

## CHAPTER 1

### BACKGROUND, PROBLEM STATEMENT AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Note: As this study deals with the United States' institution and implementation of the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, United States English has been used instead of Oxford English, which is the general academic requirement of the University of Pretoria.

#### 1.1 INTRODUCTION

From 1963 to 1997, South Africa was subjected to an international arms embargo – the first ever such measure instituted against a member state of the United Nations.<sup>1</sup> The word 'embargo' was first used in the 17<sup>th</sup> century to describe the prevention of commercial shipping in periods of conflict or war. Later, the concept was broadened to indicate a legal undertaking on the governmental level to prohibit trade with a certain country. An arms embargo is therefore the interdiction of arms shipments and sales to a particular nation or group, and is usually imposed as a response to some supposed threat by the offending country, or as part of a total trade embargo aimed at weakening the economic, political or military structures of a perceived enemy.<sup>2</sup> In the case of South Africa, the latter's policy of race segregation, generally known as apartheid, led to it being declared an international threat to peace by the United Nations in 1977. The embargo was first instituted as a voluntary arms embargo by the United States (hereafter US) in 1963, followed shortly afterwards by an embargo by the United Nations. In 1977, the US, again followed by the United Nations shortly afterwards, instituted a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, which served as the direct predecessor of a flood of economic sanctions instituted against South Africa by the US in the mid-1980s.

The US Government in the course of time often made contradicting statements concerning military cooperation with South Africa. For example, in May 1962 the Kennedy Administration declared that, "*in a showdown, the US at present stands to*

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1. United Nations Department of Public Information, *The United Nations and Apartheid, 1948-1994*, p. 20.
  2. R. Leonard, *South Africa at war: White power and the crisis in southern Africa*, p. 4; J.M. Elliot & R. Reginald, *The arms control, disarmament, and military security dictionary*, p. 84.

*lose more than South Africa would lose ... At least in the short term, we need South Africa's cooperation in the space and military fields.*"<sup>3</sup> Scarcely fourteen months later, on 1 August 1963, the Kennedy Administration announced an embargo on military cooperation and the sale of arms and military equipment to South Africa. In May 1977, a member of the Carter Administration made the following statement: *"Our diplomacy toward South Africa must therefore be carried out with a good deal of finesse and skill. We shall have to weigh carefully the relative merits of speaking out and of restraint."*<sup>4</sup> Then, in a bold move barely five months later, in October 1977, Carter instituted a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, calling the South African Government a threat to international peace.<sup>5</sup> Another example is that of the Administration of Ronald Reagan and its policy of Constructive Engagement towards South Africa. In January 1985, the Reagan Administration declared: *"Our conscious effort to relax the siege mentality no doubt played a part in enabling [State President] P.W. Botha to take the bold decision to put forward constitutional proposals ..."*<sup>6</sup> Ten months later, Ronald Reagan himself declared the contrary in an Executive Order: *"I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, find that the policies and actions of the Government of South Africa constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy and economy of the United States and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat"*.<sup>7</sup> This Executive Order was precursor to wide-ranging economic sanctions, including the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act that was instituted against South Africa by the US in 1986.

What were the factors at work behind these sudden changes in US policy and the eventual institution of a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa? Before one can begin to seek an answer to this question, it is necessary to provide some background on the internal policies of South Africa, the build-up of the South African arms industry and the relations between the US and South Africa prior to 1977.

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3. Kennedy Presidential Library (Boston), Public Papers, National Security Files, Box 2: ***Republic of South Africa: Department of State guidelines for policy and operations***, p. 2.
  4. As quoted in W.E. Schauffele, Jr., United States relations with South Africa, ***Department of State Bulletin***, 9 May 1977, p. 468.
  5. Anonymous, US is said to agree to arms sanctions against South Africa, ***New York Times***, 26 October 1977, p. 1
  6. As quoted in C.A. Crocker, An update of Constructive Engagement in South Africa Statement before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 26 September 1984, ***Department of State Bulletin***, January 1985, p. 7.
  7. As quoted in R. Reagan, South Africa: Presidential Actions, ***Department of State Bulletin***, October 1985, p. 2.

## 1.2 BACKGROUND

### 1.2.1 SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERNAL POLITICS

The institution of the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa by the US in 1977, should be viewed in the light of concerted efforts in the United Nations for punitive measures to be taken against South Africa. Three interrelated events were especially responsible for these efforts and the subsequent institution of the arms embargo in 1977: the policy of apartheid of the South African Government and the internal unrest that it caused; the military build-up of the South African Government, in spite of the United Nations arms embargo instituted against it in 1963; and the question of independence for South West Africa (Namibia), where South Africa's administration and military presence was regarded as illegal.<sup>8</sup>

South Africa became a political unit in 1910. It was initially governed by the South African Party (SAP), then by the National Party (NP), and from the early 1930s by the United Party (UP). In the mid-1940's, prior to the 1948 general elections, the re-constituted National Party (NP) campaigned for white supremacy, stricter segregation of races and separate development of races, or "*apartheid*". This meant that non-white South Africans would be stripped of all legal, political and economic rights. However, apartheid was not a totally new policy instigated in 1948 – race segregation in South Africa merely became even tighter. Political and property rights were withheld from black people even before South Africa became a Union in 1910. It was subsequently regulated in one of the most controversial laws ever passed in South Africa, namely the Natives Land Act of 1913. In terms of this law, the rights of black people living on private property owned by white people were severely restricted. It resulted in tens of thousands of black people being forced to leave these areas. In addition, black people in white areas had since the 18<sup>th</sup> century been forced to carry passes, which had to be shown on demand to any white person. It was regarded as a criminal offence for a black person to be in a 'white' area without a pass.<sup>9</sup>

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8. Armscor Archives (Pretoria), Subject: Sanctions and arms embargoes, Box 6, File 11, Study material: *The arms embargo against the RSA*, 15 October 1986; M. Hough, Military sanctions against the RSA: Current and future prospects, *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 15(1), May 1993, p. 23; J.P. McWilliams, *Armscor: South Africa's arms merchant*, p. 23.
9. D. Posel, *The making of apartheid, 1948 – 1961*, pp. 39-60; J. Grobler, *A decisive clash? A short history of Black protest politics in South Africa, 1875-1976*, pp. 42 – 43; T.R.H. Davenport, *South Africa: A modern history*, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, p. 530-532.

The NP succeeded in gaining an electoral victory in the 1948 elections, after an agreement with yet another party, the Afrikaner Party (AP), which firmly believed that the UP had put South Africa on a road that would eventually lead to destructive black rule. In the months and years after the elections, the NP implemented a wide range of measures and laws aimed at total race segregation. In brief, these measures and laws included:

- Prohibition of relationships and marriages between white and non-white people;
- A central population register by which all South Africans would be classified as white, colored or black;
- Prohibition of black people on leaving jobs without the permission of their white employers;
- Restriction on the movement of black people without a pass;
- Institution of a system of labor bureaus to ensure that the labor needs of white farmers were met before large numbers of black people were released to work in the cities;
- Separate education for black and white people; and
- The dividing of black people into ten ethnic nations, each with its own “homeland” and administrative apparatus. The idea was that each of these territories would gain independence at some future stage.<sup>10</sup>

In the years after 1948, the South African Government used legislation, restrictions, crackdowns and arrests to crush any black resistance to the system of apartheid. The resistance organization that played the biggest role at the time, was the African National Congress (ANC), which was formed as the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) in 1912 (it became known as the ANC in 1923). Until 1948, the ANC’s resistance was limited to strikes and other protest activities. By the early 1950s, the resistance took the form of mass demonstrations and work stay-aways, culminating in June 1955 in the drafting of a document called the Freedom Charter. The Freedom Charter was based on the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It affirmed that South Africa belonged to all its inhabitants, black and white. In the light of

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10. D. Posel, *The making of apartheid, 1948 – 1961*, pp. 61-90; L.E.S. de Villiers, *US sanctions against South Africa: A historical analysis of the sanctions campaign and its political implications, 1946-1993*, p. 19.

this, it demanded a non-racial, democratic system of government, with equal protection for all people. In 1959, a split in the ANC led to the formation of a new resistance group, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). Although it was in conflict with the ANC, it would become a permanent role-player in black liberation politics in South Africa.<sup>11</sup>

In 1958, H.F. Verwoerd became the new South African premier. He ushered in two major changes in the political orientation of South Africa: firstly, a firm commitment to a policy of some kind of independence for the black "homelands", and secondly, the decision that South Africa should become a Republic. Both these changes occurred against a backdrop of increased tension, especially since the PAC was unashamedly militant and grew within a year to an organization that was almost as strong as the ANC. On 21 March 1960, the PAC launched a national anti-pass campaign. Groups of black people in various parts of the country burnt their passes and thereafter went to police stations to demand arrest. Although the protests were peaceful in most places, it led to bloodshed in Sharpeville near Vereeniging and Langa near Cape Town. In Sharpeville, the police panicked and opened fire, killing 69 and wounding 178 protesters. In Langa, two black people were killed. The results were far-reaching, both in South Africa and abroad, and the police were criticized for being overly violent. The South African Government attempted to contain the crisis by a massive crackdown on 24 March 1960 on the offices and homes of most of the prominent leaders of the black resistance movements. In addition, all public meetings in many areas of the country were prohibited, and the pass laws were temporarily suspended. However, these measures were in vain. On 30 March, approximately 30,000 black people from Langa and Nyanga took to the streets of Cape Town city center. The next day, Langa was cordoned off by the police and the South African Defense Force (SADF), and a state of emergency was declared. This was followed by the banning of the ANC and PAC on 8 April 1960.<sup>12</sup>

On 31 May 1961, South Africa became a Republic, in the midst of one last attempt by the ANC to stage a nonviolent protest action in the form of a three-day stay-at-home. The action was followed by legislation giving the Government emergency powers to

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11. J. Grobler, *A decisive clash? A short history of Black protest politics in South Africa, 1875-1976*, pp. 37 - 116; N. Mandela, *Long walk to freedom*, pp. 158-160; T.R.H. Davenport, *South Africa: A modern history*, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, p. 350-352.
  12. J. Grobler, *A decisive clash? A short history of Black protest politics in South Africa, 1875-1976*, pp. 124-125; N. Mandela, *Long walk to freedom*, p. 231.

deal with unrest and dissent without declaring a national emergency. This led the ANC to conclude that they now had only two choices left: submit or fight. Nelson Mandela, the leading figure of the ANC at the time, along with other ANC leaders then decided that the time had come to use violence in the fight for freedom, although targets would be limited to physical property such as electric power lines and symbols of the state, not people. Accordingly, in June 1961 Mandela, Walter Sisulu and a few other leaders of the banned ANC and SACP formed Umkonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), also known as MK, to serve as the ANC's military arm to carry out sabotage. Nelson Mandela was appointed the Commander-in-Chief of MK.<sup>13</sup>

The PAC also established a military wing, called Poqo, after its banning. P.K. Leballo acted as its leader on behalf of Robert Sobukwe, who was in custody when Poqo was formed. In contrast to MK, which was multiracial, only black people could belong to Poqo. The latter was also much more militant than MK, which was adamant that it would focus only on sabotage and avoid loss of life. Poqo's strategy focused on three phases: intimidating black people through a terror campaign in order to build the organization up and achieve total strategy; extending the terror campaign to include the white government and all people, no matter of what race, who were pro-government; and well-planned attacks on white people countrywide, with the eventual aim of establishing of a black government when the white government collapsed.<sup>14</sup>

MK's sabotage campaign started on 16 December 1961, when homemade bombs were exploded at symbolic targets in Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth. The date was chosen for a reason – it was the day that white South Africans celebrated the victory over the Zulu tribe at the Battle of Blood River in 1838. They hailed the victory as a sign that God was on their side. Black South Africans on the other hand mourned the day as a massacre of their people. By mid-1963, more than seventy acts of sabotage had been carried out by MK, thereby ushering in a totally new phase in the internal opposition to apartheid. Poqo, in turn, launched itself into the secret training of a guerilla force at the time that the police's attention was fully focused on the sabotage campaign of MK. In 1962 Poqo decided to launch a terror campaign against white South Africans, and a

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13. N. Mandela, *Long walk to freedom*, pp. 260-262; J. Grobler, *A decisive clash? A short history of Black protest politics in South Africa, 1875-1976*, p. 129; COSAWR, *State of War: Apartheid South Africa's decade of militarism*, p. 3.

14. J. Grobler, *A decisive clash? A short history of Black protest politics in South Africa, 1875-1976*, p. 134.

white shop owner was consequently killed at Paarl not long after the decision was taken. This was followed by the arrest of the Poqo leader in the Paarl district. The organization thereupon decided to launch a full-scale attack against the police station, the prison and all white inhabitants in Paarl. However, the police foiled the attack. Other attacks followed in various parts of South Africa, but the police retaliated in force and by May 1963, the PAC reached a very low level of existence in South Africa. It then turned to continuing its resistance in exile. It had links with the FNLA, a liberation organization in Angola, but the latter suffered eventual defeat at the hands of the rival MPLA. It also unsuccessfully tried to build up contact with the People's Republic of China.<sup>15</sup>

On 11 July 1963, the ANC sabotage campaign suffered a major setback when the police raided the MK headquarters on a smallholding in Rivonia, a suburb of Johannesburg, and confiscated a large number of documents detailing plans for sabotage and revolution. The entire High Command of MK were arrested. The so-called Rivonia trial followed, and on 12 June 1964, eight men, including Mandela, were sentenced to life imprisonment. In the meantime, partly in reaction to the arrests, the US had instituted an arms embargo against South Africa on 2 August 1963, followed a few days later by a voluntary arms embargo against South Africa by the United Nations Security Council. All member states were called upon to cease the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa. In addition, the South African Government was requested by both the General Assembly and the Security Council to unconditionally release all persons imprisoned for their opposition to apartheid. The South African Government however ignored the request. By 1965, the underground resistance of the ANC within South Africa was crushed and the organization was forced to operate in exile. It moved to build international contacts with the Soviet Union and with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that was established at Addis Ababa in 1963. In addition, it made common cause with the Zimbabwe African People's Union, which was resisting British colonial rule in Rhodesia. The ANC managed to send a handful of infiltrators into South Africa and pamphlet bombs were exploded in a few large centers in 1971. However, it did not succeed in causing any real

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15. N. Mandela, *Long walk to freedom*, pp. 335-336; COSAWR, *State of War: Apartheid South Africa's decade of militarism*, p. 3; T.R.H. Davenport, *South Africa: A modern history*, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, p. 388; Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, p. 175; J. Grobler, *A decisive clash? A short history of Black protest politics in South Africa, 1875-1976*, pp. 134-136.

disturbances or build up a local base in South Africa, and therefore remained relatively quiet until the Soweto riots of 1976.<sup>16</sup>

In the decade from 1965 up to 1976, South Africa's internal politics was characterized by relative silence on the part of the resistance movements. During this decade, the South African Government launched itself with zeal into solidifying white support and strengthening the economy and security forces. By 1977, South Africa had already built up the reputation of having formidable military power, despite the arms embargo that was instituted against it in 1963. This meant that the country had come very close to being self-sufficient in arms production. This fact was a major concern to a large portion of the international community, because, firstly, it signified a basis for aggression against South Africa's neighboring countries, and secondly, South Africa's military power was regarded as a threat to international peace and security on the African continent.<sup>17</sup> Consequently, in November 1977, the United Nations Security Council declared South Africa a threat to peace, shortly after the US announced a mandatory arms embargo against the country. To understand why this was the case, it is necessary to provide a broad overview of how the South African arms industry came to flourish and expand.

### 1.2.2 THE BUILD-UP OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMS INDUSTRY

The South African Government became interested in domestic arms production after World War II. During the war, ammunition production plants were put in operation in South Africa to help arm the Allies. However, after the war, these plants were closed until 1948, when the new NP Government, after some investigation, reopened the plants. The reason was that they wanted to develop a stronger military establishment to make South Africa independent from the United Kingdom in security matters. Thereafter, arms production in South Africa stayed at a low level, until concern about domestic security started to intensify after the Defiance Campaign of 1952. This concern was heightened by the Sharpeville incident and the subsequent sabotage campaigns of the ANC, as well as pressure on South Africa to leave the Commonwealth

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16. N. Mandela, *Long walk to freedom*, pp. 273-274, 362; M.A. El-Khawas, The liberation struggle in South Africa: Will the 1980s be decisive? *TransAfrica Forum*, Fall 1983, p. 80; J. Grobler, *A decisive clash? A short history of Black protest politics in South Africa, 1875-1976*, pp. 132-133; Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, p. 175.

17. Armscor Archives (Pretoria). Subject: Sanctions and arms embargoes, Box 6, File 11, Study material: *The arms embargo against the RSA*, 15 October 1986.



due to the NP Government's apartheid policy. In addition, the Sharpeville incident and the crackdown on resistance by the South African Government gave a significant boost to international action against apartheid, which culminated in the voluntary arms embargo imposed by the United Nations in 1963. This embargo led to two of South Africa's biggest arms suppliers, i.e. Britain and the US, declaring that all provisions of arms and military equipment would cease after 1963.<sup>18</sup>

For the South African Government, it was essential to build up its military strength. This would not only enable the country to defy the United Nations over Southern African regional issues, e.g. the issue of independence for South West Africa (Namibia), but also to sell itself as a valuable ally of the West in the fight against communistic influence in the region, especially since both the ANC and PAC turned to communist countries and movements for assistance after being banned.<sup>19</sup>

Even before the arms embargo was instituted, the South African Government stated in April 1963 that the Government had all the weaponry it needed to maintain internal order. In October 1963, the establishment of an institute for the development of a ground-to-air missile was announced, and rumors that colorless, odorless and tasteless poison gases were being developed, were reported in some newspapers. However, these reports could not be substantiated at the time. After the non-binding arms embargo was instituted in 1963, efforts to ensure large-scale domestic arms production were doubled. By 1964, the South African Government had already spent between 2-3% of the Gross National Product (GNP) and 21% of the Government Budget on defense expenditures, in comparison with less than 1% of the GNP and less than 7% of the Government Budget before 1960. The small Permanent Force of the SADF was enlarged by 65%, while commando reserves, which were primarily responsible for the defense of farms and residential areas, were enlarged by 18%. In addition, in 1964 the

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18. South Africa: The making of United States policy, 1962 - 1989, Microfiche collection, National Security Files, fiche 01106: **Intelligence document**: Department of Defense, 15 July 1980; Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, **South Africa: Time Running Out**, pp. 233-234; J.P. McWilliams, **Armscor: South Africa's arms merchant**, pp. 10-11.

19. South Africa: The making of United States policy, 1962 - 1989, Microfiche collection, National Security Files, fiche 01106: **Intelligence document**: Department of Defense, 15 July 1980; Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, **South Africa: Time Running Out**, pp. 233-234; J.P. McWilliams, **Armscor: South Africa's arms merchant**, pp. 10-11.

Munitions Board was established, whose primary responsibility it was to promote local arms production through procurement, research, testing, maintenance and inspection.<sup>20</sup>

The Munitions Board's efforts quickly mushroomed into a full-scale arms production program. By 1965, it had already obtained 120 licenses for local manufacturing of weapons, and was practically self-sufficient in the production of small weapons and small caliber ammunition. Furthermore, preparation for building aircraft was started, which in 1967 culminated in the production of Italian Impala jet aircraft under license. In 1968, two organizations were established to administer the arms production program's overall direction and actual procurement: the Armaments Board (previously the Munitions Board) and Armscor, a parastatal corporation. Armscor was made responsible for weapons development, managing the state-owned factories and acquiring equipment both locally and overseas. At the end of 1968, the mounting of the first locally build naval vessel was completed, as well as the establishment of a missile base on the Natal Zululand coast. On 17 December 1968 the first rocket was successfully fired at this base. In 1969, the local development of the Cactus air defense system, in cooperation with France, was announced. This system became the backbone of the South African air defense system.<sup>21</sup> By 1972, the South African Minister of Defense, P.W. Botha, announced the progress being made in the development of advanced ammunition and armaments in the following statement: *I want to repeat today that South Africa can no longer be isolated by arms boycotts. We are absolutely self-sufficient regarding internal demands - on the contrary, an intensive investigation is under way at present with a view to exporting such weaponry*".<sup>22</sup>

Another major spurt in the military build-up of South Africa occurred from 1974 to 1977. By 1977, the defense appropriation was close to 20% of the budget and 5.1% of the GNP. The target level for standing forces rose by 18%, totaling 65 000 men on active duty. One can reasonably ask: "Why did this major spurt occur?". During the

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20. J.P. McWilliams, *Armscor: South Africa's arms merchant*, p. 11; South Africa: The making of United States policy, 1962 - 1989, Microfiche collection, National Security Files, fiche 01106: *Intelligence document*: Department of Defense, 15 July 1980; Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, p. 234; Krygkor, *SALVO: Krygkor 20 Armscor*, p. 12; R. Leonard, *South Africa at War*, p. 137.

21. Krygkor, *SALVO: Krygkor 20 Armscor*, p. 12; R. Leonard, *South Africa at War*, p. 137; J.P. McWilliams, *Armscor: South Africa's arms merchant*, p. 11; South Africa: The making of United States policy, 1962 - 1989, Microfiche collection, National Security Files, fiche 01106: *Intelligence document*: Department of Defense, 15 July 1980.

22. As quoted in J.P. McWilliams, *Armscor: South Africa's arms merchant*, p. 21.

1970's, South Africa's military requirements started to increase basically as a result of four main areas of threat to its security: guerrilla insurgent actions, conventional assault, economic isolation and psychological warfare. The guerrilla insurgent actions were firstly conducted by the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) against the South African administration of South West Africa (Namibia), and secondly by the banned ANC into South Africa. Furthermore, with the decolonization of Angola and Mozambique in the mid-1970's and the institution of hostile governments there, the South African Government felt that notwithstanding the suppression of internal unrest, it also had to deal with the possibility of a conventional threat. This threat was strengthened through the fact that the increasing range, quantity and degree of sophistication of armaments that the Soviet Union provided to Angola, Mozambique, the ANC and SWAPO, provided them with a substantial capacity for a conventional war against South Africa. On the economic side, international trade action against South Africa increased. This action was linked to an internal campaign of black South African trade unions that started to move in the direction of maximum economic disruption. The South African Government regarded this as being more of a threat than insurgent action. Lastly, the South African Government was of the opinion that Soviet Union and its satellite states were waging a relentless psychological war against them; i.e. to isolate South Africa from the world community and to condition the world toward hostile economic and military action against the country. The South African Government believed that the aim of this effort was to break its will to resist and then lead the country into the Marxist sphere of influence. In the view of the South African Government, the combination of all these threats constituted a 'total onslaught' against South Africa.<sup>23</sup>

In the light of the 'total onslaught', the South African Government reasoned that only a comprehensive counterstrategy would enable the country to survive. Consequently, a

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23. Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, p. 234; W.R. Johnson, Destabilization in Southern Africa, *TransAfrica Forum*, Fall 1983, p. 66; J.P. McWilliams, *Arm Scor: South Africa's arms merchant*, p. 24; South Africa: The making of United States policy, 1962 - 1989, Microfiche collection, National Security Files, fiche 01106: *Intelligence document*: Department of Defense, 15 October 1980.

'total strategy'<sup>24</sup> was commissioned by Prime Minister John Vorster at the beginning of 1977. Within this philosophy, the South African Government arranged its defense establishment accordingly, along with the threatening remark to the international community that if South Africa was economically being destabilized, the economic structure of the whole of Southern Africa would collapse, placing the vital strategic interests of the West in jeopardy. The first indication of a 'total strategy' actually already occurred in the early 1970's, when a centralized intelligence agency called the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) was formed. In addition, the private industry was being notified that it could be called upon at any time to provide any item deemed strategic by the Government. In an equally important move in 1977, Armscor's responsibilities were expanded to cover the entire process of weapons production from research to manufacture, servicing and repair, and procurement from private industries. Also, despite the announcement by Botha in 1972, as quoted earlier, South Africa procured a large percentage of its armaments from overseas countries despite the 1963 arms embargo. The truth is that the 1963 embargo was not strictly enforced by all the member states of the United Nations. It was openly flouted by countries like France and Italy, and more covertly in other countries such as the US, where armament manufacturers exploited several loopholes in the enforcement of the embargo, e.g. the granting of licenses for the provision of spare parts for earlier sales and dual-use equipment and components to South Africa.<sup>25</sup>

In the process of armaments procurement and production, a fundamental change by 1977 had taken place in the South African military establishment, namely a reorientation towards a "landward threat" and away from the traditional role of South Africa as a partner of the West protecting the sea-lanes around the southern point of

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24. It is interesting to note that by 1981, the South African Government had compiled a manual called "Administration Total War", which replaced the old State War Book. The latter was more focused on conventional military actions, while the new manual built on the understanding that South Africa was already in a state of total war. Therefore, it also included guidelines on countering non-conventional actions like ideological, economic, psychological and cultural-religious onslaughts. See Armscor Archives (Pretoria), File 1/15/2/3/2, Volume 5: Main Management: Departmental Committees, Commissions and Management Boards, State Security Board, Economic Liaison Committee, **Administration Total War: Feedback to the Management Committee**, 11 September 1981.
25. J.F. Burns, Afrikaners dig in against threat to their rule, *The New York Times*, 4 April 1977, pp. 1, 8; J.P. McWilliams, **Armscor: South Africa's arms merchant**, pp. 24; Krygkor, **SALVO: Krygkor 20 Armscor**, p. 14; South Africa: The making of United States policy, 1962 - 1989, Microfiche collection, National Security Files, fiche 01106: **Intelligence document**: Department of Defense, 15 July 1980; W. Cobbett, Apartheid's army and the arms embargo in J. Cook & L. Nathan (eds.), **Society at War: The militarization of South Africa**, p. 234; J. Nessen, The United States – still arming Apartheid, *Southern Africa*, November 1978, p. 4; S. Gervasi, **The United States and the arms embargo against South Africa: Evidence, denial and refutation**, pp.5-6; Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, **South Africa: Time Running Out**, p. 248.

Africa. The South African Government thereby severed most of its strategic ties with the West, and instead turned its attention to riot control, close air support of mobile ground forces, counterinsurgency operations, coastal patrol and interdiction, commando strike techniques, and local naval defense. In support of these, top priority was given to modernizing light and mobile ground forces with self-contained artillery and flexible air support.<sup>26</sup>

Internationally, the apartheid policy of the South African Government, coupled with the build-up of its military force, elicited much emotion. Apartheid was regarded as a gross violation of human rights and a crime against mankind. It was regarded as equal to colonialism, slavery and aggression; therefore a violation of the international law as stipulated in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.<sup>27</sup> However, it did not elicit much action on the part of the US Government, although some factors through the years contributed to the souring of US-South African relations, which will be discussed in the next section.

### 1.2.3 OVERVIEW OF US-SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS UP TO 1977

The history of US linkages with South Africa dates back to 1799, when the US opened a consulate in what was then the Cape Colony. That was followed in the nineteenth century by a US consulate in Pretoria. On the commercial side, the influence of the US on the Cape Colony was acknowledged as early as 1803 by Dutch Governor Janssens. Since then, relations between the US and South Africa had been cooperative, although at a low level. Up to the Second World War, US relations with South Africa, as in fact with most countries, fell within the boundaries of four traditional concerns, namely commerce, humanitarianism, anticolonialism and political noninvolvement. Fundamental to these four concerns was the refusal of the US to undertake any formal responsibility as far as Africa, with the exception of Liberia, was concerned, as it was concerned that any formal responsibility in Africa would contradict the Monroe Doctrine of 1823<sup>28</sup>. At the start of the twentieth century, it did however provide a diplomatic principle for extending US commercial and financial connections with Africa through a so-called

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26. Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, p. 235.

27. Armscor Archives, Pretoria. Subject: Sanctions and arms embargoes, Box 6, File 11, Study material: *The arms embargo against the RSA*, 15 October 1986.

28. The Monroe Doctrine, a cornerstone of US foreign policy, was enunciated by President James Monroe in a public statement proclaiming three basic dicta: no further European colonization in the New World, abstention of the US from European political affairs, and nonintervention of Europe in the governments of the Western hemisphere. See *New Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Volume VI, p. 1007.

“Open Door” free-trade policy. This significantly helped to build up South Africa through the export of US goods, capital and technical expertise.<sup>29</sup>

In the years before the First World War, official governmental ties between South Africa and the US did not enjoy much attention. After South Africa became a Union in 1910, it relied primarily on the British Government for external links, while the US, enjoying the benefit of profitable activities by the private sector in South Africa, focused its energy on developing new opportunities in the rest of Africa. After the First World War, however, relations strengthened, although minimally. South Africa participated in the First World War as part of the British Empire. As a result, after the war, the South African Prime Minister at the time, Jan Smuts, enjoyed a high standing in the United Kingdom and the US, especially since he participated closely with the US in the drawing up of the Covenant of the League of Nations. In 1926, the position of South Africa and other British dominions was clarified through a Declaration that confirmed South Africa’s autonomous status. This led to the creation of a separate Department of External Affairs on 1 June 1927. In 1928, the US raised the status of its consulate in Pretoria to that of consulate-general and in 1929, a South African legion was opened in Washington, D.C. The US Consulate in Pretoria was upgraded to an embassy in 1949.<sup>30</sup>

In 1939, the Second World War broke out, with South Africa playing a role as a valued partner of the Allies in the fight against fascism, by participating in the war in North Africa and Italy. During the war, the US signed a lend-lease agreement of over \$100 million with South Africa, which was repaid by the South African Government in 1947. In exchange for the lend-lease aid, the US War Department was granted the right to establish several air bases on South African soil, in support of the Allied war effort. At the end of the war, South African Prime Minister Smuts once again augmented his prestige by working closely with the US in the establishment of the United Nations. In

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29. E. Rosenthal, *Stars and Stripes in Africa*, p. 42; D. Prinsloo, *United States Foreign Policy and the Republic of South Africa*, p. 45; R.E. Bissell, *South Africa and the United States: The erosion of an influence relationship*, p. 8; Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, p. 341.

30. R.E. Bissell, *South Africa and the United States: The erosion of an influence relationship*, p. 8; D. Prinsloo, *United States Foreign Policy and the Republic of South Africa*, pp. 45-46; Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, p. 342.

general, however, South Africa was considered part of Europe by the US Department of State, therefore it remained essentially unknown and ignored in the US.<sup>31</sup>

In 1948, the NP's election victory in South Africa raised some eyebrows in the US, but it did not cause immediate, significant consternation. South Africa was still, as far as President Harry Truman and his Administration were concerned, just another friendly country. His goodwill was even more secured when Prime Minister D.F. Malan ensured the US of his Government's support in the fight against communism. Malan also contributed an aircrew for the Berlin airlift and dispatched a fighter squadron for the war that broke out in Korea in 1950. Indeed, in the years 1948 to 1957, there was some pressure within the US national security bureaucracies to strengthen ties with South Africa.<sup>32</sup> Even when the ideology of apartheid became the target of an Asian-Arab resolution in the United Nations for the first time in 1952, the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, set an abstention rule whereby the US refused to vote for specific resolutions on South African issues. In the words of Acheson: "*The US should not intervene for what are called moral reasons in the internal affairs of another country. Moral reasons for interfering are merely a cover for self-indulgent hypocrisy*".<sup>33</sup>

Support for stronger US-South African ties also came from the side of the US Department of Defense, which regarded South Africa as having an excellent strategic location, excellent port facilities and experienced military forces – all factors that made South Africa an important ally in the Cold War.<sup>34</sup> Consequently, military cooperation between the US and South Africa was encouraged. It took on many forms, including routine exchange visits by ranking officers of both the US and South African military forces; a military agreement in 1951 authorizing reimbursable US military assistance under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act; maintaining access to South African ports in exchange for joint military maneuvers with the South African Navy; and the sale of

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31. J.E.H. Grobler, To pay and what to pay? South Africa and lend-lease in the 1940's, *Historia* 40(2), November 1995, pp. 90-92; P.J. Schraeder, *United States foreign policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, crisis and change*, p. 191; Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, p. 342.
  32. R.E. Bissell, *South Africa and the United States: The erosion of an influence relationship*, p. 8; D. Prinsloo, *United States foreign policy and the Republic of South Africa*, p. 46; P.J. Schraeder, *United States foreign policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, crisis and change*, pp. 191 – 192; Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, p. 344.
  33. As quoted in Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, p. 344.
  34. The open yet restricted rivalry that developed after World War II between the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies. The Cold War was waged on political, economic, and propaganda fronts and had only limited recourse to weapons. See *Encyclopædia Britannica* 2003.

arms, in particular fighter aircraft, to the South African military forces. In 1954, the South African Government asked for NATO bases to be established in South Africa as a means of gaining a defense guarantee from the US, and until 1957, South Africa made repeated requests for the formation of a "Southern NATO". Neither of these plans however materialized.<sup>35</sup>

Another proponent of closer ties between the US and South Africa was the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA regarded South Africa as a natural ally in American efforts to hamper communist expansionism by the Soviet Union, on the grounds of a zealous anti-communist outlook on the part of the governing National Party. The CIA was especially interested in building up the South African counterintelligence capabilities to counteract a potential revolutionary upheaval within southern Africa, where the possibility for Soviet manipulation of African nationalism and decolonization was particularly great. Lastly, nuclear cooperation under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Commission constituted a final element in the strengthening of US-South African ties. In November 1950, the South African Government signed an agreement with the US whereby the former would provide the US with its entire output of uranium oxide, in return for technical and scientific collaboration. In 1954, the International Atomic Energy Board was formed, with South Africa being invited to join the US, Britain and other European states as members. In 1957, the US and South Africa signed a 20-year cooperation agreement on nuclear energy research and the development of nuclear power. In addition, the US relied heavily on the importation of other strategic raw materials and minerals from South Africa.<sup>36</sup>

At this point, it can be reasonably concluded that the US policy with regard to South Africa after the Second World War was based on the postwar military and economic linkages between the two countries. This included South Africa's immense mineral wealth; its great strategic importance to the US, the factor of South Africa being a proven and committed Western ally in terms of global conflict, and its opposition to

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35. Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, p. 344; P.J. Schraeder, *United States foreign policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, crisis and change*, pp. 194 – 195; D. Prinsloo, *United States foreign policy and the Republic of South Africa*, p. 59.

36. Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, p. 347; P.J. Schraeder, *United States foreign policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, crisis and change*, pp. 195 - 196; D. Prinsloo, *United States foreign policy and the Republic of South Africa*, p. 47.



communism.<sup>37</sup> Another explanation for the US' positive stance towards South Africa can be that the overall foreign policy of the US in the immediate postwar years was marked by caution, compromise and the tendency to maintain a low profile. The US furthermore reasoned that the United Nations was not competent to intervene in the domestic matters of South Africa, or any other country for that matter.

The season of change was at hand, however, and the winds announcing this season started to blow a bit more fiercely in the late 1950's. The first factor announcing the change was the growing civil rights movement in the US, which strove for greater attention to the issue of race and political equality for African Americans specifically. It has long been realized that social movements play a huge role in organizing challenges to political institutions. Yet, for many years it was seldom adequately examined how these movements influence the foreign policy-making process. The fact is that these movements, which previously might have been unrepresented, are often introduced to the foreign-policy making process through the emergence of new policy problems, the breakdown of consensus on certain issues, and changes in the global environment. In this regard, it can be asserted that the anti-apartheid movement in the US developed over several decades in the second half of the twentieth century as a result of concern over the South African Government's policy of apartheid. The anti-apartheid movement can therefore be regarded as a natural extension of the US's concern about civil rights and racial justice into the international sphere. This concern was brought about in part by the increasing power and prominence of elected African-American officials and the discovery of new methods to influence corporate policy by liberal religious groups.<sup>38</sup>

Anti-apartheid activists in the US pursued their concerns within a variety of groups, arenas and actions, e.g. civil rights organizations, peace movements, labor unions, financial management groups, local and state legislatures, churches, and colleges. It can be noted that the mere fact that such a national movement emerged in the US, was an indication of the birth of a strong feeling of revulsion against the official policies of the South African Government and an omen of what the future could hold. Indeed, in

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37. R.W. Walters, *The Formulation of United States policy toward Africa, 1958 - 1963*, pp. 331, 334; J. Nessen, The United States - Still arming Apartheid, *Southern Africa*, November 1978, p. 4; S.S. Gay, *US National Security policy and sanctions: The US arms embargo against South Africa*, p. 4; D. Prinsloo, *United States foreign policy and the Republic of South Africa*, p. 56.

38. D.R. Culverson, The politics of the anti-apartheid movement in the United States, 1969-1986, *Political Science Quarterly* 111(1), p. 127; R.K. Massey, *Loosing the bonds: The United States and South Africa in the Apartheid years*, pp. xxvi-xxvii.

December 1957, anti-apartheid activists held a public demonstration to denounce apartheid and to call attention to South Africa's refusal to sign the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights. Shortly afterwards, US civil rights activists tried to follow suit in Johannesburg, but the attempt failed. Nonetheless, these protest demonstrations started to occur more regularly, and slowly focused official attention on the issue of the racial inequality not only in the US, but also in South Africa.<sup>39</sup>

The above factor had a direct link with another significant development that would cause strain to US-South African relations, namely the change in the African political arena from the late 1950's, when a growing number of African countries gained independence from white colonial rule. Each of the new independent African states assumed its place in the United Nations General Assembly, thereby becoming the largest geographical voting bloc in the organization. Driven by their common bond of struggle against colonial rule, they focused on the apartheid policy of the South African Government. The result was a spate of resolutions against the latter in the United Nations. The US abstained or voted against these resolutions in the majority of cases in the late 1950's and early 1960's, in terms of the abstention rule instituted by Dean Acheson, as discussed. But cracks in the goodwill of the US towards South Africa nonetheless slowly started to appear, for the reason that the US suddenly found itself in a dilemma. On the one hand, it wanted to maintain the goodwill of the South African Government, mainly for its strategic and anti-communist benefits, while on the other hand it realized that it would have to cultivate the favor of a growing and potentially decisive African voting bloc in the United Nations.<sup>40</sup>

In 1958, a separate Bureau of African Affairs was formed within the US Department of State, and Sub-Saharan Africa suddenly became a distinct item on the US foreign policy agenda. Although this Bureau was the smallest and least prestigious of the regional bureaus, it was soon in a position to tackle African problems in regional terms. Its most important function became the maintenance of smooth and stable US relationships with African countries. Eventually, the majority of the members of the Bureau became most sensitive to the importance that African countries attached to opposing the South

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39. P.J. Schraeder, *United States foreign policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, crisis and change*, pp. 196 - 197; D. Prinsloo, *United States foreign policy and the Republic of South Africa*, p. 71.

40. L.E.S. de Villiers, *United States sanctions against South Africa*, pp. 11-14; P.J. Schraeder, *United States foreign policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, crisis and change*, p. 197; Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, p. 346.

African apartheid system, leading to a greater questioning of US-South African relations in the years to come.<sup>41</sup>

The early effects of all the above changes were apparent by 1958. On 30 October 1958, the US abandoned its rule of abstention on resolutions on the apartheid policies of the South African Government, by voting for the first time for a United Nations General Assembly resolution expressing "*regret and concern*"<sup>42</sup> over the mentioned policy. A similar resolution was also supported in 1959. However, these resolutions, although indicative of a change in the US policy towards South Africa, were quite weak. The policy of the US towards South Africa only came under real fire after the Sharpeville incident. That massacre and the subsequent upheavals in South Africa had far-reaching effects internationally. The image was painted that a peaceful, unarmed crowd of black people who merely wanted to practically show their unhappiness with the oppressive laws under which they had to go about their daily lives, was brutally gunned down by bloodthirsty policemen. The South African Government was widely condemned by the media, various political organizations, governments and prominent individuals. The US Department of State issued a strong rebuke. In the United Nations, although the policy of apartheid was included as a permanent discussion point on the General Assembly's agenda since 1952, its actions rapidly increased in frequency after Sharpeville.<sup>43</sup> Ten days after the incident, the policy of apartheid was discussed for the first time ever in the United Nations Security Council at the request of 29 Asian and African states, as a "*situation arising from the peaceful demonstrations against racial discrimination and segregation*"<sup>44</sup> in South Africa. The Security Council issued a resolution that stated that the situation in South Africa was leading to international friction, and, if the policy of apartheid continued, international peace and security might

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41. R.W. Copson, *Africa Background: History, US policy, principal Congressional actions*, p. 13; Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, p. 346; P.J. Schraeder, *United States foreign policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, crisis and change*, p. 197.
  42. As quoted in P.J. Schraeder, *United States foreign policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, crisis and change*, p. 198.
  43. K. Danaher, "Peaceful Change": A critique of policy themes in United States-South Africa relations, *TransAfrica Forum*, Fall 1983, p. 60; J. Grobler, *A decisive clash? A short history of Black protest politics in South Africa, 1875-1976*, pp. 124-125.
  44. As quoted in United Nations, *Countries of the World*, Chapter 2F.

be endangered. The South African Government was therefore called upon to abandon its policy of apartheid. The US fully supported this resolution.<sup>45</sup>

But, even though the US strongly voiced its dismay with the Sharpeville incident in the Security Council, it was not yet prepared to turn its back on South Africa by practically intervening in the latter's domestic affairs. Indeed, military relations between the two countries were even strengthened in September 1960, when the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) officially announced the establishment of three tracking stations in South Africa for the monitoring of both US and Soviet satellites.<sup>46</sup> In the view of Schraeder, this "*was indicative of a general consensus within the US national security bureaucracies that politico-strategic concerns outweighed any potential drawbacks of association with the apartheid government of South Africa.*"<sup>47</sup> In the longer term, however, the Sharpeville incident did act as a catalyst to a more practical approach by the US in its condemnation of apartheid. Immediately after the incident, the South African Government directed its defense expenditure mainly to the suppression of internal unrest and the curbing of potential insurgency movements. This provided a significant boost to the Afro-Asian nations and anti-apartheid movements worldwide in their efforts to bring an end to apartheid. Traditional arms suppliers to South Africa, the US amongst them, came under intense fire from internal public opinion and the Afro-Asian countries. In numerous heated meetings of the United Nations General Assembly, the Afro-Asian nations called for a complete trade boycott and arms embargo to force an end to the apartheid Government of South Africa.<sup>48</sup>

By June 1963, the Kennedy Administration had realized that it now stood face to face with a new and decisive phase in the apartheid issue. The reasons behind this realization included: international pressure; a process of segregation in the US; heightened interest in Africa as a result of the rapid independence of many of the

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45. United Nations, *Countries of the World*, Chapter 2F; Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, pp. 173-174; J. Grobler, *A decisive clash? A short history of Black protest politics in South Africa, 1875-1976*, p. 125.

46. P.J. Schraeder, *United States foreign policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, crisis and change*, p. 198; Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, p. 346; R.E. Bissell, *South Africa and the United States: The erosion of an influence relationship*, p. 54.

47. As quoted in P.J. Schraeder, *United States foreign policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, crisis and change*, p. 199.

48. M.S. van Wyk, *The 1963 United States arms embargo against South Africa: institution and implementation*, pp. 20-23; J.P. McWilliams, *Arm Scor: South Africa's arms merchant*, pp. 10 - 11, 13.

African states; and the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) earlier in 1963. The formation of the OAU marked the establishment of an organized political force in Africa. The Kennedy Administration had to decide on action against South Africa if it wanted to preserve its influence with the newly independent African states. On the other hand, Kennedy still feared losing the long-standing strategic importance and anti-communistic support of South Africa. The answer was a compromise decision. On 2 August 1963, the Kennedy Administration announced in the UN Security Council that it had decided to prohibit the sale of all arms and military equipment to South Africa after the end of 1963, pending an end to the apartheid policy of the South African Government. However, they would continue to oppose mandatory sanctions against South Africa, as they still regarded it as “*both bad law and bad policy*”<sup>49</sup> that would only result in hardship for all the people of South Africa, including those who were already suffering under the policy of apartheid.<sup>50</sup>

For the remainder of the 1960s, nothing really dramatic happened to further alter the US policy toward South Africa. Lyndon Johnson succeeded Kennedy as US President after the latter was assassinated. In general, Johnson maintained the previous outlines of US policy toward South Africa. He did however strengthen the arms embargo in January 1964 by announcing a unilateral refusal to sell “grey area” material to South Africa, and in 1967 annoyed the South African Government by ordering the aircraft carrier *U.S.S. Roosevelt* not to make its scheduled shore leave stop in Cape Town. In the United Nations, the US generally supported the requests of the African states that South Africa relinquishes its mandate of control over South West Africa (Namibia). On a more positive note for South Africa, the US in 1967 refused to join the United Nation’s Council for Namibia, which was pressing for more radical action against South Africa. Also, CIA contacts continued quietly throughout the Johnson Administration, and the nuclear energy agreement between the US and South Africa was renewed in 1967.<sup>51</sup>

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49. As quoted in Anonymous, US tells U.N. it will halt arms sales to South Africa, *The New York Times*, 3 August 1963, p. 1.

50. Kennedy Presidential Library (Boston), Papers of President John F. Kennedy, File: Schlesinger WH-1: **Secret letter** by G. Mennen Williams to Secretary of State, 12 June 1963; T.J. Noer, *Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White rule in Africa, 1948 – 1968*, p. 144; R.E. Bissell, *South Africa and the United States: The erosion of an influence relationship*, pp. 9, 52-53; Anonymous, US tells U.N. it will halt arms sales to South Africa, *The New York Times*, 3 August 1963, p. 6; M.S. van Wyk, *The 1963 United States arms embargo against South Africa: institution and implementation*, pp. 23-36.

51. Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, pp. 349-350; R.E. Bissell, *South Africa and the United States: The erosion of an influence relationship*, p. 54.

In 1969, a Republican Administration under Richard Nixon replaced Johnson's Democratic Administration in the US, thereby ushering in an effort to change both the style and substance of US relations with South Africa. This effort was explained in a National Security Study Memorandum, NSSM 39, one of 85 such memorandums ordered by Nixon's national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, as part of a review of US foreign policy. The primary focus of Kissinger was still dominated by managing the US relationship with the Soviet Union within the framework of the Cold War, but greater reliance was now also placed on finding reliable local allies worldwide. In this context, the apparent stabilization of the pro-apartheid Government in South Africa seemed to fulfill just such a role. NSSM 39 listed six different policy options for US policy in Southern Africa, of which Option Two was eventually chosen by the Nixon Administration: *"The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists."*<sup>52</sup> This indicated that the Nixon Administration would seek to secure continued contact and dialogue with the white minority government in South Africa, i.e. a policy of containment, with the major emphasis on the white minority government in South Africa being a key ally against communist expansion.<sup>53</sup>

NSSM 39 was not publicly announced, but was eventually leaked to the press. However, before this happened, several events made it clear that a shift in US policy toward South Africa had taken place. For example, in contrast with Johnson's tightening of the arms embargo in 1964, grey-area sales involving helicopters, light planes, troop transport vehicles and communications equipment were now approved by the Nixon Administration. On the economic side, long-term Export-Import Bank financing restrictions were relaxed, and the neutral attitude of neither encouraging nor discouraging investment in South Africa, was replaced by encouragement of US firms to invest, although with the requirement that they adopt progressive policies toward their employees when they did so. In the United Nations, the US abstained every time the issue of South West Africa (Namibia) was discussed and the condemnation of apartheid was demanded. However, in April 1974, Portugal's control of its two Southern African

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52. As quoted in P. Rich, United States containment policy, South Africa and the apartheid dilemma, *Review of International Studies* 14, 1988, p. 184.

53. P. Rich, United States containment policy, South Africa and the apartheid dilemma, *Review of International Studies* 14, 1988, pp. 183-184; Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, pp. 350-352.

colonies, namely Angola and Mozambique, was shattered when a coup took place in Lisbon. Angola was subsequently plunged into a bloody civil war. This, together with other world issues like the collapse of the pro-American government in South Vietnam, American failure in the Vietnam war and withdrawal from South East Asia, the rise in oil prices after the 1973 Middle East War, the Watergate Scandal and Nixon's resignation in 1974, and the Soweto uprising in South Africa in 1976 and its aftermath in which more than 600 youths were killed, plunged the US Government's policies towards South Africa into a crisis.<sup>54</sup>

The resignation of Nixon and the inexperience of his successor, Gerald R. Ford, left Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as the dominant force in the re-evaluation of the US foreign policy towards South Africa. Kissinger found himself in the midst of a period of violent political upheavals against white colonial rule in Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia. In addition, South Africa refused to let go of its mandate of South West Africa (Namibia), which it had administered since 1919. The territory became the object of a protracted battle between the United Nations and South Africa. Since the early 1950's, the question of independence for South West Africa (Namibia) was placed on the agenda of every meeting of the United Nations.<sup>55</sup>

Kissinger faced a dilemma, namely that the US actually had very narrow options with regard to its foreign policy toward Southern Africa, i.e. either revolutionary changes which were said to be antithetical to US interests, or maintaining the status quo, which was identified with stability and US interests. Further deepening his dilemma, according to Magubane<sup>56</sup>, was how to defend the white Government in South Africa without alienating African opinion and offending black Americans. Furthermore, the US and its allies had to take into account the anti-apartheid activists, who wanted the US to disengage from South Africa, as well as the African states and the world opinion. The

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54. D.R. Culverson, The politics of the anti-apartheid movement in the United States, *Political Science Quarterly* 111(1), Spring 1996, p. 131; Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, pp. 352-353; P. Rich, United States containment policy, South Africa and the apartheid dilemma, *Review of International Studies* 14, 1988, p. 185; P. Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976*, pp. 229-230.

55. D.R. Culverson, The politics of the anti-apartheid movement in the United States, 1969-1986, *Political Science Quarterly* 111(1), pp. 131-133; R.K. Massie, *Loosing the bonds*, p. 373; K. Danaher, "Peaceful change": A critique of policy themes in United States-South African relations, *TransAfrica Forum*, Fall 1983, p. 52; P.J. Schraeder, *United States foreign policy toward Africa, Incrementalism, crisis and change*, pp. 213-214; K. Danaher, South Africa, US policy, and the Anti-Apartheid Movement, *Review of Radical Political Economics* 11(3), 1979, p. 43.

56. B. Magubane, United States-South African relations and the implications for black liberation, *The Journal of Ethnic Studies* 11(1), 1983, p. 119.

danger was that open cooperation between the US and South Africa would alienate African opinion and lead to a further strengthening of ties between the Southern African liberation movements and the communist countries, including Fidel Castro's Cuba. In fact, Kissinger feared that Southern Rhodesia would become a target for direct Soviet-Cuban communistic intervention, similar to the situation prevailing in Angola since the end of 1975. He was convinced that the turmoil in southern Africa had become an important piece of the geopolitical game.<sup>57</sup>

Since US military intervention in Southern Africa was not a viable option, Kissinger resorted to diplomacy in an effort to halt the advances of communism in the region. The primary aims of the Kissinger's diplomacy policy was threefold: first, to restore US influence in Southern Africa; second, to reverse Soviet-Cuban infiltration in the area; and third, to implement his policies according to their design. Kissinger sought to make the South African Government an important partner in the negotiating process with Southern Rhodesia. He shaded his words very carefully: "*Our policy toward South Africa is based upon the premise that within a reasonable time we shall see a clear evolution towards equality of opportunity and basic human rights for all South Africans ... In the immediate future, the Republic of South Africa can show its dedication to Africa – and its potential contribution to Africa – by using its influence ... to promote a rapid negotiated settlement for majority rule in Rhodesia.*"<sup>58</sup> Basically, what this statement signaled was that the US would give the South African Government time to enact a mild program of economic and social reform in exchange for cooperation on the Rhodesian matter. Interestingly, political rights for black people were not mentioned. However, in an effort to lighten any criticism that such cooperation might draw, Kissinger stated that he was of the opinion that South Africa would, if pressurized, become more isolated and obstinate to change, and might decide to provide stronger support to the white Rhodesian Government, thus worsening the situation in that war-torn country.<sup>59</sup>

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57. B. Magubane, United States-South African relations and the implications for black liberation, *The Journal of Ethnic Studies* 11(1), 1983, p. 119; R.K. Massie, *Loosing the bonds*, p. 390; P. Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976*, pp. 290-291.

58. As quoted in Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, p. 354.

59. P.J. Schraeder, *United States foreign policy toward Africa, Incrementalism, crisis and change*, pp. 213-214; M.T. Kaufman, US considering new strategies in its policies toward South Africa, *The New York Times*, 15 May 1977, p. 3; R.E. Bissell, *South Africa and the United States: The erosion of an influence relationship*, p. 29; Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, p. 354.



From April 1976 onwards, Kissinger spend many hours traveling in an effort to enact his new approach. At the end of June 1976, he met South African Prime Minister Vorster in Bavaria to discuss the situation in Rhodesia.<sup>60</sup> One could reasonably ask why Vorster was willing to meet with Kissinger to discuss a transfer of power from a white government to a black one, while he had declared on several occasions that the South African Government was totally opposed to power-sharing between black and white people. Vorster explained that the principal reason for his cooperation with Kissinger was the defeat of communism, which he believed was the main force behind the black guerilla movements operating in Southern Africa.<sup>61</sup>

After the initial meeting in Bavaria, Kissinger and Vorster agreed on another meeting in Zurich, Switzerland in September 1976. By that time, the Soweto riots in South Africa had spread despite strong action by the South African Police and the SADF. Schools, offices, shops and public buildings in black areas were destroyed in arson attacks, and the death toll rose to around 500, many of whom were black schoolchildren. On the eve of his departure to Zurich, Kissinger promised to exert pressure to bring about change in South Africa as well as in Rhodesia and South West Africa (Namibia). Vorster immediately responded hotly, declaring that South Africa did not need to be prescribed how to conduct its internal and external policies. Nonetheless, the meeting in Zurich went ahead, and in the ensuing months, Kissinger continued pressing for progress on both the Rhodesian and South West Africa (Namibian) questions.<sup>62</sup>

On 3 November 1976, the US declared in the United Nations that the internal structure of South Africa was incompatible with any concept of human dignity, and should be condemned. In addition, the US would use what influence it had to bring about peaceful change, equality of opportunity, and basic human rights for all in South Africa. To that end, the US would continue to rigorously enforce its comprehensive arms embargo against South Africa, imposed in 1963, as well as strongly urge the South African Government to take the necessary steps to dismantle the apartheid system. To strengthen this position, the US accepted, without objection, a General Assembly

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60. R.E. Bissell, *South Africa and the United States: The erosion of an influence relationship*, p. 30; R.K. Massie, *Loosing the bonds*, p. 392.

61. L.E.S. de Villiers, *United States sanctions against South Africa*, p. 97; Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, p. 354; R.K. Massie, *Loosing the bonds*, p. 392.

62. L.E.S. de Villiers, *United States sanctions against South Africa*, pp. 96-97.

resolution concerning solidarity with South African political prisoners. However, stronger measures were still opposed – it voted against a draft resolution concerning a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which would have declared South Africa a threat to international peace. The US stated that it was not convinced that the invocation of this Chapter against South Africa for its apartheid policies was appropriate at that time. At the same time, it also voted against a draft resolution by the Special Committee Against Apartheid, which would have imposed partial economic sanctions against South Africa. The US felt that such a decision could only be taken by the Security Council, and, moreover, that the facts concerning South Africa did not warrant such a resolution.<sup>63</sup> Thus, although verbally South Africa was strongly condemned, practically the US delegation to the United Nations adhered to Kissinger's policy of going light on South Africa.

But Kissinger's new policy was doomed to failure. He failed to bring the South African Government and SWAPO together for discussions on the independence of South West Africa (Namibia), although he managed to bring the Rhodesian parties together in Geneva in November 1976. These talks continued well into December 1976, but in the end they broke down. Kissinger ascribed the failure to black Africa who refused to be influenced, as well as to the defeat of Gerald Ford by Jimmy Carter in the elections in November. However, shifting the blame was not so simple. In fact, the black African states thought they could negotiate a better deal with a potential Carter administration, and, even more important, they totally disapproved of the extent of the dialogue between Kissinger and the South African Government in the whole affair. This also proved to be a deciding factor for the American people in the elections in November 1976, when Kissinger's foreign policy was used as a political tool for domestic positioning. In fact, Kissinger's efforts produced no tangible results for Ford who faced a major re-election battle. Instead, it enhanced the perception that the Ford Administration was on the wrong side of a race war in Southern Africa, for which there seemed to be limited prospects for an immediate solution.<sup>64</sup>

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63. USUN, United States urges peaceful change in South Africa: Statements made in the U.N. General Assembly on 3 November 1976, *Department of State Bulletin*, 17 January 1977, pp. 48-50; South Africa: The making of United States policy, 1962 - 1989, microfiche collection: National Security Files, fiche 00727: *Telegram*: Secretary of State to American Embassy, Dublin, 30 January 1977.

64. Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, p. 355; L.E.S. de Villiers, *United States sanctions against South Africa*, p. 99; R.E. Bissell, *South Africa and the United States: The erosion of an influence relationship*, p. 31; D.R. Culverson, The politics of the anti-apartheid movement in the United States, 1969-1986, *Political Science Quarterly* 127(23), p. 131.

In the Republican Party's presidential campaign, Ford initially found himself challenged by the former Governor of California, Ronald Reagan. Reagan blasted Kissinger's approach and accused Ford of losing Angola to the communists and selling out the white Rhodesians. He then continued to say that as president, he would consider sending US troops to Rhodesia to defend the white minority. However, this approach was even more unacceptable for the anti-apartheid electorate. On the other hand, the Democratic Party with Jimmy Carter as their candidate for President adopted a platform severely critical of US-South African relations. It called for a more stringent arms embargo against South Africa, the denial of tax credits for US corporations operating in South West Africa (Namibia), and the withdrawal of tax credits for US corporations based in South Africa that supported apartheid policies or practices.<sup>65</sup> Carter himself was of the opinion that the US should do something to turn the racial injustices in Southern Africa around, i.e. the US should reformulate its foreign policy "*towards unequivocal and concrete support of majority rule in Southern Africa, recognizing that our true interests lie in peaceful progress towards a free South Africa for all South Africans, black and white*".<sup>66</sup>

Carter's promise of a "new" policy with regard to South Africa provided an opening for the anti-apartheid and human rights activists in the US to exploit greater public awareness and present a broader platform for their efforts. This "new" policy partly derived from Nixon and Kissinger's policy failures. Kissinger's attempts in 1976 at shuttle diplomacy in Southern Africa tumbled in the face of the escalating uprisings in the region against white minority rule. His objective of trying to prevent communist gains at all costs simply did not satisfy the anti-apartheid and human rights activists as being the answer to the turmoil.<sup>67</sup> They wanted a much stronger, strict approach to South Africa, and Carter promised them just that. Accordingly, they were extremely grateful when Carter was elected President of the US at the end of 1976.

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65. R.K. Massie, *Loosing the bonds*, pp. 390-391; P.J. Schraeder, *United States foreign policy toward Africa, Incrementalism, crisis and change*, p. 215; R.E. Bissell, *South Africa and the United States: The erosion of an influence relationship*, p. 32.

66. As quoted in K. Danaher, South Africa, US policy and the Anti-Apartheid Movement, *Review of Radical Political Economics* 11(3), 1979.

67. D.R. Culverson, The politics of the anti-apartheid movement in the United States, 1969-1986, *Political Science Quarterly* 111(1), p. 132.

For the first few months after becoming president, Carter wanted to maintain the status quo of US policy towards South Africa. However, he was almost immediately forced to find his feet in Southern Africa-related matters. This can mainly be ascribed to the rapidly increasing pressure in the United Nations for independence for South West Africa (Namibia), as well as internal pressure from both the US Congress and the US general public. Thus, from the outset, the Carter Administration followed a policy of exuberant public posturing against the apartheid policy of the South African Government. It was soon clear that South Africa would be a prime target of Carter's foreign policy, especially when the black civil rights activist, Andrew Young, was appointed as US Ambassador to the United Nations. Young was central to the Carter Administration's policy towards South Africa. He raised the hopes of African countries by proclaiming that a binding, although not mandatory arms embargo against South Africa was the irreversible policy of the US as part of an acceptable solution to the Namibia question, as well as the policy of apartheid.<sup>68</sup> In the end, in November 1977, a mandatory arms embargo was instituted against South Africa, thereby ushering in an era of boycotts and sanctions against the South African Government that would continue well into the 1990s.

### 1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND CHAPTER BREAKDOWN

Keeping the abovementioned background in mind, the study will concentrate on addressing the following questions:

Why did the US under the Carter Administration institute the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa in 1977? Did it signify a more hard lined change in US foreign policy with regard to South Africa, or was it intended only as a limited measure to appease the Afro-Asian countries, which continuously pleaded for extensive sanctions against South Africa because of the latter's racial policy of apartheid, while on the other hand maintaining the continued support of the South African Government with regard to anti-communism?

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68. A.J. DeRoche, *Andrew Young: Civil Rights Ambassador*, p. 71. South Africa: The making of United States policy, 1962 - 1989, microfiche collection: National Security Files, fiche 00735: *Telegram*: United States Embassy, Pretoria to Department of State, 23 February 1977; R.W. Copson, *Africa Background: History, US policy, principal Congressional Actions*, p. 13; D. Prinsloo, *United States foreign policy and the Republic of South Africa*, p. 106.

After the institution of the arms embargo is discussed, it is important to also discuss the US implementation thereof, in order to determine if the embargo's objectives were met or not. This takes one to the following question: what regulations did the US introduce to enforce the arms embargo, and to what extent did the various US Administrations from 1977 to 1997 adhere to or change the regulations? Furthermore, was the adherence or changes linked to their foreign policy objectives with regard to South Africa?

Lastly, it is only natural that the enforcement of the arms embargo by the US must have led to a reaction from South Africa. The question that can be asked, therefore, is whether it was primarily in a defiant reaction to the implementation and enforcement of the arms embargo by the US that South Africa turned to clandestine means to circumvent the embargo, and in the end, despite the arms embargo, succeeded in the build-up of a world-renowned defense industry.

In short, the purpose of this study is thus an attempt to determine the objectives of the US in instituting the arms embargo, whether these objectives were met through the implementation and enforcement of the arms embargo, and whether the South African establishment of a world-renowned defense industry signified the failure of the embargo to meet its objectives.

The abovementioned questions will be addressed within the following chapter breakdown:

- Chapter 1: Background, Problem Statement and Literature Review.
- Chapter 2: The institution of a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.
- Chapter 3: The implementation of the mandatory arms embargo by the Carter Administration, 1977-1980.
- Chapter 4: The Reagan Administration: Constructive Engagement and the arms embargo, 1981 – 1984.
- Chapter 5: The implementation of the arms embargo during the second term of the Reagan Administration, 1985 – 1988.
- Chapter 6: Bush, the turn of the South African political tide and the arms embargo, 1989 – 1992.

Chapter 7: The Clinton Administration and the end of the arms embargo, 1993-1998.

Chapter 8: Summary and Final Conclusion.

#### 1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The institution and implementation of the 1963 arms embargo by the US have already been addressed in a Masters degree study by the same researcher. The purpose of the doctoral study is a follow-up study of the Masters study, and will specifically focus on the institution and implementation of the 1977 mandatory arms embargo by the US until it was lifted in 1997.

The value of the topic lies in the fact that the arms embargo that the US imposed on South Africa in 1977, led to the first **mandatory** punitive measure ever instituted against a member state of the United Nations under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Chapter VII authorizes the use of sanctions by the United Nations to enforce decisions by the Security Council in cases of international aggression or when a Government's actions are considered a threat to international peace. Prior to the 1977 arms embargo against South Africa, the United Nations instituted arms embargoes against the People's Republic of China (1951), North Korea (1951), the Congo (1960), Portugal (1963), Rhodesia (1965 and 1966) and South Africa (1963).<sup>69</sup> None of these embargoes were, however, mandatory. In other words, it was not binding for members of the United Nations. The fact that South Africa became the first country to be declared an international threat to peace under Chapter VII therefore indicates an important shift in the use of practical measures by the United Nations and indeed the US, who proposed the use of the measure in the Security Council. This change led to much discussion in the mid-1980's on whether such measures were effective. In these discussions, both the proponents and opponents of expanded sanctions against South Africa used the arms embargo as a model. In the end, it paved the way for a stream of economic sanctions instituted against South Africa by the US in the mid-1980's.<sup>70</sup>

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69. S. Landgren, *Embargo disimplemented: South Africa's military industry*, pp. 4-5; R. Leonard, *South Africa at war: White power and the crisis in southern Africa*, pp. 4-5.

70. M. Brozka, Arming South Africa in the shadow of the UN arms embargo, *Defense Analysis* 7(1), p. 21.

The implementation and enforcement of the arms embargo impacted upon the foreign policy of the US in various important ways. For example, full compliance with the embargo by the US Government would have demonstrated its commitment to end the policy of apartheid in South Africa. On the other hand, any relaxation of the arms embargo by the US Government would have been interpreted as a retreat from the commitment to eradicate the policy of apartheid. Also, the enforcement of the arms embargo by the US Government often raised the important question on the ability of major arms producers like the US to reduce the threat of global violence by controlling the flow of arms to potential belligerents. Lastly, implementation of the arms embargo by the US Government tested the latter's capacity to put measures in place to successfully block arms and related items being exported to the country against which the measure was imposed.<sup>71</sup> In the light of all that has thus been said, it is hoped that the evaluation of the US implementation of the embargo will lead to a better understanding of the role that South Africa played in the formulation of the US foreign policy with regard to Southern Africa in the years 1977 – 1997.

The importance of the study lies in the fact that the embargo directly led to the development of the South African arms industry as one of the biggest and most advanced in the Southern hemisphere, despite the fact that the arms embargo increased the prices of weapons significantly and thus made the procurement of weapons by the South African defense forces more complicated. This industry was built up over a period of more than 15 years, especially during the time that South Africa was involved in operations in southern Angola against the Angolan/Cuban/Soviet communist alliance and had to find new ways and equipment to counter the latter's sophisticated defense systems.<sup>72</sup> The South African Government was therefore often willing to pay high prices for the arms it desperately needed to maintain its position of power both in unrest-torn South Africa and the Southern African region. Furthermore, the domestic South African arms industry was in many cases built by way of clandestine trade in especially US designed weaponry. A further objective of the study is therefore to establish to what extent the US Government's implementation of the arms embargo was hampered by the illegal procurement of weapons by agents of the South African Government; in other words, the way in which the illegal procurement of weapons by South Africa

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71. M.T. Klare, Evading the Embargo: Illicit US arms transfers to South Africa, *Journal of International Affairs* 35(1-2), Spring/Summer 1981-1982, pp. 16-17.

72. S.J. Smith, The South African EW capability, *Armed Forces*, March 1994, p. 17.

problemized the formulation of a US foreign policy with specific regard to Africa. On the other hand, the South African Government sometimes procured US-designed weaponry on a quite legal basis, through third countries. For example, some sources draw a very specific triangle between the US, Israel and South Africa in the field of military cooperation.<sup>73</sup> This indicates an inconsistency in the US foreign policy of especially the 1980's, which further contributed greatly to the build-up of an internationally renowned South African arms industry.

In 1991, the clandestine trade in arms with South Africa led to an extended legal case by the US Government against seven South African citizens, the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armcor) and subsidiaries of Armcor. The case went on for several years and was only resolved when the Vice President of the new democratically elected South African Government in 1994, Thabo Mbeki, intervened in the matter and reached a satisfactory agreement with the Clinton Administration in 1997. Shortly afterwards, the Clinton Administration lifted the arms embargo against South Africa. The discussion of this whole process will contribute to a better understanding of the difficulties that the new South African Government after 1994 under leadership of Nelson Mandela faced in the solution of problems inherited from the apartheid Government, and the struggle in which they found themselves to enhance the image of South Africa not only in the broader world, but also in the US as the biggest institutor of sanctions against South Africa in the 1980's.

The Government-to-Government agreement between Mbeki and Clinton was reached with the view to normalize defense trade between the two countries. In terms of the agreement, Armcor had to implement an internal Compliance Program<sup>74</sup> with procedures to ensure that US origin defense articles, services and technical data would be transferred to Armcor with the necessary authorization from the US, would be properly tracked while in the possession of Armcor, and that all transfers to third parties would be authorized and shipped in accordance with requirements as stated by the US. As the US legal case against Armcor was a direct outflow of its illegal procurement and use of US-origin defense articles, this study will also attempt to bring

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73. Examples: B.M. Joseph, *Besieged Bedfellows: Israel and the Land of Apartheid*, 1988; S. Landgren, *Embargo disimplemented: South Africa's military industry*, 1989; S. Landgren, *Embargo disimplemented: South Africa's military industry*, 1989; F.J. Parker, *South Africa: Lost Opportunities*, 1983; S. Reiser, *The Israeli arms industry: Foreign policy, arms transfers and military doctrine of a small state*, 1984.

74. See Appendix V.



to light at least some illegal procurement incidents in which Armscor was involved. Full revelation of Armscor's dealings is unfortunately not possible, as the researcher was not allowed to view all of the company's documents in this regard, even though access was requested under the South African Freedom of Access to Information Act.

## **1.5 SCOPE OF THE STUDY**

The study will investigate the institution and implementation by the US Government of the mandatory arms embargo that was instituted against South Africa in 1977. The term 'arms' could be interpreted in various ways, for example conventional war-making tools and related items, or also including nuclear weapons or chemical or biological weapons. For the purpose of this study, arms would refer to conventional war-making tools and related items and nuclear technology, with only brief references to chemical or biological weapons. Including a detailed discussion of South African chemical or biological weapons in this study is not feasible, as each in its own right justifies a full masters or doctoral study and would therefore make this thesis too lengthy. Furthermore, information on such weapons or technology remains highly classified, therefore permission to access documents in this regard could be a very lengthy process, which would exceed the time allowed for the completion of this study.

## **1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW**

The research for the study is based primarily on archival documents, official government publications and newspaper reports, with limited references to books and journal articles. Due to the sensitive nature of the topic, the researcher did not think it advisable to make use of interviews. The supervisor agreed with this viewpoint. Potentially, this could have constituted a limitation of the study; therefore, it had to be determined whether the study would be feasible without interviews.

Researching a contemporary topic usually limits the availability of suitable source material, especially archival material. This was certainly the case with this study. Also, since the study specifically deals with the institution and implementation of the arms embargo by the US, it was essential to obtain primary documents from both US and South African origin. If only one country's material was used, the study would be subjective and one-sided, thus lacking the objectivity that characterizes a research study

based on thorough research. It also had to be determined whether the study would be feasible, and if so, whether the topic under study has not already been extensively researched. An intensive search was therefore launched into the availability of sources from both South African and US origin.

Research was firstly undertaken into the availability of books on the subject. However, no book could be found that specifically deals with the US implementation and institution of the embargo. Most of the literature studied deal with the 1977 United Nations arms embargo against South Africa, with reference to the adherence of the various member states. Some of these books however did prove valuable in their discussion of the adherence of the US to the broader United Nations embargo. One of these that proved especially valuable in the sense that it explains how the arms embargo aided the build-up of the South African arms industry, is that of S. Landgren, namely *Embargo disimplemented: South Africa's military industry*. A number of other books either contained a chapter on the US arms embargo, or discussed it in the light of another topic, for example the development of the South African arms industry. The most useful of these books are: McWilliams, J.P., *Armscor: South Africa's arms merchant*; Cook, J & Nathan, L. (eds.), *Society at War: The militarization of South Africa*; and NARMIC, *Automating Apartheid - US computer exports to South Africa and the arms embargo*.<sup>75</sup>

A most valuable book dealing specifically with the policy of the US toward South Africa prior to 1980, was written by a commission tasked by the Rockefeller Foundation to determine how the US could best respond to the problems posed by the South African Government's system of racial separation and discrimination. The commission had eleven members with diverse backgrounds, but nonetheless reputed in their various fields of employment, which included business, labor, universities, foundations, government service, and so forth. The fact that none of them was a specialist on Southern Africa, did not stand in the way of a thorough study. The book is based on well-researched facts, and a real effort for objectivity is clear throughout. It is entitled *South Africa: Time Running Out*, compiled by the Study Commission on United States Policy toward Southern Africa. Another book on the US policy toward South Africa, is entitled *US Foreign Policy and the Republic of South Africa*, written by Daan Prinsloo. This book was published in the late 1970s, putting it in the same time frame as the one

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75. Publication details of the books are provided in the bibliography at the end of this thesis.

written by the Study Commission. However, it lacks the volume and objectivity of that book, and the researcher is of the opinion that it tends to favor the South African Government. It was nonetheless very helpful in determining the South African view of the US policy towards it.

Another valuable book is that of Robert K. Massie, entitled *Loosing the bonds: The United States and South Africa in the Apartheid years*. It is a detailed, well-written book, based on thorough research, and the effort for objectivity is clear throughout. The book tells the story of how South Africa and the US became entangled in each other's struggle for justice. It is a comparative history, having at its core the issue of racial tension. It lifts out the efforts of anti-apartheid activists in the US and how it escalated until a climax in the latter part of the 1980's, when South Africa was hit by a wave of sanctions and the white electorate in the country agreed to let go of their monopoly on political power. It is useful because of very detailed discussions of South African issues that raised much emotion in the US, and how it worked together to raise tension in the relations between the two countries. The book was first published in 1997, and cover the early years of apartheid right through to the first democratically elected South African Government in 1994. Thus, the book is also useful because of its time span, which covers the various US Administrations that will be referred to in this research study.

Useful books that deals with US foreign policy with reference to South Africa, are: Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa: Making peace in a rough neighborhood*; Richard E. Bissell, *South Africa and the US: The erosion of an influence relationship*; and Peter J. Schraeder, *US foreign policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, crisis and change*. These books were especially useful for their overviews of certain aspects of US foreign policy toward South Africa.

Secondly, some research reports and pamphlets were procured. Although the majority of these are quite one-sided, they were of some use. The most valuable is a research report by Gay, S.S., *US National Security policy and sanctions: The US arms embargo against South Africa*, which was undertaken for the Air War College, Air University, Alabama, in 1987. The following are pamphlets by anti-apartheid movements and individuals: COSAWR, *State of War, Apartheid South Africa's Decade of Militarism*, published in 1984; Sean Gervasi, *The US and the Arms Embargo against South Africa*:

*Evidence, denial and refutation*, published in 1978, and National Action/Research on the Military-industrial Complex (NARMIC), *Military exports to South Africa - A research report on the arms embargo*, published in 1984. Usable South African research reports include two documents compiled by Armscor, *Essentials of the Armscor Compliance Programme* and *SALVO: Krygkor 20 Armscor*.

Thirdly, research into journal articles was undertaken. Numerous of the journals studied contain articles that specifically address the issue of the arms embargo and the violation thereof. Others address the embargo as part of the foreign policy of the US with regard to South Africa. Most of the articles cover the period between 1977 and 1990, when negotiations for a democratic South Africa commenced. The majority are severely critical of either the US policy with regard to South Africa and/or the South African racial policy of apartheid, while others clearly favor only the South African or US point of view. Thus, although more than 50 journal articles have been analyzed, the majority could not be trusted as objective sources. On the other hand, these articles are valuable sources of information that cannot be ignored. For example, journal articles often contain statements that are not reported on anywhere else. This often spurred the researcher to embark on further research to prove the correctness or incorrectness of the statement. In such instances, the value and utmost importance of primary documents to prove statements made in journals or books were yet again realized.

The researcher fourthly made extensive use of primary documents, i.e., archival documents, newspaper reports and governmental or official publications. Concerning archival documents, a valuable collection of US-origin documents is held by the Academic Information Service (AIS) of the University of Pretoria, namely *South Africa, The making of US policy, 1962 - 1989*. It is a microfiche collection of documents from the US National Security Archives. The AIS has also procured a collection of videotapes dating 1977 onwards with speeches, policy announcements, news broadcasts, statements, etc. The videotapes were identified by the researcher in the search for archival material. Archival documents were also obtained from the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library in Atlanta, Georgia, during a research visit to the US. A number of declassified archival documents from the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California, as well as the George Bush Presidential Library in College Station, Texas, were obtained via the Internet. However, the majority of the documents in the collections of these two presidents are still classified, but declassification has been

requested under the US Freedom of Information Act. As this process can take two to three years, these documents can form a major part of a postdoctoral study.

Archival documents from the South African side were mainly obtained from the Armscor archives in Pretoria. Access was granted under the South African Freedom of Information Act, with the restriction that Armscor must first view the thesis upon completion. If found to contain sensitive information that will be harmful to South Africa, Armscor or individual persons, the thesis will be classified. The Department of Defense (DOD) Info Centre in Pretoria has also granted access under the Freedom of Information Act. However, upon studying the relevant archival lists, it became clear that the collection contained hardly anything of direct relevance to this study. Further investigation of the DOD lists was therefore not pursued.

With regard to newspaper articles, a wide range of newspapers was investigated. Major South African newspapers include the *Beeld*, *Argus*, *Die Burger*, *The Citizen*, *The Pretoria News*, *The Star* and *Sunday Times*, amongst others, and major US newspapers include the *Christian Science Monitor*, *The New York Times*, *LA Times*, *Chicago Tribune* and the *Washington Post*, amongst others. Reports from these newspapers cover the whole embargo period.

Another very important source of primary documents that was investigated, is the category of governmental and official publications. Of particular value is the *Department of State Bulletin*, the monthly publication of the US Department of State (the name changed to the *Department of State Dispatch* in 1991). This publication has been studied in detail during a research visit to the US, and valuable material for almost every year that the arms embargo was in place, was obtained. Other official documents of much value are complete hearings held by members of the US Congress. The one hearing is on *US - South Africa relations: Arms embargo implementation*, which was held before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, on 14 and 20 July 1977. The other hearing is on the *Enforcement of the US arms embargo against South Africa*, held before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, on 30 March 1982. On the South African side, a valuable document is the Department of Defense's *White Paper on Defense and Armaments Supply*, 1979. Other documents include publications by the United Nations, i.e. resolutions, policy documents, etc.

In the light of the above overview, it was established that although the study is contemporary in nature, enough reliable source material was available to make it feasible.