Abstract:
The main research problem in this study is whether law and specifically the human rights
framework can speak to the lived experiences and realities of the disabled Nigerian woman. This
thesis reflects the frustrations that I experience with my own intersectional identity as a (Nigerian,
Yoruba and disabled) woman. These frustrations begin with Nigerian law, specifically its human
rights framework and its perception of the disabled woman. One illustration is that the law
demands that one must choose between being a woman (identity category) and being disabled
(identity category). Yet, the disabled woman has trouble choosing one of these established identity
categories because she is a woman and disabled at the same time.
The law makes these demands without necessarily recognising and contemplating the interaction
and intersection between sex(ism) and disability (discrimination). Unfortunately, because the
disabled woman does not neatly fit into the human rights categories, she is labelled deviant and
denied protection.1 In most cases, Nigerian law even makes the choice: on the strength of the
disability the law decides that one is less of a woman and more disabled, and so refuses to
contemplate and recognise the gendered and emergent nature of disability.2 Thus the limits of the law and human rights in speaking to the complex and intersectional lived realities of the disabled
Nigerian woman become evident.
The law, and specifically the human rights framework, is often portrayed as a saviour of some sort.
For instance, a number of commentators point to the need for a Nigerian law and human rights
framework that will protect the rights of disabled persons.3 The acquisition of rights, particularly
for vulnerable groups who have previously been denied access to these rights, can be empowering
and there is no denying the value of a legal and human rights framework. This in turn raises the
question that is asked in this thesis.
The position I hold is that law and specifically the human rights framework, while having
enormous value, is limited in its ability to speak to the lived realities of disabled women. In my
view, this limitation results from a failure to recognise the complexities, interactions and
intersections that exist between identity categories such as sex, gender, ethnicity or race, sexuality,
class, age, culture, religion and disability. Specifically, in this case, the law fails to recognise the
interactions and intersections between sex(ism) and disability (discrimination) in the country.
However, I argue that the product of these unacknowledged interactions and intersections crucially
underlie and form the lived realities of the disabled woman.
