From especially the 1950's, campaigns had been launched by the Afro-Asian nations in
the United Nations for the institution of mandatory sanctions against South Africa. In all
the early campaigns, South Africa had rather enjoyed the support of the United States,
although the latter had always verbally condemned the South African policy of apartheid.
When Kennedy became United States president in January 1961, this fact was due to
change. In August 1963, an arms embargo was instituted against South Africa by the
Kennedy Administration in an attempt to bring the verbal condemnation of apartheid in
line with active action. The arms embargo, although not mandatory, was the first
concrete, practical step taken by the United States in its opposition to the apartheid
policy of the South African Government. In 1977 the embargo was strengthened to
become a mandatory one.
The purpose of this study is to analyse the institution as well as the implementation of
the arms embargo by the different United States Administrations up to 1977. By doing
that, the observer can judge the relative commitment of the United States to the arms
embargo from president to president, thus drawing a wide conclusion on the role that
South Africa played in the foreign policy objectives of the United States in the years that
the arms embargo was in effect. The Afro-Asian clearly had an impact on the formulation
of this policy, and part of the purpose of this study is to establish just how big that
impact was. In order to do this, a wide selection of archival material as well as
newspaper reports, articles in journals, governmental publications and some secondary
sources were researched. The outcome is the conclusion that although the different United States Administrations from Kennedy to Carter generally adhered to the arms
embargo, the implementation there-of depended mainly on what role the embargo played
in the foreign policy objectives of each of these Administrations. For some, like Nixon
and Ford, the strategic importance of South Africa weighed heavier than gaining the
favour of the African nations, in comparison with Kennedy and Johnson who followed
a midway. They didn't want to loose the privileges that the United States had in South
Africa, while at the same time they wanted to appease the African countries in the
United Nations. In the case of Carter, the implementation of the arms embargo was
directly based on gaining the favour of the African nations, resulting in the institution of
a mandatory arms embargo in October 1977. A future study on the role of that embargo
in the formulation of the United States foreign policy, will be conducted as continuation
of this study.
Vanaf die 1950's veral, is uitgebreide veldtogte deur die Afro-Asiatiese Iande in die
Verenigde Nasies vir die instelling van verpligte sanksies teen Suid Afrika gevoer. In al
die vroeere veldtogte, het laasgenoemde voortdurend die ondersteuning van die
Verenigde State van Amerika (VSA) geniet, alhoewel daardie land altyd die SuidAfrikaanse
apartheidsbeleid mondeling veroordeel het. In Januarie 1961 het Kennedy die
president van die VSA geword, en daarmee het die ondersteuning van Suid-Afrika stadig
maar seker begin afneem. In Augustus 1963 het die Kennedy-administrasie 'n
wapenverbod teen Suid-Afrika ingestel in 'n paging om die mondelinge veroordeling van
apartheid in lyn te bring met aktiewe optrede. Die wapenverbod, alhoewel dit nie
verpligtend was nie, was die eerste konkrete, praktiese stap wat deur die VSA in sy
opposisie teen die apartheidsbeleid van die Suid-Afrikaanse regering geneem is. In 1977
is die verbod uitgebrei na 'n verpligte een.
Die doel van hierdie studie is om die instelling sowel as die implementering van die
wapenverbod deur die verskillende Amerikaanse Administrasies tot en met 1977, te
analiseer. Deur dit te doen, kan die navorser die relatiewe verbintenis van die VSA tot die
wapenverbod beoordeel en sodoende 'n wye gevolgtrekking maak oor die rol wat SuidAfrika
gespeel het in die buitelandse beleidsdoelwitte van die VSA gedurende die jare wat
die verbod ingestel was. Die Afro-Asiatiese nasies het beslis 'n impak gehad op die
formulering van hierdie buitelandse beleid, en deel van die doelwit van hierdie studie is
om te bepaal hoe groat daardie impak werklik was. Ten einde by h!_erdie gevolgtrekking
te kon uitkom, is 'n wye verskeidenheid argivale materiaal sowel as koerantberigte, tydskrifartikels, regeringspublikasies en literatuur bestudeer. Die uitkoms van hierdie
navorsing is die gevolgtrekking dat alhoewel die verskillende VSA regerings vanaf
Kennedy tot Carter oor die algemeen die wapenverbod ondersteun het, die
implementering daarvan hoofsaaklik afhanklik was van die rol wat die verbod in die
buitelandse beleidsdoelwitte van elkeen van hierdie Administrasies gespeel het. Vir party,
soos byvoorbeeld Nixon en Ford, het die strategiese waarde van Suid-Afrika vir die VSA
swaarder geweeg as die guns van die Afrikalande, in vergelyking met Kennedy en
Johnson wat 'n middeweg gevolg het. Hulle wou nie die voordele wat die VSA in SuidAfrika
gehad het, verloor nie, maar terselfdertyd wou hulle ook die Afrikalande tevrede
stel. In die geval van Carter, was die implementering van die wapenverbod direk gebaseer
op die guns wat die VSA in die Afrikalande kon geniet. Dit het gelei tot die instelling van
'n verpligte wapenverbod teen Suid-Afrika in Oktober 1977. 'n Verdere studie oor die rol
wat daardie verbod in die formulering van die Amerikaanse buitelandse beleid gespeel
het, sal as 'n opvolg tot hierdie studie onderneem word.
