
<td>Kenyan</td>
<td>90s</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda/Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22*</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Terror Attacks and Recruitment</td>
<td>Kenyan</td>
<td>90s</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda/Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>Yemeni</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
<td>Somalia and Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24*</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>Egyptian</td>
<td>90s</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda/Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia and Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Tanzanian</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>Egyptian</td>
<td>1992-1993</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Pilot</td>
<td>Egyptian born citizen of the US</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Pakistan, US, and Sudan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Names of individual members of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda presented in Table 4 and Table 4.1 were entered into Node XL Pro and illustrated as follows:

**Adjacency Matrix 2: Al-Shabaab-by-Al-Qaeda**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muharrar Robow/Abu Musa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Raji Mirelaad Al-Afgani</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fadl Mohamed Khalil Shonepe</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ahmad Umar Abu Bakr 1989</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Ibrahim Said Bial</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salim Hadi Shere</td>
<td>0</td>
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Sociogram 2: Affiliated Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda Members

(Source: Author’s construction on Node XL Pro of individual members of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda verified by multiple sources)

3.1.4. Availability of Data Beyond 1997

The study sought to obtain data on ties between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda members from the time of the former’s establishment in 2006 to 2017 to analyse against its performance from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). However, both raw and processed data that was eventually included in Node XL Pro indicated that a majority of the relationships formed between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda members occurred in the 90s as demonstrated in Table 4.1, with the last known relationship established between individual members dating back to 1997. Therefore, in an effort to find recent affiliatory activities between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda members, the study sought recently published sources containing names of Al-Shabaab members with possible links to Al-Qaeda. Jones, Liepman, and Chandler’s (2016) Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Assessing the Campaign Against Al-Shabaab emerged as a valuable source of names of senior Al-Shabaab members, but served
more as a means of verifying identified members whose affiliatory activities occurred in the 90s than a revelation of new names of recently established ties. The most recent intelligence revealed in *Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Somalia* however, was with regards to Al-Shabaab members who were killed or detained particularly between 2013 and 2016. This therefore came to characterise the nature of the information provided by most sources during the data collection and verification stages regarding Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda members whose most recent activities were reported as deaths or detainment as opposed to updates on affiliatory relationships. Furthermore, the study widened the scope of inquiry to between 1992 to 2017 in line with the first affiliatory activities between the two terrorist organisations and the most recent death of an individual member in the network.

There are two possible reasons for this gap in intelligence from the last known affiliatory relationship in 1997 to where the study intended to begin analysing ties between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda members. Firstly, due to the clandestine nature of terrorist organisations and the sensitivity concerning current investigations by intelligence agencies, recent developments particularly of a specific nature concerning relationships between members of the two terrorist organisations are not publicly disclosed either by the terrorist organisations involved or the intelligence agencies investigating them. This is due to the significance this intelligence has on counter-terrorism efforts, particularly with regards to the decapitation strategy that constitutes the targeting and elimination of key members of terrorist organisations. Therefore, in an effort to protect the confidentiality of ongoing counter-terrorism efforts, in many cases public reports of terrorists are made when they have been identified as considerable threats to national security and when they are deceased or detained. The strategic withholding of and release of affiliatory activity by both parties are ostensibly beneficial to their legitimacy, as Al-Shabaab’s declaration of an official merger with Al-Qaeda in 2012 without disclosing particular details is considered an effort to legitimate itself as an ally of the international terrorist organisation (Hansen, 2013: 62). Concerning government intelligence agencies, identified, detained or deceased reports are imperative for testaments of the efficiency of intelligence agency’s counter-terrorism efforts.
Secondly, following Osama bin Laden’s move to Sudan in 1991 with approximately 480 Al-Qaeda combatants, a relatively small cell known as Al-Qaeda in East Africa (AQEA) was established in Kenya. The AQEA cell not only laid the foundations for the affiliation between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda through frequent engagements and support of AIAI and ICU, but were responsible for two major attacks: The 1998 US embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi as well as the 2002 Paradise Hotel and Arkia Airlines missile attacks (Pirio, 2007: 56 & 91). Following these terror attacks, the AQEA cell is said to have withdrawn themselves from playing an active role in ongoing terror attacks in the region and functioned more as liaisons between Somali jihadis who constituted AIAI at the time and Al-Qaeda (Pirio, 2007: 91). In doing so, affiliatory activities concerning specific members of both organisations became more difficult to identify compared to prior activities that involved physical engagements like traveling, training and collective involvement in specific terror attacks which constituted the nature of affiliatory links between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda members in Table 4 and Table 4.1. Compounded with the widespread use of technology and the internet, the means and nature of engagement enters a more clandestine space of the digital world. Therefore, in prior instances where Al-Qaeda members travelled to Somalia for the purposes of training then AIAI or ICU members, training material (for instance) is made available and dispersed online. With infinite possibilities regarding the duration of access to this material as well as which individuals have accessed this material and used it to further develop the capacity of Al-Shabaab becomes considerably difficult to locate in ways the study has collated.

3.1.4.1. Deceased, Detained, Defected and Confirmed Alive

In an effort to maintain the relevance of the data collected to the time period selected for the study, the 27 individual members of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda presented in Table 4, 4.1 and Sociogram 1 were considered with regards to whether they were deceased, detained, defected or confirmed alive.

Table 5: Deceased, Detained, Defected and Confirmed Alive Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Deceased</th>
<th>Detained</th>
<th>Defected</th>
<th>Confirmed Alive</th>
</tr>
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38
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year of Death</th>
<th>Year of Reappearance</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mukhtar Robow/Abu Monsoor (Omar, 2017)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Haji Jama Mee'aad 'Al-Afghani' (Al-Jazeera, 2013)</td>
<td>2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fu'ad Mahamed Khalaf Shongole</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri (Hirsch, 2006: 115)</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ahmed Umar (BBC, 2014)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mohamed Ibrahim Said Bilal* (Los Angeles Times, 2002)</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Aden Hashi Ayro (Pflanz, 2008)</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Osama bin Laden (Hasan, 2011)</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ali Mohamed Rage/Ali Dhere (Gannon, 2017)</td>
<td>2017</td>
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<td>Sheikh Ali Warsame</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td>Hassan Dahiir Aweys (Horadam, 2011)</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>Ayman Zawahiri (Hoffman, 2018)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>2013</td>
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<td>Ahmed Aw Abdi Godane (Sheikh, 2014)</td>
<td>2014</td>
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<td>Sahal Iskudhuq (Associated Press, 2014)</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>✓</td>
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12 N/A against corresponding names and categories indicates where data was Not Available. In this instance the study considered these individuals to be alive and operating in the capacities noted in the abovementioned Tables 4. and 4.1.
The study found that of the 27 Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda members entered into Node XL Pro, 21 were either deceased, detained or defected between 1996 and 2017. In the proceeding chapter, the study seeks to consider the degree of significance of all 27 members of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda concerning their role, rank, skills, nationality, membership history and travel history against the impact their absence has made on the former's performance particularly between 1996 and 2017.

3.1.5 Data Collection and Findings: Global Terrorism Database

To ensure sufficient coverage of analysis in terms of the timeline and developments leading towards the establishment of Al-Shabaab and its current prominence, the study amalgamated statistical data from the GTD of the AIAL which operated from 1992 to 2005, the ICU which operated from 2005 to 2008 and Al-Shabaab whose earliest reported terror incident started from 2007 to 2017.
Because of the intrinsic nature of the history between Al-Shabaab, the ICU and Al-AI, the study presented the data regarding the terror attacks and fatalities instigated by the three terrorist organisations together, as they were all the result of fragments of each other which carried a common theme of an affiliation with Al-Qaeda and in some instances individual members with a history with one, two or all the terrorist organisations. Advanced searches were made on the GTD where only the relevant perpetrator groups were selected and searched on the database:

- The “when” tab was selected in which only a year was selected, eg. ‘x’ year/January/1 and ‘same x year’/December/31 for all organisations in the years in which they were active. Subsequently, in the “perpetrator” tab the relevant terrorist organisation was selected.
- The study recorded the automatically calculated number of terror attacks instigated by the relevant terrorist organisation within the selected year.
• The numbers under the ‘fatalities’ column were manually collated, calculated, and presented against the terror attacks recorded for each year for all terrorist organisations in the years they were active.
• This data was recorded on an Excel spreadsheet linked to Word which generates graphs.

3.2. CONCLUSION

The study used Gregory A. Pirio’s (2007) *The African Jihad: Bin Laden’s Quest for the Horn of Africa* and Stig J. Hansen’s (2013) *Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group* as baseline texts which proved to be complementary, as the former offered valuable contextual information while the latter became a main source of the names that would eventually be used in the study. The process of verifying the names of individual members of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda used in this book further revealed the nature of the data available, as the study reached data saturation as a result of failing to find more affiliated terrorists or affiliatory activities beyond 1997. Considering the most recent data available concerning the selected members constituted reports of their death, detainment or defection, the study sought to appropriate this data by expanding the timeline of analysis from 1992 to 2017 in order to maintain the relevance of the data collected to the time period initially selected for the study. In doing so, the study widened its inquiry on the GTD to consider the terrorist organisations that lead to the creation of Al-Shabaab which were the ICU and AIAI. Therefore, a holistic presentation of their performance was presented with regards to the number of terrorist attacks and fatalities instigated by the terrorist organisations. Considering the data presented in this chapter, the study determined to consider the degree of significance of the Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda members identified in the study in light of their absence, and the impact this has had on the performance Al-Shabaab in the following chapter.
ANNEXURE A: NETWORK CONSTRUCTION RAW DATA
CHAPTER FOUR: ASSESSING THE TACTICAL UTILITY OF THE AL-SHABAAB AND AL-QAEDA AFFILIATION

4. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will chronologically outline the history of Al-Shabaab beginning with the events that brought members of the affiliation together towards the establishment of Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya (AlIAI), the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) to what is presently known as Al-Shabaab. The chronological account will be undertaken against the backdrop of an analysis of the performance of the three organisations and the individual members that formed part of the networked affiliation and their impact on the organisations. In doing so, the chapter will determine the tactical utility of the Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda affiliation that has led to the capacity of the former to instigate mass casualty attacks since its inception.

A chronological account of the Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda affiliation will be undertaken by considering the events of the Ogaden and Afghan-Soviet wars, the collapse of the Barre regime and the beginning of Al-Qaeda operations in East Africa. Furthermore, the introduction of radical Islam into East Africa will be addressed followed by the establishment of the ICU which will form part of a comprehensive introduction into Al-Shabaab.

4.1.1. The Ogaden and Afghan-Soviet Wars: 1977-1989
In 1974, in the midst of the Cold War, the Haile Selassie government was toppled and replaced by a revolutionary military government in Ethiopia. Subsequently, the United States (US) withdrew its economic and military support of Ethiopia, paving the way for further expansion of Soviet influence from Somalia to include Ethiopia. However, the rivalry between Somalia and Ethiopia over the Ogaden region (see Annexure B), of which the former claimed ownership of, determined the nature of relations between themselves and the Soviet Union. Considering the Soviet Union’s newly established ties with Ethiopia as an act of betrayal coupled with the anticipation of further encroachment of Somali territory as a result of Ethiopia’s increasing military capacity, Somalia severed ties with the Soviet Union (Weiss, 1980: 2-13). In 1977, the Ogaden War saw Somalia’s president Siad Barre appeal to the US and Arab states to assist in providing heavy artillery necessary to conquer Ogaden. While the US failed to provide
Somalia with arms on the grounds that it respected the Organisation of African Unity’s (OAU) principle of territorial integrity, some Arab states notably Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia in particular, were instrumental in providing arms to Somalia during the Ogaden War. However, this was not sufficient to win the war against the Soviet-backed Ethiopian government, resulting in a major loss for Somalia in 1978 (Brind, 1983: 87; Makinda, 1982: 100).

According to Pirio (2007: 48), merely two years after the end of the Ogaden War, the Siad Barre regime allowed the US to airlift hundreds of Somalis to fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Considering the relations between Somalia and the Soviet Union leading up to and during the Ogaden War, this decision may be considered to have been in retaliation for the Soviet Union’s assistance of the Ethiopian government that led to Somalia’s loss in the Ogaden War. Consequently, Somali nationals joined the most prominent insurgent group known as the Mujahideen under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Massoud, where they were trained and gained experience in armed combat against the Soviet Union. According to Williams (2008: 40-41), the Mujahideen were the product of a joint operation between the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence’s (ISI) Operation Cyclone, a code name for the creation of an anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan and Pakistan which involved global recruitment of fighters, financial support and arming of the Mujahideen. However, in 1989 the CIA’s concern over the possible repercussions for the creation of what are now, “battle-hardened militant Islamists”, saw the US take steps to de-legitimise and disarm the Mujahideen to the extent that it plotted to assassinate its key members such as Osama bin Laden (Atwan, 2011). Under the newly designated label of ‘terrorists’, the US pressured governments to detain or expel their citizens who participated in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. In 1993 approximately 500 Pakistani Islamists fighting in Afghanistan who were members of “Harakat-ul-Mujahideen were forced out of Pakistan and made their way to Sudan from whence many went to Somalia to join forces with Somali jihadist militia AIAI” (Pirio, 2007: 22). This is not only a contributing factor to the diversity of nationalities represented in the Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda network operating in Somalia (see Table 4.1), but led to growing animosity towards the US which came to determine the agenda of international terrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda and those that became their offshoots such as Al-Shabaab.
Sociogram 3: Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya and Al-Qaeda Members Who Met and Trained in Afghanistan

The profile of Ibrahim Haji Jama Mee’aad ‘Al-Afghani’ (see Table 4 and 4.1) demonstrates the origin of ties between Somalis that would be future Al-Shabaab members, as he was said to have been in Afghanistan during the Afghan-Soviet War of 1979-1989 and established ties with Ayman Zawahiri, the current leader of Al-Qaeda. He was instrumental in restructuring Al-Shabaab following its separation from the ICU between 2006 and 2007. Even after the Afghan-Soviet War, ties between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda members continued, as Afghanistan was seen as a place from which Al-Shabaab could draw ideological inspiration and tactical training against who they came to consider to be common enemies as a result of the strength of their relationship that was established during the Afghan-Soviet War. For example, in 2001 at the height of the US offensive in Afghanistan against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, Aden Hashi Ayro and Hassan Dahiir Aweys, who were both members of AIAI at the time both went to Afghanistan for further training through battles against US forces alongside Al-Qaeda (Pirio, 2007: 78). Aden Hashi Ayro went on to be one of the founding members of Al-Shabaab and its first emir of training whilst Hassan Dahiir Aweys became one of Al-Shabaab’s earliest senior members (see Table 4). It is

(Source: Author’s construction on Node XL Pro of individual members of Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya and Al-Qaeda verified by multiple sources)
unknown when and under what circumstances Ahmed Aw Abdi Godane went to Afghanistan, however he became the leader of Al-Shabaab and chief of its intelligence and terror operations known as the Maktabatu Amniyat (see Table 4). This evidence suggests the social capital passed on to the four members of Al-AI (see Annexure A) in the form of skills to participate in combat and terror attacks (see Table 4.1) was considerably valuable, as they eventually played a significant role in the establishment, leadership and operation of Al-Shabaab.  


Between 1977 and 1991, Somalia, under the Barre regime, experienced three major conflicts that led to the collapse of the regime. The first was the Ogaden War with Ethiopia in which Somalia suffered 25,000 casualties sowed the initial seeds of contempt for the Barre regime that several liberation movements held responsible for the costly war against Ethiopia (World Bank, 2005: 9). The second major conflict in 1988 was between the Somali National Movement (SNM), an Isaaq clan movement that was also formed over grievances relating to the Ogaden War, and the Somali military under the Barre regime. The conflict arose over the control of North West Somalia, and deepened when Barre placed North West Somalia under military control, which resulted in human rights abuses experienced by the Isaaq clan which included displacement and ethnic cleansing. These atrocities propelled the Isaaq clan’s demands for secession into what is known today as the self-declared state of Somaliland which was established in 1991 (see Annexure B) (World Bank, 2005: 10). The third major conflict was from 1991 to 1992, and was characterised by clashes between clan-based movements such as the Hawiya clan’s United Somali Congress (USC), the Ogadeni clan’s Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), and the Majerten clan’s Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SDDF), which saw predatory looting and banditry characterise this multi-front conflict (World Bank, 2005: 10).

Therefore, the collapse of the Barre regime left a power vacuum in Somalia that was characterised by nation-wide violence and anarchy against the backdrop of an

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13 This analysis excludes members and former members of Al-Qaeda, as many of these individual members are predominantly from the Middle East and North Africa. The purpose of this analysis is to emphasise the movement of Somalis to Afghanistan, as it highlights the historical links between the two countries and the impact their travels have made to their ability to further contribute to the effectiveness of their terrorist organisations.
emerging famine that further threatened the security of the Somali people. In 1992, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) established the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM), which was mandated to facilitate humanitarian relief activities, establish and maintain a ceasefire agreement between all parties involved in the conflict, as well as contribute to the maintenance of peace towards national reconciliatory efforts (Hansen, 2012: 257). This UN operation was established through Resolution 75144, which was premised on the importance fostering cooperation between the UN and regional organisations within the context of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, by providing humanitarian relief and other assistance (Planck, 2005: 258).

However, lawlessness and violence severely hampered UNOSOM’s humanitarian efforts, resulting in an unprecedented number of Somalis dying from hunger and disease. For the first time in history, the UN established a military force known as the United Task Force (UNITAF), mandated to undertake acts of force against threats to its peace and humanitarian efforts. The significance of UNITAF is that it was the first military force that was not under official UN command but primarily under the US and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) member states, tasked with the sole purpose of using force to end an internal conflict. This was unprecedented, as Chapter VII of the UN Charter was conceived to discourage the use of military force upon sovereign states, however it was decided that Somalia was a unique case that was an exception to the conditions outlined in the UN Charter (Planck, 2005: 533-534).

Although there was supposed to be a clear distinction between UNOSOM and UNITAF, their concurrent operation in Somalia made this impossible. The combination of a peacekeeping force and an enforcement force eventually led to growing tensions, primarily between the UN peacekeeping force and General Aidid’s clan-based militia group known as the Somali National Alliance (SNA) (Planck, 2005: 535-541). According to Farah (2017), on a visit to Sudan, General Aidid met Osama bin Laden who agreed to assist the SNA in their efforts against the US presence in Somalia. Khattab Al-Masri and Mohammad Saddiq Odeh (see Table 4) and one of Al-Qaeda’s chief instructors, Ali Muhammad14, were dispatched by Osama Bin Laden to provide on the ground training to SNA and AIAI against UNOSOM and UNITAF (Gunaratna, 2018).

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14 Ali Muhammad formed part of the not-fully verified data considered for inclusion into the Node XL Pro software, however failure to identify specific members with which to link him to led to his exclusion from the network.
2002: 155) (see Sociogram 3). In 1993, the SNA killed 24 peacekeepers in the infamous Black Hawk Down attack that led to a battle between the UN and the SNA which precipitated the end of the UN operation in Somalia in 1995. Spokesperson for the Islamic Union of Mujahideen in Ogaden, Abu Yaser stated (Gunaratna, 2002: 156):

“…the team of Shaykh Osama bin Laden had an effective role in repelling the American invaders in Somalia, that is because they participated in that battle with some explosives and in launching attacks against the army of the alliance.”

This was the first major offensive in East Africa orchestrated with the tactical support of Somali militants by Al-Qaeda. The following year the Ethiopian military undertook a mop up operation in the Gedo region of Somalia by attacking AIAI bases in the cities of Luuq and Bulo Hawo which precipitated into the Battle of Dolow City. Al-Qaeda once again fought alongside AIAI and the SNA against Ethiopian forces, however AIAI were eventually defeated following the withdrawal of SNA militants (Woldemariam, 2018, 234) (see Annexure B). In 1998 Al-Qaeda was exclusively behind the twin bombings of the US embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi resulting in over 200 casualties. This attack involved 9 out of the 27 individual members of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda members in the network: Wadih el Hage who contacted Essam Al-Ridi on behalf of Osama bin Laden for the plane that would transport those involved in the attack in Kenya, one of which included Mohammed Atef. Mohammad Saddiq Odeh who was previously involved in training the SNA and AIAI militants against US forces was also involved and is said to have arrived in Somalia for this mission with Fadil Harun, who was also implicated in the US embassy attacks and at some point lived with Wadih el Hage in his house in Nairobi. Other implicated members were Khattab Al-Masri who was also involved in the offensive against US forces in Somalia, Fu'ad Mahamed Khalaf Shongole, Ayman Zawahiri and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan.

In 2002, the second attack to be exclusively undertaken by Al-Qaeda was on the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, in which suicide bombers drove through the gates of the hotel and subsequently detonated explosives that resulted in a total of 13 casualties: 10 Kenyans and 3 Israelis. Minutes prior to the attack two surface-to-air missiles were launched and just missed the Boeing 757 of the Israeli-based Airkia Airlines. According to Ombati (2010), Issa Osman Issa was a central player in the joint attacks and personally fired the missiles together with Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan (see
The members of Al-Qaeda involved in providing training to Somali militants and participated in the terror attacks that took place in Kenya formed part of what constituted an Al-Qaeda East African (AQEA) network (see Sociogram 3) which operated in both Somalia and Kenya’s north eastern province (see Annexure B). Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri (see Table 4) played a central role in the operations of AQEA as its military chief and as Osama bin Laden’s personal secretary. Furthermore, Sociogram 3 indicates Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri had as many as 6 ties to: Osama bin Laden, Mohammed Atef who replaced him as the liaison between Al-Qaeda and AIAI after he died in 1996, Mohammad Saddiq Odeh, and Wadih el Hage who were involved in the twin bombings of the US embassies in 1998; his brother-in-law Ashif Mohamed Juma who was a senior Al-Qaeda member, and Ayman Zawahiri Osama bin Laden’s deputy leader of Al-Qaeda.

**Sociogram 4: Al-Qaeda East Africa Network**

(Source: Author’s construction on Node XL Pro of individual members of Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya and Al-Qaeda verified by multiple sources)

Sociogram 3 further indicates the relationship between Osama bin Laden, Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri and Ayman Zawahiri laid the foundations for a deadly alliance between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda members, as they all had ties mutually connecting them to AQEA members with ties to significant members of Al-Shabaab. Through Wadih el Hage, both Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri and Osama bin Laden were tied to Fadil
Harun, a former Al-Qaeda member who used to ferry money to AQEA operatives between Khartoum and Nairobi in preparation for the 1998 embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Fadil Harun later became a member of Al-Shabaab and brought with him his experience in combat from fighting alongside the Mujahideen during the Afghan-Soviet War, which may have been highly useful for the period in which he was a member of Al-Shabaab until he was killed in 2011 (see Table 4, Table 4.1 and Table 5). Furthermore, through Ayman Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden and Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri were indirectly tied to the former leader of Al-Shabaab, Ahmed Aw Abdi Godane, and through him further indirectly tied to the current leader of Al-Shabaab Ahmed Umar. In addition, Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri and Osama bin Laden were indirectly tied to Ibrahim Haji Jama Mee’aad ‘Al-Afghani’ through Ayman Zawahiri and directly tied to Aden Hashi Ayro who was one of the founding members of Al-Shabaab as well as Mukhtar Robow, Al-Shabaab’s former spokesperson.

Considering evidence that Osama bin Laden, Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri and Ayman Zawahiri were connected directly or indirectly tied to highly capable Al-Shabaab members suggests social capital was proliferated from them to Mukhtar Robow, Fadil Harun, Ibrahim Haji Jama Mee’aad ‘Al-Afghani’, Ahmed Aw Abdi Godane, Aden Hashi Ayro and Ahmed Umar. Furthermore, what becomes apparent concerning these six highly capable members of Al-Shabaab is the common history of training in Afghanistan between Fadil Harun and Ibrahim Haji Jama Mee’aad ‘Al-Afghani’, who would have had the opportunity to transfer social capital from their ties with AQEA members such as experience fighting in Afghanistan in the form of combat, terror attacks, recruitment and communication to Al-Shabaab and the rest of its members (see Table 4.1). This therefore demonstrates the impact of the AQEA cell on the members that would eventually establish and operate Al-Shabaab into a fully-fledged terrorist organisation. The AQEA network opened pathways of social capital transfer through which future members of Al-Shabaab had the opportunity to train in Afghanistan or even Somalia, and establish ties with the infamous former leader of Al-Qaeda. This led to the establishment of a highly capable network of Al-Shabaab members, whose seniority in the organisation would allow for further proliferation of social capital throughout the terrorist organisation which they obtained from their training and ties to Osama bin Laden, Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri and Ayman Zawahiri.
The number of an individual member of Al-Shabaab’s ties, their direct tie to the former Al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, their membership history as a former member of a terrorist organisation, their rank or role in the organisation as well as a history of travel to Afghanistan, may be considered key criteria in measuring what constitutes the profile of a noteworthy individual whose skills and experience would significantly contribute to the effectiveness of their organisation. In light of this against Sociogram 1 which illustrates the entire network, Mukhtar Robow, who ranked as second or third in Al-Shabaab as spokesperson and military commander, had a total of 6 ties in including one directly to Osama bin Laden. Mukhtar Robow’s ties with Al-Qaeda began in 1996 when its members fought alongside AIAI of which he was a member in the Battle of Dolow City against Ethiopian forces before he went on to be a member of the ICU and later a member of Al-Shabaab. Although there is no indication whether Mukhtar Robow has been to Afghanistan for training, his profile (see Table 4 and Table 4.1 as well as Sociogram 1) suggests he is a noteworthy member of Al-Shabaab and the product of social capital exchanged over the years between the two terrorist organisations, who may have contributed significantly to the lethality of the terrorist organisation.

4.1.3. Radical Islam in East Africa: 1989-2005

Following an Islamic military coup in 1989 led by Omar Hassan al-Bashir against Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi’s government, Sudan became the beachhead of radical Islam in East Africa. Under the ideological influence of Hassan al-Turabi, al-Bashir’s government sought to implement Salafist interpretations of Islam in political and intellectual circles of Sudanese society (Rabasa, 2009: 47). Al-Turabi was the founder of the National Islamic Front (NIF) an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, a political and religious group founded in Egypt that subscribes to orthodox interpretations of Islam and considered to be a forerunner of militant Islamism with ties to terrorist organisations (Jones and Cullinane, 2013). According to Rabasa (2009: 47), Sudan became an international centre for radical Islamism under Al-Bashir’s government, as the Popular Arab Islamic Conference (PAIC) was hosted in Khartoum in 1991, 1993 and 1995 which saw the amalgamation of Islamic movements come together to discuss the goal of establishing Islamic states. The al-Turabi-al-Bashir alliance was heralded by “terrorist organizations [such as the] Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Hamas, and the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)” (Rabasa, 2009: 48). Al-Bashir’s regime also invited Al-Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin Laden, to reside in Sudan in 1991, where he became a consultative member of the NIF, established 23 training camps, given exemptions on import duties and a Sudanese diplomatic passport. From Sudan, Osama bin Laden dispatched Al-Qaeda operatives to establish ties with AIAI members that resulted in the successful offensive against US presence in Somalia and the AQEA cell that instigated the two terror attacks in Kenya.

Osama bin Laden’s residence in Sudan which resulted in considerable support of AIAI marked the beginning of ties between Al-Qaeda and militants who would later be members of Al-Shabaab. In an effort to establish the tactical utility of the affiliation between Al-Qaeda and AIAI, an organisation that would eventually fragment and become Al-Shabaab, Graph 2 seeks to illustrate AIAI’s performance against the elimination of key Al-Qaeda members\textsuperscript{15} actively involved in assisting AIAI between 1992 and 2005.

\textbf{Graph 2: Terror Attacks and Fatalities Instigated by Al-Itihad Islamiya}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{graph2.png}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{15} Graph 2 and 4 uses the last names of detained, deceased and defected members indicated in Table 5, as it is a common practice within the literature to refer to terrorists by their last names to avoid confusion due to the similarity of their first names.
Between 1992 and 2005, 5 terror attacks have been attributed to AIAI by the GTD (START, 2018): 1 in 1992 resulting in 1 casualty, 1 in 1996 resulting in 3 casualties, 1 in 1999 resulting in 2 casualties, 1 in 2004 resulting in 2 casualties and 1 in 2005 resulting in 15 casualties. During this period 5 members of Al-Qaeda were eliminated from the network (see Table 5): Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri, who played a key role in liaising between AQEA and Osama bin Laden drowned in Lake Victoria in 1996, followed by Mohammad Saddiq Odeh and Wadih el Hage who were detained in 1998 for their involvement in the US embassy bombings, Mohammed Atef who was killed in Afghanistan as a result of a US bombing campaign, and Mohamed Ibrahim Said Bilal who was detained in 2002.

The AIAI instigated terror attacks with Al-Qaeda’s most popular weapons (see Annexure F): 2 (1992 and 2004) were instigated with firearms and 3 (1996, 1999 and 2005) were instigated with explosives, one of which delivered the highest casualties for AIAI in 2005 (see Annexure C). With only 5 attacks and 2 different weapon types, a pattern for analysis of the lethality of the organisation is difficult to establish, as Graph 2 indicates that the second time AIAI used firearms in an attack it resulted in more casualties than the first attack whereas the second and third time AIAI used explosives it initially resulted in less casualties than the first time it used explosives before recording the highest rate of casualties in its existence. Therefore, with 3, 2 and 15 casualties in 1996, 1998 and 2004 respectively, AIAI’s lethal performance is sporadic, as the 2005 attack with 15 casualties presents an anomaly in the data. Furthermore, each attack instigated by AIAI were aimed at different targets: in 1992 it targeted a religious institution, 1996 it targeted a business, in 1994 it targeted private citizens and property as well as transport infrastructure, in 2004 it targeted and a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) and in 2005 it targeted government as well as private citizens and property. With such a diversity of target types, which is in stark contrast to the Al-Qaeda’s apparent preference for targeting private citizens and property, transportation and the military (see Annexure F1), its apparent their attacks were indiscriminate with no single entity with which it was aggrieved. Although two attacks involved private citizens and property, other target types obscure any
assumptions for a preferred target type, particularly with only 5 attacks (see Annexure C1).

Although AIAI was established in 1984, the GTD indicates the terrorist organisation began instigating attacks in 1992, merely a year after Osama bin Laden acquired residence in Sudan. This notably demonstrates the newly established proximity from which the Al-Qaeda leader could propagate his influence prompted the relatively sedentary organisation into action by participating in terror attacks in Somalia. Furthermore, 1992 was the same year in which Osama bin Laden and (most likely with the assistance of) his personal secretary Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri, prepared to dispatch members of Al-Qaeda to assist AIAI (and SNA) fight against UNOSOM and UNITAF forces in Somalia in 1993\(^\text{16}\), followed by further assistance in 1996 in the Battle of Dolow City. Of those exclusively known to have been deployed by Osama bin Laden include Khattab Al-Masri, Mohammad Saddiq Odeh, Ali Muhammad, and Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri to provide hands on coordination of social capital exchange between Al-Qaeda and AIAI members which primarily comprised of combat training. It is likely that the rest of the members of AQEA, some of which include Wadih el Hage, Mohammad Saddiq Odeh, Mohammed Atef and Mohamed Ibrahim Said Bilal, were dispatched at a later stage for the purposes of the 1998 embassy bombings but had some degree of social capital exchange with AIAI members through Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri which they were all directly tied to.

In what seems like a preference for explosives by the AIAI against Mohammad Saddiq Odeh’s expertise in explosives and architecture (see Table 4.1), it becomes apparent that Mohammad Saddiq Odeh may have had the largest and most evident impact on the manner in which the AIAI instigates terror attacks. Despite his arrest in 1998, AIAI used explosives once more in its most successful attack since its establishment, which is an indication of the tactical utility of the affiliation between Al-Qaeda and AIAI since the use of explosives contributed in large part to the lethality of AIAI. Furthermore, in spite of Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri’s absence from the network from as early as 1996, the AIAI continued to instigate attacks most likely through the assistance of Al-Qaeda members with which they established ties with before his passing. In addition, AQEA went on to instigate attacks in the absence of Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri, one of which

\(^{16}\) The GTD data does not attribute or indicate attacks and casualties against UNOSOM and UNITAF to Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya.
was the most successful attack for the relatively small cell. Therefore, what becomes apparent is the evidence that social capital such as the use of explosives or high-level coordination that led to the successful execution of the 1998 US embassy bombings continues long after the elimination of individual members who possessed these skills cease to exist, most notably Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri. Key members such as Mohammad Saddiq Odeh formed part of a network that provided numerous opportunities for social capital to pass through many individual members of Al-Qaeda and AIAI, which at the time included its founder Sheikh Ali Warsame, Mukhtar Robow, Ahmed Aw Abdi Godane, Hassan Dahiir Aweys, Aden Hashi Ayro and Hasan Turki17 who was a prominent AIAI leader with links to Al-Qaeda and operated an Al-Shabaab military training camp in Ras Kamboni (see Annexure B). As previously mentioned, most of these members of AIAI later became key members of Al-Shabaab with noteworthy skills and expertise to establish and operate the terrorist organisation.


Lawlessness came to characterise the state of Somalia following the collapse of the Barre regime and the emergence of clan-based militias. Therefore, when Islamic Courts were first established in 1994 in northern Mogadishu, it was in response to the need for law and order. The Islamic Courts achieved considerable success in addressing criminality in northern Mogadishu and eventually spread to the south of Mogadishu in 1998. The expansion of the Islamic Courts into southern Mogadishu saw a transition in its underpinning governance framework from judgements delivered by militias appointed by local clans to being influenced by political Islam. Concurrently, AIAI suffered a major offensive by the Ethiopian military in the Battle of Dolow City which saw remnants of AIAI seek refuge in southern Mogadishu under the Islamic Courts. The active involvement of AIAI’s deputy Hassan Dahiir Aweys in key decisions of the Islamic Courts was considered proof that a reconstituted AIAI was in charge of the governance structures of the Islamic Courts and the battle for the capital city.

In 2005, following a series of disappearances and assassinations in Mogadishu, which the Islamic Courts claimed were the result of covert operations by the US government, a militant force known as Al-Shabaab emerged. Therefore, what became known as

17 Hasan Turki formed part of the verified data to be considered for inclusion into the Node XL Pro software, however despite sources stating he had ties to Al-Qaeda, failure to identify a specific member of Al-Qaeda which he had ties to led to his exclusion from the network.
the Islamic Courts Union constituted an amalgamation of members who subscribed to either moderate or extreme interpretations of political Islam. Hassan Dahiir Aweys and members of Al-Shabaab became an important component of the extremist faction of the ICU, especially militarily when it came to instigating attacks against Western-backed Hawiye warlords who formed an alliance known as the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism, as well as the TFG, which posed a threat to its agenda for Islamic governance in Somalia (Hassan and Barnes, 2007: 152-154). The attacks and casualties instigated by the ICU as follows:

**Graph 3: Terror Attacks and Fatalities Instigated by the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)**

(Source: Author’s construction from data obtained from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Global Terrorism Database, 2018)

According to the GTD (START, 2018), between 2005 and 2008 the ICU instigated 12 terror attacks in Somalia. Attacks by the ICU began in 2005 almost as a continuation from the activities of the AIAI, with 1 attack resulting in no casualties. The GTD (START, 2018) records no attacks or casualties for the ICU in 2006, however the subsequent year saw 1 attack by the ICU with no casualties like the 2005 attack. In 2008, the ICU instigated 10 terror attacks resulting in a total of 8 casualties. In 2005
and 2007 the ICU used firearms, however of the 10 attacks of 2008 only 1 attack is known to have been instigated with an incendiary device whereas the other 9 attacks were with unknown weapon types (see Annexure D). This may be evidence of a deviation from Al-Qaeda’s preferred weapon type of explosives (see Annexure F), due to evidence of social capital exchange between AIAI and Al-Qaeda that led to the former developing a preference for a particular weapon type as a result of the tactical influence of the latter. Most importantly, in the absence of Mohammad Saddiq Odeh, AIAI exhibited evidence of a continuation of skills obtained from him which contributed in large part to the lethality of the terrorist organisation. Remnants of AIAI who formed part of the ICU included Mukhtar Robow, Ali Mohamed Rage, Ahmed Aw Abdi Godane, Aden Hashi Ayro, Ahmed Umar, and Hassan Dahiir Aweys, who by virtue of formerly being AIAI members possessed the skills to influence the ICU instigate attacks with explosives. Therefore, what constitutes an unknown weapon type is mostly likely similar to an Al-Qaeda weapon type or may be interpreted as an active deviation from Al-Qaeda. However, without an indication of the nature of the weapon type, the presumption of a deviation is inconclusive, as similarities between the two terrorist organisations’ weapon types may exist in the midst of this ambiguity in the data.

Despite instigating more terror attacks than AIAI, Graph 3 illustrates a pattern across 5 years in which the ICU’s attacks consistently resulted in less casualties than terror attacks, however 2008 was the year it was the most active and the deadliest. Until then the ICU’s target types varied with 2 attacks against the government and military respectively, and 1 attack against businesses and NGO’s respectively. In 2008 the ICU made its preferred target type abundantly evident as it spent most of that year targeting private citizens and property (see Annexure D1) almost as a continuation of what appeared to be AIAI’s preferred target as a result of Al-Qaeda’s influence whose top target were private citizens and property (see Annexure F1). Between 2005 and 2007 the data reflects a degree of restraint by the ICU from instigating terror attacks towards its agenda to present itself as the vanguard of law and order which was in stark contrast to the practices of warlords that perpetually targeted the general public, however, 2008 marked a drastic diversion from this initial agenda. Because Al-Shabaab formed the militant wing of the ICU, terror attacks instigated during this period were a product of their operations. What looks like a high degree of restraint
between 2005 and 2007 to instigate as few terror attacks as possible for the purposes of drawing public support is indicative of the initial control leaders of ICU had over its militant wing, Al-Shabaab. The data from 2008 may be indicative of the ideological and tactical differences emerging between the moderate and extreme faction within the ICU that led to the advent of Al-Shabaab as a separate terrorist organisation.

Despite the direct and indirect links Mukhtar Robow, Ali Mohamed Rage, Ahmed Abdi Godane, Aden Hashi Ayro, Ahmed Umar, and Hassan Dahiir Aweys had with AQEA members it’s not evident the extent to which Al-Qaeda had an influence on the capacity of ICU between 2005 and 2008. On the one hand, the social capital they possessed as a result of their connections and past experiences was evidently suppressed under the larger agenda of the ICU. Hassan Dahiir Aweys, who is said to be the earliest founder and leader of Al-Shabaab, is the only evidence of the extent of Al-Qaeda’s influence, as his ties to AQEA members and social capital acquired as a result may have contributed to his role in the establishment of this significant component of ICU. On the other hand, in the midst of what seems like a deliberate effort to avoid a high degree of lethality, it was largely unclear which weapon types the ICU used, and in the few cases where weapon types could be identified, weapons such as firearms and incendiary devices were used, which formed a small part of Al-Qaeda’s preferred weapon type (see Annexure F). Furthermore, the ICU’s performance against the ongoing state of anarchy in Somalia is demonstrable of an attempt by the terrorist organisation to establish its own means of achieving its objectives before its extremist faction, Al-Shabaab, rose to prominence. This is most likely the result of a degree of autonomy governing the affiliation between ICU and Al-Qaeda, in which the former was able to use different weapon types from its predecessor and affiliate, establish its own agenda as well as branches of governance to fulfil certain functions such as its militant wing Al-Shabaab.

4.2. AL-SHABAAB: 2006-2017

At the request of the TFG, the Ethiopian army ousted the ICU from Mogadishu in 2006 with relative success which forced its members to disperse throughout Somalia and into neighbouring countries. The humiliation of occupation and defeat by the Ethiopian army is said to have triggered Al-Shabaab to develop into a fully-fledged terrorist organisation capable of instigating guerrilla assaults, bombings, assassinations, kidnappings and take control of territory in southern and central Somalia. Between
2006 and 2008 Al-Shabaab’s ties to Al-Qaeda became more public as a result of recurrent praise by Al-Shabaab’s leaders of Al-Qaeda (Felter, Masters, and Sergie, 2018). In 2012, Al-Shabaab officially declared its allegiance to Al-Qaeda in a move that was widely controversial considering it came after the death of Osama bin Laden and Fadil Harun in 2011 who were vehemently opposed to the official merger between the two terrorist organisations. According to Lahoud (2012: 3) and McCants (2013) Osama bin Laden was particularly concerned that Al-Shabaab’s militancy and extremism undermined the efforts of the ICU, which he considered to be an organisation that showed potential in implementing Islamic governance throughout Somalia. In light of this, Lahoud (2012: 3) states Fadil Harun’s two-volume autobiography argued that the handful of Al-Qaeda members remaining in Somalia continued to operate under the directive of Osama bin Laden and

“made clear that there were no organizational ties between al-Qa`ida and al-Shabab. Further, at no point did Bin Ladin or any of al-Qa`ida’s senior leaders…guide or influence the process of forming al-Shabab.”

When a video featuring Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan pledging “bayat” (loyalty) on behalf of Al-Shabaab to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda” in 2008 surfaced, Lahoud (2012: 2) considered Osama bin Laden’s subsequent statements following this video stating support for Jihadists in Somalia and failing to mention Al-Shabaab by name as indicative of a decision to ignore Al-Shabaab’s courtship, which was contrary to Ayman Zawahiri’s response in which he acknowledged the group and called them “my brothers, the lions of Islam in Somalia” (Joscelyn and Roggio, 2012).

Therefore, the death of Osama bin Laden paved the way for not only his deputy to take leadership of Al-Qaeda, but also establish the merger that his predecessor was opposed to. Furthermore, the timing and circumstances surrounding Fadil Harun’s death 6 months after Osama bin Laden, in which he uncharacteristically wondered into a checkpoint placed by TFG troops may be considered as a set-up by Ahmed Aw Abdi Godane who was in the midst of a bitter feud with Fadil Harun18 for leadership of Al-Shabaab (Aynte, 2012). According to McCants (2013) Ahmed Aw Abdi Godane used the merger to silence internal opposition to his leadership, particularly after Al-

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18 Fadil Harun was said to have been strongly supported by Osama bin Laden for leadership of Al-Shabaab (Aynte, 2012)
Shabaab lost significant territory in Mogadishu which resulted in factions between himself, Hassan Dahiir Aweys and Mukhtar Robow who wanted to pursue an Islamic nationalist agenda as opposed to Aw Abdi Godane’s global jihadist orientation (Aynte, 2012). Despite desperate attempts by Hassan Dahiir Aweys, Mukhtar Robow and one of Aw Abdi Godane’s confidants, Ibrahim Haji Jama Mee’aad ‘Al-Afghani’ to Ayman Zawahiri to intervene in what they considered to be the destruction of the organisation, Ayman Zawahiri saw Aw Abdi Godane’s global jihadist orientation beneficial to Al-Qaeda, as it was battling to maintain its strongholds in the Middle East. Therefore, because Aw Abdi Godane presented Al-Qaeda the opportunity to fulfil its global influence to include parts of Africa beyond the north of the continent, the merger remained intact and Ayman Zawahiri failed to intervene in the internal matters of Al-Shabaab.

Ayman Zawahiri’s response to matters pertaining to Al-Shabaab reflects the nature of their affiliation and the structure of Al-Qaeda with respect to its affiliates. Al-Qaeda’s affiliates comprise of a loose “array of groups and individuals held together not by formal organisational ties but by personal connections and the unity of their ambition to follow the call to Jihad” (Hellmich, 2011: 118-120). Al-Qaeda’s core members like Ayman Zawahiri, focus on strategic command and control rather than direct management of its affiliates. Thus, Al-Qaeda has little to do with the internal operation of its affiliates with respect to its leaders, members and activities, but remains the centre for strategic and ideological inspiration for its affiliates (Gunaratna and Oreg, 2010: 1053). Therefore, what came to characterise the nature of the merger between Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab saw the latter retain a higher degree of autonomy than it previously possessed under the direct influence of Osama bin Laden. For example, between 1991 and 2001 social capital from Al-Qaeda was imparted to AIAl in the form of tactical training. Members such as Aden Hashi Ayro, Hassan Dahiir Aweys and Ahmed Aw Abdi Godane who were AIAl at the time went as far as going for training under Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the beginning of the US-led war in Afghanistan following Al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attack. Beyond Osama bin Laden’s direct involvement in shaping the tactical capacities of AIAl, during the establishment and early operations of Al-Shabaab, the Al-Qaeda leader expressed concerns over their degree of extremism and went so far as to openly consider Fadil Harun as his preferred leader of the emerging terrorist organisation.
Considering what constituted intrinsically close ties between Al-Qaeda, AIAI, and ICU members against what is now considered to be an affiliation characterised by autonomy between Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab against the overall difference in performance between AIAI, ICU and Al-Shabaab, which for the most part consists of the same individual members from the early 90s, Graph 4 illustrates that their performance differs vastly in frequency, lethality, weapon type, and even targets.

**Graph 4: Terror Attacks and Fatalities Instigated by Al-Shabaab**


Between 2007 and 2017 Al-Shabaab has instigated 3298 terror attacks in Somalia and Kenya. Between this period, Al-Shabaab used a variety of weapon types, of which the most popular include firearms and explosives (see Annexure E), like Al-Qaeda’s preferred weapon types. This has resulted in a consistently high casualty rate over the ten-year period, particularly after the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011, who saw Al-Shabaab as an organisation that undermined the ICU and would cost it the support of
the general public. Another cause of this evident lethality concerning Al-Shabaab’s terror attacks may be due to the increasing practice of simultaneous attacks particularly between 2016 and 2017. Gunaratna (2002: xxxi) states the “modus operandi of Al-Qaeda is whenever possible to conduct coordinated and simultaneous attacks,” which was first seen in the early attacks by the AQEA on the US embassies and Paradise Hotel. Al-Shabaab has shown to not only be instigating simultaneous attacks in Somalia but in Kenya and Somalia simultaneously, with the last of such an attack occurring on the 22nd of September 2017 according to the GTD (START, 2018).

However, concerning Osama bin Laden’s concern over the cost of Al-Shabaab’s lethality, Sjah (2014: 39) states that by 2007 Al-Shabaab had already lost popular support due to the terrorist organisation’s style of governance that applied strict Sharia law and prevented the public from participating in certain social activities, as well as the frequency of their attacks of which civilians were a common target. After Al-Shabaab realised it would not achieve its nationalistic goals in the near future by its failure to gather public support, it sought to pursue a transnational Islamic agenda to establish Islamic governance in Somalia and throughout the East African region by attacking foreign targets in Somalia, parties supported by the US, and third parties that enabled those who attacked it. Due to the fact that most of these targets comprise of foreign, regional and local military forces, Annexure E1 indicates Al-Shabaab’s top target are the military, followed by the targeting of private citizens and property which has been a common theme across both its predecessors. Al-Shabaab’s choice of targets is once again similar to Al-Qaeda’s, as Annexure F1 illustrates the military as well as private citizens and property as amongst the most targeted. Furthermore, Al-Shabaab’s third highest target is the TFG tasked with promoting democratic governance and developing counter-terrorism policies against Al-Shabaab, followed by the police who are tasked with maintaining law and order within Somali society. This is unlike Al-Qaeda as indicated in Annexure F1, where the government is not remotely amongst Al-Qaeda’s top targets.

However, this demonstrates Al-Shabaab has impeccably undertaken the strategy of attrition (Kydd and Walter, 2006: 59) by doing three key things: firstly Al-Shabaab has notably returned to adopting Al-Qaeda’s preferred weapon type of explosives, similar

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19 This analysis includes attacks on transportation as the targeting of private citizens and property since they are often the victims of these attacks.
to the AIAI in the 90s and early 2000s as its own, which has considerably impacted on its persistent lethality over 10 years. Secondly, it has continued the pattern of targeting private citizens and property from the practices of the Al-Qaeda influenced AIAI and ICU. This is integral to its strategy, as the targeting of civilians is considered to be key to demonstrating the organisation’s capacity to inflict considerable harm to its target audience, which is primarily the Somali government that has also been a persistent target of terror attacks from the AIAI and ICU days. However, most significantly, its main target being the military which it continued from the ICU further demonstrates its capacity to instigate attacks against both armed and unarmed targets, which bares testimony to the capacity of the terrorist organisation. Thirdly, despite a strategic choice of main targets, Al-Shabaab has established a wider range targets in comparison to what was seen in the activities of the AIAI and ICU, to the extent that it could be described as indiscriminate in nature. Once again, coupled with the use of explosives, particularly in cases where they are detonated simultaneously in different locations, this contributes significantly to what is evidently a highly lethal terrorist organisation.

Despite the high degree of autonomy that characterises the recent affiliation between Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab, the study relies on Sociogram 1 and the development of ties between Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab particularly between 2011 and 2017 as an indication that not only do remnants of AQEA remain in Al-Shabaab, but the elimination of key members that characterised their affiliation particularly from as far back as the 90’s may have had a lasting impact on the performance of the terrorist organisation.

**Sociogram 5: Affiliated Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda Members in 2011**
According to Graph 4, by 2011 Aden Hashi Ayro, Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, Issa Osman Issa, Fadil Harun, Rajah Abu Khalid and Osama bin Laden were eliminated from the network of Sociogram 1. All members played a key role in the early ties established between the organisation from the early 90’s, and believed to have imparted key skills to members of Al-Shabaab during their tenure as they all possessed skills in a form of combat, terror attacks, and military strategy (see Table 4.1). As a result of the elimination of members of the network from as early as 1996, Ashif Mohamed Juma, Essam Al-Ridi and Khattab Al-Masri are believed to have remained in the network but lost their only known ties to various members.

Sociogram 4 illustrates three significant factors contributing to the tactical utility of the affiliation between the two terrorist organisations. Firstly, and most notably, the leader of Al-Shabaab at the time, Ahmed Aw Abdi Godane maintained ties with the new leader of Al-Qaeda, Ayman Zawahiri, which is demonstrable not only of the continuity of ties between the two organisations from the early 90s when Ahmed Aw Abdi Godane was a member of AIAI and Ayman Zawahiri was part of AQEA operations, but also of what became an official merger between the two organisations which Ayman Zawahiri was in favour of. Despite what can be characterised as a loose affiliation between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda, the mere ties between the two leaders maintains a channel through which Ahmed Aw Abdi Godane could use to request additional tactical support such as weapons, training, and new members without Ayman Zawahiri being intimately involved in the operational details of Al-Shabaab. Therefore, this particular tie may be the most significant contributing factor to the capacity of Al-Shabaab to instigate mass casualty attacks, particularly in a manner quite similar to Al-Qaeda.

Secondly, members of the network with a militant history in both AIAI and ICU such as Mukhtar Robow, Ali Mohamed Rage, Ahmed Umar, and Hassan Dahiir Aweys were part of Al-Shabaab and may also be responsible for the lethal capacity of Al-Shabaab as a result of the skills and experiences they have acquired over the years. Furthermore, considering their profiles indicating their seniority within the organisation (see Table 4.1), it is likely that they were highly influential and instrumental in
increasing the performance of Al-Shabaab exponentially, especially in the absence of Osama bin Laden’s micromanagement from 2011. Thirdly, despite Khattab Al-Masri losing his only two ties to Osama bin Laden and Rajah Abu Khalid, the study still considers him to be part of the networked affiliation between the two organisations. Considering his initial role in facilitating social capital exchange between Al-Qaeda and AIAI through training militants to combat the counter-terrorism made by the Ethiopian and Somali governments, the likelihood that he may have continued this role after he joined Al-Shabaab may also be a contributing factor to the sustained capacity of the terrorist organisation to increasingly instigate mass casualty attacks.

**Sociogram 6: Affiliated Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda Members in 2017**

![Sociogram 6](image)

(Source: Author’s construction)

By 2017, Sociogram 5 indicates no (known) ties between members of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab members. According to ABC News (2018) after Essam Al-Ridi crash landed the plane requested by Osama bin Laden to transport AQEA members to Somalia in Sudan, he fled to the United States. Because he has testified in a federal court in Manhattan of his involvement in the establishment of the East African cell, it is likely that he has severed ties with Al-Qaeda and is no longer an active member of the network. However, it is believed that Fu’ad Mahamed Khalaf Shongole, Sheikh Ali
Warsame, and Sheikh Mohamed Juma remain active in the network, as no information has stated otherwise.

In 2014, Ahmed Umar became the leader of Al-Shabaab after Ahmed Aw Abdi Godane’s death, who was his only known tie despite being a member of AIAI and ICU. Furthermore, unlike his predecessor, there are no known ties between himself and the current leader of Al-Qaeda, Ayman Zawahiri. A third notable figure is Sheikh Ali Warsame, the founder of AIAI who is believed to been alive for the entire duration of terror activities in Somalia, which amounts to a total of 33 years. Therefore, despite failure to determine any ties between these three notable members of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab, the history of social capital exchange between their organisations from the early 90s is sufficient to argue that Al-Shabaab’s key members, Ahmed Umar and in particular Sheikh Ali Warsame, continue to possess and influence the rest of the organisation with the skills and experience they have obtained as a result of this affiliation. Most importantly, what appears to be most evident in Graph 4 is that despite the elimination of key members of the Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab network between 2011 and 2017, the latter continues to demonstrate its increasing capacity to instigate mass casualty attacks, which bares testimony to the longevity of social capital long after the elimination of key members of the network.

4.2.1 Assessing the Tactical Utility of the Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda Affiliation

Al-Shabaab’s affiliation to Al-Qaeda has significantly contributed to its capacity to instigate mass casualty attacks. This contribution has its roots in the intrinsically close ties between Al-Qaeda and the AIAI from the early 90s to the early 2000s. During this period, members of AIAI who would later be key members of Al-Shabaab established ties with Al-Qaeda members through which they gained skills they would have the opportunity to practice throughout their tenures as AIAI, ICU and Al-Shabaab members. It is certainly no coincidence that Mukhtar Robow, Ali Mohamed Rage, Aw Abdi Godane, Aden Hashi Ayro, Ahmed Umar and Hassan Dahiir Aweys with a history dating back to this period, were amongst the founders and key members of Al-Shabaab. Whether it was tactical training in Afghanistan or Somalia in combat, creating explosives or recruitment, Al-Qaeda directly contributed to the enablement of this specific group of individuals who would later determine the trajectory of Al-Shabaab to what we see today. The most apparent evidence of this are the similarities
of attack, target and weapon type between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda. Annexure E and E1 as well as F and F1 respectively, clearly indicate the preferred choice of weapons as explosives and preferred target types where they both share the military as well as private citizens and property as their top targets. Once more, Al-Shabaab reflects the early influence between the AIAI and Al-Qaeda where the evidence of the latter’s influence was the most evident before its emergence. Former members of AIAI are arguably the centre of the apparent adoption of Al-Qaeda practices, as they were equipped with the tactical expertise to do so early in their militant careers, which they have evidently dispersed throughout the rest of their organisation.

The individual members involved in the establishment of this lethal alliance are Osama bin Laden with his direct tie to one of the founders of Al-Shabaab, Aden Hashi Ayro, Ayman Zawahiri with his direct tie to the former leader of Al-Shabaab Ahmed Aw Abdi Godane and Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri who facilitated the relationship between the two organisations. However, the relationship between members of both organisations that sustained this affiliation even after the death of Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri and Osama bin Laden was Ayman Zawahiri’s tie to Ahmed Aw Abdi Godane until his passing in 2014. Although there are no known ties between Ayman Zawahiri and Al-Shabaab’s current leader, Ahmed Umar, the affiliation between Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab remains intact, perhaps if not due to their active presence in the network, but through their history and membership to terrorist organisations that were intrinsically close in the early 90s. Most importantly however, is the indication that although Sociogram 5 illustrates no known ties between existing members of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab as well as the apparent absence of 80% of the network involving key members to which the affiliation could be attributed to, Al-Shabaab continues to demonstrate an ever-increasing capacity to instigate mass casualty attacks. This reflects the lasting influence of former members of AIAI who are likely to have transferred their social capital obtained from Al-Qaeda from the early 90s to the rest of their organisation.

4.3. CONCLUSION

The Ogaden War created the context for the Barre regime to send hundreds of Somalis to fight in the Afghan-Soviet War of 1979 to 1989, which lay the foundation between Somali militants and the Mujahideen which would later be known as Al-Qaeda. This saw Ibrahim Haji Jama Mee’aad ‘Al-Afghani’, Hassan Dahiir Aweys, Ahmed Aw Abdi
Godane and Aden Hashi Ayro attain social capital from Al-Qaeda from their journeys to Afghanistan where they trained and fought alongside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The social capital they accrued as a result of this experience contributed to the significant roles they eventually played in Al-Shabaab. Another instance of social capital exchange occurred after the collapse of the Barre regime, which saw Osama bin Laden deploy members of Al-Qaeda to train and assist AIAI members to fight against UNOSOM and UNITAF which included Khattab Al-Masri, Mohammad Saddiq Odeh, and Ali Muhammad. These individuals later formed part of an AQEA network responsible for the US embassy attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as well as the Paradise Hotel attack. As a result of the AQEA operations in Somalia, the networks revealed their links to prominent members of Al-Shabaab directly or indirectly which suggests the social capital shared to them by Al-Qaeda members enabled them to be significant Al-Shabaab members. This demonstrated the impact of the AQEA cell on Somali militants who were at the time members of AIAI. Mukhtar Robow emerged as a noteworthy Al-Shabaab leader with an important history in terms of his number of ties, one of which linked him to Osama bin Laden, his previous membership to AIAI and ICU, as well as his rank as second or third in Al-Shabaab. This profile revealed potential for social capital exchange he attained from Al-Qaeda to the rest of Al-Shabaab, which eventually contributed to the substantial capacity of the terrorist organisation.

Furthermore, the Sudanese government played a significant role in establishing an Al-Qaeda base in Sudan, which propelled the relatively inactive AIAI into action for the first time in its history in a manner that indicated a degree of Al-Qaeda influence through the preferred use of explosives even after the detainment of Mohammad Saddiq Odeh, the Al-Qaeda member who may have enabled the AIAI to instigate terror attacks using explosives. However, the defeat of the AIAI and the subsequent establishment of the ICU saw a degree of restraint in the conduct of terror attacks due to its Islamic nationalist agenda to establish law and order. Although similarities in attack patterns can be identified between the ICU and Al-Qaeda, the most apparent evidence of Al-Qaeda’s influence is the profile of Hassan Dahiir Aweys who had ties to AQEA from his previous membership in AIAI where he may have accrued the social capital necessary to be one of the earliest founders and leaders of Al-Shabaab.
Al-Shabaab officially declared its allegiance to Al-Qaeda in 2012, which saw the terrorist organisation adopt a global jihadist orientation. This widened its scope of targets, which had ramifications for its choice of weapons that allowed the terrorist organisation to achieve a significantly high casualty rate that eliminated all its preferred targets simultaneously. The affiliation between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda was characterised as loose, which allowed Al-Shabaab to practice a degree of autonomy to manage its internal affairs and instigate terror attacks at a larger scale than would have been allowed by Al-Qaeda’s former leader, Osama bin Laden. Despite the elimination of a significant number of key members in the network, the continued ties between Ayman Zawahiri and Ahmed Aw Abdi Godane until his death in 2014, as well as the presence of Mukhtar Robow, Ahmad Umar and Hassan Dahiir Aweys who all accrued social capital from Al-Qaeda through their previous membership in AIAI and ICU, are considered to have contributed significantly to the lethal capacity of Al-Shabaab. After the elimination of 80% of the network, remaining members in the network include Ahmed Umar and Ayman Zawahiri, the leaders of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda respectively. Despite not being directly linked to each other in the past, their shared history of involvement with the AIAI in the 90s is considered to be the point of continued social capital exchange between the two organisations without any indication of it being explicitly stated.

The tactical utility of the affiliation between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda is evident in the persistent pattern of influence concerning the attack, target and weapon types of the former’s predecessors, the AIAI and the ICU which were key precursors to its establishment. Al-Shabaab’s successful adoption of Al-Qaeda’s choice of target and weapon type, made possibly by former members of AIAI, significantly contributes to its high degree of lethality. Furthermore, the remaining members of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab in the network with a history of militancy from the 90s may also have contributed to the persistent lethality of the organisation against the backdrop of the elimination of key members within the network. Al-Shabaab’s ever increasing capacity to instigate mass casualty attacks bares testament to the longevity of skills left behind in the organisation by key members of the network long after they have been eliminated. Although the Sociogram 1 is not an accurate or complete depiction of an Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda networked affiliation at any given time, it seeks to demonstrate the span of influence key members of the affiliation had at their disposal.
with which to impart the social capital that has contributed to the existing capacities of Al-Shabaab.
ANNEXURE B: AL-SHABAAB MEMBERS WHO TRAVELED TO AFGHANISTAN FOR TRAINING WITH AL-QAEDA

(Source: Author’s construction of map obtained from NBC News, 2017; Hansen, 2013: 20; Pirio, 2007: 78; Hansen, 2013: 37)
ANNEXURE C: KENYA AND SOMALIA MAP OF TERROR ATTACKS BY AL-SHABAAB AND AL-QAEDA

(Source: Author’s construction of map obtained from Google Maps, 2018)
ANNEXURE D: AL-ITIHAD AL-ISLAMIYA WEAPON TYPES 1992-2005

(National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Global Terrorism Database, 2018)
ANNEXURE D1: AL-ITIHAD AL-ISLAMIYA TARGET TYPES 1992-2005

(National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Global Terrorism Database, 2018)
ANNEXURE E: ISLAMIC COURTS UNION WEAPON TYPES 2005-2008

(National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Global Terrorism Database, 2018)
ANNEXURE E1: ISLAMIC COURTS UNION TARGET TYPE 2005-2008

(National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Global Terrorism Database, 2018)
ANNEXURE F: AL-SHABAAB WEAPON TYPES 2007-2017

(National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Global Terrorism Database, 2018)
ANNEXURE F1: AL-SHABAAB TARGET TYPES 2007-2017

(National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Global Terrorism Database, 2018)
ANNEXURE G: AL-QAEDA WEAPON TYPES

(National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Global Terrorism Database, 2018)
ANNEXURE G1: AL-QAEDA TARGET TYPES

(National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Global Terrorism Database, 2018)
CHAPTER FIVE: A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

5. OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this study was to assess the impact of affiliations between international and African terrorist organisations. Within this context the study ventured in this under-researched area by determining how Al-Shabaab’s affiliation to Al-Qaeda contributes to its capacity to instigate terror attacks. This was undertaken by analysing the network of individual members that formed part of the affiliation against the data pertaining to the nature of terror attacks and subsequent casualties of Al-Shabaab and its predecessors, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI) on the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).

Social capital theory was used as the theoretical framework of the study. The overall premise of the theory suggests that social capital constitutes the exchange of resources such as assets, skills and services within a network of individuals or organisations. Furthermore, the nature and size of the network of individuals or organisations determines the extent to which the exchange of social capital can be fully exploited for the single or mutual benefit of parties to the affiliation. The application of social capital theory to the phenomenon of terrorism was premised on the rational choice theory by Martha Crenshaw which suggests individual terrorists and their organisations undertake cost-benefit analyses when determining which actions would contribute to the accomplishment of their objectives. This was applied to the decisions of individual terrorists and their organisations to affiliate, particularly on the basis of substantial or complementary capabilities as well as strategic locations conducive to the facilitation of social capital exchange. The theories demonstrated the nexus between individual terrorists and their organisations whereby social capital exchanged between individuals contribute to the tactical enhancement of their respective organisations.

Within this context, the study developed a network of individual members of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda who initiated and formed a part of what constituted an affiliation between the two terrorist organisations. Profiles of 27 members were created, which indicated their role, organisation, rank, skills, the year in which they established relations with their affiliates, membership history, nationality and travel history. In doing so, the study measured the significance of particular individuals based
on the social capital accrued and attributed to them as a result of their militant experiences as indicated on their profiles. The tactical contribution Al-Qaeda members had on Al-Shabaab was analysed based on the manner in which Al-Shabaab and its predecessors, ICU and AIAI, instigated terror attacks in the absence of key members. The study identified similarities in attack, target and weapon types between Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab and its predecessors, which were attributable to the contribution made particular individuals. The study found that in the absence of members it considered to have significantly contributed to the capacity of Al-Shabaab and its predecessors to instigate terror attacks, the terrorist organisations continued to demonstrate their capacity of a particular nature attributable to the eliminated key members identified by the study. This is most evident in the performance of Al-Shabaab on the GTD, where the terrorist organisation demonstrated a considerable degree of lethality despite the fact that it suffered the loss of not only 80%, but key members that formed part of the networked affiliation between itself and Al-Qaeda.

5.1. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS
The key findings of the study are summarised below by answering the research question and subsequent sub-questions posed in chapter one.

5.1.1. How Does Al-Shabaab’s Affiliation to Al-Qaeda Contribute to its Capacity to Conduct Terror Attacks?
Al-Shabaab’s capacity to conduct terror attacks is attributable to the tactical training of its members in Afghanistan and Somalia in combat, recruitment and the creation and detonation of explosives by its affiliate, Al-Qaeda, in the early 90s. Although the study found no evidence of this transfer of social capital at the establishment of the ICU and Al-Shabaab, individuals who were part of the initial period of social capital transfer furthered Al-Qaeda’s contribution to Al-Shabaab by transferring the social capital they accrued from Al-Qaeda towards the enhanced capacity of their organisations.

5.1.1.1 Who Are the Individuals Involved in the Creation and Sustained Affiliation Between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda?
The tie between the founders of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab, Osama bin Laden and Aden Hashi Ayro respectively, as well as the tie between the current leader of Al-Qaeda and the former leader of Al-Shabaab, Ayman Zawahiri’s and Ahmed Aw Abdi Godane respectively, were involved in the creation of the affiliation between the two
terrorist organisations. Their ties date back to the early 90s when Al-Qaeda was intrinsically close to AIAI which Osama bin Laden’s personal secretary, Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri, played a key role in facilitating. By 2017, Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri, Aden Hashi Ayro, Osama bin Laden and Ahmed Aw Abdi Godane had been eliminated from the network, leaving Ayman Zawahiri and Ahmed Umar, the leaders of both of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab respectively, with a history dating back to the beginning of their organisation’s affiliation. This has been a significant reason for the study inferring their continued existence in the network has contributed to the sustained affiliation between the two terrorist organisations in the absence of evidence of a direct tie between the two individuals.

5.1.1.2. Are There Similarities in Attack, Target and Weapon Type that Demonstrate the Tactical Influence of Al-Qaeda on Al-Shabaab that Contributes to the Latter’s Capacity to Conduct Terror Attacks?

Mukhtar Robow, Ali Mohamed Rage, Aw Abdi Godane, Aden Hashi Ayro, Ahmed Umar and Hassan Dahiir Aweys emerged as a significant group of Al-Shabaab members who were largely influenced by Al-Qaeda throughout their militant history as members of the AIAI, ICU and eventually Al-Shabaab. The study considered their senior positions within the terrorist organisation as an opportunity to impart the knowledge and skills they attained from their experience with Al-Qaeda towards enhancing the capacity of Al-Shabaab. This was most evident in the emerging similarities in attack, target and weapon type between Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab, which indicated a preference for bomb attacks against the military, as well as private citizens and property. Most importantly, the consistent preference for targeting private citizens and property by the AIAI, ICU and Al-Shabaab and a preference for explosives by the AIAI and Al-Shabaab reflected the influence of Mukhtar Robow, Ali Mohamed Rage, Aw Abdi Godane, Aden Hashi Ayro, Ahmed Umar and Hassan Dahiir Aweys across all three organisations that they had been a part of.

5.2. COUNTER-TERRORISM CRITIQUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The study undoubtably links to counter-terrorism strategies involving the elimination of key individual terrorists and its subsequent impact on their organisation’s capacity to continue operating in their absence. This prompts reference to the counter-terrorism strategy known as decapitation, which emphasises the elimination of leaders of terrorist organisations and hypothesizes that their removal will significantly weaken
and subsequently lead to the demise of a terrorist organisation. This counter-terrorism strategy has been widely adopted as conventional wisdom and features in key national security policy documents such as the United States (US) National Strategy for Counter-Terrorism (NSCT) (The White House, 2018: 13). As key propagators of the Global War on Terror (GWoT), this strategy has evidently been practiced in Africa and the Middle East by the US government with the successful elimination of Osama bin Laden and Ahmed Aw Abdi Godane amongst many others. In spite of this the study shows Al-Qaeda has continues to remain active, particularly through its global affiliates, of which Al-Shabaab forms a part of. This concurs with the terrorism literature further indicating little evidence of the impact elimination of leaders have on the capacity of terrorist organisations to instigate mass casualty attacks. Thus, the study considers the following weaknesses in the decapitation counter-terrorism strategy:

5.2.1. Rank Over Skills

The targeting of leaders is premised on the assumption that leaders are essential to the operation of a terrorist organisation, as their main role is considered to constitute the provision of strategic and tactical direction, as well as ensure persistent recruitment and retention of members by using their charisma to offer incentives far more than the cost of membership (Jordan, 2009: 724-726). However, the study revealed the operation of terrorist organisations require tangible attributes such as military strategy, combat, recruitment, as well as knowledge in explosives and architecture to effectively operationalise the goals of the terrorist organisation. What the study considers as skills, may or may not exclusively be possessed by a leader, but may be evident in one or several of their subordinates who may play a far more active role in imparting the skills necessary for the efficient execution of terror attacks than the terrorist organisation’s leader. Therefore, beyond the rank of individual terrorist, the study attributed worth on the basis of individual skills and the significance of their relationships within which skills could be exchanged. Thus, the study recommends a profile dependent counter-terrorism strategy that considers skills attributable to individual members as opposed to the mere identification and decision to eliminate leaders of terrorist organisations.

5.2.2. Individual Membership and Organisational History

The study revealed another component to the significance of individual terrorists was their militant history as members of the AIAI, ICU and Al-Shabaab. This proved
important at an individual level for two reasons: firstly, the early 90s marked a significant period concerning Al-Qaeda’s strategic decision to establish East African affiliates. It was a period in which the unadulterated exchange of social capital between Somali militants of AIAI and Al-Qaeda reached its peak, thus contributing to the development of a group of individuals who would later be key Al-Shabaab members. Secondly, as these select group of individual terrorists continued their militant careers in the ICU and eventually Al-Shabaab, the study accounted for the likelihood that they had developed expertise in their crafts due to their membership history. At an organisational level, Al-Shabaab essentially emerged as an amalgamation of its predecessors alongside key members who formed part of this history and played a key role in its establishment. Thus, Al-Shabaab is essentially an old organisation with some of its senior members with a history dating back to the early 90s remaining in the network as recent as 2017. The study considered these individuals as integral to the current capacity of Al-Shabaab to instigate mass casualty attacks, as their continued existence not only allows opportunity to further their expertise, but to impart premium skills and knowledge to the rest of the terrorist organisation. Irrespective of the youthfulness of the terrorist organisation, tactical training and knowledge obtained from Al-Qaeda in the early 90s continues to be prevalent and most demonstrable in the attack, target and weapon types of Al-Shabaab. This concurs with Crenshaw’s (2007: 79) finding that the older a terrorist organisation is the less susceptible it becomes to leadership decapitation; thus, the study recommends a counter-terrorism strategy that targets the longest serving and most experienced members of terrorist organisations.

5.2.3. The Longevity of Social Capital in Terrorist Organisations
The study revealed the increasing capacity of Al-Shabaab to instigate mass casualty attacks bore testimony to the longevity of social capital long after the elimination of key members of the network. This is a significant finding, as irrespective of whether a counter-terrorism strategy targets leaders, or individual members with considerable skills, or some of the longest serving members of a terrorist organisation, so long as social capital has been exchanged within or between terrorist organisations, the high likelihood they will be able to continue practicing the skills imparted to them in the absence of those individuals the skills originated from. Because the study recalls a time in which Somalia was in a state of anarchy following the collapse of the Barre
regime, it reveals the absence of law and order provided an environment for social capital exchange between Al-Qaeda and AIAI in the early 90s. This constituted unregulated access to and from Somalia by militants that allowed training camps and Al-Qaeda East Africa (AQEA) to be established, as well as the exchange of weapons and money necessary for the successful execution of the earliest terror attacks in East Africa. However, the existence of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) alongside the counter-terrorism efforts of the East African Community lead by the Kenyan government does much to constrain the exchange of social capital beyond the borders of Somalia as in the early 90s. Thus, the study recommends the continuation of efforts to implement law and order, and the targeting of Al-Shabaab training camps.

However, the study considers Al-Shabaab’s current performance of evidence of continued social capital exchange within the organisation and to a limited degree between Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab, directed by the remaining members of the network with a history dating back to the early 90s. This therefore calls for Social Network Analysis (SNA) to be used as an effective counter-terrorism tool, not merely for the sake of identifying leaders or individual members with the most ties, but to be frequently updated by government intelligence agencies so as to identify who the remaining members are influencing. In doing so, the most influential members with the longest serving membership and those they may have influenced through their ties would be identified and ranked as potential targets, thus halting further perpetuation of social capital exchange. The overall aim of the strategy would be to create a relatively youthful and inexperienced terrorist organisation which would be more susceptible to demise following a successful decapitation operation.
6. REFERENCE LIST


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