

The origins of the garrison state?

**An analysis of South African political-intellectual discourse during the 1930s and
1940s**

A thesis submitted for the requirements of the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (PHD) IN HISTORY

Department of Historical and Heritage Studies

Faculty of Humanities

University of Pretoria

by

Frederik Fouché Kirsten

October 2024

Supervisor: Professor Ian Macqueen

ABSTRACT

The concept of the garrison state as developed by American political scientist Harold Lasswell in 1941, is examined as a “developmental construct.” The concept predicted the future path democracies could take in their confrontation with fascism in the mid-twentieth century. The thesis argues that the garrison state is a state phenomenon and that political parties, with different ideological beliefs, benefited from developing garrison state characteristics in South Africa. These characteristics were not already established, but rather developing, motivating the use of “origins.” Using prominent figure Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr’s viewpoint as a lens, the thesis follows a chronological approach which focuses on the political-intellectual discourse of the 1930s and 1940s. Hofmeyr’s interactions with his peers Jan Smuts, D.F. Malan, and Oswald Pirow are highlighted. In the thesis Smuts is framed as a “specialist on violence” while Hofmeyr and Pirow (Pirow because of his “five-year plan”), are presented as inadvertent agents of the garrison state. The thesis positions the garrison state as one of many anti-fascist manifestations.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, thank you to Professor Karen Harris, the Head of the Department Historical and Heritage Studies at the University of Pretoria for assisting me with all my inquiries and helping me to start this degree.

I would like to thank the University of Pretoria for its generous financial support in awarding me a Postgraduate Doctoral bursary. The staff at the University of Pretoria's Postgraduate Scholarship Office have been immensely helpful.

I would like to express my deepest appreciation to Professor Ian Macqueen for acting as my supervisor for this thesis. He provided invaluable academic insight. My experience collaborating with Professor Macqueen has been incredibly positive and I will be forever grateful.

I am also grateful for all the archivists, administrators and librarians at the National Archive of South Africa; the Cullen Library at the University of Witwatersrand; the Alan Paton Centre at the University of Kwa-Zulu Natal (Pietermaritzburg campus); the Harold Dwight Lasswell Papers Archives at Yale University and finally the Gericke Library at the University of Stellenbosch.

Special thanks goes to my entire family, especially my parents and my two sisters for all their love and support.

Last, this endeavour would not have been possible without the bedrock of my life, my wife Chantell. Thank you for being such an inspiration and always believing in me. Ek is lief vir jou.

Thank you

Frederik Fouché Kirsten

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAC	All Africa Convention
ACF	Active Citizen Force
ANC	African National Congress
AP	Afrikaner Party
Armcor	The Armaments Corporation of South Africa
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BBV	Boeren Beschermingsvereniging
BOSS	Bureau of State Security
CGS	Chief of the General Staff
COL	Cost of Living Index
CPSA	Communist Party of South Africa
DOD	Department of Defence
HNP	Herenigde Nasionale Party
JMCs	Joint Management Centres
Iscor	South Africa Iron and Steel Corporation
MID	Military Intelligence Department
NIS	National Intelligence Service
NSDAP	Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei
NSMS	National Security Management System
NP	National Party
OB	Ossewa-Brandwag
PAC	Pan African Congress
POW	Prisoners of War
PRO	Public Relations Officer
RCS	Royal Commonwealth Society
RNVR(SA)	Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (South African Division)

SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SACP	South African Communist Party
SACS	South African College School
SADF	South African Defence Force Council
SAHJ	South African Historical Journal
SAIC	South African Indian Congress
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SAP	South African Party
SAPA	South African Press Association
SSC	State Security Council
SU	Soviet Union
UDF	Union Defence Force
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UP	United Party
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USA	United States of America
UUTS	Union Unity Truth Service
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS	iv
CONTENTS	vi
INTRODUCTION	1
Research Question, Aims and Objectives	6
Literature Review	8
Conceptualising the Garrison State	8
South Africa in the 1930s and 1940s	19
Rationale	33
Methodology	34
Chapter Outline	37
CHAPTER 1 Lasswell, Hofmeyr and Pirow and the Origins of the Garrison State	41
The Garrison State Explained	42
The Harold D. Lasswell Lens: The “One-Man University”	51
Criticism by Other Scholars	61
The Hofmeyr Lens:	63
A Summarised Biography: Who was Hofmeyr?	69
Hofmeyr’s Early Political Career	73
Why the Hofmeyr Lens?	77

The Oswald Pirow Lens: An Authoritarian Vision for the Future of South Africa	89
A Summarised Biography: Who was Pirow?	90
Conclusion	103
CHAPTER 2 Coming of Age (1930–1933): Hofmeyr and the Politics of the Early 1930s	105
Hofmeyr and Malan: The Immigration Quota Bill	108
Studies in South African Citizenship and Politics	114
South African Politics and the Great Depression 1930–1933	124
Carnegie Report: The Poor White Question	131
Conclusion	139
CHAPTER 3 The Beginning of Endless Trouble (1934–1938): The Contributions of	
Hertzog and Pirow to the Garrison State	141
The Hertzog Bills 1934–1935	149
Opposition to the Hertzog Bills 1934–1935	152
Oswald Pirow’s “Five-Year Plan” 1934–1938	155
Hertzog and South African Sovereignty 1935	170
Hofmeyr’s “The Middle of the Road” Speech 1935	173
Hofmeyr’s “Israel’s Gift to Humanity” Speech 1938	181
The Rise of the Ossewa-Brandwag 1938	185
Conclusion	189
CHAPTER 4 A Divided Nation (1939–1943): South Africa Enters World War II	192
The Ossewa-Brandwag Continued	197

Malan and Pirow Split: Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika (The New Order for South Africa) 1940	207
The Rising Sun—A Message from Hofmeyr 1940	210
The Problem of South African National Unity by 1940	212
Lasswell Publishes <i>The Garrison State</i> 1941	221
United Party Newsletter—National Socialism: What it Means	223
The Election of 1943	231
Conclusion	241
CHAPTER 5 A Rude Awakening (1944–1948): The Build-Up to the 1948 Election	245
Smuts: Imperial Internationalism	250
Reconciling Imperialism and Liberty: Hofmeyr 1945	254
The Fagan Commission vs. The Sauer Commission 1946–1948	260
In Their own Words: What the United Party Stood for 1946–1948	267
The National Party and Hofmeyr	275
The Election of 1948	276
The Results of the 1948 Election and the Garrison State	280
What of the Future? 1948	283
The Threat to Democratic Freedom may Come from Within	287
The Nationalists Party and National Unity	292
Conclusion	295
CHAPTER 6 Conclusion: Malan takes Advantage of the garrison state	298
Future Full of Danger for South Africa	301
What Became of Pirow and Hofmeyr’s Visions for the Future of South Africa?	303

Which Garrison State Characteristics did South Africa Exhibit in the 1930s and 1940s?	305
Improving the Garrison State Concept	312
A Final Summary	315
BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary Sources	320
BIBLIOGRAPHY Secondary Sources	327

INTRODUCTION

Apart from being an innovative pioneer in the social sciences,¹ Harold D. Lasswell is also regarded as one of the unique and prolific political scientists of the twentieth century.² His research was multidisciplinary in nature, and he focused on a broad diversity of themes such as politics and personality, propaganda and public opinion, symbolism and mass communication on national and global scales, encompassing a wide array of academic concerns.³ Lasswell wrote numerous books and essays on topics ranging from “international relations, political philosophy, and empirical political science to economic policy, labour relations, psychiatry, and quantitative semantics.”⁴ Lasswellian expressions such as “content analysis,” “value pyramid,” and “policy science” would be used in works of social scientists.⁵

During the 1930s and 1940s, social scientists were considered as best-equipped to explain and analyse the functioning of a democratic society⁶ as their work often involved conducting surveys, experiments, interviews, and analysing data to understand and explain human social behaviour and interactions. As a social scientist, Lasswell understood this belief, and created the concept of the garrison state to understand the governing of a democratic state and the threats it may face. By referring to both Lasswell’s concept and to an actual garrison state, this thesis will unpack the characteristics of both, with the difference becoming clearer as the study engages the work of Bernard Magubane. This

¹ G. A. Almond, "Harold Dwight Lasswell February 13, 1902–December 18, 1978," in *Bibliographical Memoirs*, ed. N. V. A. de Abreu (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1987), 249.

² Almond, "Harold Dwight Lasswell February 13, 1902–December 18, 1978," 249.

³ Almond, "Harold Dwight Lasswell February 13, 1902–December 18, 1978," 249.

⁴ M. Battistini and H. D. Lasswell, "The 'problem of world order,' and the historic mission of the American middle class," in *Beyond the nation: Pushing the boundaries of US history from a transatlantic perspective*, ed. F. Fasce, M. Vaudagna, and R. Baritono (Torino: Otto Editore, 2013), 225-254.

⁵ Almond, "Harold Dwight Lasswell February 13, 1902–December 18, 1978," 249.

⁶ Almond, "Harold Dwight Lasswell February 13, 1902–December 18, 1978," 249.

study will therefore not only use the garrison state as a label, but also engage with the concept.

As a theoretical framework, the garrison state initially developed as a “developmental construct.” A developmental construct is an idea that is not only used to understand and describe changes, patterns, and future developments that occur over time but also used to make predictions. In 1935, Lasswell initially created the developmental construct as an analytical tool which he further developed between 1937 and in 1941 as a feature of the approach of futures thinking.⁷ Thereafter, he continued to use it in several of his other publications. Lasswell saw the developmental construct as part of a larger process of “intellectual investigation” which he labelled “developmental analysis.”⁸ In this analysis Lasswell provided futurists with a basis for examining the future by “interrogating the investigation of goals and values, trends, conditions, projections and alternatives.”⁹ The developmental construct was just one of many other examples of how Lasswell was forward looking. Lasswell himself referred to a developmental construct as a speculative model of social change, thus a possible direction in which society was moving. Lasswell was advanced for his time, and unfortunately, he was restricted by it. He was a pioneering scholar urging his social science associates to broaden their horizons.

One example of the numerous developmental constructs that Lasswell created was the garrison state.¹⁰ Lasswell was anxious about “the values of democracy”—both “the existence of human rights and civil liberties,” and the “competitive political systems based

⁷ W. Bell, “H.D. Lasswell and the futures field. Facts, predictions, values and the policy sciences,” *FUTURES* 3, no. September 1993 (1993): 807.

⁸ Bell, “H.D. Lasswell and the futures field. Facts, predictions, values and the policy sciences,” 807.

⁹ Bell, “H.D. Lasswell and the futures field. Facts, predictions, values and the policy sciences,” 807.

¹⁰ Bell, “H.D. Lasswell and the futures field. Facts, predictions, values and the policy sciences,” 807.

on free and fair elections.”¹¹ According to Lasswell, the construct of the garrison state would warn citizens (who held democracy in high regard) to specific dangers. Prepared with expertise, these citizens would then attempt to counter the movement to the garrison state.

Lasswell focused on the future direction of global politics. A defining feature of the garrison state is as a move away from the domination of the “specialist on bargaining,” or the businessman, towards the “supremacy” of the “specialist on violence,” the soldier.¹² In a garrison state the ruling elite would either be agents of the military (the specialists on violence) or closely allied to them (more detail to follow in Chapters 1 and 2). Lasswell did not believe the garrison state to be inevitable, and thus, it was not intended as a dogmatic prediction of the future.¹³ Instead, the concept would function more as a possibility that society should be wary of.

This thesis seeks to apply Lasswell’s concept of the garrison state to the South African context. Specifically, the study provides an analysis of the political-intellectual discourse of South Africa during the 1930s and 1940s, the period in which Lasswell developed the concept, which was also a turning point in the history of the country.

Despite Lasswell’s influence on political science, the historical veracity of his ideas has rarely been tested. In modern idiom, The garrison state could be seen as a form of “state capture” by the military: a situation that increasingly described the South African state, especially during the late apartheid era. This thesis explores the extent to which Lasswell’s developing characteristics of the garrison state can be detected in South Africa in the 1930s and 1940s. The thesis also explores the “conditions of possibility” created in the time-period for the garrison state to realise. During the 1930s and 1940s there were many

¹¹ Bell, “H.D. Lasswell and the futures field. Facts, predictions, values and the policy sciences,” 807.

¹² H. D. Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” *American Journal of Sociology* 46, no. 4 (1941): 455.

¹³ Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” 456.

“moving parts”—not all are necessarily relevant to the garrison state. Therefore, the thesis also identifies limitations of Lasswell’s concept and how to possibly improve it. In this way, the thesis seeks to both contribute to South African history and to the study of Lasswell.

The universal challenge to the racist assumptions of colonial rule and segregation after the Second World War had an impact on South Africa.¹⁴ The influence of innovative ideas from groups such as black¹⁵ leaders, liberal academics, and a broader liberal intelligentsia, as well as urban businessmen were reflected in major publications and commissions such as the van Eck, Smit, and Fagan Reports.¹⁶ However, instead of these liberal ideas becoming increasingly popular in South Africa, they were rejected in the end, and apartheid introduced by the Nationalist Party to be elaborated on and consolidated in the 1950s and 1960s, respectively. In fact, the Sauer Commission, which made directly opposite recommendations to the Fagan Report, was used as a policy platform for Afrikaner Nationalist sympathisers.¹⁷ Both the Fagan Commission and Sauer Commission is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.

The novelty of the thesis lies in exploring the insights and observations of leaders such as Jan Christiaan Smuts, Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, James Barry Munnik Hertzog, Daniel François Malan, and Oswald Pirow for traces of the developing characteristics of the garrison state that Laswell predicted at the time. The research is a continuation of concepts covered during the candidate’s master’s degree.¹⁸ The primary focus of the master’s study was “the nature of the relationship between the South African Defence Force and the local

¹⁴ M. Lipton, *Capitalism and apartheid, South Africa 1910–1986* (Aldershot, Hants: Wildwood House, 1989), 20.

¹⁵ The thesis will use racial terminology such as “black”; “white”; “indian” – racial terminology such as “native”; “non-white”; “European”; “non-European” will only be used by the thesis when used by a source.

¹⁶ Lipton, *Capitalism and apartheid, South Africa 1910–1986*, 20.

¹⁷ Lipton, *Capitalism and apartheid, South Africa 1910–1986*, 21.

¹⁸ F. Kirsten, “A critical analysis of the relationship between the South African defence force and the South African media from 1975–83” (Unpublished master’s dissertation, Rhodes University, 2015), 42–47.

media from 1975 to 1983.”¹⁹ This relationship functioned within a highly militarised society deemed to be a garrison state.²⁰

The developmental construct of the garrison state emerged during the period that this research is focusing on. Thus, the research also seeks to determine the possibility that there was a moment of inception and an incubation period for apartheid South Africa’s garrison state. The research seeks to determine different ways in which various parties conceptualised apartheid South Africa as a state. This helped to determine whether referring to apartheid South Africa as a garrison state is the best way to conceptualise it, and if so, to what extent. When referring to the garrison state in this study it should be viewed as, following Lasswell, a developmental construct, which can also be used as a label to understand specific characteristics of a country.

Across all countries, global events impact local decision-making. Therefore, it can be argued that South Africa was not at all inward looking in terms of the development of the garrison state. Two specific global events during the 1930s and 1940s had an important influence on South Africa. First, the great Depression and its far-reaching economic impact caused global hardship and poverty. For example, if we localise the phenomenon of the great Depression, the issue of poor “whiteism” becomes relevant in South Africa. Conditions of unemployment are one of the important characteristics of a garrison state. The garrison state views unemployment in a specific light that is discussed in Chapter 2. The second major global event was the beginning of WWII, which caused political divisions in terms of

¹⁹ Kirsten, "A critical analysis of the relationship between the South African defence force and the South African media from 1975–83," 42-47.

²⁰ Kirsten, "A critical analysis of the relationship between the South African defence force and the South African media from 1975–83," 42-47.

the decision whether South Africa would join the side of Great Britain or remain neutral during the war. The impact of WWII is dealt with in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.

Research Question, Aims and Objectives

The period explored in this thesis, the 1930s and 1940s, was a period marked by a series of conservative victories and liberal failures, both on the ideological and political fronts. From an international perspective, this period was characterised by what British historian Eric Hobsbawm described as:

In many ways this period of capitalist and communist alliance against fascism—essentially the 1930s and 1940s—forms the hinge of twentieth-century history and its decisive moment. In many ways it is a moment of historical paradox in the relations of capitalism and communism, placed, for most of the century—except for the brief period of anti-fascism—in a posture of irreconcilable antagonism.²¹

Similarly, in South Africa, issues surrounding fascism impacted the political-intellectual discourse at the time, with the debate revolving around the direction the country was moving in. The 1930s and 1940s could be seen as a period of segregation, and yet the country was at a crossroads because of the disagreements between liberal and conservative voices. The research explores the political-intellectual discourse of the period leading up to the development of the characteristics of the garrison state. Consequently, the research seeks to provide answers to various questions: What does the political-intellectual discourse of the 1930s and 1940s reveal? How was it that South Africa came to be at a political crossroads during the 1930s and 1940s? Also, did any garrison state characteristics develop in South Africa during the 1930s and 1940s? If so, which and to what extent? To

²¹ E. Hobsbawm, *Age of extremes: The short twentieth century 1914–1991* (London: Abacus, 1994), 7.

what extent is the garrison state a state phenomenon? How does the garrison state manifest itself as a response to fascism? How can the garrison state as a concept be improved? The thesis also explores the limits of Lasswell's garrison state concept using South Africa as an example. The thesis focuses on various debates, speeches, and laws of the time and how they impacted the 1930s and 1940s South African society. The thesis also sought to answer the question of how Hofmeyr and his allies viewed the future of the South African state? In contrast to Hofmeyr, Pirow was used as his political antithesis. Even before Hofmeyr's established political career, Pirow was concerned about the future of South Africa. It was also important to ask to what extent Hofmeyr, together with Smuts, became an agent of the garrison state.²² Here, the question was also if Hofmeyr saw any pitfalls that would relate to the formation of a garrison state, or whether he was more concerned with race relations and the politics of the day. How did Pirow become an inadvertent agent of the garrison state with his "five-year plan"? Finally, as the study also focused on the political-intellectual discourse of the 1930s and 1940s, it was important to ask what the liberal failures and the conservative victories in the 1930s and 1940s were and how these related to garrison state characteristics.

The thesis proposes that the political-intellectual discourse of the 1930s and 1940s were dominated by debates about race which informed the political crossroads that the country found itself in. Certain garrison state characteristics did develop—however, not all—and some to a greater extent than others. This is discussed in greater detail in the conclusion of the thesis. The thesis proposes that the garrison state was a state phenomenon in which, at least in the South African context, different parties with different

²² In Lasswellian terms, Smuts could be seen as a "specialist on violence."

political ideologies took advantage of the benefits of the garrison state. For South Africa this unfolded with the continuation of the garrison state from the United Party (UP) to the takeover by the National Party (NP). In South Africa, the garrison state manifested itself as a response to fascism considering the imperial internationalism of Smuts and Hofmeyr. This imperial internationalism also informed Hofmeyr's view for the future of South Africa. Hofmeyr became an agent of the garrison state to the extent that he assisted the state in its battle against fascism in WWII. Unlike Smuts, Hofmeyr cannot be seen as a "specialist on violence" as he had no military background or involvement and had been more concerned with race relations and domestic politics. With his "five-year plan" Pirow became an inadvertent agent of the garrison state. Through his reorganisation of the military he assisted Smuts to combat fascism, which was Pirow's selected political ideology. Finally, as the study also focused on the political-intellectual discourse of the 1930s and 1940s, various liberal failures and conservative victories in the 1930s and 1940s (for example, the Hertzog Bills) were identified and is discussed throughout the thesis.

Literature Review

Conceptualising the Garrison State

Lasswell was an associate professor of political science, professor of law, as well as a communications expert who focused on propaganda during WWI.²³ This pushes the chain of causation for the garrison state prior to WWII. It is here where one can question how South Africa began to position itself on the international stage and made changes internally to become a "global player." In Lasswell's visualisation of the garrison state "the specialist on violence" (the soldier), was in control and organised economic and social life was

²³ R. Muth, M. M. Finley, and M. F. Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography* (New Haven & Dordrecht: New Haven Press & Kluwer Academic, 1990), 29.

“systematically subordinated” to the military. As the military needed to preempt a larger portion of the country’s funds and military principles were accorded higher levels of societal standing a garrison state would become progressively “dictatorial, governmentalised, centralised, and integrated.”²⁴ This characteristic was evocative of conditions in South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s. Military officers as a “ruling elite” achieved expertise in the managing of civilian matters with civil rights seen as inferior to the needs of national security. Although Lasswell’s focus did not shift that such from WWI, it continued to develop because of his wide range of interests. Lasswell was especially concerned that the United States was at risk of becoming a garrison state as the focus on the military and perpetual readiness for war became ever more pronounced.

From a Western perspective, the garrison state can be characterised as a state dominated by the “military-industrial complex.”²⁵ As early as the late 1940s, Dwight D. Eisenhower, general for the allied forces during WWII and future president of the United States, believed that the American military’s fear of the supremacy of the Soviet Union might devolve the United States into a garrison state, with an economy controlled by military spending and with civil rights weathered and battered.²⁶ Eisenhower feared that the military-industrial complex would use the majority of the American discretionary federal budget at the expense of infrastructure, education, and health spending.²⁷ Following the end of the Cold War, the US would look for threats to substitute the Soviet Union using fear to force compliance.²⁸

²⁴ D. Lerner and H. D. Lasswell, "The policy orientation," in *The policy sciences: Recent developments in scope and method*, ed. D. Lerner et al. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951), 11.

²⁵ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

²⁶ R. Aron, "Remarks on Lasswell's 'The Garrison State'," *Armed Forces & Society* 5, no. 3 (1979): 347.

²⁷ Aron, "Remarks on Lasswell's 'The Garrison State'," 347.

²⁸ Aron, "Remarks on Lasswell's 'The Garrison State'," 347.

During the twentieth century, especially after WWII, a clear pattern developed where various states reverted to aggressive military policies. These states exhibited similar tendencies regarding their aggressive military policies and these tendencies would lead to scholars coining various phrases to describe these characteristics. Global conflict deepened and entrenched these characteristics. Scholars refer to these highly militarised states as garrison states. Characteristically, a garrison state is made up of states with aggressive military policies and repressive internal security policies. However, a garrison state is much more complex than this. Historians and political scientists have written numerous accounts on the garrison state. Scholars have debated various issues surrounding the garrison state. Again, as previously mentioned, Lasswell stated that the idea of the garrison state was offered not as a dogmatic forecast.²⁹ Rather, it was a picture of the probable. It was thus not inevitable.³⁰ It may not even have the same probability as some other descriptions of the future course of development.³¹

The garrison state was therefore a “developmental construct” focused on the future trajectory of global politics. As noted above, the feature of the garrison state was seen in its tendency to move away from the “dominance of the specialist on bargaining, the businessman, and toward the supremacy of the specialist on violence, the soldier.”³² The strategies employed by the ruling elite of the garrison state would be to obtain most of the skills that had come to be accepted as part of modern civilian management.³³ The ruling elite played a key role in the continued management of the garrison state. Unemployment

²⁹ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

³⁰ Muth, Finley, and Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*, 3.

³¹ Muth, Finley, and Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*, 3.

³² Muth, Finley, and Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*, 3.

³³ E. Milton, *The emerging American Garrison State* (New York: Palgrave Pivot, 2013), 5.
<https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137093653>.

would be “psychologically” abolished.³⁴ “Internal violence” would be aimed primarily at unskilled manual workers and suspicious “counter-elite” elements.³⁵ This occurred in the United States during the “Red Scare” and McCarthyism.³⁶ During the 1950s, the United States was certainly a society characterised by substantial consensus in target group selection.³⁷ The Communist Party and its suspected sympathisers were subjected to substantial suppression, and there seemed to be a lot of support for such actions among major sections of the political class as well as the general public.³⁸ For Lasswell, incomes in a garrison state would be equalised in the interest of maintaining morale.³⁹ The practice would be to recruit the elite according to competence in times of crisis, as in a garrison state there was always a supposed looming threat. The hierarchy of society would be a steep pyramid, but the distribution of safety would be equal.⁴⁰ This is where Lasswell postulated the importance of the supremacy of military air power.

The introduction of air power to the military was the technological revolution that contributed most to Harold Lasswell’s conceptualisation of the theory of the garrison state.⁴¹ Lasswell focused specifically on military air power and how the air force of a country would play a crucial future role. Lasswell believed that technological development in the air force may possibly render civilians more susceptible to harm. Previously, military infrastructure and personnel were uniquely vulnerable and at risk, however, with technological advancement in the air force, civilians would be equally at risk. Lasswell was

³⁴ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

³⁵ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

³⁶ J. L. Gibson, "Political intolerance and political repression during the McCarthy Red Scare," *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2 (1988): 512.

³⁷ Gibson, "Political intolerance and political repression during the McCarthy Red Scare," 512.

³⁸ Gibson, "Political intolerance and political repression during the McCarthy Red Scare," 512.

³⁹ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

⁴⁰ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

⁴¹ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

proven to be correct regarding this point, with examples such as carpet bombing, the fire-bombing of Coventry and Dresden, and the eventual nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end WWII. Therefore, technological development within the air force democratised danger, putting civilians and the military equally at risk.⁴² Lasswell argued that within a democracy, or even a state with superficial democratic institutions, civil-political supremacy could deteriorate.⁴³ This would leave a void for the “specialists on violence” to fill. These “specialists on violence” would rise to power in reaction to continuing global hostility.

Lasswell hypothesised that during preparation for war, liberty in a society would be limited.⁴⁴ This took a turn in the 1960s with limitation of freedom in the face of the danger of “terrorism”—for example, South Africa’s anti-terrorism legislation and suspension of habeas corpus.⁴⁵ The preparation for war would also become the focus of any society being controlled by a garrison state. Lasswell foresaw a decrease in the authority of civilian politicians and democratic institutions. This decrease in civilian authority would be combined with an increase in authority for military personnel, resulting in these “specialists on violence” becoming part of the ruling elite.⁴⁶ Guiding society and ensuring that it was always in a constant state of readiness for war, society would be militarised, and the garrison state would be entrenched.⁴⁷

It is also important to focus on the role of ideology. Saul Dubow has highlighted how apartheid was not solely a result of one ideological perspective, but rather a combination of

⁴² Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 456.

⁴³ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 461.

⁴⁴ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 458.

⁴⁵ Terrorism Act, No.83 of 1967, (1967).

⁴⁶ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 461.

⁴⁷ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

various elements.⁴⁸ Dubow believes that the influence of racial thinking, colonial history, economic interests, and political motivations in shaping the apartheid strategies of the South African government should not be ignored.

In a garrison state economic development would also be promoted. Economic independence was the aim, although Lasswell also envisaged a collective of garrison states (plural) which would interact and trade with one another. The economic development would be capitalistic in nature as communism, or in South African idiom, the *Rooi Gevaar* (“red menace”), was presented as one of the threats that the state needed to prepare to resist. In South Africa this meshed with the *Swart Gevaar* (“black menace”). This would be a cultivated threat. These doctrines occupied the imagination of the South African public, and were exploited and presented as existential threats for the South African garrison state to protect the white populace against.

When analysing the concept of the garrison state, it was useful to split the term into its two constituents namely “Garrison” and “State” and to clarify what Lasswell meant by these terms, both separately and combined as the concept garrison state. This was another important aspect of the research, as it sought to determine the conditions under which South Africa could have exhibited garrison state characteristics during the 1930s and 1940s. Another issue surrounding terminology is that comparative terms such as “militarism,” “military-industrial complex,” “military dictatorship,” “contract state,” “authoritarianism” cannot be used as interchangeable synonyms with the garrison state. The question of origins also needs to be addressed as the garrison state characteristics were developing in South Africa and were not already established in the 1930s and 1940s.

⁴⁸ S. Dubow, *Apartheid 1948–1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
<https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/apartheid-1948-1994/>.

Two chapters by Bernard Magubane, “The Crisis of The garrison state”⁴⁹ and “From Détente to the rise of the garrison state”⁵⁰ provided a critical insight into the garrison state in South Africa, specifically during the 1970s and 1980s. Bernard Magubane, who was a professor of sociology and professor emeritus in anthropology at the University of Connecticut, was the first academic to label South Africa as a garrison state. Magubane was also the South African Democracy Education Trust’s editor. Magubane’s perspective comprised a study of the political, economic, and social context within which the struggle against apartheid was fought. Magubane uses the concept of the garrison state to frame the militarisation of South African society during the 1970s and 1980s. Magubane framed South Africa of the 1970s and 1980s as an actual garrison state focusing on the pronounced influence the military had on the country at the time. Magubane engaged less with Lasswell’s concept and his various writings on the garrison state and focused more on the actual South African garrison state of the 1970s and 1980s. The thesis thus differs from Magubane’s work in that it is also focused on Lasswell’s writings and his concept of the garrison state.

Magubane’s focus on the South African garrison state of the 1970s and 1980s started by looking at the time-period of the “Information Scandal”⁵¹ which compelled Vorster to vacate his leadership position. At the time South Africa was in the clutches of “war

⁴⁹ B. Magubane, "The crisis of the Garrison State," in *The road to democracy in South Africa*, ed. South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET) (Routledge, 2011), 1-37.

⁵⁰ B. Magubane, "From détente to the rise of the Garrison State," in *The road to democracy In South Africa*, ed. South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET) (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2011), 37-99.

⁵¹ The “Muldergate scandal”, also referred to as the “Information Scandal” or “Infogate”, was a South African political scandal involving a secret propaganda campaign conducted by the apartheid “Department of Information”.

psychoses.”⁵² Magubane used an article published in the *Financial Mail* entitled: “The March of Militarism” which depicted the atmosphere of the time:

A bakery in central Johannesburg displays in its window a birthday cake in the shape of an army tank. A few blocks away a toy shop reports the sale of ‘war games,’ bearing names like *Attack on Moscow*, have jumped fivefold in the past year. A recent defence force appeal to the public to give dogs to the army for border-patrol duty elicited more than 200 offers.... our rulers’ control of radio and television has enabled them not only to step up the quantity of defence-oriented programmes beamed into our homes, but also to make sure we get the kind of news they think we ought to hear.⁵³

As confirmed by Magubane, the military had become one of South Africa’s largest employers.⁵⁴ Magubane provided statistics that showed almost 60 000 civilians were mobilised for military service in 1977, while applications to become part of the permanent force had increased by 80 percent from 1976 to June 1978.⁵⁵ More ominous for the *Financial Mail* was the growing militarisation of schools with the cadet program.⁵⁶ As the number of soldiers, sailors and airmen grew, they were becoming an increasingly visible class, treated advantageously from the rest of the population.⁵⁷ There was also the national defence bonds. The scheme, which was formally launched in July 1976, had made R240 million by 1978.⁵⁸ South Africa also saw a boom in gun ownership.⁵⁹ The number of military processions, displays, flypasts and television programmes showing the army’s prowess increased greatly, as did those focusing on weapons and troops on manoeuvre. The South

⁵² Magubane, "The crisis of the Garrison State," 37.

⁵³ Anon., "The march of militarism," *Financial Mail*, 23 June 1978.

⁵⁴ Magubane, "The crisis of the Garrison State," 37.

⁵⁵ Magubane, "The crisis of the Garrison State," 37.

⁵⁶ Anon., "The march of militarism," *Financial Mail*, 23 June 1978.

⁵⁷ Magubane, "From détente to the rise of the Garrison State," 38.

⁵⁸ Magubane, "From détente to the rise of the Garrison State," 38.

⁵⁹ Magubane, "From détente to the rise of the Garrison State," 38.

African journalist Allister Sparks explains, the defence force made its presence inescapable and gave Pretoria the atmosphere of a capital city in wartime, with uniformed men and military staff cars everywhere.⁶⁰ This atmosphere added to the perception of a looming threat that South Africans needed to be wary of. Here, the introduction of conscription is also important to mention, and the eventual increased timeframe that conscripts had to serve.

The new security ideology that accompanied this militarisation changed the tone of the country's politics.⁶¹ There were suggestions that the military had even considered a coup. As militarisation of the apartheid state increased dramatically, it brought to the fore the country's finite white manpower resources.⁶² Since 1948, the apartheid defence forces had been moulded by the overall objectives of Afrikaner nationalism. The leadership of the defence forces and its members gradually became predominantly Afrikaner.⁶³ The NP's moves to "temper" the "Afrikanerisation" of the defence forces only began in the mid-70s, when it became obvious that the complete mobilisation of all sections of the white populace had become an absolute necessity.⁶⁴ A movement started to attract English-speaking recruits to fill up vacancies in the armed forces that the Afrikaner population was unable to fill.⁶⁵ With P. W. Botha's accession to power, Richard Leonard (who authored *South Africa at War*) remarked that "A shift had taken place in South Africa: a government anchored by police repression had become a government anchored by military power."⁶⁶ Botha played an important role in this process as he served as minister of defence from 1966 until 1981,

⁶⁰ Sparks cited in Magubane, "From détente to the rise of the Garrison State," 38.

⁶¹ Magubane, "From détente to the rise of the Garrison State," 38.

⁶² Magubane, "From détente to the rise of the Garrison State," 38.

⁶³ Magubane, "From détente to the rise of the Garrison State," 38.

⁶⁴ Magubane, "From détente to the rise of the Garrison State," 38.

⁶⁵ Magubane, "From détente to the rise of the Garrison State," 38.

⁶⁶ R. Leonard, *South Africa at War: White power and the crisis in southern Africa* (New York: L. Hill, 1983), 1.

as well as incorporating the ministry of defence into the presidency when he served as the sixth state president of South Africa.

As previously mentioned, during the 1970s and 1980s, “state capture” could be seen in the form of a garrison state which could take many different forms. South Africa had proven itself vulnerable to “state capture” about civil-economic relations. Therefore, it was important to study the history of South Africa’s military “state capture” which could lead to the 1970s and 1980s incarnation of a garrison state. South Africa has a history of secrecy, and it was this unfortunate relationship with secrecy that allowed for underhanded dealings to take place. The need for secrecy in a garrison state was especially crucial as the apparatus of a garrison state could not function effectively in an open democratic society. Yet, the appearance of democracy was important for a garrison state. However, behind the veil of democracy, the “specialists on violence” controlled society in secret. The NP and what Hennie van Vuuren describes as its “cult of secrecy”⁶⁷ was an important link to make with the garrison state. According to van Vuuren, the director of the non-profit organisation Open Secrets, the *Broederbond* planned to organise society in apartheid South Africa.⁶⁸ This is also how “state capture” happens, in secret. More importantly, as Magubane showed, this was how “state capture” by the military happened in the 1970s and 1980s of South Africa, turning the country into a garrison state. The South African state had proven itself vulnerable to being “captured” by small groups of powerful elites, and then being manipulated for their own gains. In the case of this research, the “small group of powerful elites” would constitute the “specialists on violence” within a garrison state. Surprisingly, this did not begin with the NP but rather with Smuts and the special needs of WWII.

⁶⁷ H. Van Vuuren, *Apartheid, guns, and money: A tale of profit* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 25.

⁶⁸ Van Vuuren, *Apartheid, guns, and money: A tale of profit*, 25.

There is also a body of literature that addresses the concept of the garrison state with respect to other countries, exploring them as examples or variants of the garrison state. This specific body of literature was useful for the research as both a comparative tool as well as a groundwork to determine research already done on the concept of the garrison state.⁶⁹ An example of this was *The garrison state Project*.⁷⁰ The Graduate Institute of Geneva created a multi-year project (2015–2020), funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation, examining the expansion of the garrison state. The principal investigator of the project was Professor David Sylvan, a professor of international relations/political science at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. The focus was on established democratic countries in which organisations troubled with matters of national security grew, “became more active, and were less and less subject to oversight.”⁷¹ The project looked at seven countries, namely, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, New Zealand, Japan, and Switzerland, over a time span of almost seventy years.⁷² These case studies were surprising. Apart from the US they were hardly the first countries one would name as examples of garrison states. Thus, it examined the validity of Lasswell’s claim for a diversity of democracies irrespective of size, whether they are members of alliances, and those who used to have colonies opposed to those who

⁶⁹ P. G. Aaron, "The idolatry of force (Part II): Militarism in Israel's Garrison State," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 48, no. 2 (2019): 58-87; J. Abadi, *Israel's quest for recognition and acceptance in Asia: Garrison State diplomacy* (London: Frank Cass, 2004); E. M. Ahrari, "The Pakistan Garrison State: Origins, evolution, consequences (1947–2011)," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 24, no. 11 (2013): 112-117; B. Baack and E. J. Ray, "The political economy of the origins of the military-industrial complex in the United States," *The Journal of Economic History* 45, no. 2 (1985): 369-375; D. M. Peers, "Gunpowder empires and the Garrison State: Modernity, hybridity, and the political economy of colonial India, circa 1750–1860," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27, no. 2 (2007): 245-258; A. Perlmutter, "The making of Israeli militarism," *Middle East Journal* 54, no. 1 (2000): 129-131; T. T. Yong, *The Garrison State: Military, government and society in colonial Punjab, 1849–1947* (California: SAGE, 2005); Y. Kim, *Origins of the North Korean Garrison State: The people's army and the Korean war* (New York: Routledge, 2017).

⁷⁰ Anon., "Garrison State project," The Graduate Institute Geneva, 2020, accessed 1 December 2021, <https://www.garrisonstateproject.com/>

⁷¹ Anon., "Garrison State project."

⁷² Anon., "Garrison State project."

never possessed them. The project searched to establish if Lasswell was indeed correct, suggesting that “in the long term, democratic governance was being eroded by concerns over national security.”⁷³ The project found that there is a long-term tendency “toward consensus for political elites in various countries on national security issues.”⁷⁴ It also found that elites will “increasingly tend to agree amongst themselves on foreign policy issues regarding national security, whereas there will be no such trend on other foreign policy issues.”⁷⁵

This research project involved developing a methodology, based on overlapping reasoning claims in political debates, for determining consensus, then applying that methodology to pairs of foreign policy debates, one on national security, one not, at three points in time from the early Cold War to the present, for the seven previously mentioned countries. However, The garrison state Project did not include a focus on how garrison state characteristics could develop within the countries, nor did it include an example country such as apartheid South Africa. Apartheid South Africa would have been a particularly good example to include in The garrison state Project as it was a highly militarised society with a minority rule government (hallmarks for a potential garrison state to develop). Thus, the proposed research complemented The garrison state Project by focusing on the example of apartheid South Africa as well as the idea of the developing characteristics of the garrison state within a country. The garrison state Project looked at a tendency among elites within a potential garrison state, whereas the thesis was trying to explore the concept from a historical rather than a political sciences perspective.

South Africa in the 1930s and 1940s

⁷³ Anon., "Garrison State project."

⁷⁴ Anon., "Garrison State project."

⁷⁵ Anon., "Garrison State project."

The book *Apartheid's Genesis 1935–1962* edited by Phil Bonner, Peter Delius, and Deborah Posel, although now a relatively dated text, served as an important guide for the research. These essays dealt with social and economic history and focused on the initial stage of apartheid.⁷⁶ Bonner was, and Delius is, an historian and Posel is a distinguished sociologist. Migration, urbanisation, as well as African and Afrikaner nationalism were explored. They demonstrated how many of apartheid's essential aspects came from the state's reactions to the growing contradictions of industrialisation, urbanisation, and popular struggle. This matched the lens of the garrison state for the research, as a garrison state develops from the reaction of the state towards a specific political ideology, namely fascism. This raised the key point that apartheid was often about improvisation, and not a grand design, therefore there was not necessarily a predetermined plan to deal with tensions in South African society at that time. This lack of a predetermined plan, or grand design, could have allowed for opportunistic elements within the South African government to assume command.

Newell Stultz's *The Nationalists in Opposition 1934–1948*⁷⁷ provided a good overview of how the NP acted whilst an opposition party, however, it does not thoroughly address how they came to be an opposition party and the origins of the party. The Nationalists played an important part in the construction of the garrison state, be it inadvertent at times. However, to understand their role when in power, we first must also understand *how* they came to power. It was also important to investigate what aspects of the NP as an opposition party hinted at the direction they would take when they came into government. Stultz's focus on the time-period 1934–1948 together with how the NP came

⁷⁶ Anon., *Apartheid's genesis, 1935–1962*, ed. Philip Bonner, Peter Delius, and Deborah Posel (Braamfontein: Ravan Press, 1993).

⁷⁷ N. M. Stultz, *The Nationalists in opposition 1934–1948* (Cape Town: Human and Rousseau, 1975).

to power provided the research with important background information to address the issue of the garrison state being a state phenomenon specifically in the South African context. Although the garrison state was a reaction to fascism, which can be argued helped to inform the NP's ideology, the NP benefited from certain garrison state characteristics after it came to power in 1948. Therefore, the thesis found that although the developing characteristics of a garrison state found its origins with Smuts and the UP, it was Malan and other NP leaders who would entrench its existence as Magubane argues.

Describing apartheid South Africa as a garrison state was not the only way in which apartheid South Africa was conceptualised. It had also been conceptualised via the lens of Afrikaner Nationalism and fascism. As mentioned in the abstract, the garrison state as a concept presents us with an opportunity to fill in the gaps not covered by South African history. The garrison state adds another layer to South African history both during the apartheid and segregationist eras. It was thus important for the thesis to focus on literature relating to the apartheid era. Patrick Furlong for example has written extensively on this period; however, this was not related to the garrison state. Furlong reviewed Afrikaner Nationalism and the NP during the twentieth century and how South African politics of this period was dominated by right-wing ideals.⁷⁸ Though apartheid South Africa and, more specifically, the NP, had been likened to a form of fascism or even Nazism, Furlong sees this comparison as overly simplistic. Furlong mentioned the German connection to the Afrikaner people and the NP; however, he also mentioned other European influences and the influences of British imperialism.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ P. J. Furlong, *Between crown and swastika: The impact of the radical right on the Afrikaner Nationalist Movement in the fascist era* (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1991), 68.

⁷⁹ Furlong, *Between crown and swastika: The impact of the radical right on the Afrikaner Nationalist Movement in the fascist era*, 68.

Existing studies on the topic of South African intellectual culture of the 1930s and 1940s including historiographical work was utilised. For example, Ken Smith's *The Changing Past: Trends in South African Historical Writing* focuses on how recorded history frequently tells us more about the historian's own era than it does of the times about which one is writing about.⁸⁰ The historians and the manner in which each generation has rewritten history in the light of its own issues is the subject of *The Changing Past*.⁸¹

Adam Ashforth's *The Politics of Official Discourse in Twentieth-Century South Africa* was also relevant, providing the first thorough study of the reports of the commissions of inquiry that influenced the history of South Africa, such as the Fagan Commission, which featured prominently in this research.⁸² The Fagan Commission (also referred to as the Native Laws Commission) made a primary suggestion that the 'influx control' of African people to urban areas should be relaxed. The NP launched their own investigation, the Sauer Commission, which proposed contrary findings. These commissions were relevant as it showed how there was a conflict between liberal ideas and conservative ideas during the 1930s and 1940s. This again showed that the development of politics in South Africa was not a foregone conclusion.

Paul Maylam's *South Africa's racial past: the history and historiography of racism, segregation, and apartheid*⁸³ is a distinctive synopsis of the entire 350-year racial history of South Africa, from the 1600s to the apartheid era.⁸⁴ Maylam also analysed the subtleties of

⁸⁰ K. W. Smith, *The changing past: Trends in South African historical writing* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989), 1.

⁸¹ Smith, *The changing past: Trends in South African historical writing*, 1.

⁸² A. Ashforth, *The politics of official discourse in twentieth-century South Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).

⁸³ P. Maylam, *South Africa's racial past: The history and historiography of racism, segregation, and apartheid* (London: Routledge, 2001), 1-10. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315242736>.

⁸⁴ Maylam, *South Africa's racial past: The history and historiography of racism, segregation, and apartheid*, 200-238.

South African white racism and prejudice, focusing on the important issues that brought about and continued persecution, discriminatory policies, procedures, structures, laws and beliefs.⁸⁵ There was also a strong historiographical factor to the study. It showed how various scholars have, according to alternative viewpoints, endeavoured to describe the South African racial order and drew out the political and ideological plans that lay beneath these varied understandings. The research uses Maylam's writing to focus on the significance of race relations of the time. Race relations played a vital role in the creation of a developing garrison state, as a garrison state is led by an elite minority and requires a threat. Lasswell did not directly mention the issue of race relations within the garrison state, however in the South African context it cannot be ignored.

The research relies on various works of Saul Dubow such as *A Commonwealth of knowledge: science, sensibility, and white South Africa, 1820–2000*,⁸⁶ *Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa, 1919–36*,⁸⁷ as well as *South Africa's 1940s: worlds of possibilities*.⁸⁸ Dubow highlighted the development of South Africa from 1910 to the 1940s where the country was at a crossroads. Here especially, *South Africa's 1940s: worlds of possibilities*, Dubow together with Alan Jeeves edited a collaboration from various authors and it became an increasingly important source as it addressed the question of "What could have been?" had South Africa taken a different path. With *A Commonwealth of knowledge*, Dubow focused on the growth of a white national identity or 'South Africanism,' which was crucial to understanding how an elite minority rule came to be from the period of British

⁸⁵ Maylam, *South Africa's racial past: The history and historiography of racism, segregation, and apartheid*, 200–238.

⁸⁶ S. Dubow, *A commonwealth of knowledge: Science, sensibility, and white South Africa, 1820–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 1. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199296637.001.0001>.

⁸⁷ S. Dubow, *Racial segregation and the origins of Apartheid in South Africa, 1919–36*, St Antony's Series, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989), 1. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20041-2>.

⁸⁸ S. Dubow and A. Jeeves, *South Africa's 1940s: Worlds of possibilities* (Cape Town: Double Storey, 2005), 1.

colonial rule starting in 1820 to 1948 with the victory of the NP. This was important to the research as one cannot uncover developing garrison state characteristics in South Africa without focusing on the origins of segregation, apartheid, and white national identity as Dubow did. *South Africa's 1940: Worlds of Possibilities* looked at the last decade of South African history before apartheid. This particularly tumultuous period was crucial to understanding the garrison state. The combination of a war abroad, which South Africa only joined narrowly on the side of the Allies, together with domestic political turmoil proved a powerful force for new thoughts. There were competing visions for the future of South Africa. In *South Africa's 1940: Worlds of Possibilities* a chapter from Jeremy Seekings entitled "Visions, Hopes and Views about the Future: The Radical Movement of South African Welfare Reform" was especially important as it showed how the Smuts government was, albeit only to a certain extent, inclined to improve the social welfare of black South Africans.⁸⁹ Dubow notes that although "Smuts did not actively encourage such developments," he did however concede to them knowing that "old-style segregation was no longer viable."⁹⁰

The NP and its "cult of secrecy"⁹¹ was an important link to make with the garrison state. According to Hennie van Vuuren, this "cult of secrecy" was deeply entrenched in the NP's way of thinking and how they planned to organise society in apartheid South Africa.⁹² Van Vuuren detailed various underhanded dealings involving the *Broederbond*, Armscor, military intelligence, the NP, and foreign entities during the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, again

⁸⁹ J. Seekings, "Visions, hopes and views about the future: The radical movement of South African welfare reform," in *South Africa's 1940s: Worlds of possibilities*, ed. S. Dubow and A. Jeeves (Cape Town: Double Storey, 2005), 44.

⁹⁰ S. Dubow, "Smuts, the United Nations and the rhetoric of race and rights.," *Journal of Contemporary History* 43, no. 1 (2008): 64.

⁹¹ Van Vuuren, *Apartheid, guns, and money: A tale of profit*, 25.

⁹² Van Vuuren, *Apartheid, guns, and money: A tale of profit*, 25.

proving the point that the South African state had proven itself vulnerable to being “captured” by small groups of powerful elites, and then being manipulated for their own gains. In the case of this research, the “small group of powerful elites” would constitute the “specialists on violence” within a garrison state. The *Broederbond*, especially, played a significant role in creating a small group of powerful elites in South Africa. From its onset in 1920 until 1948, the *Broederbond* played an important role in establishing conservative, right-wing values and even came under attack by both Hertzog and Smuts to try and contain its ideological influence.⁹³ However, after WWII was over, and the NP won the 1948 election, the *Broederbond* became more influential as every Prime Minister of the apartheid era was a member of the *Broederbond*.⁹⁴ Again, the link between a small group of powerful elites and the establishment of a garrison state could not be overlooked. The role of Christian-Nationalism in the acceptance of elitist leadership as well as the rejection of “enemies” such as liberalism and Marxism also played a crucial role.⁹⁵ Christian-Nationalism became a theological defence for Afrikaner Nationalism and a religious justification for structuring South African society in a discriminatory manner to keep out threats such as *Swart Gevaar* and *Rooi Gevaar*. Ian van der Waag’s *A Military History of Modern South Africa*⁹⁶ is utilised regarding the military history of South Africa. Van der Waag provides important statistics and insights into not only the military, but also the interactions between the military and politicians. This is a vital resource regarding the discussion of the concept of the garrison state as well as the actual garrison state characteristics developing in South Africa during the 1930s and 1940s relating to the process of militarisation.

⁹³ C. Bloomberg, “Christian-nationalism and the rise of the Afrikaner Broederbond,” in *South Africa, 1918–48*, ed. S. Dubow (London: MacMillan, 1990), 108-130 & 183-200.

⁹⁴ Bloomberg, “Christian-nationalism and the rise of the Afrikaner Broederbond,” 201-229.

⁹⁵ Bloomberg, “Christian-nationalism and the rise of the Afrikaner Broederbond,” 1.

⁹⁶ I. Van der Waag, *A military history of modern South Africa* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2015).

As previously mentioned, global events and its impact on South African society should also be explored. The rise of communism had an enormous impact with the formation in South Africa of its own Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), originally founded in 1921. Sheridan Johns, in *Invisible Resurrection: The Recreation of a Communist Party in South Africa in the 1950s*, mentions how the South African Communist Party's (SACP) forerunner, the CPSA, was a specific target of the NP as it came to power in 1948.⁹⁷ The NP believed the CPSA was a cause of “unrest” within the black African populace.⁹⁸ While it numbered only several thousand, its membership drew from every racial group in South Africa and numerous members were important “activists in trade unions” and nationalist organisations, particularly the ANC and the South African Indian Congress (SAIC).⁹⁹ It recruited assistance via public gatherings as well as publications and participated in elections, mutually in “white” elections and in the partially segregated spaces where non-whites were allowed to vote. In 1950, the NP's concerns over the *Rooi Gevaar* (“communist menace”) were also established when “two White Communists successively won elections as ‘native’ representatives in the ‘African voters-only’ constituency of the Western Cape.”¹⁰⁰ This relates to a garrison state requiring a threat, and the beforementioned example showed that the threat of the *Rooi Gevaar* was real in that elections were being lost to communist candidates.

Historian Richard Steyn in *Seven Votes: How WW2 Changed South Africa forever*, notes how if a meagre seven or more “MPs had voted with Prime Minister Hertzog in favour

⁹⁷ S. Johns, "Invisible resurrection: The recreation of a communist party in South Africa in the 1950s," *African Studies Quarterly* 9, no. 4 (2007): 8.

⁹⁸ Johns, "Invisible resurrection: The recreation of a communist party in South Africa in the 1950s," 8.

⁹⁹ Johns, "Invisible resurrection: The recreation of a communist party in South Africa in the 1950s," 8.

¹⁰⁰ Johns, "Invisible resurrection: The recreation of a communist party in South Africa in the 1950s," 8.

of neutrality,” South Africa's history would have been completely altered.¹⁰¹ Parliament's close “decision to go to war in 1939” led to a significant change during the 1940s namely that Black people migrated in increasing numbers from rural to urban areas looking for employment; applicants of varied racial backgrounds answered “the call” to go “up north” to fight; and detractors of the Smuts government aggressively obstructed “the war effort by attacking soldiers and committing acts of sabotage.”¹⁰² South Africa's politics was upended by the impact of WWII, destroying attempts to grow white unity as well as “improving opposition to segregation among (black) African, indian, and coloured communities.”¹⁰³ This ignited disputes between “Nationalists, Socialists, Liberals, and Communists” which was completely new to South Africa. As Steyn recounts, WWII’s unexpected result was the advancement it provided to “nationalisms, both Afrikaner and African,” which continued to change South Africa in the latter part of the twentieth century. Steyn focused on many of the main figures of this research such as Jan Smuts, D. F. Malan, and his NP colleagues, but he also mentioned African nationalists from “Anton Lembede and A. B. Xuma to Walter Sisulu and Nelson Mandela, the influential Indian activists Yusuf Dadoo and Monty Naicker,” and numerous other examples.¹⁰⁴ Steyn’s focus on WWII is directly related to this research as WWII serves as an important role in the foundation of a garrison state. This is an apt point to mention that it was Smuts, not Malan, who was the leader of South Africa during WWII and therefore the origins of the garrison state lie, not with Malan and the NP, but with Smuts, the UP and the outbreak of WWII.

¹⁰¹ R. Steyn, *Seven votes: How WW2 changed South Africa forever* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2020.), 1.

¹⁰² Steyn, *Seven votes: How WW2 changed South Africa forever*, 1.

¹⁰³ Steyn, *Seven votes: How WW2 changed South Africa forever*, 1.

¹⁰⁴ Steyn, *Seven votes: How WW2 changed South Africa forever*, 1.

Bill Nasson's *South Africa at War: 1939–1945*, tells an illustrated story of South Africa's contribution to the struggle against Nazi Germany, its lack of preparation at the beginning, its unexpected success in rising to the task, and the major influence the war had on South African society and on hopes of change.¹⁰⁵ It explores the effect, both immediate and in a wider historical context, of the 1939–45 crisis upon the Union and its often unpredictable society.¹⁰⁶ Focusing on a wide range of experiences and events—military, political, economic and social—Nasson provided an important depiction of a largely forgotten time in South Africa's modern history and helped set the broader context of the contingencies that allowed for the eventual realisation of the garrison state.¹⁰⁷ Post WWII, many international leaders, such as Dwight D. Eisenhower were among those who spoke out against the increasing influence of the military-industrial complex. Nevertheless, these warnings were not heeded, and the United States built one of the most imposing armaments industries of the world. This was an important strategy within the garrison state as attaining the ability to be self-sufficient in terms of weapons production would allow for independent self-defence against threats, real or imaged, internal, or external.¹⁰⁸ South Africa began to move in this direction with the envisaging and creation of Iscor¹⁰⁹ and Armscor¹¹⁰ and are all important to this point.

Although outside the 1930s and 1940s but providing background to the terms alluded to earlier, of *Swart Gevaar* and *Rooi Gevaar*, there are various sources that were used. Scholtz's *The SADF in the Border War 1966–1989*,¹¹¹ as well as *A far-away war*—

¹⁰⁵ B. Nasson, *South Africa at war, 1939–1945: A Jacana pocket history* (Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2021), 9.

¹⁰⁶ Nasson, *South Africa at war, 1939–1945: A Jacana pocket history*, 9.

¹⁰⁷ Nasson, *South Africa at war, 1939–1945: A Jacana pocket history*, 9.

¹⁰⁸ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 460.

¹⁰⁹ though established earlier in 1928

¹¹⁰ established in 1968

¹¹¹ L. Scholtz, *The SADF in the Border War 1966–1989* (Cape Town: Helion & Company, 2014).

*Angola 1975–1989*¹¹² by Ian Liebenberg, Jorge Risquet and Vladimir Shubin, were relevant. These sources, though outside of the time-period of the research, provided insight into the apartheid state being a “finished product” in terms of its development into a garrison state. These sources also showed how South African society became militarised and the development of the military as well as the development of threats in *Swart Gevaar* and *Rooi Gevaar*. The development of the military and threats are key components in the development of a garrison state. The Border War (1966–1990) provided the garrison state with two necessary components: the continued development of the military as well as a required threat. Thus, as previously mentioned, though the Border War falls outside the time-period of the research, it was still an important component to understanding the garrison state.

Previous research on similar topics such as those explored in this thesis are problematic in that it had taken place in “silos,” either focusing only on a country’s garrison state status, or more on the military itself. Studies of key political role players were also not connected to the concept of the garrison state. By identifying the relevant research, evaluating it, and providing an understanding of the relevant debates, the literature review shows that approaching the developing characteristics of the garrison state in the 1930s and 1940s, before the advent of apartheid, provides fresh insights into South Africa’s authoritarian history.

Jonathan Hyslop a professor of sociology and African studies at Colgate University and extraordinary professor at the University of Pretoria, together with Kasper Braskén who has specialised in the history of international communism and the history of anti-fascism,

¹¹² I. Liebenberg, J. Risquet, and V. Shubin, *A far-away war–Angola 1975–1989* (Cape Town: Sun Press, 2016).

and Neil Roos a professor of history and Dean of Social Sciences and Humanities at the University of Fort Hare collaborated to write an article in a special issue of the *South African Historical Journal* on anti-fascism.¹¹³ Jonathan Hyslop, Kasper Braskén and Neil Roos locate South Africa within the contemporary historiographical debates on anti-fascism.¹¹⁴ They provide an extensive overview of the history of anti-fascist political ideas and practice within the region.¹¹⁵ They also examine in detail the impact of ‘historical’ anti-fascism in the era of fascist Europe with leaders such as Mussolini, Hitler and Franco at the helm. It is important to note that the different manifestations of anti-fascism which Hyslop, Braskén and Roos discuss omit mention of the garrison state. This thesis contributes to the body of knowledge by showing the garrison state was one counterintuitive response to fascism. In contrast, the predominant focus has been how German National Socialists aided and were associated with far-right groups in South Africa in the interwar years, and specifically the extent to which fascism later influenced apartheid South Africa.¹¹⁶ Hyslop, Braskén and Roos mention the issue of to what extent the Smuts government of 1939–1948 can be seen as being anti-fascist, albeit briefly.¹¹⁷ They position Smuts as an impactful “war leader,” as under his leadership South Africa contributed greatly to the “military campaigns in the Horn and North Africa, and more modestly to that in Italy.”¹¹⁸ Smuts’s anti-fascism rhetoric is acknowledged as well as the fact that he “certainly played an important role in the

¹¹³ J. Hyslop, K. Braskén, and N. Roos, "Political and intellectual lineages of Southern African anti-fascism," *South African Historical Journal* 74, no. 1 (2022): 1.

¹¹⁴ Hyslop, Braskén, and Roos, "Political and intellectual lineages of Southern African anti-fascism," 1.

¹¹⁵ Hyslop, Braskén, and Roos, "Political and intellectual lineages of Southern African anti-fascism," 1.

¹¹⁶ In 1992, the *South African Historical Journal* (SAHJ) included a substantial section focusing on the relation between Germany and South Africa, including the following articles: P. J. Furlong, "Fascism, the Third Reich and Afrikaner nationalism: An assessment of the historiography," *South African Historical Journal* 27, no. 1 (1992): 113-126; A. Hagemann, "Very special relations: The 'Third Reich'," *Southern African Historical Journal* 27, no. 1 (1992): 127-147; C. Marx, "'Dear listeners in South Africa': German propaganda broadcasts to South Africa, 1940–1941," *Southern African Historical Society* 27, no. 1 (1992): 148-172.

¹¹⁷ Hyslop, Braskén, and Roos, "Political and intellectual lineages of Southern African anti-fascism," 22.

¹¹⁸ Hyslop, Braskén, and Roos, "Political and intellectual lineages of Southern African anti-fascism," 22.

formation of the United Nations and its legal frameworks.”¹¹⁹ Hyslop, Braskén and Roos came to the conclusion that, specifically during the period of 1941–1943, Smuts gained the status, both nationally and internationally, as a credible anti-fascist. However, Hyslop, Braskén and Roos do not mention how Smuts’s imperial internationalism informed his anti-fascism nor do they address the issue of garrison state anti-fascism as previously mentioned.

Unlike previous research on the relations between Nazi Germany and South Africa, the new trend has been concerned with analysing forms and practices of anti-fascism. However, this anti-fascism trend did not necessarily provide us with the full picture of South African history. It also did not consider the possibilities presented to us by using the garrison state as a means of understanding South African history. Importantly, the garrison state was not a political ideology itself, but rather a response to a political ideology, namely fascism. The dynamics between fascism, anti-fascism and the garrison state are intertwined. The garrison state should be seen as one of many anti-fascism manifestations. It is thus important to tread carefully here as many would see anti-fascism and the garrison state as interchangeable synonyms, or that the garrison state was solely an implementation of anti-fascist ideas. The same could be said for the garrison state and communism. One could draw a similarity between this, and when far-right propagandists conflate anti-fascism with communism, and then argue that the anti-fascists embodied a “foreign ideology” (communism).¹²⁰ Researchers concentrating on Lasswell’s hypothesis have tended to focus on the assumed methods through which the governing elite of a garrison state would wield power. These methods were condensed into what political scientist Samuel Fitch termed three restrictions of civil or political rights in the name of safety namely “(1) centralisation of

¹¹⁹ Hyslop, Braskén, and Roos, "Political and intellectual lineages of Southern African anti-fascism," 22.

¹²⁰ K. Braskén, "South African anti-fascism and the Nazi foreign office: Antisemitism, anti-communism and the surveillance of the Third Reich’s international enemies," *South African Historical Journal* 74, no. 1 (2022): 54.

power,” “(2) manipulation of international crises,” and “(3) restriction of civil or political liberties in the name of security.”¹²¹ These were very broad practices and thus could also be applied to different political ideologies. The garrison state can transverse political ideologies as with the example of the post -1948 conservative NP government taking advantage of foundations laid by the UP.

¹²¹ S. J. Fitch, "The Garrison State in America: A content analysis of trends in the expectation of violence," *Journal of Peace Research* 22, no. 1 (1985): 31-45.

Rationale

The significance of this study lies in numerous factors. Identifying the origins of this concept in South Africa during the 1930s and 1940s is important for understanding the country's eventual political developments, specifically regarding apartheid and later militarisation. This allows historian and political scientists to better understand the mechanisms through which developing militarism eventually became entrenched in South African politics and society during apartheid. The 1930s and 1940s can be seen as the height of many prominent politicians' political careers. Politicians such as Jan Smuts, Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr and Oswald Pirow, to name but a few, produced a range of political thought that influenced subsequent generations. The garrison state allows us to reinvestigate these important political actors and the time-period of the 1930s and 1940s with a new lens. The research also provides contemporary relevance in South Africa as the garrison state can be seen as a form of "State Capture" which has become a prominent phenomenon that South Africa has to guard against. This research will also contribute to the broader scholarship on authoritarianism and militarisation. The delicate interplay between military and political power is a topic that is important for both historians and political scientists. This research can serve as a foundation for further research into the political and military history of South Africa, the garrison state as well as Lasswellian studies.

The choice of Lasswell's garrison state lies in its novelty as Bernard Magubane has been the only scholar who sought to apply Lasswell's concept to South Africa. Magubane only sought to apply it to the 1970s and 1980s. The time-period of the 1930s and 1940s provides crucial and often overlooked characteristics that can help scholars understand South African history better. The 1930s and 1940s can be seen as a tumultuous time-period in South Africa history, not only due to domestic issues, but also due to the impact of

important global events such as the great Depression and World War Two. The choice to focus on prominent political figures of the time such as Smuts, Hofmeyr and Pirow was made to show the broad spectrum of political ideologies that existed in South Africa during the 1930s and 1940s. The garrison state helps us to reinvestigate these prominent politicians and their political beliefs.

Investigating the origins of the garrison state in South Africa through the lens of political-intellectual discourse of the 1930s and 1940s provides a new critical framework for understanding South African history. The research is a unique undertaking, applying a concept that is mostly used in the realms of political science to a specific historical time-period in South Africa. Lasswell's concept of the garrison state has never before been applied to 1930s and 1940s South Africa. Ultimately, the rationale of the study is to indicate if the characteristics of the garrison state were prevalent in South Africa during the 1930s and 1940s, and whether Lasswell's conceptualisation could adequately illuminate or be applicable to South Africa's political landscape of the time.

Methodology

A large section of the study draws on biographies and autobiographies of important political figure such as Smuts, Hofmeyr, Hertzog, Malan and Pirow which served as a key window into the period.¹²² With regards to analysing the political-intellectual discourse of the 1930s and 1940s, various publications from Hofmeyr such as specific chapters from

¹²² Anon., *Selections from the Smuts papers*, vol. 1–7, ed. W.K. Hancock and J. van der Poel (London: Cambridge University Press, 2007); W. K. Hancock, *Smuts: The fields of force 1919–1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968); L. Koorts, *D. F. Malan and the rise of Afrikaner nationalism* (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2014); F. A. Mouton, "'Fascist or opportunist?': The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943," *Historia* 63, no. 2 (2018): 93-111; A. Paton, *Hofmeyr* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); O. Pirow, *James Barry Munnik Hertzog* (Cape Town: Howard Timmins, 1950); J. C. Smuts, *Jan Christian Smuts* (London: Cassell & Company, 1952).

Coming of Age (1930),¹²³ as well as various works from the historian W.M. Macmillan, such as his autobiography *My South African Years* (1975),¹²⁴ were used. Smuts' biography *Jan Christian Smuts*, written by his son of the same name, served as a guide to understanding the political culture of the 1930s and 1940s together with other biographies on Smuts as well as a collection of his most famous speeches and letters. As Smuts served in various leadership positions during the 1930s and 1940s, he played an integral role in the direction in which South Africa was moving or could have moved. Smuts and his leadership can also be related to the liberal failures which culminated in the victory of the NP in 1948. With specific reference to Hofmeyr, the South African writer Alan Paton's biography *Hofmeyr* served as a main guide together with *Jan Hofmeyr: Heir to Smuts*¹²⁵ by Tom Macdonald. *James Barry Munnik Hertzog*¹²⁶ written by Oswald Pirow was another important source. Historian Lindie Koorts's *D.F. Malan and the Rise of Afrikaner Nationalism* together with various articles on Malan, including some authored by Koorts, guided the discussion on Malan.¹²⁷ For Pirow, a biography has recently been published by Alex Mouton and this, together with other writings by Mouton on Pirow, is utilised.¹²⁸

In addition, this study draws on archival research. The National Archives of South Africa (NASA) is used for its comprehensive collection of newspapers and newspaper cuttings, official publications, a unique collection of pamphlets, press releases and speeches of Ministers. This helped the focus of the study especially regarding the political-intellectual

¹²³ E. H. Brookes et al., *Coming of age: Studies in South African citizenship and politics* (Cape Town: Maskew Miller, 1930).

¹²⁴ W. M. Macmillan, *My South African years: An autobiography* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1975).

¹²⁵ T. Macdonald, *Jan Hofmeyr: Heir to Smuts* (London: Hurst & Blackett, 1948).

¹²⁶ Pirow, *James Barry Munnik Hertzog*.

¹²⁷ Koorts, *D. F. Malan and the rise of Afrikaner nationalism*.

¹²⁸ F. A. Mouton, *The opportunist: The political life of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1959* (Pretoria: Protea Boekhuis, 2021).

history of the 1930s and 1940s. This archive has substantial amounts of content specifically related to Oswald Pirow and his time as minister of defence. This is specifically relevant regarding the militarisation of South Africa.

The Alan Paton Centre and Struggle Archives at the University of Kwa-Zulu Natal (Pietermaritzburg campus) also played a significant role. This archive holds the original works, speeches and documents by Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr as well as original work used by Paton to write his biography on Hofmeyr. The Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr Memorial Trust Papers as well as the Alan Paton Collection was be used. This archive provides important primary sources to help establish the “Hofmeyr lens” that is utilised in the thesis.

The Historical Papers Research Archive, William Cullen Library, University of the Witwatersrand hold papers, dating from 1910–1948, contain sixty-one boxes of correspondence of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr including, his diary, personal documents, scrapbooks, press clippings, speeches he made, addresses, college notes, as well as manuscripts of published and unpublished works and printed items. Topics covered by this material include his academic and political career. These papers also include correspondence between Hofmeyr and other prominent figures.

The Harold Dwight Lasswell Papers Archives at Yale University was used for the theoretical background of the garrison state and to find primary sources on Lasswell such as unpublished works as well as material which influenced him. The Hansard Records is used as they include the Debates of the House of Assembly, Union of South Africa, which is relevant to the analysis of the political-intellectual discourse of the 1930s and 1940s. The garrison state Project measured the growth by differential trends in legislative agreement on national security debates as opposed to those on other foreign policy issues. The unit of analysis is thus the debate; with three time periods (early Cold War, late Cold War, and

post-9/11), two issue areas, and seven countries, there will be forty-two debates all told.

This source provided a more contemporary view of the garrison state and how it could be applied. Last, the University of Stellenbosch, J.S. Gericke Library, Document Centre, D.F.

Malan collection is utilised to provide a background of D.F. Malan.

In terms of ethical considerations, there are very few problematic issues that can be predicted. All the sources that are utilised are already in the public domain. The research did not draw from any human participants through interviews or surveys. Therefore, issues such as informed consent, voluntary participation, confidentiality, and anonymity are not anticipated as challenges for this research.

Chapter Outline

This first chapter provides the intellectual biographies of Harold Lasswell, Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr and Oswald Pirow, who feature as three of the main characters in the thesis. The chapter starts by focusing on Lasswell, his concept of the garrison state and the criticism of other scholars. The chapter then moves to look at the Hofmeyr lens and a summarised biography of who Hofmeyr was. Last, the chapter focuses on Oswald Pirow, who can be seen as the ideological antithesis to Hofmeyr. The chapter argues that Hofmeyr can be seen as an agent of the garrison state due to his support of Smuts and his belief in anti-fascism. Pirow could also be seen as an inadvertent agent of the garrison state with his “Five-year Plan” of modernisation of the South African Defence Force, which is discussed in more detail in the third chapter. Finally, the chapter also argues that since these individuals were born either in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century, exploring their lives help to contextualise the 1930s and 1940s.

The second chapter starts by focusing on an initial clash between Hofmeyr and Malan, a debate regarding the Immigration Quota Bill. The chapter then moves on to the

publication of *Coming of Age* (1930), and its importance for the time. The chapter also provides insights into the early activities of Hofmeyr and his flourishing political career is unpacked. As the chapter focuses on the early 1930s, it also focuses on the impact of the Great Depression on South Africa. Finally, the chapter focuses on the Carnegie Report and The Poor White Question. Here the chapter argues that *Coming of Age* provides us with a different vision for the future of South Africa as well as holding numerous important topics in terms of the garrison state origins. By looking at the impacts of the Great Depression, the Carnegie Report and The Poor White Question, the chapter argues that the actions taken by the state can be seen as an economic component of an embryonic garrison state.

The third chapter starts by looking at what the Hertzog Bills were and what they entailed. Criticism and opposition to the Hertzog Bills is also explored. The chapter then continues by focusing on Oswald Pirow's "Five-year Plan" to reorganise and improve the South African military. Hertzog and South African sovereignty will then be focused on. The chapter will then look at two important speeches made by Hofmeyr, and it will conclude by looking at the rise of the Ossewa-Brandwag (OB). The chapter argues that the Hertzog Bills were the beginning of the development of the "state machinery" that the NP post-1948 would utilise to implement apartheid. The importance of Pirow's "Five-year Plan" cannot be underestimated; the chapter argues that Pirow created the foundation for the development of key garrison state characteristics that would later be utilised by Smuts and the UP during WWII.

The fourth chapter frames the OB as a social and anti-parliamentarian movement which helped promote fascist sentiments among the Afrikaner populace. The chapter argues that the OB can be seen as a fascist threat from within South Africa which intensified the rationale for the garrison state. The chapter then continues to look at how Smuts came to

power and the political circumstances at the time, specifically the split between Pirow and Malan. The chapter will then continue to look at two important speeches by Hofmeyr and an unpublished chapter he wrote on the differences between liberal and conservative ideologies. The chapter then turns to 1941 and how Lasswell came to publish the *garrison state*. The chapter will then focus on an important newsletter from the UP and concludes by focusing on the 1943 election. The results of the 1943 election, the chapter argues, provided the UP a false sense of security as Smuts being a military man enjoyed greater support in wartime.

Chapter five starts by looking at Smuts and his imperial internationalism together with Hofmeyr's famous speech "Reconciling Imperialism and Liberty." The chapter also focuses on election propaganda from both the UP and NP in the build-up to the election of 1948. The chapter ends by looking at several articles from Hofmeyr in 1948 regarding the future. The chapter argues that these articles should be viewed not only as a reaction to the 1948 election, but also as an expression of concern that the NP would take advantage of garrison state characteristics such as the extension of the War Measures Act of 1942. Towards the end of the chapter, an important argument for the thesis starts to emerge that a garrison state is a state phenomenon, and that both the UP pre-1948 and the NP post-1948 benefited from the garrison state.

The conclusion will focus on a final article by Hofmeyr which provides a summary of the key points mentioned in his previous articles. The conclusion will then focus on what became of Pirow and Hofmeyr's visions for the future of South Africa. It also provides a section which garrison state characteristics South Africa exhibited, as well as those it did not exhibit, during the 1930s and 1940s as well as how the garrison state as a concept can be

improved. A final summary will be provided which will conclude the thesis arguing for the positioning of the thesis within the new anti-fascism research of Hyslop, Braskén and Roos.

CHAPTER 1

Lasswell, Hofmeyr and Pirow and the Origins of the Garrison State

To establish whether South Africa was developing garrison state characteristics during the 1930s and 1940s, this study focused on the background of three noteworthy people: Harold Lasswell, Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, and Oswald Pirow.

From an international point of view, Harold Lasswell serves as an intellectual point of reference for this study. While Hofmeyr and Pirow were of particular relevance to South Africa, Lasswell provides an international reference because of his work in the US and his experiences in Europe.

Locally, Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr and Oswald Pirow were influential political-intellectual actors who were also involved in the conservative victories and the liberal failures of the 1930s and 1940s. The viewpoints of these men provide a relevant political-intellectual lens for this study—especially as both were born either in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century. As opponents in the political-intellectual debates of the 1930s and 1940s (with the men having vastly different ideas for the future of South Africa), their lives will therefore help to contextualise the 1930s and 1940s with Pirow also playing a significant role in the mid-1930s with his reforms of the South African military. Together with their ideas, the backgrounds of Lasswell, Hofmeyr, and Pirow were therefore useful lenses to analyse the 1930s and 1940s.

An actual garrison state cannot develop without the influence of impactful agents that—deliberately or inadvertently—steer a country towards developing garrison state characteristics. Such individuals do not necessarily have to be well-versed or even aware of the existence of the concept. For example, thus far, there is neither evidence suggesting

that Hofmeyr or Pirow were aware of Lasswell's concept, nor is there any evidence that they interacted with Lasswell himself. However, this does not mean that Pirow and Hofmeyr did not contribute to developing garrison state characteristics in South Africa.

This chapter depicts both Hofmeyr and Pirow as agents of the garrison state: Hofmeyr because of his support of Smuts and his belief in anti-fascism, and Pirow because of his "five-year plan." Both of these will be discussed in greater detail in the third chapter.

The Garrison State Explained

The term *garrison state* is made up out of the two concepts of *garrison* and *state*. What Lasswell meant by *garrison* can be viewed in two ways. The noun form means "troops stationed at a fort or fortified town" while the verb form denotes "to provide with or occupy as a garrison." According to Dr. Ronald Dains, an associate professor of military and security studies in the Air Command and Staff College's Department of International Security, Lasswell used literary license to modify the word *state* by using *garrison* as an adjective.¹ It should also be noted that Lasswell often used *garrison police-state* or *garrison prison-state* interchangeably with garrison state.² Within a garrison state, societal freedom is perpetually reduced in preparation for war. To prepare for war, a state needs a threat, irrespective of whether the threat is internal or external. This threat can also be real or perceived. The constant readiness and preparedness for total war leads to a militarised society. Technological innovations, especially in the military, and what Lasswell referred to as the rise of "specialists on violence" assisted in the continuation of the garrison state. Lasswell also stated that compulsory labour groups or unskilled manual labourers would be used as

¹ R. N. Dains, "Lasswell's Garrison State reconsidered: Exploring a paradigm shift in US civil-military relations research" (PhD diss., University of Alabama, 2004), 11-12, DTIC (ADA429969).

² Dains, "Lasswell's Garrison State reconsidered: Exploring a paradigm shift in US civil-military relations research," 12.

“enemies” and “scapegoats.”³ Lasswell himself commented on the garrison state: “By the energetic application of the principle of civilian supremacy, we can guard against the perils of a garrison police-state and conserve the physical and moral resources of our nation.”⁴

Lasswell defined the garrison state as “a world in which the specialists on violence are the most powerful group in society.” For the purposes of this research, the term *powerful* incorporates “power, authority, and influence.” Power is defined as the capability to get people to do what you want with force or threat. Authority is defined as the recognised right to make people do what you want. Finally, influence is defined as the ability to get people to do what you want by convincing them it is in their best interests.⁵ Dains comments that “These negative images of a garrison state have undoubtedly served as motivation for civil-military relations research of the last half century—most notably in regard to the proper political role of the military in a democracy such as the United States.”⁶ Furthermore, Lasswell’s garrison state construct provided “the first conscious, systematic, and sophisticated theory of civil-military relations.”⁷ Lasswell based the garrison state on three pillars or methods which are condensed into what Samuel Fitch terms *garrison state practices*, namely: (1) centralisation of power, (2) manipulation of international crises, and (3) restriction of civil or political liberties in the name of security.⁸ These points also provide a means of exploring the South African garrison state case.

³ Dains, "Lasswell's Garrison State reconsidered: Exploring a paradigm shift in US civil-military relations research," 12.

⁴ S. J. Kunitz, *Twentieth century authors first supplement: A bibliographical dictionary of modern literature*, ed. V. Colby (New York: The H.W. Wilson Company, 1955), 552.

⁵ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

⁶ Dains, "Lasswell's Garrison State reconsidered: Exploring a paradigm shift in US civil-military relations research," 1.

⁷ Dains, "Lasswell's Garrison State reconsidered: Exploring a paradigm shift in US civil-military relations research," 2.

⁸ Dains, "Lasswell's Garrison State reconsidered: Exploring a paradigm shift in US civil-military relations research," 2.

Daniel Lerner commented:

One of Harold's great intellectual creations—perhaps his greatest—was his idea of the 'developmental construct' about the future course of world politics, whose function is to stimulate the individual specialist to clarify for himself his expectations about the future as a guide to the timing of scientific work.⁹

The trend of the time was away from the dominance of the "specialist on bargaining": the businessman, and towards the "supremacy of the specialist on violence": the soldier.¹⁰

Lasswell had a clear vision for his work that would follow on from the garrison state. Unfortunately, for reasons not known, this did not realise. "The Political Science of Contemporary China,"¹¹ an unpublished article, provides us with further links to Lasswell's inspiration from the Sino-Japanese War. Also "Power in Political Theory,"¹² another unpublished article, shows how Lasswell saw developmental constructs within political science as important theoretical foundations to understanding state-security issues. Lasswell also attempted to finish "Symbol, Power & Crisis"¹³ to focus on how power, and who wields power¹⁴ plays a crucial role in society.

In his 1927 dissertation *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, Lasswell argued that in wartime, "much reliance must be placed on propaganda . . . no government could hope to win without a united nation behind it, and no government could have a united

⁹ Cited in Muth, Finley, and Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*, 2.

¹⁰ Muth, Finley, and Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*, 2.

¹¹ H. D. Lasswell, The political science of contemporary China, 1923–1981, Unpublished Manuscript, Part of Collection Box 129, Folder 129, Harold Dwight Lasswell papers (HDLP). Series II: Writings, 1043, Archives at Yale, Yale, <https://paton.ukzn.ac.za/core-collections/>.

¹² Lasswell, The political science of contemporary China, 1923–1981, Unpublished Manuscript.

¹³ Lasswell, The political science of contemporary China, 1923–1981, Unpublished Manuscript.

¹⁴ In the case of the Garrison State, this would be the "specialists on violence"

nation behind it unless it controlled the minds of its people.”¹⁵ Indeed, since WWI, “people’s minds” have been recognised as a critical area of warcraft.¹⁶ Lasswell would remark that “The use of coercion can have an important effect upon many more people than it reaches directly; this is the propaganda component of any propaganda of the deed.”¹⁷ “Compulsory labour gangs” in prisons or “concentration camps” was an example of a negative means of control Lasswell referred to. This aroused fear and guilt. Compulsory labour groups were fitting scapegoats in a garrison state. “The duty to obey, to serve the state, to work— these are cardinal virtues” within the garrison state. “Unceasing emphasis upon duty is certain to arouse opposing tendencies within the personality structure of all who live under a garrison regime.”¹⁸

Lasswell believed that “to speak of a garrison state is not to predict something completely new.” Lasswell himself admitted that there certainly was nothing novel about the idea that “specialists on violence may govern the state.” Lasswell also acknowledged that some of the most “influential discussions of political institutions have named the military state as one of the chief forms of civil society.” Comte, the French philosopher, saw “history as a succession (and a progression) that moved, as far as it concerned the state, through military, feudal, and industrial phases.” Herbert Spencer, English philosopher and the father of Social Darwinism, split every society into the “military type,” established according to aggression, and the “industrial type,” based on “contract and free consent.”¹⁹ Thus, there can be a tendency to use phrases such as “military dictatorship” or “militant

¹⁵ F. Monama, “Marshalling a splintered society: Censorship, publicity and propaganda in South Africa during the Second World War,” *Historia* 67, no. 2 (2022): 27.

¹⁶ Monama, “Marshalling a splintered society: Censorship, publicity and propaganda in South Africa during the Second World War,” 27.

¹⁷ Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” 459.

¹⁸ Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” 460.

¹⁹ Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” 457.

nationalism” interchangeably with the garrison state or to use them as synonyms for the garrison state. However, the nuance that Lasswell introduced should not be ignored. For Lasswell, what was important was to foresee the potential development of the military state under the technical circumstances during the time that Lasswell was writing. At the time, the early 1940s, there were “no examples of the military state combined with modern technology.” Whilst times of crises are taking place, the “great powers” had given great “scope to military authority, but temporary acquisitions of authority” lacked the fundamentals of “comparative permanence and acceptance” that completed the garrison state.²⁰ Military dictators of the time in states “marginal to the creative centres” of Western civilisation were not incorporated with the modern technology of the day, they merely used some of its particular methods. South Africa could not fall into this category as it produced its own modern technology, and it was not a military dictatorship. According to Lasswell, the military men who dominated a modern technical society were very different from their predecessors of history and tradition.

Fear and the use of fear to coerce were flagged by Lasswell as strong characteristics of a garrison state. “The importance of the morale factor” was emphasised by universal fear. This fear was “possible to maintain in large populations through modern instruments of warfare.”²¹ The advancement of aerial warfare had tended to “abolish the distinction between civilian and military functions.”²² It was no longer viable to uphold those who entered the military who took the physical risk while those who remained at home stayed safe and contributed to “the equipment and the comfort of the brave heroes at the front.”²³

²⁰ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 458.

²¹ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 459.

²² Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 459.

²³ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 459.

This antiquated idea of warfare was something that Lasswell criticised and rightly so.

“Indeed, in some periods of modern warfare, casualties among civilians may outnumber the casualties of the armed forces” he remarked. Together with the use of fear, another characteristic psychological pattern of the garrison state was the *startle pattern*, “which is carried over to the internal as well as to the external threat of danger.”²⁴ This *startle pattern* is overcome and stylised as “alert, prompt, commanding adjustment to reality.”

Lasswell also noted that there will be symbolic adjustments, one of those would be the abolition of the unemployed.²⁵ Lasswell’s background in economics and labour studies from the early 1920s helped him formulate these ideas. There would be complete stigmatisation of the unemployed in the garrison state. In the garrison state the unemployed were seen as useless. This would be the case, whether the unemployed were provided a “dole” or placed on “relief projects.”²⁶ “No doubt the garrison state would be distinguished by the psychological abolition of unemployment.”²⁷ “In the garrison state there must be work and the duty to work for all.”²⁸ Lasswell saw work within the garrison state as becoming “public work,” and thus for the betterment of the garrison state, the unemployed were seen as disregarding military discipline. “For those who do not fit within the structure of the state” only one choice exists according to Lasswell: “to obey or die.”²⁹ “Compulsion, therefore, was to be expected as a potent instrument of the garrison state.”³⁰

Lasswell noted that “The chief targets of compulsory labour service will be unskilled manual workers.” It is important to remember this was being written in the shadow of the

²⁴ Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” 460.

²⁵ Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” 459.

²⁶ Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” 459.

²⁷ Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” 459.

²⁸ Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” 459.

²⁹ Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” 460.

³⁰ Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” 460.

great Depression of 1929. Here, an interesting link can be drawn with South Africa and its history of using and targeting cheap black labour. As the value of labour declines³¹ "it also declines in warfare, hence, it will be treated with less consideration."³² Lasswell was also concerned with the development of the pharmacology industry and how it could be used as a form of compulsion. Lasswell stated:

If recent advances in pharmacology continue, as we may anticipate, physical means of controlling response can replace symbolic methods. This refers to the use of drugs, not only for temporary orgies of energy on the part of frontline fighters, but to deaden the critical function of all who are not held in esteem by the ruling elite.³³

Here, one could criticise Lasswell for becoming too conspiratorial. There was no evidence that the state, irrespective of the type of state, would implement the use of psychopharmacological drugs for the purposes of control over the entire population. These examples relate specifically to enhancing the performance of soldiers during a time of war. The thesis argues that Lasswell's assertion of "control over the entire population" is flawed. Though individual cases exist of soldiers on the frontlines using narcotics³⁴ or political dissidents being drugged, again the evidence does not extend to Lasswell's prediction. Lasswell himself saw the limitations of this prediction and stated:

For the immediate future, however, ruling elites must continue to put their chief reliance upon propaganda as an instrument of morale. The manipulation

³¹ Though one could argue cheap black labour was very valuable to South Africa

³² Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 460.

³³ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 461.

³⁴ Both the allies and Germany used performance enhancing drugs to stave off fatigue, especially cocaine in WWI and methamphetamine in WWII (S. Snelders and T. Pieters, "Speed in the Third Reich: Metamphetamine (pervitin) use and a drug history from below," *Social History of Medicine* 24, no. 3 (2011), <https://doi.org/10.1093/shm/hkq101>, <https://doi.org/10.1093/shm/hkq101>).

of symbols, even in conjunction with coercive instruments of violence, is not sufficient to accomplish all the purposes of a ruling group.³⁵

A pertinent question that has to be asked about the development of a garrison state is: "What about the capacity of the garrison state to produce a large volume of material values?"³⁶ The elites of the garrison state, like the modern-day elites, what Lasswell would call the "business states"³⁷ will "confront the problem of holding in check" the tremendous potential of modern science and engineering to produce goods.³⁸ "The ruling elites of the modern business state" do not know how to "control productive capacity," thus "modern society" has been characterised by periods of unrestrained growth, succeeded by periods of underutilisation of production.³⁹ The rulers of the garrison state will be able to regularise "the rate of production, since they will be free from many of the conventions that have stood in the way of adopting measures suitable to this purpose in the business state."⁴⁰ Lasswell saw the "business elite" as being reluctant to revise "institutional practices" to the point "necessary to maintain a continually rising flow of investment."⁴¹ The "institutional structure" of the "business state" called for "flexible adjustment" between governmental and "private channels of activity and for strict measures to maintain price flexibility."⁴² However, anywhere the business elite had not supported "such necessary arrangements," the business state began to collapse according to Lasswell.

The rulers of the garrison state would "depend upon war scares as a means of maintaining popular willingness to forgo immediate consumption," though these deliberate

³⁵ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 461.

³⁶ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 464.

³⁷ A term Lasswell would use for Western Capitalist states.

³⁸ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 464.

³⁹ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 464.

⁴⁰ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 464.

⁴¹ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 464.

⁴² Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 464.

war scares would not cause actual violence. Numerous aspects in the garrison state justify the “expectation that tendencies toward repetitiousness” and “ceremonialisation” will be pertinent. Lasswell believed that “to some extent this is a function of bureaucracy and dictatorship.”⁴³ However, to some extent “it springs also from the preoccupation of the garrison state” with danger. “Even where military operations are greatly respected, the fighter must steel himself against deep-lying tendencies to retreat from death and mutilation.”⁴⁴ An example of an effective way of “relieving fear is some repetitive operation, some reiteration of the old and well-established.”⁴⁵ “Hence, the reliance on drill as a means of disciplining men to endure personal danger without giving in to fear of death.”⁴⁶ The garrison state tends to “ceremonialise” rather than go to war, and this would be particularly prominent among the most important foundations in the garrison state. Those in control of the military would certainly be remunerated better than most. In times of real war, “it may be necessary to make concessions in the direction of moderating gross-income differences in the light of preserving general morale.”

Lasswell asked interesting questions about the transition to the garrison state, such as: What is the probable order of appearance—Japan, Germany, Russia, United States of America?⁴⁷ What are the probable combinations of bargaining, propaganda, organisation, and violence skills in elites?⁴⁸ Is it probable that the garrison state will appear with or without violent revolution?⁴⁹ Will the garrison state appear first in a small number of huge continental states (Russia, Germany, Japan [in China], United States) or in a single world

⁴³ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 466.

⁴⁴ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 466.

⁴⁵ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 466.

⁴⁶ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 466.

⁴⁷ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 467.

⁴⁸ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 467.

⁴⁹ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 467.

state dominated by one of these powers?⁵⁰ With what symbol patterns will the transition to the garrison state be associated?

These questions show that Lasswell had certain doubts about the garrison state and that it was a concept that could be more flexible than one might first have thought. South Africa as a garrison state is something Lasswell never considered.

The Harold D. Lasswell Lens: The “One-Man University”

Lasswell reflected that “The picture of the garrison state that is offered here is no dogmatic forecast. Rather it is a picture of the probable. It is not inevitable.”⁵¹ By 1941, Europe was in the grips of WWII. Nazi Germany had become a major threat not only to civilians, but also to entire countries. The militarisation and build-up towards WWII did not go unnoticed by scholars, many of whom were looking for answers as to how this happened. With no end in sight to this global catastrophe, a profound sense of insecurity prevailed across the world. In 1941, Lasswell attempted to introduce a more nuanced answer when he first introduced the garrison state in the *American Journal of Sociology*.⁵² Shortly after the garrison state was published, Lasswell wrote to his parents and mentioned that he was asked to be a civilian advisor for the War Department.⁵³ A year before, in 1940, Lasswell was interviewed on radio on the topic of “Human Nature in Action.”⁵⁴ Though on the surface these two events do not seem related, they show how Lasswell was focused on and involved in WWII. Lasswell was, as with many of his peers at the time, influenced by predominantly Western ideas and ways of thinking especially in the realms of psychology, sociology, and

⁵⁰ Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” 467.

⁵¹ Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” 455.

⁵² Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” 455.

⁵³ H. D. Lasswell, Letter to Ann and Linden Lasswell, 17 February 1941, Letter, Part of Collection Box 56, Folder 775–787, Harold Dwight Lasswell papers (HDLP). Series I: General files, 1920–1978, 1043, Archives at Yale, Yale, https://archives.yale.edu/repositories/12/archival_objects/1529256.

⁵⁴ Anon., “University of Chicago Round Table” (Chicago, 3 November 1940).

political science. However, what made the garrison state unique, was how Lasswell was influenced by the Second Sino-Japanese War⁵⁵ including the development of aerial warfare.⁵⁶ Lasswell believed these examples, which had a profound influence on him, would lead to a "socialization of danger."⁵⁷ The development of the concept of the garrison state did not take place instantaneously, it was a gradual process with numerous points of contention which should have been highlighted more, yet it was not.

It is important to reiterate that this study will only focus on information relevant to Lasswell's development of the garrison state. The disciplines that influenced him range from economics, political science, psychology, to sociology. Lasswell studied the power of influential communication in political processes. He developed a well-known model of the communication process, which has been used as a basis for many other studies. He thus became a leading figure in the field of communication theory, and his work has had an enduring impact on the development of theories in this area. He is known for his *influential communication model* which identifies five essential elements that form the basis of any communication event: a source, a message, a channel, a receiver, and an effect.⁵⁸

Lasswell had the ability to sample from various disciplines, as the moniker the *one-man university* would suggest.⁵⁹ Lasswell engaged multiple disciplines, not being limited by

⁵⁵ The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) was a military conflict that was primarily waged between the [Republic of China](#) and the [Empire of Japan](#). The war made up the Chinese Theatre of the wider [Pacific Theatre](#) of the [Second World War](#). The beginning of the war is conventionally dated to the [Marco Polo Bridge Incident](#) on 7 July 1937, when a dispute between Japanese and Chinese troops in [Peking](#) escalated into a full-scale invasion. The Second Sino-Japanese War was one the largest Asian wars in the twentieth century. It accounted for the majority of civilian and military [casualties](#) in the [Pacific War](#), with between 10 and 25 million Chinese civilians and over four million Chinese and Japanese military personnel missing or dying from war-related violence, famine, and other causes. The war has been called "the Asian [holocaust](#)."

⁵⁶ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

⁵⁷ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

⁵⁸ H. D. Lasswell, "The structure and function of communication in society: A series of addresses," in *The communication of ideas*, ed. L. Bryson (New York and London: Institute for Religious and Social Studies, 1948), 37-52.

⁵⁹ Muth, Finley, and Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*, 3.

conventional academic boundaries. Lasswell came from relatively humble beginnings and was born in Donnellson, Illinois in 1902.⁶⁰ He died in 1978 in New York City. After spending his early academic years at the University of Chicago, and in Washington D.C., he established a base at Yale University from which he pushed traditional, institutional and disciplinary boundaries on various topics. During his lifetime, his effect on the social sciences was far-reaching. Edward Shils, a distinguished service professor in the Committee on Social Thought and in sociology at the University of Chicago remarked on the life of Lasswell and his career:

. . . Lasswell was exceptional in his generation in combining the macro-sociological view with a great interest in and familiarity with personality functions and their manifestations. From Marx, Weber, and Pareto he elaborated a toughminded worldly view of the harsh and constricting life of man in society. From Freud he drew the basic conception of the personality system. To each of these he added what was unequalled in its time and what is still very rare, namely, the alertness and wealth of imagination which permitted him to see the functions of the personality operating in the macrosocial environment—in the presence of class conflict, nationalism, war and revolution.⁶¹

Towards the end of his extensive career, Lasswell clarified his switch from economics to political science, saying that “I stuck to political science because it was more challenging than economics. Principally, it was less well advanced.”⁶² Much of Lasswell’s academic interests and scholarly drive was encouraged by his parents and other early mentors. His father, Linden, was a Presbyterian minister, whose Calvinist influence was not confining. His

⁶⁰ Muth, Finley, and Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*, 3.

⁶¹ E. Shils, "Reflections on defence," in *Politics, personality and social science in the twentieth century: Essays in honor of Harold D. Lasswell*, ed. A. A. Rogow (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1969), 297.

⁶² M. Harrington Hall, "A conversation with Harold Dwight Lasswell," *Psychology Today* October (1968): 63.

mother, Ana, an intermittent high school teacher, was also his classroom instructor at one stage. Together, both his parents lived highly organised lives, a trait that Lasswell emulated and perfected, which by example encouraged his scholarly pursuits. Both his parents made a living “by thinking, talking and giving advice.”⁶³

Lasswell wrote to his parents in 1924 explaining his change from economics to political science: “. . . economics is a field which is sadly in need of general reorganisation on the theoretical side, although in research work it is farther along than political science, very much farther . . . ”⁶⁴ His other early mentors involved his uncle, a medical doctor who gave the teenage Lasswell a copy of Freud’s lectures at Clark University. William Casey, a high school teacher encouraged Lasswell to attend the University of Chicago and later become a professor of sociology at Columbia University. Lasswell was also exposed to a cosmopolitan world via books—by Havelock Ellis and Karl Marx for example—and he met with John Dewey, an American philosopher, psychologist, and educational reformer who had a noteworthy impact on the fields of education and philosophy, who also deeply influenced Lasswell’s thinking about problem solving and contextuality.⁶⁵ Lasswell stayed active after retiring from Yale and his scholarly output continued unabated.⁶⁶

From 1919–1922 he taught classes for trade union groups and WWI veterans interested in business and labour management at Mayo Business College in Chicago.⁶⁷ From these courses, he authored his first book in collaboration with Willard Atkins titled *Labour Attitudes and Problems* (1924) whilst he was in Europe. Lasswell did his postgraduate work

⁶³ Muth, Finley, and Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*, 3.

⁶⁴ H. D. Lasswell, Letters to Ann and Linden Lasswell, 16 March 1924, Letter, Part of Collection Box 56, Folder 775–787, Harold Dwight Lasswell papers (HDLP). Series I: General files, 1920–1978, 1043, Archives at Yale, Yale, https://archives.yale.edu/repositories/12/archival_objects/1529256.

⁶⁵ Muth, Finley, and Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*, 3.

⁶⁶ Muth, Finley, and Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*, 24.

⁶⁷ Muth, Finley, and Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*, 4.

at universities in London, Berlin and Geneva studying with such notables as Werner Sombart, the German economist, and Hugo Preuss, the German liberal politician and minister of interior. Whilst in Europe he wrote numerous letters. These letters included analyses of economic and political current affairs, particularly those in England, France, and Germany. He would also interpret or make recommendations about forecasted national and international problems. He focused on issues debated at the League of Nations and in parliaments of differing countries. Lasswell's letters to his parents also foreshadowed his future intellectual efforts. In some examples, his letters seemed more like notes to himself, instead of letters to his parents.⁶⁸

In 1926 Lasswell finished his PhD thesis and it was first published in 1927. Titled *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, it focused on the many unexpected techniques and the scientific analysis of propaganda during WWI. This would also serve as a foundation to focusing on propaganda and communication processes in general.⁶⁹ His thesis was reprinted in 1938 in New York by Peter Smith.⁷⁰ Lasswell covered various topics, however propaganda was the main focus with propaganda organisations, conditions and methods of propaganda and the results of propaganda being emphasised in various chapters.⁷¹ In this text Lasswell also mentions:

In the defeated countries such as Germany, the military people have seized upon propaganda so save their own faces. They declare that their army was never defeated by the battering of Allied battalions, but that the nation collapsed behind their lines because all the alien and radical elements in the population were easy marks for the seductive bait of foreign propaganda.⁷²

⁶⁸ Lasswell, Letters to Ann and Linden Lasswell, 16 March 1924, Letter.

⁶⁹ Muth, Finley, and Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*, 8.

⁷⁰ H. D. Lasswell, *Propaganda technique in the World War* (New York: Peter Smith, 1938).

⁷¹ Lasswell, *Propaganda technique in the World War*, 14.

⁷² Lasswell, *Propaganda technique in the World War*, 8.

It should be noted how Lasswell viewed the military and their leaders and how they used propaganda to their advantage as this would be an insight he developed further with the garrison state.

In 1925, Lasswell spent considerable time in the Prussian state library in Berlin focusing on the topics of patriotism, civic education and the duties of citizenship as well as other general issues within political science, particularly political theory.⁷³ From 1926 to 1927, when Lasswell was an assistant professor in political science at the University of Chicago, he worked closely with Elton Mayo,⁷⁴ the Australian professor of industrial relations, Robert E. Park, the American urban sociologist who collaborated with Booker T. Washington⁷⁵, as well as George Herbert Mead⁷⁶, an American philosopher and social theorist. Thus, Lasswell was influenced by a variety of experts in different fields within the social sciences. In 1928, Lasswell returned to Europe and travelled extensively, visiting Vienna, Budapest, Prague and Berlin.⁷⁷ There he met with influential people such as Adolf Adler, the medical doctor, psychotherapist and founder of the school of individual psychology, as well as Anna Freud, the daughter of Sigmund Freud and a prominent psychoanalyst in her own right. This meeting was very impactful on Lasswell as he had read Freud extensively from a young age. He also met with Wilhelm Stekel, an Austrian physician and psychologist, and one of Freud's earliest followers. Lasswell held Stekel in extremely high regard. In a letter to his parents Lasswell stated that:

Stekel is the most interesting acquaintance of the past week. He is one of the original circle which gathered around Freud, but broke off some time ago.

⁷³ Muth, Finley, and Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*, 10.

⁷⁴ E. Mayo, *The human problems of an industrial civilization* (New York: Macmillan, 1933).

⁷⁵ R. E. Park and B. T. Washington, *The man farthest down: A record of observation and study in Europe* (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1911).

⁷⁶ G. H. Mead, *The philosophy of the present*, ed. A.E. Murphy (London: The Open Court Company, 1932).

⁷⁷ Muth, Finley, and Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*, 10.

Freud, Adler, Jung, and Stekel are the *big four*. Stekel reacted with more brilliance to my problem [research] than any other man I have met in Vienna . . . he may be willing and able to contribute some valuable hypotheses . . . He has identified himself with no single theory.⁷⁸

The fact that Stekel did not identify with a specific theory influenced Lasswell tremendously. This is evident from Lasswell's career from how he was able to move between different disciplines quite seamlessly. It was this specific trip to Europe in 1928 that influenced Lasswell, specifically within the fields of personality, psychology, and psychiatry.

When Lasswell returned from Europe in 1929, he published "The Problem Adequate Personality Records: A Proposal"⁷⁹ and "The Study of the Ill as a Method of Research into Political Personalities."⁸⁰ Here, Lasswell became increasingly interested in the idea of the authoritarian personality. Both studies were based on Lasswell's European experiences. Richard C. Clark noted in *The McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of World Biography* (1973) that Lasswell's work was "an honest attempt to answer the root problem of politics: how to direct into healthy channels the neurotic lust for domination, which can be abolished no more than any other lust."⁸¹ In 1930, he published *Psychopathology and Politics* a companion to *Propaganda Technique*.⁸² The book used clinical case material to examine "private motives and personality disturbances that goaded political actors and that gave vitality to political movements."⁸³ It also outlined a politics of prevention and established him as the founder of "political psychology."⁸⁴ In 1935, while he was a visiting professor at

⁷⁸ H. D. Lasswell, Letters to Ann and Linden Lasswell, 14 October 1928, Letter, Part of Collection Box 56, Folder 775–787, Harold Dwight Lasswell papers (HDLP). Series I: General files, 1920–1978, 1043, Archives at Yale, Yale, https://archives.yale.edu/repositories/12/archival_objects/1529256.

⁷⁹ Muth, Finley, and Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*, 11.

⁸⁰ Muth, Finley, and Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*, 11.

⁸¹ Muth, Finley, and Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*, 11.

⁸² Muth, Finley, and Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*, 11.

⁸³ Muth, Finley, and Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*, 11.

⁸⁴ Muth, Finley, and Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*, 11.

the University of California, Berkeley, Lasswell again published various works on propaganda with *Propaganda and Promotional Activities: An Annotated Bibliography* being the most important.⁸⁵ He also published *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* in 1935.⁸⁶ These earlier works of Lasswell paved the way for the garrison state as they addressed broad themes of authoritarianism. It is also important to note the manner in which political elites could manipulate fear to gain additional influence and power and justify greater security measures, such as steps towards militarisation.

At the outbreak of WWII, Lasswell was conducting research in New York, held a lectureship at Yale University, and held the position of chief of the experimental division for the study of wartime communications in the Library of Congress.⁸⁷ This position was underwritten by the Rockefeller Foundation and supported Lasswell's analysis of war propaganda. Here Lasswell started to focus on issues such as wartime allies and political symbols which both can be viewed via the lens of the garrison state. Lasswell stated:

Should the United States become more intimately involved in . . . [World War II] it would rather be important for us to formulate war aims in terms of what would strengthen rather than weaken the morale of our allies. We need, therefore, to keep a watchful eye on the role of political symbols in the lives of our potential allies.⁸⁸

Following this submission, in 1941, Lasswell published "The Garrison State," which appeared in the *American Journal of Sociology*. This concept posits that governments were taking an increasingly aggressive stance against their citizens. He argued that a militarised

⁸⁵ Muth, Finley, and Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*, 12.

⁸⁶ Muth, Finley, and Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*, 12.

⁸⁷ Muth, Finley, and Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*, 15.

⁸⁸ Lasswell submitted this to the Rockefeller Foundation in 1940 for support of his wartime propaganda studies at the Library of Congress, New York (H. D. Lasswell, "Meeting minutes of the Rockefeller Foundation," *Library of Congress*, 15 November 1940.)

state would arise in which the government's main function was to use its military force to maintain social order. Lasswell also argued that the primary goal of the garrison state was not necessarily the protection of the citizens, but the protection of the state.

We can find early references in Lasswell's work to the garrison state. Lasswell's attempts to merge political science and psychology, or political psychology, led him to the personality frameworks of authoritarian leaders. The question that plagued Lasswell was: what type of personality made an authoritarian leader? The understanding of an authoritarian personality and leader would be a microcosm of a greater garrison state. For Lasswell the authoritarian leader was the primary locus for the later development of the garrison state construct. The role of personalities, and how their "lust for domination" (as per Clark), is crucial in understanding the garrison state. Domination is a theme that occurs throughout the characteristics of the garrison state. The garrison state cannot function without authoritarian-minded leaders, or an elite class that have authoritarian tendencies. Thus, the earlier work by Lasswell on the psychology of authoritarian leaders and a need for domination set a solid foundation for Lasswell to theorise the garrison state. The possible reason as to why the general public elect or tolerate such authoritarian leaders could be due to political elites using fear to manipulate the populace.

Lasswell was promoted to associate professor of political science at the University of Chicago in 1932.⁸⁹ His "Triple-Appeal Principle" was published in the same year.⁹⁰ Here "he attempted to work out some political and sociological equivalents of Freud's divisions of the personality . . . [arguing] that institutions, relationships, and behaviours . . . derive their

⁸⁹ Muth, Finley, and Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*, 12.

⁹⁰ H. D. Lasswell, "The triple-appeal principle: A contribution of psychoanalysis to political and social science," *American Journal of Sociology* 37, no. 4 (1932): 1.

strength . . . from their ability to gratify the demands of the id, ego, and superego.”⁹¹

Psychoanalysis splits personality into three sections namely: the id-including biological needs, the superego-the socially acquired inhibitions, and the ego-the testing of reality.⁹²

The “id” could be said to resemble “impulse,” the “superego” resembles “conscience,” and the “ego” resembles “reason.” These three elements work in a specific manner in “person-to-person relationships, in the role and meaning of institutions, and in person-to-occasion relationships.”⁹³

According to Lasswell, choice of workers and reactions to superiors, leaders, and models, could be explained via a three-way personality, “which usually shows the predominance of one aspect.”⁹⁴ Organisations, he argued, understand their goals in light of that which makes them specifically appealing: “economic, political, scientific, and technological to expediency; religion and fundamental law to conscience; art and sociability to natural impulse.” This is a broader understanding of this approach and “person-to-occasion relationships also follow this general pattern.”⁹⁵ Elections for Lasswell were “appeals to rational considerations; patriotic holidays to conscience; carnivals and various celebrations to natural impulse.”⁹⁶ The tripartite principle could be linked to “analysis of policies and practices, doctrines, and myths and legends” as well.⁹⁷ For Lasswell it was noticeably filled with potential when linked to the issue of “social dynamics,” an area he was also very interested in.

⁹¹ Muth, Finley, and Muth, *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*, 12.

⁹² Lasswell, “The triple-appeal principle: A contribution of psychoanalysis to political and social science,” 1.

⁹³ Lasswell, “The triple-appeal principle: A contribution of psychoanalysis to political and social science,” 1.

⁹⁴ Lasswell, “The triple-appeal principle: A contribution of psychoanalysis to political and social science,” 1.

⁹⁵ Lasswell, “The triple-appeal principle: A contribution of psychoanalysis to political and social science,” 1.

⁹⁶ Lasswell, “The triple-appeal principle: A contribution of psychoanalysis to political and social science,” 1.

⁹⁷ Lasswell, “The triple-appeal principle: A contribution of psychoanalysis to political and social science,” 1.

Criticism by Other Scholars

Samuel P. Huntington criticised this garrison state construct by arguing that Lasswell's hypothesis was "unscientific," thereby requiring the use of the concept "construct": a claim reinforced by referring to the unsuccessful "bourgeois-proletariat formulation" of Marx and Engels.⁹⁸ Without "debating the appropriateness" of Huntington's equivalence, it is possible to argue that shaping the accurateness of any prediction "occurs only through trend analysis of appropriate indicators," or "by case analysis at some future point in which history, as it pertains to that particular prophecy, is considered complete."⁹⁹ "Support for the propriety of using a construct was continually defended by Lasswell," as can be seen in his declaration that "A developmental construct characterises a possible sequence of events running from a selected cross section of the past to a cross section of the future," in other words, a trend.¹⁰⁰

Another important critic of Lasswell was the sociologist Raymond Aron. Lasswell described "three world systems of symbols" or, to use informal language, "three political regimes (liberal capitalism, fascism (anti-plutocratic), Soviet communism) that were occupying the international arena in the 1930s and that continued through WWII; two of these were allied to destroy the third."¹⁰¹ Aron argued that There no longer existed "a system of symbols" that could be characterised as a form of "national anti-plutocratic government," which was also "anti-proletariat," or instead, "anti-communist."¹⁰² The conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States "became inevitable after the

⁹⁸ S. Huntington, *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military*, trans. E. Stern and M. Martin (Cambridge: Harvard, 1957), 354.

⁹⁹ Huntington, *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military*, 354.

¹⁰⁰ Huntington, *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military*, 354.

¹⁰¹ Aron, "Remarks on Lasswell's 'The Garrison State'," 347.

¹⁰² Aron, "Remarks on Lasswell's 'The Garrison State'," 347.

destruction of the Third Reich;" it was the conflict between the "ideal of a world proletariat" that was embodied in the socialist state and that of "liberal democracy realised in Europe and America albeit in an imperfect form."¹⁰³ Aron believed that, on the other hand, "the argument did not clearly expose the major cause of the ascension of the garrison state," one which supposes the pre-eminence of the "specialists on violence."¹⁰⁴ Starting from this hypothesis, "Lasswell elaborated an ideal type, an abstract model" of a society that one could call "militaristic."¹⁰⁵

However, "neither the liberal or plutocratic democracies nor the so-called bureaucratic ideological regime" of the Soviet Union was dominated by the "managers of violence"; whether military or police. In the United States, the negotiating or bargaining "experts," such as jurists or administrators, all held top positions in the organisation of the nation. Therefore, "the model of the garrison state, as a probable hypothesis" focusing on the development of society, "is in contradiction with the sociological tradition, with the classical alternatives, either war or industry, either market economy or state-controlled economy."¹⁰⁶ Conceived "under the shock of fascist regimes (or anti-plutocratic), Soviet totalitarianism, and WWII, the garrison state represents the outcome of the evolution" that went from militarisation of "German society during WWI to that of fascist and Soviet societies (including Japan) in the 1930s."¹⁰⁷ This development was halted by "the defeat of the second symbolic system of Lasswell (anti-plutocratic regimes)."¹⁰⁸ The industrialised societies "redistributed themselves between Lasswell's first and third systems," with

¹⁰³ Aron, "Remarks on Lasswell's 'The Garrison State'."

¹⁰⁴ Aron, "Remarks on Lasswell's 'The Garrison State'."

¹⁰⁵ Aron, "Remarks on Lasswell's 'The Garrison State'."

¹⁰⁶ Aron, "Remarks on Lasswell's 'The Garrison State'."

¹⁰⁷ Aron, "Remarks on Lasswell's 'The Garrison State'."

¹⁰⁸ Aron, "Remarks on Lasswell's 'The Garrison State'."

changes occurring in opposite directions; that is, “type 3” regimes are “more militaristic, at least as much as they were forty years ago.”¹⁰⁹ The military organisation, alternatively, in Western countries, “not only will be unable to put its seal on the social order,” would relinquish a section of its “distinctiveness” and become similar to civil organisations.

Lasswell was concerned with the authoritarian reaction many states exhibited to combat fascism. He was equally concerned with fascism as with the reaction to fascism. Here we find a similarity with Hofmeyr who provides us with a unique lens to view South African political-intellectual discourse during the 1930s and 1940s.

The Hofmeyr Lens:

As with Lasswell, Hofmeyr was apprehensive about authoritarianism, even stating that “Repression will not solve real problems.”¹¹⁰ With this quote, Hofmeyr was focusing on the repression of civil liberties occurring in South Africa at the time in 1948. Not only is Hofmeyr a crucial figure during the 1930s and 1940s of South African politics, but he also provides us with a unique opportunity to see an alternative world view. Hofmeyr also produced a large body of published material, from speeches to newspaper articles, chapters in books and political propaganda. The tendency, when writing about Hofmeyr is to focus on the two most prominent biographies written about him, one written by Alan Paton¹¹¹ and the other by Tom Macdonald.¹¹² Macdonald cast Hofmeyr in the shadow of Jan Smuts, in other words, he does not see him as an independent entity. Interestingly, Macdonald published his biography before Hofmeyr passed away. Macdonald saw Hofmeyr’s future as an uncertain one, being the heir to Jan Smuts did not mean becoming the next prime

¹⁰⁹ Aron, “Remarks on Lasswell’s ‘The Garrison State’.”

¹¹⁰ J. H. Hofmeyr, “What of the future: South Africa’s present day problems,” in *To-day and to-morrow: XI, Analysed* (1948), 50.

¹¹¹ Paton, *Hofmeyr*.

¹¹² Macdonald, *Jan Hofmeyr: Heir to Smuts*.

minister of South Africa. Macdonald also saw the problems created by Hofmeyr's liberalism with the mainstream voter in South Africa at the time. Macdonald saw the possibility of the "herrenvolk mentality"¹¹³ blocking Hofmeyr's pathway to the premiership of South Africa. Macdonald stated: " . . . the 'herrenvolk mentality' of too many South Africans may yet rob him of what he has earned, the right to the premiership of South Africa, when the *old man of the mountain*, Jan Christiaan Smuts, lays down his burden."¹¹⁴

Hofmeyr did a lot for liberal causes at the time. Thus, as a liberal intellectual with a background in academia trying to juggle his own beliefs with the politics of the day, he provides us with a unique insight into the political landscape of the 1930s and 1940s.

Whilst the famous South African writer, Alan Paton, was busy writing a biography on Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr,¹¹⁵ he came across an unpublished essay coauthored by Hofmeyr and a Polish compatriot entitled "The New World Outlook," written in 1940 for publication in 1941. However, the document was never published.¹¹⁶ Hofmeyr pondered much over the problem of how to carry over the altruism and heroism of war into peace times.¹¹⁷ In Stanisław Łepkowski, the consul in Pretoria for the exiled Polish government, Hofmeyr found a thinker interested in similar issues. Łepkowski arrived in South Africa in 1940 and was introduced to Hofmeyr by Smuts.¹¹⁸ Hofmeyr introduced Łepkowski to Herbert Frankel at the Institute of International Affairs at the University of the Witwatersrand, and arranged for Łepkowski to speak to the society on the topic of a *Brave New World*. This was not the

¹¹³ A term used to describe a superior ethnicity, a "master race" as advocated by the Nazi's

¹¹⁴ Macdonald, *Jan Hofmeyr: Heir to Smuts*, 13.

¹¹⁵ Using material that would later be housed at the Hofmeyr Papers in the Alan Paton Centre at the University of Kwa-Zulu Natal (Pietermaritzburg Campus) and the archives at the William Cullen Library at Wits University.

¹¹⁶ Unfortunately, one can only speculate or make assumptions as to why this piece of work was never published, Paton mentions that Mrs. Hofmeyr goes as far as to completely deny that Hofmeyr and Łepkowski ever worked together or even knew each other.

¹¹⁷ Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 346.

¹¹⁸ Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 346.

Aldous Huxley novel, but rather a reflection on how to use man's altruism and heroism in times of peace. Together, Łepkowski and Hofmeyr decided to write a chapter for a new Commonwealth, which would replace the League of Nations.¹¹⁹ The new Commonwealth was envisaged as an extension of the British Commonwealth with Russia being excluded. When the chapter was finished, Łepkowski took it to Smuts, who thought the document was premature. A decision was then made to publish anonymously, however, this never occurred. In the end the chapter was never published.

Though the chapter did not use the term *garrison state*, the authors did speak of how right-wing authoritarianism was far more sinister than liberal orthodoxy. While the garrison state and right-wing authoritarianism should not be used as interchangeable synonyms, it did flag what Lasswell would call "specialists on violence." Hofmeyr, unlike many of his compatriots, could see the dangers of a state dominated by the "specialists on violence." For Hofmeyr and Łepkowski:

In all these aspects, the extreme right is far more subtle and cunning than the extreme left. It is more diabolically logical, cynical, and brutal and much more merciless and unscrupulous . . . and aspirations of the reactionary, that the battle is fought on his own battlefield. The conditions favour him, and the result is a foregone conclusion.¹²⁰

Together with the opening quote, "Repression will not solve real problems"¹²¹ it is clear that Hofmeyr indicated early signs of concern regarding what Lasswell would characterise as a garrison state developing. Though his conception of a garrison state was

¹¹⁹ Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 347.

¹²⁰ A. Paton, *The new world outlook, 1948–1987*, Unpublished Manuscript, Part of Collection Box PC1/1/7/10, Alan Paton Centre unpublished works, Alan Paton Centre, University of Kwa-Zulu Natal, Pietermaritzburg, <https://paton.ukzn.ac.za/core-collections/>.

¹²¹ Hofmeyr, "What of the future: South Africa's present day problems," 50.

not fully developed (as he had no interaction with Harold Lasswell),¹²² it does show that garrison state characteristics did not appeal to Hofmeyr, especially not from a political front. Hofmeyr was concerned though with similar elements to what Lasswell was flagging in the international context.

In his biography, Macdonald assumed that Hofmeyr had “earned” the right to be premier, and that if he did not become premier it was because he was “robbed” by right-wing Afrikaner Nationalists. This was an overly simplistic take on a complex issue. Macdonald was asserting that all those who did not support Hofmeyr were right-wing Afrikaner Nationalists. This was of course not the case with many on the left and the right of the political divide disagreeing with Hofmeyr’s politics. Hofmeyr did not only face opposition from Afrikaner Nationalists such as Malan or fascists such as Pirow, but he also faced opposition from Communists and African Nationalists like Moses Kotane and Anton Lembede. Another assumption that Macdonald made was that Hofmeyr wanted to be the prime minister. Macdonald went as far as predicting that Hofmeyr would replace Smuts and become premier. As he stated: “And in due time, Jan Hofmeyr as premier after Jan Smuts, will have won his guerdon, and not in the easy way.”¹²³ By the beginning of 1948, the political question South Africans grappled with was who would replace Jan Smuts. Would it be the individual Macdonald described as:

. . . Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, deputy prime minister of the Union, minister of finance and of education, the great liberal, a man whose creed (some say) has been a beacon in the land of racial rivalries . . . Much will depend on the result of the general election in 1948. Much, too, will depend on whether the man

¹²² Thus far, no evidence exists of any interaction interaction.

¹²³ Macdonald, *Jan Hofmeyr: Heir to Smuts*, 267.

with the finest brain in South Africa will someday lead his nation. And that man is certainly Jan Hofmeyr.¹²⁴

Hofmeyr himself thought a lot about the question of succession. The inevitable “What will happen after Smuts?” question was on everyone’s mind. Hofmeyr even wrote about it in his diary, referring to Dr. Arthur Keppel-Jones’s dystopian novel *When Smuts Goes*.¹²⁵ Though Hofmeyr never stated in his diary any ambitions to replace Smuts, the question of “the world after Smuts” was something that Hofmeyr pondered. Hofmeyr did speak in his diary of the example of Hitler and the Acton cliché of power corrupting, and he continued to say that he would not “mourn” the loss of his own power.¹²⁶

Though there is no evidence of Hofmeyr seeking power for his personal gain, he did produce writings that were in favour of powerful imperial entities. When Hofmeyr was studying classics at the University of Cape Town he wrote two papers: “The achievement of Roman Imperialism” as well as “Augustus as builder of the new Roman Empire.”¹²⁷ His fascination with imperialism, specifically ancient imperialism, continued when he published a pamphlet with Haarhoff titled *Studies in Ancient Imperialism*.¹²⁸ Thus from an early age Hofmeyr showed an interest in large imperial powers that could be used as a method to

¹²⁴ Macdonald, *Jan Hofmeyr: Heir to Smuts*, 11.

¹²⁵ J. H. Hofmeyr, Diary entry of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, 23 August 1947, Diary Entry, Papers of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, ZA HPRA A1-A-Ab-Ab1/1947, Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, <https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/km0fd>.

¹²⁶ J. H. Hofmeyr, Diary entry of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, 25 March 1948, Diary Entry, Papers of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, ZA HPRA A1-A-Ab-Ab1/1948, Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, <https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/km0fd>.

¹²⁷ J. H. Hofmeyr, Debating society address at South African College, 1948, Speech, Speeches by Hofmeyr in English, ZA HPRA A1-E-Ea-Ea142-221-Ea142/1948, Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, <https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/debating-society-address-at-south-african-college>.

¹²⁸ J. H. Hofmeyr, *Studies in ancient imperialism*, by J. H. Hofmeyr and T. Haarhoff, 1948, Pamphlet, Publications and unpublished writings of J.H. Hofmeyr, ZA HPRA A1-F-Fn/1948, Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, <https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/studies-in-ancient-imperialism-by-j-h-hofmeyr-and-t-haarhoff>.

maintain peace. During his political career he continued this theme with his support of British imperialism together with Smuts.

The praise that Macdonald showered Hofmeyr with could seem over-enthusiastic, however Hofmeyr's achievements cannot also be under-represented. His early years were dominated by illness, and his legacy could have been overshadowed by his uncle *Onze Jan* ("Our Jan") Hofmeyr or his compatriot Jan Smuts. His mother also played a prominent role (some might say overbearing) in his life. Yet his undeniable academic genius, and his extreme work ethic made him a prominent figure in South African politics. After his untimely death at the age of 54 in 1948, his legacy was continued by the J. H. Hofmeyr Memorial Trust in Natal.¹²⁹

Jan Smuts mentioned in an interview given to *Forum* publication in 1948 that Hofmeyr was South Africa's conscience.¹³⁰ It is important to note the limits of this view of a white liberal presented as saviour. Smuts also said men did not like their conscience and that after Hofmeyr's death South Africa no longer had a conscience.¹³¹ For Smuts, Hofmeyr was one of the greatest men that he had known, which was noteworthy as Smuts had personally known both Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Winston Churchill.

¹²⁹ The Trust ran from 1949-2000 with a specific vision for the future. Two essential functions of the Trust were the annual high school speech contests as well as bursaries. What was unique about these speech contests was that the topics spoke to the legacy of Hofmeyr, and the participants were from various races. The recipients of the bursaries were also of various races. From 1950 to the 1980s especially, the Hofmeyr trust pushed for liberal and democratic ideals which at the time seemed completely unattainable. Hofmeyr's legacy was protected and promoted by the Trust

¹³⁰ Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 530.

¹³¹ Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 530.

A Summarised Biography: Who was Hofmeyr?

Hofmeyr was always concerned with what he perceived as national unity.¹³² The question can be asked: where did his patriotic concern for the well-being of South Africa come from? Hofmeyr had unique childhood and educational experiences. Having *Onze Jan*¹³³ as his uncle and namesake came with lots of responsibility during a very patriarchal and socially conservative time. Combined with his superb intelligence and academic aptitude, remarkable things were expected of Hofmeyr. Unfortunately, the only diary available today that Hofmeyr kept dates from 1947–1948 and thus his feelings about his first-hand experiences whilst growing up are at times difficult to capture.

Hofmeyr was a child prodigy. Born in Cape Town on 20 March 1894, he was quite healthy until the age of two, when he fell ill, and the odds were against his recovery.¹³⁴ Had it not been for the devotion of his mother to nurse him back to health he might have easily died. Hofmeyr contracted hydrocephaly, a neurological condition caused by an irregular accumulation of cerebrospinal fluid in the ventricles (cavities) deep within the brain where this excess fluid causes the ventricles to expand, putting detrimental pressure on the brain's tissues. The idea at the time was that Hofmeyr, after he had recovered, would either be intellectually impaired or a genius.¹³⁵ Modern doctors reckon this to be a nonsensical legend, however Hofmeyr was seriously ill and later in life developed into a genius.

¹³² J. H. Hofmeyr, Address on national unity, 12 June 1940, Speech, Speeches by Hofmeyr in English: General, ZA HPRA A1-E-Ea-Ea1-141-Ea105/1940, Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, <https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/address-on-national-unity>.

¹³³ Frankel describes "Onze Jan" Hofmeyr as: "The Great Cape Liberal who worked for the ideal of British and Afrikaner unity in South Africa ... - had a tremendous influence on Jan Hofmeyr's life." S. H. Frankel, "Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr," *African Affairs* 48, no. 191 (1949): 117-119.

¹³⁴ Macdonald, *Jan Hofmeyr: Heir to Smuts*, 14.

¹³⁵ Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 2-3.

Macdonald saw Hofmeyr's entire life as an answer to the devotion of his mother. She never ceased to be jealous of the career which claimed so much of Hofmeyr's time.¹³⁶

The tragedies did not stop with his illness, as Hofmeyr also lost his father at the early age of three.¹³⁷ Despite these upheavals, Hofmeyr had a tremendous academic career. Hofmeyr attended the South African College School (SACS). He matriculated at the age of twelve. When he was fifteen, he read for his bachelor of arts in classics. At sixteen he read for his second bachelor in mathematics and science, and at seventeen his master of arts in classics. He was awarded a Rhodes scholarship but as he was too young to go to Oxford he attended later with his mother. Hofmeyr spent three years at Oxford with his mother. At the age of twenty-two he returned to his old college in Cape Town as a lecturer in Latin.¹³⁸ Six months later he was appointed professor of classics at the Witwatersrand University, which later became the University of the Witwatersrand, of which, at the age of twenty-five, he was appointed the first principal. In 1924, while still under thirty, he was appointed administrator of the Transvaal. Before his career in politics, the government would often call on the help of Hofmeyr as his academic achievements created a noteworthy reputation. He was a member of the Miners' Phthisis Commission, of the Provincial Finances Commission and chairman of the Education Administration Commission in his professorial days.

His uncle especially influenced Hofmeyr about his ideas surrounding South African unity, and more specifically unity between the British and the Afrikaners. Both Hofmeyr and his uncle understood that South Africa as a country could never properly unite during the political climate of the time without unifying both "Boer and Brit." Hofmeyr wrote the

¹³⁶ Macdonald, *Jan Hofmeyr: Heir to Smuts*, 14.

¹³⁷ Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 2-3.

¹³⁸ Macdonald, *Jan Hofmeyr: Heir to Smuts*, 15.

biography on *Onze Jan*¹³⁹ in collaboration with Senator Francis William Reitz, but Reitz only did some of the preliminary work for the book.¹⁴⁰ It was a volume that consisted of 250,000 words and was published in 1913. Hofmeyr did most of the research and wrote the book within a year. The book was finished when he was eighteen years old, and he singlehandedly typed the entire manuscript. This enormous undertaking showed Hofmeyr's intelligence, work ethic and pride.

Hofmeyr's career did not end with academia and publishing and as previously mentioned, he became a crucial figure in South African politics. Though for some of his peers, and later political analysts and historians, it seemed a natural progression, Hofmeyr was reluctant at first to throw his hat into the political ring. Though he reached great heights as a politician, Hofmeyr's political career was filled with difficulties because of his inability to reconcile his personal beliefs and morals with that of his party and government. Hofmeyr's liberalism was often a source of contention and controversy and conflicted with many of the UP policies, let alone the Nationalists. Hofmeyr's liberalism became an easy target for seasoned politicians in the opposition such as Daniël François Malan, Oswald Pirow and James Barry Munnik Hertzog. Hofmeyr's inability to connect with the common man on the street, his verbosity, academic language and regular fence-sitting, made for challenging times when it came to parliamentary debates and public speeches. For example, his disastrous first debate in parliament was completely overshadowed by the reaction of opposition members to the impending crisis of WWII in Europe and that South Africa could not hope to avoid the clash of the coming conflict.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ J. H. Hofmeyr and F. W. Reitz, *The life of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr (Onze Jan)* (Cape Town: Van de Sandt de Villiers, 1913).

¹⁴⁰ Macdonald, *Jan Hofmeyr: Heir to Smuts*, 24.

¹⁴¹ Parliamentary correspondent, "Day of tension in the house," *The Argus*, March 1939.

Hofmeyr was also frequently heavily criticised in the press for his liberal views. He was a regular target for *Die Kruithoring*, an ultra-conservative right-wing publication.¹⁴² In historical context, a *kruithoring* is made of the horn of a cow or antelope, fitted with a lid or cap, and worn on a belt, usually to transport gunpowder. They especially targeted Hofmeyr with ad hominem attacks when Hofmeyr stated that it would not be possible to keep South Africa a *witmansland* ("white man's country"), and that any policy that would attempt this would be futile.¹⁴³ Even though Hofmeyr faced all these challenges, at times self-inflicted, his intelligence and work ethic could not be questioned, and Smuts saw the value Hofmeyr could bring to South African politics. Smuts entrusted Hofmeyr with numerous portfolios, noting that Hofmeyr's intelligence and work ethic would allow him to succeed despite the pressures of the work.

Through the course of his political career Hofmeyr was placed in charge of the portfolios of education, mines, labour, native affairs, finance as well as serving as a stand-in prime minister for Smuts during WWII whilst Smuts was acting as a field marshal for Churchill. There will always exist a debate as to whether his strenuous schedule led to his untimely demise, and the hypothetical scenario of what would have happened in South African politics had Hofmeyr not died at such a young age. We do know that Hofmeyr was still very much alive when the NP took power in 1948, and that Hofmeyr had a very prominent position in Smuts' cabinet and in the UP. It cannot be doubted that Hofmeyr would have been a force for liberal change in South Africa. However, one can only speculate what Hofmeyr would have achieved, and most of those achievements would have most likely come from the opposition benches at least in the late 1940s in early 1950s. This is

¹⁴² Anon., "Dit is onmoontlik om Blanke Land te hou!," *Die Kruithoring*, 16 July 1947.

¹⁴³ Anon., "Dit is onmoontlik om Blanke Land te hou!," *Die Kruithoring*, 16 July 1947

counter-factual history, also called *speculative history*, in “which key features of the real world were not present or took on different values.”¹⁴⁴ A counter-factual involves “the mental construction of a course of events which is altered through modification in one or more ‘conditions.’”¹⁴⁵ The focus primarily on the utility of counter-factual “analysis [is] for helping to validate causal inferences in historical analysis.”¹⁴⁶

The question we need to ask regarding counter-factual history is “how can we use what did not happen but which easily could have happened to understand what did happen?”¹⁴⁷ Historians have used counterfactuals “ever since Herodotus argued that if the Athenians had not defeated the much stronger Persian forces in the Battle of Salamis (480 BCE),” “Hellas would have been conquered by the Persians.”¹⁴⁸ Historians have been divided, though, as to the functionality of counterfactuals.¹⁴⁹ Criticisms of counter-factual history (or *what if* history,) are summarised by British historian and diplomat E. H. Carr’s argument that “although counterfactuals might be entertaining, they are too arbitrary, speculative, and self-serving to contribute to historical understanding.”¹⁵⁰ Although, contrary to what Carr believes, alternative possibilities for South Africa would contribute to historical understanding of what was lost in 1948.

Hofmeyr’s Early Political Career

Hofmeyr was by no means a countryman or a farmer, yet he never failed to mention a drought when there was one. This was his attempt to connect with the common man. By

¹⁴⁴ J. S. Levy, "Counterfactuals, casual inference and historical analysis," *Security Studies* 24, no. 3 (2015): 379.

¹⁴⁵ M. Weber, *The Methodology of the social sciences* (New York: Free Press, 1949), 173.

¹⁴⁶ Levy, "Counterfactuals, casual inference and historical analysis," 379.

¹⁴⁷ Levy, "Counterfactuals, casual inference and historical analysis," 379.

¹⁴⁸ R. B. Strassler, *The landmark Herodotus: The histories*, ed. R. B. Strassler, trans. A.L. Pervis (New York: Anchor Books, 2007), 139.

¹⁴⁹ Levy, "Counterfactuals, casual inference and historical analysis," 379.

¹⁵⁰ Levy, "Counterfactuals, casual inference and historical analysis," 379.

the end of the 1930s and moving into 1931, South Africa was having an exceedingly challenging time economically due to the great Depression. The United States was not buying diamonds, and the price of wool declined all over the world. By 1931, “Havenga was a leading member of Hertzog’s government.”¹⁵¹ Together with Oswald Pirow, they formed the basis of Hertzog’s “inner cabinet” which controlled decision-making, taxing townsmen heavily to keep farmers on the land. Smuts was determined to leave the gold standard. Most sectors of society were in favour of moving away from the gold standard, except the farmers. This was an issue throughout Hofmeyr’s political career, his inability to reach the common man, which in South Africa, at the time, were rural Afrikaner farmers. Havenga wanted to stay on the gold standard because he believed it would demonstrate South Africa’s economic independence to the world. Hofmeyr, in contrast to Havenga, wanted South Africa to move away from the gold standard.¹⁵²

Hofmeyr was against the idea that South Africa should stick to the gold standard simply as a political demonstration, however, he agreed with Havenga that it would be difficult to stabilise wages and prices afterwards. However, Hofmeyr was also quoted in the *Rand Daily Mail* as saying, “South Africa should remain on gold unless the price becomes too heavy.”¹⁵³ Arguments in favour of maintaining the gold standard included maintaining economic stability, retaining fiscal discipline and that gold held long-term value. The arguments against maintaining the gold standard focused on the gold standard being too rigid, preventing governments from taking necessary monetary policy actions during economic crises and running the risk of deflation and resource dependency. Eventually

¹⁵¹ Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 183.

¹⁵² Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 183.

¹⁵³ J. H. Hofmeyr, "South Africa should remain on gold unless the price becomes too heavy," *Rand Daily Mail*, 12 February 1932.

South Africa left the gold standard in 1932.¹⁵⁴ Again, as with the Immigration Quota Bill, Hofmeyr's fence-sitting did not resonate well with the common man.

The year 1932 was a particularly important year for Hofmeyr. An important person in the story of the garrison state was Oswald Pirow. Paton described Pirow as a lieutenant-heir to Hertzog, much like Hofmeyr was to Smuts.¹⁵⁵ Smuts and Hofmeyr could be seen as liberal-internationalists. Liberal-internationalists were anti-fascist by nature, and as the garrison state was developed in reaction to the rise of fascism, this shows how liberal-internationalism could inform a garrison state. Hertzog and Pirow could be categorised as conservative, right-wing localists. Both groups could be susceptible to garrison state type thinking as the garrison state is not linked to a specific political ideology.

Like Hofmeyr, Pirow was highly intelligent, however, due to his interests in boxing, flying planes and target shooting, he was a lot more likable than Hofmeyr. Pirow was highly effective as the minister of justice for Hertzog. Pirow was responsible for the Riotous Assemblies Act¹⁵⁶ although it was only passed in 1956, and in 1932 he introduced the Native Service Contract Act,¹⁵⁷ both of which had an important impact on South African society. The Riotous Assemblies Act allowed the minister of justice to declare any area in South Africa as a "riotous assembly area" and it gave the police and security forces significant powers to disperse gatherings, arrest individuals without warrants, and use force to maintain public order. The Native Service Contract Act "aimed at turning sharecroppers into labour tenants, working from 90 to 180 days a year for the farmer on the days of his choice." It also enabled farmers to "call on the labour of their workers' families as well as

¹⁵⁴ South African Reserve Bank (SARB), "History," 2023, accessed 22 January 2023, <https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/about-us/history>.

¹⁵⁵ Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 186.

¹⁵⁶ Riotous Assemblies Act, No.17 of 1956, (1958).

¹⁵⁷ Native Service Contract Act, No.24 of 1932, (1932).

the workers themselves, to evict them summarily for non-performance of labour obligations even if there were no written contract of service.” Furthermore, “it forced all tenants on white-owned farms either to work between three and six months per year for the landowner or to pay a heavy tax,” and it also “prevented them from leaving the farm without written permission.” These acts can be seen as harbingers of the garrison state especially if we link this with Fitch’s garrison state practices and the restriction of civil or political rights in the name of safety. These Acts controlled labour and freedom of movement and assembly which is key for a garrison state to function properly. Thus, Pirow can be seen as an important actor in the establishment of the garrison state. He made many important decisions regarding the law and labour to lay a sound foundation for the establishment of the garrison state.

In 1933, Hofmeyr was set on *hereniging* (“reunification”), the amalgamation of South African political parties, unifying white Afrikaans and English South Africans. Hofmeyr was always against a split or schism in white society, especially one based on language and culture. On 10 February 1933, Hertzog issued a public statement that was “virtually an offer to form a coalition government including Smuts and the South African Party (SAP).”¹⁵⁸ Smuts responded favourably, and five days later private negotiations began.¹⁵⁹ A coalition government was formed after Smuts and Hertzog came to an agreement.¹⁶⁰ When the fusion government of Hertzog and Smuts was announced in 1933, Malan parted from Hertzog and took with him twenty-six Nationalists who did not approve.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁸ N. M. Stultz, *Afrikaner politics in South Africa 1934–1948* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 27.

¹⁵⁹ Stultz, *Afrikaner politics in South Africa 1934–1948*, 27.

¹⁶⁰ Stultz, *Afrikaner politics in South Africa 1934–1948*, 27.

¹⁶¹ H. Gibbs, *Twilight in South Africa* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1950), 30.

Why the Hofmeyr Lens?

An election pamphlet gives good insight into the usefulness of using Hofmeyr as a lens. The pamphlet was reprinted by J. L. Brill (an NP Candidate) and read “Vote Brill for White Dominance.”¹⁶² The pamphlet also emphasised how “SA enters a new Epoch!” and that “Min. Hofmeyr’s liberalism triumphs at UP’s meeting!”¹⁶³ This was because Hofmeyr addressed an audience that consisted of a variety of races and ethnicities at a UP gathering. The pamphlet also mentioned “Coloureds and Europeans on UP Platform!”¹⁶⁴. It made specific reference to the composition of the audience by saying: “The audience consisted of Natives, Coloureds, Malayans (*sic*), Indians, Chinese and Europeans and the stage was decorated with banners condemning Nationalism by the Springbok Legion.”¹⁶⁵ This was clear race-baiting and fearmongering by the NP in which Hofmeyr was featured prominently.

Hofmeyr’s liberalism was an easy target for opposition figures. It would be a mistake though to over-simplify Hofmeyr’s beliefs. Hofmeyr was a complex character with loyalties to a multitude of causes. He was not exclusive in his loyalties. At times, his loyalties could even be seen as conflicting. Hofmeyr was loyal to his own Afrikaner people, loyal to South Africa as a country, loyal to the British Commonwealth, to Zionism, to India’s emancipation, to the organs of international order and the emergence of a world-government.¹⁶⁶ Hofmeyr always had liberal leanings for his time. For example, in 1938 he wrote a public letter

¹⁶² J. H. Hofmeyr, S.A. enters a new Epoch, 1938–1939, Paper, Politics: General, ZA HPRA A1-D-Dq/1938, Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, <https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/liberalism>.

¹⁶³ Hofmeyr, S.A. enters a new Epoch, 1938–1939, Paper.

¹⁶⁴ Hofmeyr, S.A. enters a new Epoch, 1938–1939, Paper.

¹⁶⁵ Hofmeyr, S.A. enters a new Epoch, 1938–1939, Paper.

¹⁶⁶ Frankel, “Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr,” 119.

defending the *Kinder Beskermings Wet*, later the 1937 *Kinder Wet*¹⁶⁷ which protected children from abuse, irrespective of their race.¹⁶⁸

Hofmeyr also tried to reconcile his political beliefs with his religion, as he was a very religious man.¹⁶⁹ At the annual Hoernle lecture where Hofmeyr was the guest speaker, he focused on "Christian Principles and Race Problems."¹⁷⁰ Hofmeyr tried to unpack what was expected of a Christian in terms of race relations. This was a complex topic: could one be seen as a Christian if one participated in the oppression of people based on their race? Hofmeyr was trying to juggle various aspects from religion and party politics to his own liberal beliefs. Every break from the duties of his office was spent fighting for liberal causes at the time.¹⁷¹ In the publication of *Coming of Age* Hofmeyr worked with fellow likeminded liberal friends and colleagues.¹⁷² He also worked with the similar group to establish *The Forum*, which at the time was the only liberal weekly publication in South Africa.¹⁷³ In 1937 he also broke from tradition and was the guest speaker at the graduation and opening of the Livingstone Hall at Fort Hare University and spoke of how the increasing development of black Africans would be to the benefit of South Africa.¹⁷⁴ This was quite out of the ordinary for a minister.

¹⁶⁷ The Children's Protection Act, formally known as the Children's Act, No.38 of 2005, (2005).

¹⁶⁸ Hofmeyr, S.A. enters a new Epoch, 1938–1939, Paper.

¹⁶⁹ There are countless examples in the Paton biography of Hofmeyr never missing a Sunday church service, this is also corroborated in his diary.

¹⁷⁰ J. H. Hofmeyr, Christian principles and race problems, 1945, Lecture, Publications and unpublished writings of J. H. Hofmeyr, ZA HPRA A1-F-Fo/1945, Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, SA Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, <https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/christian-principles-and-race-problems-johannesburg-s-institute-of-race-relations>.

¹⁷¹ Frankel, "Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr," 119.

¹⁷² Frankel, "Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr," 119.

¹⁷³ Frankel, "Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr," 119.

¹⁷⁴ J. H. Hofmeyr, Address at Fort Hare graduation ceremony, 24 March 1937, Speech, Speeches by Hofmeyr in English: General, ZA HPRA A1-E-Ea-Ea1-141-Ea89, Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, <https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/address-at-fort-hare-graduation-ceremony>.

Lasswell's garrison state in conjunction with the Hofmeyr lens provides a unique opportunity to view South African history, as well as South African authoritarian history in a different light. The fact that Hofmeyr was a liberal of his time, actively participating in government, during an extremely conservative time where racism, sexism and numerous other forms of discrimination was the order of the day, is used here to gain a better understanding of the inner workings of an oppressive system. For example, the issue of South Africa joining or remaining neutral in WWII was not as simple as pro- or anti-fascism and pro- or anti-imperialism. This issue links back to the insecurities on South African Sovereignty in the mid-1930s, discussed in Chapter 2, and later served as a springboard for the characteristics of the garrison state.

Thus far, a lot of focus has been placed on Hofmeyr being a liberal of his time. However, it is necessary to unpack what that means. What was deemed a liberal in the 1930s and 1940s according to Hofmeyr? Hofmeyr himself spoke about "New Liberalism vs. Old Liberalism." In 1936, Hofmeyr delivered a speech that was published in a document titled "The Approach to the Native Problem."¹⁷⁵ This speech was addressed to the Bantu Studies Society of the students at the University of the Witwatersrand. Hofmeyr spoke of a "fear complex" that would not be defeated by using old liberalism. Hofmeyr saw the old liberalism of the Cape as fighting a losing battle against the Union's handling of "native problems."¹⁷⁶ By the time of the Union there were those who had hoped that Cape ideas of political equality between white men and black men would have prevailed throughout the Union. Instead of this political equality, what took place was the prevailing desire to "Keep

¹⁷⁵ A. Paton, The approach to the native problem, 1954, Unpublished Manuscript, Part of Collection Box PC1/1/7/10/54, Alan Paton Centre unpublished works, Alan Paton Centre, University of Kwa-Zulu Natal, Pietermaritzburg, <https://paton.ukzn.ac.za/core-collections/>.

¹⁷⁶ Paton, The approach to the native problem, 1954, Unpublished Manuscript.

the native in his place, a place of subordination to the white man and subservience to his interests.”¹⁷⁷ This fear complex was at the root of many of the “native” policies which, at the time, Hofmeyr believed should be deplored.

Hofmeyr believed this fear complex, which can also be seen as a rationale for the garrison state, was psychological in nature, but that it had practical facts to support it. Hofmeyr mentioned the “black man’s numerical superiority” as well as “our country’s apparently low absorptive capacity” meaning that according to Hofmeyr, South Africa struggled to integrate people into its economy and greater society.¹⁷⁸ Hofmeyr continued by saying that “It would be strange indeed if the European in South Africa were not apprehensive as to his children’s future.”¹⁷⁹ These circumstances which created the fear complex could be overcome by the *new liberalism*. Hofmeyr’s definition of new liberalism tended to be verbose and vague and overly academic, though his points still stood. Hofmeyr saw the new liberalism as the acceptance of the same broad principles of old Cape liberalism, together with the application of first-hand acquaintances with the black peoples.¹⁸⁰ This was a new, pragmatic, and restrained liberalism that Hofmeyr spoke of, which to his mind was gaining popularity outside of parliament, whilst the old Cape liberalism was being rejected inside parliament.

Hofmeyr must be criticised for vagueness when he said: “It must be a liberalism of the mind as well as of the heart.”¹⁸¹ This failed to convey any pragmatic goals. Hofmeyr did put forth ideas of promoting and developing so-called bantu studies at universities as well as

¹⁷⁷ Paton, The approach to the native problem, 1954, Unpublished Manuscript.

¹⁷⁸ Paton, The approach to the native problem, 1954, Unpublished Manuscript.

¹⁷⁹ Paton, The approach to the native problem, 1954, Unpublished Manuscript.

¹⁸⁰ Paton, The approach to the native problem, 1954, Unpublished Manuscript.

¹⁸¹ Paton, The approach to the native problem, 1954, Unpublished Manuscript.

the rejection of the doctrine of “Keep the native in his place.”¹⁸² Hofmeyr saw two extremes in terms of policy possibilities with regards to the “native problem.” The one, was to “Keep the native in his place” and have black people as property in the “white man’s economy.”¹⁸³ The other was complete equality, on social, political, and economic fronts. For Hofmeyr neither were viable solutions. Thus the “restrained” new liberalism would provide the suitable middle ground. Hofmeyr was against the idea of what he called “crude segregation,” simply amputating different races from each other’s lives completely. Hofmeyr favoured what was called “constructive segregation.”¹⁸⁴ This meant the distinctive development of black people, the encouragement of and provision of facilities, that aimed at the development of black people not merely for themselves, but as a contribution to the greater community. The ideals of new liberalism via the potential policy of constructive segregation would encourage economic and territorial intermingling, however the emphasis would be on “native” development. The previously mentioned emphasis on “native” development could be seen as a slippery slope towards apartheid, which similarly presented itself as benign. Davenport notes how the “study of the growth of segregationist thinking” between 1919 and 1936 appears at first sight to be roughly designed for it is divided into three sections which manage the idea of segregation, the structure and ideology of the Department, and the public debate over the Hertzog Bills in 1926 to 1936, respectively.¹⁸⁵ Davenport differentiates between the “pragmatic” and “dogmatic” nature of segregation.

¹⁸² Paton, The approach to the native problem, 1954, Unpublished Manuscript.

¹⁸³ Paton, The approach to the native problem, 1954, Unpublished Manuscript.

¹⁸⁴ Paton, The approach to the native problem, 1954, Unpublished Manuscript.

¹⁸⁵ Reviewed Work(s): T. R. H. Davenport, "Saul Dubow, Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa, 1919–36. London: Macmillan & St Antony's College Oxford," *Africa* 60, no. 3 (1990), doi:10.2307/1160129. T. R. H. Davenport, "Hugh Macmillan and Shula Marks (eds.), *Africa and Empire*: W. M. Macmillan, historian and social critic. London: Temple Smith for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies," *Africa* 60, no. 3 (1990), doi:10.2307/1160129.

The “pragmatic segregation” aligns with Hofmeyr’s idea of “constructive segregation” and the “dogmatic segregation” aligns with Hofmeyr’s idea of “crude segregation” thus the “rough design” which Davenport refers to as segregationists seemed to oscillate between the two versions.

Although Hofmeyr was fighting for liberal causes, one cannot absolve him of his ideals about imperialism. Here, Hofmeyr had extremely flawed views trying to reconcile imperialism with liberty. Especially after WWII, British imperialism lacked the moral high ground it thought it had. After WWII “imperialism could no longer hide behind anti-fascism.”¹⁸⁶ Since fascism had been defeated, what was the excuse for British imperialism? It is also important to look at the broader context of British imperialism in world affairs and the origins of the United Nations.¹⁸⁷ Historian Mark Mazower looks to set aside the popular myth that “the UN miraculously rose from the ashes of WWII as the guardian of a new and peaceful global order,” providing instead an explanation of the UN's ideological roots, early history, and changing role in world affairs.¹⁸⁸ The UN’s creators envisioned a world organisation that would “protect the interests of empire,” yet not how this “imperial vision was decisively reshaped by the post-war reaffirmation of national sovereignty and the unanticipated rise of India and other former colonial powers.”¹⁸⁹ Mazower believed that “Jan Smuts saw in the UN a means to protect the old imperial and racial order.”¹⁹⁰

Hofmeyr set out his ideas regarding the importance of reconciling British imperialism with liberty in a speech he made at an event where he addressed the members of the Royal

¹⁸⁶ Hyslop, Braskén, and Roos, “Political and intellectual lineages of Southern African anti-fascism,” 1.

¹⁸⁷ M. M. Mazower, *No enchanted palace: The end of empire and the ideological origins of the United Nations*, vol. 4, Lawrence Stone Lectures, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 1.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt7pfjg>.

¹⁸⁸ Mazower, *No enchanted palace: The end of empire and the ideological origins of the United Nations*, 4, 1.

¹⁸⁹ Mazower, *No enchanted palace: The end of empire and the ideological origins of the United Nations*, 4, 1.

¹⁹⁰ Mazower, *No enchanted palace: The end of empire and the ideological origins of the United Nations*, 4, 1.

Empire Society.¹⁹¹ The speech that Hofmeyr delivered was titled “Reconciling Imperialism and Liberty: South Africa’s contribution to the solution of world problems.”¹⁹² It is important to note Hofmeyr made the speech in October 1945 in his capacity as the deputy prime minister of South Africa.¹⁹³ According to Hofmeyr:

That conception represents the bringing into harmony of the two principles of imperialism and liberty: of freedom and order; of cooperation and independence. That problem of reconciling imperialism and liberty is one of the age-old problems of history.¹⁹⁴

He then continued to invoke the ideals of ancient imperialism:

In the Roman Empire a partial solution was found along the lines of a world state—as complete a world state as was possible in the circumstances of those days, a world state based upon a common nationality.¹⁹⁵

Finally, Hofmeyr praised the British Commonwealth:

But in the British Commonwealth of Nations, we claim to have found a more complete solution of that problem along the harder path of developing that commonwealth as an effective means of association and partnership between independent nations.¹⁹⁶

This was a prime example of Hofmeyr’s failure to connect with the common man.

Hofmeyr alienated several groups with his idea that imperialism, specifically British

¹⁹¹ Currently known as the Royal Commonwealth Society. It has changed its name on various occasion during its history, most recently in 1958 to its current name. The Royal Commonwealth Society (RCS) is an NGO with a [mission](#) to promote the value of the British [Commonwealth](#) and the [values](#) upon which it is based. The Society upholds the values of the [Commonwealth Charter](#), promoting [conflict resolution](#), [peace-making](#) and [democracy](#) to improve the lives of citizens across the [member states of the Commonwealth](#) (Royal Commonwealth Society, "Our vision and mission," Not dated, accessed 25 August 2024, <https://www.royalcwsociety.org/vision-and-mission/>).

¹⁹² A. Paton, Reconciling imperialism and liberty, 27 October 1945, Speech, Part of Collection Box PC1/1/7/10/29, Alan Paton Centre unpublished works, Alan Paton Centre, University of Kwa-Zulu Natal, Pietermaritzburg, <https://paton.ukzn.ac.za/core-collections/>.

¹⁹³ Paton, Reconciling imperialism and liberty, 27 October 1945, Speech.

¹⁹⁴ Paton, Reconciling imperialism and liberty, 27 October 1945, Speech.

¹⁹⁵ Paton, Reconciling imperialism and liberty, 27 October 1945, Speech.

¹⁹⁶ Paton, Reconciling imperialism and liberty, 27 October 1945, Speech.

imperialism, could be reconciled with liberty. Many Afrikaners still had vivid recollections of the Anglo-Boer War, losing independence, and being colonised by the British, and having their women and children thrown into concentration camps and farms burned down. This was followed by then being dragged into participation in WWI and having their sovereignty threatened throughout the 1930s due to the instability in Europe.

Hofmeyr also alienated a large group of his non-white supporters who viewed the British as nothing more than colonisers who had oppressed and discriminated them. Though this specific group was not part of Hofmeyr's voting base, many of them still had hoped for Hofmeyr's continued support and for the liberal ideas he espoused to help improve their lives. One should note the limitations of this custodianship. At this very moment, the ANC Youth League was demanding self-determination, which in effect put an end to the liberal visions of Hofmeyr and his ilk.¹⁹⁷ It was almost as if Hofmeyr betrayed numerous local South Africans to satisfy a global power. Here Hofmeyr was falling into the same trap as Smuts and his "imperial internationalism."

Imperial internationalism refers to Smuts' belief in a form of cooperation and unity among the British Empire's dominions and colonies. He envisioned a global framework where the different parts of the British Empire would work together to address common challenges and advance shared interests. This concept emerged during a time when the British Empire was undergoing significant changes and facing new geopolitical realities. The position taken by Hofmeyr on the topic of imperialism and liberty was also an easy target for the NP to exploit. Smuts was criticised for not only joining the efforts of WWII, but also for pulling South African resources and manpower into a war that many Afrikaners thought had

¹⁹⁷ A. B. Xuma, "Africans' claims in South Africa 14 December 1943," African National Congress (ANC), 2025, accessed 00 Month 0000, <https://www.anc1912.org.za/africans-claims-in-south-africa/>.

nothing to do with them, or even to an extreme degree, had sympathies towards Germany. Smuts also left a leadership vacuum both in the South African government as well as in the UP whilst he was participating in WWII. Hofmeyr may have spoken of a “free parliament”¹⁹⁸ and a “free people”¹⁹⁹ deciding to join the British in WWII, however this proved to be a superficial assessment.

Though Hofmeyr made certain noteworthy errors, with his support of British imperialism being prominent, his anti-apartheid stance cannot be questioned. It offered one of the few occasions that Hofmeyr was concise, clear, and direct in his appeal to voters. During the electoral year of 1948, Hofmeyr authored a political pamphlet that was disseminated to voters across South Africa. In it Hofmeyr sought to bring clarity to voters on what the UP’s position was on apartheid, and what the NP actually proposed. The pamphlet, titled “Apartheid and the Native Question”²⁰⁰ stated that nationalists were trying to scare voters with the “black peril.”²⁰¹ They then promised a utopian white South Africa if only they would vote for the Nationalist candidates and apartheid.²⁰² Hofmeyr saw apartheid as a catchword:

According to Dr. Malan’s Statement on March 30, “apartheid” has as its ultimate aim the total separation of Europeans and non-Europeans in South Africa; it is a plan for THE PARTITION OF SOUTH AFRICA.²⁰³ Eventually all Natives will have to live in Reserves and have their own organs of Government,

¹⁹⁸ Paton, Reconciling imperialism and liberty, 27 October 1945, Speech.

¹⁹⁹ Paton, Reconciling imperialism and liberty, 27 October 1945, Speech.

²⁰⁰ A. Paton, Apartheid and the native question, 1948, Pamphlet, Part of Collection Box PC1/1/7/10/29, Alan Paton Centre unpublished works, Alan Paton Centre, University of Kwa-Zulu Natal, Pietermaritzburg, <https://paton.ukzn.ac.za/core-collections/>.

²⁰¹ Paton, Apartheid and the native question, 1948, Pamphlet.

²⁰² It should be noted that the word “Apartheid” appears in inverted commas in the pamphlet itself, almost as a way of being condescending to the policy. In the research it has been kept like that purposefully.

²⁰³ Emphasis in the original

industries, commercial enterprises, etc. Only Native males will be allowed in the cities as temporary workers.²⁰⁴

Malan believed that “imperialism usually stood in alliance with capitalism” that had always used political rights” for coloured as well as black people as a “weapon” in opposition to “the nationalist Afrikanerdom” and, in so doing, had opened the door for “communist agitators” to initiate the elimination of “all colour distinctions.”²⁰⁵ This contrasted Malan’s own beliefs regarding race, “as he believed that colour distinctions were inherently natural and God-given.”²⁰⁶ Progressively, from 1944–1947, “Malan was busy formulating his policy of apartheid.”²⁰⁷ By the 1948 election, Malan and the NP had become “the embodiment of the Afrikaners ethnic identity” and they voted as such. The apartheid policy, as Malan proposed, “was directly linked to their calling and identity as Afrikaners.”²⁰⁸

As Malan later explained, “apartheid was mainly a positive and non-oppressive policy.”²⁰⁹ Lindie Koorts notes that apartheid had different meanings for different interest groups, “each of which had its own expectations of the benefits they would derive from it.” “The word and the policy itself was ambiguous enough to accommodate these conflicting interests and versions and, contrary to popular belief, Malan and his party did not take office with a “grand plan” of apartheid in hand.”²¹⁰

One of the more daring claims that the pamphlet made was that apartheid was impossible, and then it proceeded to provide reasons for why. The basic premise was South

²⁰⁴ Paton, *Apartheid and the native question*, 1948, Pamphlet.

²⁰⁵ L. Koorts, “An unlikely charismatic leader: D. F. Malan in a Weberian light” (Paper presented at the Charisma and Emergent Social Movements Conference, University of Groningen, Institute of Biography, 6–7 November 2008), 20-21.

²⁰⁶ Koorts, “An unlikely charismatic leader: D. F. Malan in a Weberian light.” 20-21.

²⁰⁷ Koorts, “An unlikely charismatic leader: D. F. Malan in a Weberian light.” 20-21.

²⁰⁸ Koorts, “An unlikely charismatic leader: D. F. Malan in a Weberian light.” 20-21.

²⁰⁹ Koorts, “An unlikely charismatic leader: D. F. Malan in a Weberian light.” 20-21.

²¹⁰ Koorts, “An unlikely charismatic leader: D. F. Malan in a Weberian light.” 20-21.

Africa did not possess enough land in the reserves to accommodate the black population.

According to Hofmeyr:

The Natives will need four times as much land in the Transvaal as at present, if the Nationalist scheme is to be carried out. In the Cape Province 62 percent of the Natives are in Reserves and 38 percent outside. The Transkei and Ciskei are fertile and beautiful parts of South Africa, but they cannot carry their present Native population. Another Transkei will have to be set aside for Natives in the Cape if Dr. Malan's scheme is to be carried out. In Natal 940,000 Natives are in Reserves and 630,000 outside. Another two Zululands will have to be acquired in Natal for Malan's scheme. In the Orange Free State 26,000 Natives are in Reserves and 630,000 outside. For Dr. Malan's "apartheid" the Natives in the Free State will need 25 times as much land as at present (All figures are from the recent report of the Fagan Commission).²¹¹

The rhetorical questions of "Where will all this land come from?" and "Are European farmers to be dispossessed all over South Africa?" were used to emphasise the points made above. The pamphlet concluded by providing five points as to why "apartheid" was dangerous as well as providing a summarised alternative of what the UP proposed. The first point why "apartheid" was dangerous was that to forcibly uproot almost two million black people in the towns would cause hardship and resentment. Thus, the relationship between the Europeans and natives would deteriorate. This would lead to feelings that the white man was oppressing the black population. The fear existed that the black population would then become more receptive to communist propaganda.

The second point was what the Fagan Commission pointed out, that South Africa needed the black population for its industrial development and that Malan wanted to turn

²¹¹ Paton, Apartheid and the native question, 1948, Pamphlet.

the clock back.²¹² The economic disruption in the Union because of apartheid would be unpredictable. For the UP one thing was certain: “We shall see our industrial life disrupted and we shall again see the unemployment, the misery, and the poor “whiteism” that we knew under the NP from 1929–1932.”²¹³ The third reason was that so-called native industries would eventually compete with the industries of white South Africa. The low standards of living, which according to Hofmeyr would have been even lower under apartheid, would enable them to produce much more cheaply than white South Africans would be able to. The fourth reason was that the black population would become hostile towards white South Africans due to the policy of apartheid.²¹⁴ Even if the black population did develop along their own lines and in their own areas, which Hofmeyr doubted due to the disparity in availability of resources and opportunities, this hostility would not be beneficial to anyone. According to Hofmeyr: “We need the Natives’ faith and confidence, not his hostility.”²¹⁵ Finally, the fifth reason, was that if black women and children were to be removed from cities, white society would be left with hundreds of thousands of males only, deprived of their homes and their families.

The closing section of the pamphlet focused on the alternative the UP offered. The pamphlet focused on the word *sanity* as the offering provided by the UP. Of course, this meant that, by implication, what the NP was offering was *insanity*.²¹⁶ The UP positioned its policy as sane, wise, and just. It purported to protect and assure white civilisation and the standard of living of the white man, and at the same time offered the black population justice and fair treatment. However, strangely enough, the UP stated that it stood by

²¹² Paton, *Apartheid and the native question*, 1948, Pamphlet.

²¹³ Paton, *Apartheid and the native question*, 1948, Pamphlet.

²¹⁴ Paton, *Apartheid and the native question*, 1948, Pamphlet.

²¹⁵ Paton, *Apartheid and the native question*, 1948, Pamphlet.

²¹⁶ Paton, *Apartheid and the native question*, 1948, Pamphlet.

General Hertzog's Acts of 1936. The UP emphasised that the Hertzog Acts would not be changed. This was to retain its white voters. The UP, together with Hofmeyr, believed that those Acts provided for the representation of "natives in parliament by Europeans" and for the limited enlargement of the Reserves to alleviate existing overcrowding and to eliminate "black spots in European areas."²¹⁷

Hofmeyr was by no means the perfect political candidate, however, he was part of the vanguard against an even more brutal authoritarianism presented by members of the South African political elite such as Oswald Pirow.

The Oswald Pirow Lens: An Authoritarian Vision for the Future of South Africa

To understand Pirow, it is important to understand authoritarianism.

Authoritarianism can be conceptualised as:

. . . a constellation of beliefs, emotions and behaviours including a rigid adherence to traditional values, resistance to introspective self-examination, adulation of powerful leaders, exaggerated sexual conservatism, racial prejudice, and over- generalized dichotomous thinking.²¹⁸

Oswald Pirow's legacy is that of a confirmed fascist, however, historian F. A. Mouton argues that he could also be described as an opportunist.²¹⁹ Ambition was a strong underlying motive for the political actions he took. Pirow joined the "political momentum of influential people" such as Tielman Roos and J. B. M. Hertzog in "the NP with flattery and loyalty."²²⁰ As an underling of Roos, he was a staunch Republican, however, during his time "as a Hertzog loyalist he rejected Republicanism and National Socialism, and was a friend of

²¹⁷ Paton, *Apartheid and the native question*, 1948, Pamphlet.

²¹⁸ D. Edwards, "Authoritarianism in South Africa: A conceptual challenge to social science.," *The High School Journal* 68, no. 4 (1985): 261.

²¹⁹ Mouton, "'Fascist or opportunist?': The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943," 93.

²²⁰ Mouton, "'Fascist or opportunist?': The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943," 93.

the Jewish community.”²²¹ Subsequently, after September 1939 with “the collapse of the Hertzog government” and with Nazi Germany seemingly assured of victory in WWII, overnight he became a “radical Republican, a National Socialist and an anti-Semite.”²²² Mouton observes that “the essence of his political belief was not National Socialism,” but being victorious, and the “opportunistic advancement” of his career. Pirow’s founding of the fascist New Order in 1940 was based on the belief that Germany would be victorious. That German victory never came.

Though Pirow was a political opportunist, this does not absolve him of his pro-Nazi stance. His association with Roos and Hertzog opened doors politically for Pirow, however once the Hertzog government collapsed, and South Africa went to war against Germany, their political use had run its course. This is not to say that Pirow did not still admire Roos and Hertzog, as he even wrote Hertzog’s biography, a project which he took immense pride in. Like Hofmeyr, though, for several reasons, Pirow can also be seen as an agent of the garrison state. Although, specifically in Pirow’s case, he was an *inadvertent* agent of the garrison state. As will be shown later in the thesis, Pirow made a major contribution in terms of developing important garrison state characteristics with the military with his “five-year plan.”

A Summarised Biography: Who was Pirow?

Born in Aberdeen, Cape Colony on 14 August 1890, Oswald Pirow’s mother and father were both German.²²³ Pirow’s father, Carl Ferdinand was a medical doctor and “was the son of a missionary, and emigrated to South Africa in 1888.”²²⁴ At the age of three,

²²¹ Mouton, “Fascist or opportunist?: The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943,” 93.

²²² Mouton, “Fascist or opportunist?: The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943,” 93.

²²³ Mouton, “Fascist or opportunist?: The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943,” 94.

²²⁴ Mouton, “Fascist or opportunist?: The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943,” 94.

Pirow's parents moved to Potchefstroom in the Transvaal "where they became naturalised citizens of the South African Republic."²²⁵ As a result of inferior educational prospects, Pirow left South Africa in 1905 and continued his studies at the "Itzehoe Gymnasium in Holstein, Germany."²²⁶ After finishing school "he attended the Middle Temple in London from 1910 to qualify as a barrister."²²⁷ He went back to South Africa in 1914 after he was "called to the Bar."²²⁸ Pirow was resolute and set on making his mark as "an advocate, and to pursue a political career."²²⁹ He was very driven and dedicated. His personal ambitions would push him into his political career.

The journalist George Aschman called Oswald Pirow the "defence dictator" of South Africa.²³⁰ This moniker was more suitable than was at first thought. Aschman described Pirow as a thickly built "schoolmaster" who was a strict disciplinarian and an admirer of military methods especially applied to civic life, as was illustrated in Germany at the time.²³¹ Nevertheless, he was an important cog in the South African government and held lots of influence, especially during the 1930s. Whilst Pirow was visiting the UK in 1936, he answered important questions of empire defence and of the sea route to the East. Pirow went to London at the invitation of the British government. He did not only have discussions with the British minister of defence and other ministers about the question of an alternative sea route to the east via the Cape, but also air routes and how they had an impact on South Africa. No other dominion minister or official was invited to attend these highly confidential

²²⁵ Mouton, "Fascist or opportunist?": The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943," 94.

²²⁶ Mouton, "Fascist or opportunist?": The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943," 94.

²²⁷ Mouton, "Fascist or opportunist?": The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943," 94.

²²⁸ Mouton, "Fascist or opportunist?": The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943," 94.

²²⁹ Mouton, "Fascist or opportunist?": The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943," 94.

²³⁰ G. Aschman, Defence dicator, Evening Standard, 8 June 1936, Newspaper Article, Part of Collection P.S. 9/9/2, National Archives of South Africa (NASA), Pretoria.

²³¹ Aschman, Defence dicator, Evening Standard, 8 June 1936, Newspaper Article.

discussions. Pirow had been singled out because South Africa was vitally concerned about these discussions and the fact that he had a wide knowledge of defence problems in the whole of Southern Africa, even beyond the borders of South Africa.²³² This trip to the UK was just one of the various examples of how influential Pirow was at the time.

Twenty years earlier, Pirow had returned from the UK for the first time. Mouton notes that "Pirow claimed that on his return to South Africa he immediately associated himself with the Afrikaner nationalism of Hertzog, and the newly founded NP to campaign for Afrikaner interests."²³³ Not a lot is known about this initial time-period after returning to South Africa, however "in 1914 the NP was an insignificant splinter party compared to the ruling SAP of Generals Louis Botha and Jan Smuts."²³⁴ Therefore it should be seen as dubious at best that Pirow initially saw the NP as an appropriate "vehicle for his ambitions." In August 1914, Pirow decided to join the Union Defence Force (UDF) with the start of WWI. "As an NP supporter he would not have done so because the party vehemently opposed any involvement in the war."²³⁵ Moreover, more than 11,000 Afrikaners "resorted to armed rebellion against the decision to fight for the British Empire," while others left the SAP in favour of the NP.

The major problem facing Pirow's legal and political ambitions was not his participation in the UDF, but the perception that he was a German and not South African. Thus, he was an outsider, as he could not fit in with either the Afrikaner or English camps in South Africa. "His background, education and especially the fact that his home language was German," added to the fact that he was Lutheran, meant that Afrikaners felt that "he was

²³² Aschman, Defence dicator, Evening Standard, 8 June 1936, Newspaper Article.

²³³ Mouton, "'Fascist or opportunist?': The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943," 95.

²³⁴ Mouton, "'Fascist or opportunist?': The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943," 95.

²³⁵ Mouton, "'Fascist or opportunist?': The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943," 95.

not one them.”²³⁶ Afrikaners felt that he had a “German mentality, and Afrikaner cultural organisations kept their distance.”²³⁷ As he developed his career in politics, Pirow thus required the normal “support system of school, university, cultural organisations and the church,” all of which were accessible for any determined youthful Afrikaner. He did not have a community or organisation to back him in his political endeavours. To nullify the opposition, Pirow required a “powerful backer” to help his career, and he discovered one in Tielman Roos, “leader of the NP in the Transvaal, and the most sought-after advocate at the Pretoria Bar.”²³⁸ Pirow was a very charming individual, and knew how to use his charm to progress in life. Thus, he set out to nurture this friendship with the influential Roos. Roos, despite his cheerful and successful image, did not appreciate any form of criticism but really enjoyed praise. Pirow was eager to show admiration and provide support and in turn, Roos would repay the favour.

In the Westminster parliamentary system that South Africa followed, “newly-elected parliamentarians of ruling parties are expected to attend parliamentary debates, to praise and support the government and to badger the opposition.”²³⁹ Though, Pirow was no normal “backbencher.”²⁴⁰ The *Cape Times* insultingly reported that he was “the chosen pet of Mr. Roos,” and with the support of the “second most powerful man in the NP,” Pirow did not feel that he needed to follow the rules, in fact, he seldom attended parliamentary debates, rather focusing on his developing career in law.²⁴¹

²³⁶ Mouton, “‘Fascist or opportunist?’: The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943,” 96.

²³⁷ Mouton, “‘Fascist or opportunist?’: The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943,” 96.

²³⁸ Mouton, “‘Fascist or opportunist?’: The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943,” 97.

²³⁹ Mouton, “‘Fascist or opportunist?’: The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943,” 97.

²⁴⁰ An MP who does not hold office is commonly referred to as a “backbencher”.

²⁴¹ Anon., *Cape Times*, 24 January 1930. Cited in Mouton, “‘Fascist or opportunist?’: The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943,” 97.

As soon as Roos was “appointed minister of justice in 1924,” Pirow took over Roos’s legal practice, and Pirow’s prominence improved yet again when he became part of the “King’s Council in 1925.”²⁴² Pirow was loyal to Roos and he believed that Roos would become the prime minister, and Roos had pledged him a position in his cabinet. Pirow was aware of the extreme sensitivity of Roos to critique from within the NP, and Pirow felt “obliged to support Roos” in his “power struggle” with Malan, who at the time was the “minister of health, interior and education, and the leader of the Cape NP.” Malan was Roos’s only significant competitor as a possible successor to Hertzog. Acting as Roos’s political “enforcer,” Pirow set out to destroy Malan’s reputation as a diligent and competent minister. In an interview with *Ons Vaderland* in late 1925, he attacked Malan’s competence directly.²⁴³ Newspapers supporting the SAP gladly published these accusations. Malan did not take kindly to this. A. L. Geyer, who was the editor of *Die Burger* at that time and a Malan admirer, came to his aid and publicly condemned Pirow’s attacks on Malan. Pirow had made influential enemies in Malan and Geyer. Pirow’s relationship with Hertzog was also negatively impacted by his “support of Roos on Article 4 of the NP’s constitution which embodied the party’s support for the ideal of secession from the British Empire.”²⁴⁴ After the Balfour Declaration of 1926 had secured South Africa’s and the other British dominions’ equal status with Britain, Hertzog felt that as South Africa was a sovereign nation within the British Empire the issue of republicanism should be dealt with at a later date. “However, Roos wanted to retain Article 4 as an ideal in the NP.” Once again, it was Pirow who

²⁴² Mouton, “‘Fascist or opportunist?’: The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943,” 98.

²⁴³ Anon., *Ons Vaderland* 1925. Cited in Mouton, “‘Fascist or opportunist?’: The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943,” 97.

²⁴⁴ Mouton, “‘Fascist or opportunist?’: The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943,” 99.

intervened and at a public meeting in December 1927, Pirow stated forcefully that “the ideal of a republic should always be a pillar of the NP’s principles.”

At the beginning of 1928, Pirow came to the realisation that Roos’s political career was not as strong as it once was. The chances of Roos becoming prime minister were unlikely as he had become estranged from Hertzog and the rest of the cabinet. In addition, Roos did not have the vigour required for South African politics anymore. When Pirow realised that he had “hitched his wagon to a doomed politician,” Pirow had to produce a new strategy and thus he decided to reach out to the prime minister. Hertzog was an authoritarian leader of his party, and he was obsessed with loyalty. “What made it possible for Pirow to reach out to the prime minister was his susceptibility to flattery and accordingly, Pirow set out to cultivate Hertzog’s friendship.”²⁴⁵ His legal knowledge also helped Pirow and he offered his services to Hertzog in “dealing with constitutional matters.” Pirow and Hertzog spent a lot of time in each other’s company developing a constitution for the “mandated territory of South West Africa, and compiling a bill to remove black people from the common voters’ roll in the Cape Province.” In the process, handily, Pirow’s initial vocal republicanism disappeared. “By March 1929, Pirow was part of Hertzog’s inner circle.” Pirow’s status as a Hertzog favourite led to his appointment in June 1929 as the new minister of justice when Roos resigned for health reasons. Roos’s loyal followers were not as fortunate as without the protection of Roos they were sidelined in the party. Pirow was appointed to parliament at the age of 38, making him “the youngest cabinet minister South Africa had ever had.” This evoked concern in- and outside the NP, specifically because he lacked a “proven track record as a parliamentarian.”²⁴⁶ According to Leslie Blackwell, an SAP

²⁴⁵ Mouton, “‘Fascist or opportunist?’: The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943,” 100.

²⁴⁶ Mouton, “‘Fascist or opportunist?’: The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943,” 101.

MP, he was virtually unknown in the House of Assembly in 1929 due to his constant absenteeism. *Die Burger* published an article in which an “unimpressed Geyer pointed out that Pirow had no parliamentary success behind him but conceded that he was highly intelligent.”²⁴⁷

The coalition government was sworn in on 31 March and Pirow’s loyalty to Hertzog was “rewarded with his promotion to the more senior position as the minister of railways and harbours, as well as that of defence.”²⁴⁸ To ensure validity for the coalition government a general election was swiftly announced for 17 May and the NP and SAP would not oppose one another. “Pirow played a leading role in the election campaign against Roos who contested the election.” By April 1933, Roos’s political career was in disarray and his popularity quickly disappeared. The English press in South Africa that had promoted him as “the saviour of South Africa” dropped him with enthusiasm as soon as the coalition government was created. Roos was struggling with his health and also became politically secluded. He was also in a dire financial position.

Pirow was an energetic and groundbreaking minister. He updated the railway system, founded the South African Airways, and restored a crumbling UDF. “His successes fuelled speculation that he would succeed Hertzog as prime minister.”²⁴⁹ To accomplish his goals, Pirow set out to cultivate English-speaking SAP MPs who until 1933 had viewed him as a narcissist constantly attempting to defy the opposition in an authoritarian manner. He inundated them with his charisma. Pirow used his charm as a weapon. M. E. Antrobus, a member of the British high commissioner’s staff in South Africa, described Pirow’s strategy

²⁴⁷ Anon., *Die Burger*, 19 June 1929. Cited in Mouton, “‘Fascist or opportunist?’: The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943,” 98.

²⁴⁸ Mouton, “‘Fascist or opportunist?’: The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943,” 101.

²⁴⁹ Mouton, “‘Fascist or opportunist?’: The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943,” 102.

in the following way, “[Pirow] is charming when he is getting something he wants but viperish and entirely outspoken when he isn’t.” It was challenging to oppose Pirow’s charming manner if he “wanted to secure an individual’s friendship,” as was apparent in his persuading of C. F. Stallard, “the leader of the pro-imperial Dominion Party (DP), one of his severest critics in parliament.” Pirow went to radical lengths to win Stallard over. “In 1936 he went so far as to arrange that a South African Air Force plane fly Stallard to Cairo” to see him on his return from a stay to Great Britain to review defence matters. “Stallard’s correspondence reflects that he loved every second of the flight, as well as his stay in Cairo.”²⁵⁰ Soon they became endearing friends. According to B. K. Long, a prominent English-speaking MP, Pirow was a “mixer,” who was happy to “gather a little crowd around him, stand them drinks, tell them stories and be on genial, hail-fellow-well-met terms with them.” Additionally, though Long was “an outspoken critic of Nazi Germany,” he did not observe any fascist ideals in the charming Pirow.

On 15 July 1936, the newspaper the *Evening Standard* published an article containing various opinions of Pirow.²⁵¹ Pirow declared on his arrival from England that the return of South West Africa and Tanganyika to Germany was not feasible, but that he found influential support in the highest quarters for giving Germany compensation somewhere in Africa. This statement conflicted with a speech made by Pirow during his stay in London. Pirow also spoke on economic unity. His address on that occasion could have been described as pro-Empire. Pirow said that economic issues bound South Africa to Britain, and that the two countries were united on account of those issues, and that it would be foolish

²⁵⁰ Mouton, “‘Fascist or opportunist?’: The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943,” 103.

²⁵¹ Anon., The Evening Standard, 15 July 1936, Newspaper Article, Part of Collection P.S. 9/9/2, National Archives of South Africa (NASA), Pretoria.

not to recognise the importance.²⁵² However, his speech was not pro-German, surprisingly enough. He showed clearly that he was first of all a South African. Pirow also spoke about Germany's claims. Pirow said that Germany was entitled to a footing in Africa and that Germany could have a place on the west coast, but not on the east. He said that the territory that was formerly German South West Africa was not an integral part of South Africa. He declared that the farmers of South West Africa undercut South African farmers and produced nothing of advantage to the Union. Pirow was not opposed to ceding South West Africa to Germany. Pirow also spoke about protectorates, as he told his audience of South Africa's desire to take over the protectorates in the near future. Finally, he said that South Africa made no further claims to taking part in the administration of British territories.²⁵³

In November 1937, Pirow addressed a military gathering at Theunissen, a small town in the Free State.²⁵⁴ Pirow stated that nowhere was the prestige of South Africa's military past better realised and appreciated than overseas.²⁵⁵ He also stated that although modern warfare demanded drastic changes in the commandos, the mobility they presented would still be made use of. Pirow proposed to develop commandos to fight in the bushveld. It was Pirow's belief that South Africa would not be attacked along or from the coast, but rather from its northern borders.²⁵⁶ Thus, the need for mobile bush battalions. Pirow envisioned the numerical strength of the commandos to eventually reach 150,000 soldiers.

²⁵² Anon., The Evening Standard, 15 July 1936, Newspaper Article.

²⁵³ Anon., The Evening Standard, 15 July 1936, Newspaper Article.

²⁵⁴ Anon., Saturday Review, 1937, Newspaper Article, Part of Collection P.S. 9/9/2, National Archives of South Africa (NASA), Pretoria.

²⁵⁵ Anon., Saturday Review, 1937, Newspaper Article.

²⁵⁶ Anon., Saturday Review, 1937, Newspaper Article.

On 11 April 1938, the newspaper *The Scotsman*, reported on Pirow's statement as to what South Africa would do if its neighbours were attacked.²⁵⁷ Pirow stated that he would like to see South Africa better prepared, however, they already possessed the means to defend themselves. Pirow continued to say that if Rhodesia, Portuguese East Africa or another neighbour were attacked, South Africa would have no choice but to take action because the enemy would be after South Africa's gold mines within a month.²⁵⁸ It was Pirow's position that South Africa could not wait for the enemy to cross its border.²⁵⁹

In late 1938, Pirow toured Franco's Spain.²⁶⁰ As the South African defence minister, he was accompanied by Don Nicola Franco, who was an ambassador to Portugal, and a brother of Franco.²⁶¹ Pirow was received by General Jordano, who was the minister for foreign affairs under Franco.²⁶² He also visited Bilbao to view the defence works that were captured by Franco's troops.²⁶³ Pirow also visited Lisbon, Portugal, under the control of Salazar.²⁶⁴ Strict censorship was enforced during this visit though it was admitted that Pirow discussed the question of an airline between South Africa and Angola.²⁶⁵ However, newspapers reported that a reliable source noted that the main topic of discussion was the establishment of a common South Africa-Portuguese defensive front against possible aggression in the southern part of the African continent.²⁶⁶ Also, German colonial claims

²⁵⁷ Anon., *The Scotsman*, 11 April 1938, Newspaper Article, Part of Collection P.S. 9/9/2, National Archives of South Africa (NASA), Pretoria.

²⁵⁸ Anon., *The Scotsman*, 1938, Newspaper Article.

²⁵⁹ Anon., *The Scotsman*, 1938, Newspaper Article.

²⁶⁰ Anon., *Daily Mail*, 31 April 1938, Newspaper Article, Part of Collection P.S. 9/9/2, National Archives of South Africa (NASA), Pretoria.

²⁶¹ Anon., *Daily Mail*, 1938, Newspaper Article.

²⁶² Anon., *Daily Mail*, 1938, Newspaper Article.

²⁶³ Anon., *Daily Mail*, 1938, Newspaper Article.

²⁶⁴ Anon., *Newsday London*, 31 October 1938, Newspaper Article, Part of Collection P.S. 9/9/2, National Archives of South Africa (NASA), Pretoria.

²⁶⁵ Anon., *Newsday London*, 1938, Newspaper Article.

²⁶⁶ Anon., *Newsday London*, 1938, Newspaper Article.

were believed to have been reviewed between Pirow and Salazar. According to reports that were circulating at the time in Lisbon, Pirow adopted the attitude that the return of former German colonies to Germany must be opposed. Pirow also offered the closest collaboration with the Portuguese government in measures for the protection of Angola as well as Mozambique. Salazar strongly reaffirmed his previous declaration that Portugal would not give up any colonial territory.²⁶⁷ Portugal's position was that it got nothing after Germany's colonies were distributed after WWI, thus it had nothing to give back.²⁶⁸ Pirow also proposed that the defence of Angola, Mozambique, the Union of South Africa and the important port of Lourenco Marques should be fortified. South Africa had considerable interest in the port of Lourenco Marques, as many exports from the Transvaal were shipped from Lourenco Marques.

Pirow also visited his homeland, Germany. However, in November of 1938, Germany was a vastly different place.²⁶⁹ Pirow met with various high-ranking Nazi officials before the grand prize of meeting with Hitler himself. He first met with von Ribbentrop the German foreign minister, and Field Marshall Goering.²⁷⁰ Pirow was treated like an old friend and a celebrity; he was given a private air force demonstration, visited an air force training school and infantry school, and he was also a private guest of Goering, staying with Goering during his visit and even going hunting him.²⁷¹

²⁶⁷ Anon., Newsday London, 1938, Newspaper Article.

²⁶⁸ Anon., Newsday London, 1938, Newspaper Article.

²⁶⁹ Anon., Daily Telegraph, 19 November 1938, Newspaper Article, Part of Collection P.S. 9/9/2, National Archives of South Africa (NASA), Pretoria.

²⁷⁰ Anon., Daily Telegraph, 1938, Newspaper Article.

²⁷¹ Anon., Daily Telegraph, 1938, Newspaper Article.

Hitler met with Pirow on 25 November in Berlin, though it was just for an hour.²⁷²

Hitler also met with King Carol of Romania as did Pirow briefly.²⁷³ There was a question though regarding what Hitler and Pirow discussed, and why the meeting was so relatively short.²⁷⁴ Officially it was stated that Hitler and Pirow discussed the relations between Germany and Great Britain at the time, and that German colonies were not discussed.²⁷⁵ This could have been because of reports that Pirow had been ordered by the South African government not to discuss the issue of colonies with Hitler or even to raise his personal opinion regarding the matter.²⁷⁶

Early in the 1940s, Pirow crafted the idea that his change to fascism, “and the desire that South Africa should remain neutral in a war between Germany and Britain,” was due to his meetings and his admiration for fascist leaders such as “Dr. Antonio Salazar, the Portuguese dictator, General Francisco Franco, leader of the Spanish Nationalist government in the civil war, Hitler and Benito Mussolini of Italy, and the military might of Germany.”²⁷⁷ These declarations of appreciation for “Nazi Germany and fascism were so convincing that after the German surrender in 1945, Brigadier R. J. Palmer, commissioner of the South African Police,” asked British military intelligence to establish if “any evidence of contact between Pirow and Nazi Germany could be found in captured documentation.”²⁷⁸ “British intelligence found no such incriminating documentation.” The belief was that South Africa would go to war with Germany.

²⁷² Anon., *The Scotsman*, 25 November 1938, Newspaper Article, Part of Collection P.S. 9/9/2, National Archives of South Africa (NASA), Pretoria.

²⁷³ Anon., *The Scotsman*, 1938, Newspaper Article.

²⁷⁴ Anon., *The Scotsman*, 1938, Newspaper Article.

²⁷⁵ Anon., *Yorkshire Post*, 21 November 1938, Newspaper Article, Part of Collection P.S. 9/9/2, National Archives of South Africa (NASA), Pretoria.

²⁷⁶ Anon., *Yorkshire Post*, 1938, Newspaper Article.

²⁷⁷ Mouton, “‘Fascist or opportunist?’: The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943,” 104.

²⁷⁸ Mouton, “‘Fascist or opportunist?’: The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943,” 104.

An important question that should also be asked regarding Pirow's ambitions is: How far was the Union interested in the continent of Africa? Pirow thought that "even a casual examination of the map of Africa" showed that most of the continent was more "within the sphere of interest of Europe than of the Union."²⁷⁹ Pirow stated:

I do not think even the most ambitious South African can visualise a time when our influence will mean very much in the territories to the north of this dividing line. Next, let us look at the West Coast as far south as Angola. Without exception these areas are made up of territories with a climate which will never encourage the building-up of a permanent white population. The West Coast represents a portion of Africa which-whatever European power it may owe political allegiance to-belongs and always will belong to the black man. Our interests, if any, will never go beyond such commercial relations as we may be able to establish in competition with European countries.²⁸⁰

For Pirow, in fact, it was "no exaggeration to say that" it was as crucial for the future of these areas as it is for South Africa that South Africans should work in the "closest possible harmony and with the fullest possible cooperation."²⁸¹ Even though this section of Africa contained many parts as "unhealthy as the West Coast," according to Pirow, most of the areas it comprised could accommodate a "large white population," which is what Pirow was interested in.

At this point it is important to address the question asked by the heading of the article, namely "How far was the Union interested in the continent of Africa?" The reply was as follows: "The Union was not interested in the African continent to a greater extent than,

²⁷⁹ O. Pirow, "How far is the Union interested in the continent of Africa?," *Journal of the Royal African Society* 36, no. 144 (July 1937): 317; Pirow, "How far is the Union interested in the continent of Africa?."

²⁸⁰ Pirow, "How far is the Union interested in the continent of Africa?," 317; Pirow, "How far is the Union interested in the continent of Africa?."

²⁸¹ Pirow, "How far is the Union interested in the continent of Africa?," 317; Pirow, "How far is the Union interested in the continent of Africa?."

roughly, south of the Equator, including, as previously stated, Kenya and Uganda, but excluding French Equatorial Africa.”²⁸² In these areas South Africa showed substantial interest, because South Africa was not “the only white state in Africa and because these areas or most of them will, in time, carry a large white population” of their own. Pirow stated that while in “Europe white states may be able to afford fighting each other, in Africa the whites will disappear with calamitous rapidity unless they stand together.”²⁸³ Pirow saw the obligation which rested on “the Union in this connection” as a grave one, but one which they were “capable of bearing and willing to accept.”

Pirow and Hofmeyr shared a sense of South Africa’s imperial aims, which connects them to an extent. However, where they differed was the context of those imperial aims with Hofmeyr promoting South Africa’s aims within the British Empire and Pirow wanting to move South Africa towards a fascist response to its aims.

Conclusion

Lasswell, Hofmeyr and Pirow were unique men. Each played a prominent role in their respective sphere of influence. They seem quite different; however, they share certain similarities. All three were exceptional students. Although only Lasswell was the only member of this trio who continued with a long-term career in academia, the same would have been possible for Pirow and Hofmeyr as well had they not entered politics. Each of them was influenced by their respective travels to Europe though it should be noted that the influence occurred due to varied reasons. Lasswell was influenced by academia in Europe, especially psychology. Hofmeyr was influenced by his curiosity with empires,

²⁸² Pirow, "How far is the Union interested in the continent of Africa?," 317; Pirow, "How far is the Union interested in the continent of Africa?."

²⁸³ Pirow, "How far is the Union interested in the continent of Africa?," 317; Pirow, "How far is the Union interested in the continent of Africa?."

together with his studies at Oxford, thus visiting ancient Greek and Roman ruins. And finally, Pirow was influenced by the fascist movement of Europe in the 1930s.

Lasswell's legacy as a "One-Man University" and the contributions he made to academics which are still relevant today will cement his place in history. Hofmeyr, for all the good that he tried to do in terms of bringing a liberal perspective to South African politics, has been somewhat forgotten in recent years. If it were not for the Paton and Macdonald biographies very little would be remembered of Hofmeyr. Hofmeyr is a tragic figure whose premature death did not allow for him to reach his full potential in his political career. Although Pirow tried his utmost to resurrect his political career after WWII, the subsequent fallout damaged his reputation permanently. He returned to practising law, and he published several books most notably the biography on Hertzog.

In the thesis Lasswell is of a different order to Hofmeyr and Pirow—the latter were actors in SA providing a lens for the political-intellectual discourse in South Africa during the 1930s and 1940s, whereas Lasswell was an optic and intellectual sounding board.

CHAPTER 2

Coming of Age (1930–1933): Hofmeyr and the Politics of the Early 1930s

Social conflict results from the conscious pursuit of exclusive values.

Harold D. Lasswell, *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*

Maskew Miller published *Coming of Age: Studies in South African Citizenship and Politics*¹ in Cape Town in 1930. What the publisher did not know at the time, was how South African citizenship and politics would change in the following two decades, setting South Africa on a course very few could have envisioned. By 1930 South Africa had yet to mature as a country, with difficulties of economic inequality, and the development and evolution of provincial and local government. South Africa and its relationship to the British Commonwealth as well as South African nationality were all focal points for the decision makers of the country at various levels of society. These focal points were unsurprising, therefore, the subject matter for *Coming of Age*. It should be noted that these focal points were being discussed amidst the trauma of the great Depression, shaping the minds and experiences of many South Africans. Thus, South Africa's political "coming of age" came at an exceedingly challenging time in the country's history where "exclusive values" were being pursued. As one of the authors of *Coming of Age*, Hofmeyr was also experiencing his own political "coming of age" during this time. The chapter argues that *Coming of Age* provided a different vision for the future of South Africa and holds numerous important topics in terms of the garrison state origins.

¹ Brookes et al., *Coming of age: Studies in South African citizenship and politics*.

Half a world away from South Africa, Lasswell, who at that time had recently returned from a formative academic experience in Europe, was sitting in his office at the University of Chicago and was putting together the research and ideas that would later be published as "The Garrison State,"² a decade later. Characteristics of the garrison state are not always easily identifiable, especially during the 1930s, which predates the creation of the garrison state as a concept. At face value, Lasswell, and South Africa of the 1930s and 1940s, were worlds apart. Yet, these seemingly unrelated events would years later illuminate missing elements in the telling of South African history. Although the garrison state as a concept had not yet existed in the early 1930s when *Coming of Age* was published, one can retrospectively use the concept and apply it to 1930s South Africa to determine whether South Africa had been exhibiting the development of garrison state characteristics. Those who contributed to *Coming of Age* could not have engaged with Lasswell's concept; however this does not make it any less useful in unpacking this important time-period (1930s) of South African history.

Rural Afrikaner farmers of South Africa, the largest organised political constituency post-unification, had a turbulent, if not traumatic, entry into the twentieth century. The creation of South Africa stemmed from war and colonialism. After unification in 1910, the Great War broke out, with the economic boom of the 1920s leading into the great Depression. After all the dramatic events, South Africa experienced a political "coming of age," with the effect of the great Depression looming large in the minds of decision-makers. The effects of the great Depression on South Africa, as with many other countries, had a dramatic bearing on the economy and political stability of the country. The rural Afrikaner

² Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455-468.

farmers not only relied on agriculture for economic reasons, but it also formed part of their identity, both socially and politically. By looking at the impacts of the great Depression, the *Carnegie Report* and *The Poor White Question*, the chapter argues that the actions taken by the state can be seen as an economic component of a garrison state. The economic component of the concept of a garrison deals with specific examples of employment, a “duty to work,” as well as how the economy of a country can be utilised to benefit a garrison state. The great Depression, the *Carnegie Report* and the reaction to *The Poor White Question* by the South African state, should be viewed as actual developing garrison state characteristics.

Events between 1930 and 1933 stemmed from the re-election and second cabinet of J. B. M. Hertzog. Hertzog’s so-called Native bills³ together with Pirow’s “five-year plan” of restructuring and modernisation of South Africa’s military, played a significant role during the mid-1930s with regards to garrison state characteristics developing in South Africa. Hertzog’s bills and Pirow’s “five-year plan” will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. The way South African society was militarised and split along racial lines created a threat from which a garrison state would need to defend the population. However, the years preceding these events created an important foundation. The economic, social, and political impact of the great Depression, Hofmeyr’s entry into politics, as well as his various writings, and Malan’s Immigration Quota Bill all played a substantial role in the events that occurred in later years. In telling the story of South African authoritarian history the political “coming of age” was never a predetermined outcome as the country was at a crossroads during this time.

³ Also referred to as Hertzog’s Bills

Hofmeyr and Malan: The Immigration Quota Bill

The Immigration Quota Bill can be seen as a “conscious pursuit of exclusive values” when using the Lasswellian statement. As the thesis positions itself within the new scholarship on South African anti-fascist history, and fascism is riddled with inherent anti-Semitism, it is important to show South Africa’s history and relationship to anti-Semitism. This will be done using Hofmeyr as a lens to focus on the Immigration Quota Bill as an expression of anti-Semitism in South Africa.

Early on in his political career, one of the first challenges Hofmeyr would face would be to navigate the complexities of Malan’s draft legislation. The guarantees that the Jewish community had received regarding Jewish immigration from the South African government in the late 1920s were by the start of the following decade shown to be false promises.⁴ As Rubin writes, “In 1930, a new Quota Act⁵ was enacted which denied Eastern European Jews entrance to South Africa.”⁶ The Act was subsequently followed by the 1937 Anti-Aliens Act⁷ that prevented Western European Jewish immigration at a crucial time in history, specifically Jewish history.⁸ One can only speculate how many Jewish lives could have been saved had South Africa allowed for Jewish immigration. These two Acts can be seen as examples of the “social and political climate that existed in South Africa during the 1930s.”⁹ These Acts were global manifestations of the racism and anti-Semitism that had become popular at the time. The Eugenics movement was “sweeping across the world in the late 1920s and the early 1930s,” and South Africa was equally influenced. South Africa was not

⁴ M. Rubin, “The Jewish community of Johannesburg 1886–1939: Landscapes of reality and imagination” (Unpublished master's dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2004), 131.

⁵ Immigration Quota Act, No.8 of 1930, (1930).

⁶ Rubin, “The Jewish community of Johannesburg 1886–1939: Landscapes of reality and imagination,” 131.

⁷ Aliens Act, No.1 of 1937, (1937).

⁸ Rubin, “The Jewish community of Johannesburg 1886–1939: Landscapes of reality and imagination,” 131.

⁹ Rubin, “The Jewish community of Johannesburg 1886–1939: Landscapes of reality and imagination,” 131.

immune from Nazi ideology, which assisted the development of several “shirt” organisations.

The historian Milton Shain states that without the notion of the Jews as a race apart and “the maturation of widely shared anti-Jewish stereotypes, the Quota Act of 1930 would not have received popular support.”¹⁰ Shain states that hostility towards Jews in the 1930s and 1940s “was not an aberration of South African thought or a moment of irrational deviation,” but was premised on these stereotypes.¹¹ However, the hatred went much further than that. Prior to the Quota Act, anti-Jewish enmity had been expressed at the level of ideas, and in the 1930s and 1940s it mutated into proposed action or public policy, what historian Todd Endelman has referred to as “the transformation of private into public anti-Semitism.”¹² Prominent political parties took more cognisance of the increasing anti-Jewish feeling among the public, specifically the voting public. As one might expect, right-wing parties supported this sentiment. Unfortunately, the more centrist parties failed both morally, in condemning these sentiments, and practically, in combating the Quota Act. Leftist parties were not influential enough at the time to take a meaningful stand.

Hofmeyr was known for his pro-Jewish stance. He made various speeches throughout his career expressing his pro-Jewish sentiment. Unfortunately, as with many other instances with Hofmeyr, his ideological stance clashed with what was politically practical at the time. Hofmeyr would become trapped attempting to justify his position from a logical perspective, even when it was not feasible. Here, with the Immigration Quota Bill, the same issue was at play.

¹⁰ M. Shain, *A perfect storm: Antisemitism in South Africa 1930–1948* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2015), 7.

¹¹ Shain, *A perfect storm: Antisemitism in South Africa 1930–1948*, 7.

¹² Shain, *A perfect storm: Antisemitism in South Africa 1930–1948*, 7.

The political sentiment of the day was in contrast with Hofmeyr's ideological stance. "The beginnings of the 1930 Quota Act" had started five years prior in the *1925 Census Report*.¹³ It was proposed that what was required in South Africa were people from Western Europe "who would be better stock" for the country's "development and who shared greater similarities to the dominant Afrikaans population."¹⁴ The NP, "which had won the 1929 elections," had failed in their effort to "win the Jewish community's vote," thus, the implementation of the Quota Act in 1930 meant that the NP lost "none of their constituents by passing the Act."¹⁵ Instead, the NP added a major "block of the Afrikaans and English vote when the reasons for the Quota Act" were publicised and Malan "rationally" outlined the "three central principles of the Act," as follows:

(1) The desire of every nation to maintain its basic racial composition; (2) The doctrine of assimilability; and (3) South Africa's desire to maintain its own type of civilisation, and the fact that the civilisation of Eastern or Southern Europe was, to a large extent, different from that of Western Europe.¹⁶

At the time, racial anxieties were seen as understandable explanations for introducing the Act. Most white people agreed with the philosophy of racial "homogeneity and had been conditioned" and accustomed to think of themselves as a "volk,"¹⁷ a group with a particular "cultural and racial identity that was under constant threat from other races and nations."¹⁸ The Quota Act was implemented on 1 May 1930 and made it evident that:

¹³ Shain, *A perfect storm: Antisemitism in South Africa 1930–1948*, 7.

¹⁴ G. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism: The South African experience* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1980), 1.

¹⁵ Shain, *A perfect storm: Antisemitism in South Africa 1930–1948*, 7.

¹⁶ Cited in D. J. Elazar and P. Medding, *Jewish community in frontier societies: Argentina, Australia, and South Africa* (New York & London: Holmes & Meier, 1983), 60.

¹⁷ The "South Africanism" pioneered by people like Jan Smuts and Louis Botha, not necessarily the narrower Afrikaner nationalist ideas proposed by Hertzog and his ilk.

¹⁸ Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism: The South African experience*, 370–400.

No person born in any country not specified in the Schedule . . . shall enter the Union, unless his entry has been approved in accordance with such regulations as may be prescribed . . . (Clause 1 [I]) [and] . . . not more than fifty persons born in any particular country not specified in the Schedule . . . shall in any calendar year be permitted to enter the Union for permanent residence therein (Clause 1 [II]).¹⁹

The group of countries scheduled in the Act included “those of the British Commonwealth, as well as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA and only immigrants from these countries were given unlimited immigration rights to South Africa.”²⁰ The Act did allow for “an additional thousand people per calendar year from unscheduled countries if they satisfied certain conditions.”²¹ These conditions stated that immigrants should “be of good character,” should be “assimilable,” not “harmful to the economy of the country,” and “not have a profession that was already adequately represented in South Africa.”²² These conditions were extremely challenging to meet, specifically for Eastern European Jews who were not considered assimilable, and who, generally, did not possess any special skills which would grant them access to South Africa.

In 1930, Malan pushed for an Immigration Quota Bill which proposed unrestricted immigration from certain countries, and set a limit on others.²³ The countries on which an immigration limit was placed were mostly from Eastern Europe where Jewish immigrants tried to escape ghettos.²⁴ Malan’s bill was clearly designed to limit Jewish immigration,

¹⁹ Cited in M. Cohen, “Anti-Jewish manifestations in the Union of South Africa during the 1930s” (Unpublished honours research report, University of Cape Town, 1968), 19.

²⁰ Elazar and Medding, *Jewish community in frontier societies: Argentina, Australia, and South Africa*.

²¹ Cohen, “Anti-Jewish manifestations in the Union of South Africa during the 1930s,” 19.

²² Cohen, “Anti-Jewish manifestations in the Union of South Africa during the 1930s,” 19.

²³ Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 169.

²⁴ Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 169.

which in previous years had constituted about a third of the total immigration, whereas South African Jews composed fewer than five percent of the white populace.²⁵ There was an anti-Semitic theory held among many white South Africans that as soon as the Jewish populace became 5 percent of the total population, the situation in the society could become unstable.²⁶ Malan argued that by curbing Jewish immigration one would be curbing anti-Semitism. This strange argument that one must be anti-Semitic in order to curb anti-Semitism was clearly opportunistic and calculating. However, this argument also allowed Malan to promote the notion that a country had the right to preserve its own characteristics and therefore shape its own immigration policy. Though sovereignty was a convincing argument for a country to create its own immigration policy, Malan's argument was clearly thinly veiled nationalism and anti-Semitic to its core.

Hofmeyr's speech to oppose Malan's Immigration Quota Bill was his first in parliament in 1930. However, his opposition was only in principle, and Hofmeyr would eventually vote in favour of the bill. This was a typical issue with Hofmeyr's political career, where he would make lengthy academic arguments regarding political issues, however, in practice would follow the status quo. Hofmeyr was caught sitting on the fence on many prominent issues, getting stuck in the proverbial mud of trying to balance the pros and cons of various arguments. During this specific sitting, Hofmeyr faced a hostile House with seasoned politicians such as Malan and Hertzog in opposition. Hofmeyr stated that he did not like that the bill offended the self-respect of South African Jews, whom he defended stoutly.²⁷ Hofmeyr challenged the view that Jews were not able to assimilate, and used his

²⁵ Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 169.

²⁶ Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 170.

²⁷ Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 170.

former students at the University of the Witwatersrand as an example.²⁸ Hofmeyr asked the rhetorical question whether the Jewish immigrants coming to South Africa were really that different from the settled South African Jews?²⁹ Hofmeyr appealed to the Jews of South Africa to restrict immigration for their own sake, but he wished to dissociate himself from any idea of supporting the bill to restrict Jewish immigration.³⁰ Hofmeyr stated that Malan implied that the Jews in South Africa could not be assimilated:

The Minister implied that one of the principles of the Bill was that of assimilability. He included in the schedule those nations which can be assimilated, he left out the nations which cannot be assimilated. I would question the implied statement of the Minister that the Jewish people cannot be assimilated. They are being assimilated today. They are adopting our ways of life, our standards and methods of thought; environment is doing that, and in the second-generation education is carrying on the work of environment. I have been privileged in my educational work to watch the development of young Jewish students and to see the change that comes over them as they pass through a good school, college or university, to compare them with their parents and to see how they are being assimilated into the general body of the population. I say again that within the limits I have indicated, in principle there is no reason why they should not be assimilated here in South Africa. I would repeat that in so far as this Bill is being conceived as a Bill to restrict Jewish immigration, and is receiving support on that basis, I, for one, would wish to be dissociated from an idea of supporting it along those lines.³¹

When asked by the Minister of Defence Frederic Creswell, if Hofmeyr would vote against the bill or not, Hofmeyr replied that he accepted the position that, as a fact, the bill

²⁸ Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 170.

²⁹ Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 170.

³⁰ Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 170.

³¹ Anon., Debates of the House of Assembly Second Session, Sixth Parliament, 17 January to 31 May 1930, Debate, vol.14, 590, Hansard Records, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, <https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/handle/10539/12791>.

would restrict Jewish immigration, but that at the present circumstances Jewish immigration should be restricted.³² Hofmeyr stated that:

I am coming to that. I will tell the Honourable Minister on what grounds the principle should be the position that, as a fact, this Bill will restrict Jewish immigration. We believe that in the present circumstances such immigration should be restricted, and therefore, we support the Bill on that basis although not on the grounds to which I have referred.³³

This response was met with laughter and jeers of “fence-sitting” by other members.³⁴ This was a difficult start to Hofmeyr’s parliamentary career, and it did not inspire confidence in the Jewish community who saw Hofmeyr together with Smuts as a champion for their cause. One could argue that public debate was not Hofmeyr’s strength, however this does not absolve him from the practical matter that he still voted for the Bill.

Studies in South African Citizenship and Politics

Hofmeyr had associations with various liberal thinkers such as Dr. R. F. Currey, Oliver Schreiner, Edgar Brookes, Ramsbottom, Prof. Theodorus Haarhoff, Sally Frankel, Rheinallt Jones and Alfred Hoernle. These thinkers would come together and collaborate to write *Coming of Age*. Both Schreiner and Currey noted that Hofmeyr did not play a vigorous part in the discussions preceding the writing of *Coming of Age* published in 1930. This was not necessarily a surprising turn of events, as Hofmeyr was hearing new ideas. It was decided that Hofmeyr would write the introduction and one of the studies dealing with the uncontroversial subject of *provincial and local government*. Though not necessarily controversial, yet vitally important, it was agreed that Hofmeyr was not committed to the

³² Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 170.

³³ Anon., Debates of the House of Assembly Second Session, Sixth Parliament, 17 January to 31 May 1930, Debate.

³⁴ Anon., Debates of the House of Assembly Second Session, Sixth Parliament, 17 January to 31 May 1930, Debate.

views expressed, especially on the controversial matters dealt with by the other writers. This was partly due to Hofmeyr's party affiliations, but more specifically because of his membership of the select committee on Hertzog's Native bills.

While *Coming of Age* was well-received by the press its success was modest, and its readers were confined to a highly select public, of whom less than two thousand bought the English edition, and only a hundred the Afrikaans. *Coming of Age* was a product of the liberalism of the 1930s.³⁵ All the contributors were at the forefront of South African liberalism at the time. Currey and Haarhoff stated that until national unity between Afrikaners and English was achieved, the question of the degree to which non-white peoples were members of the nation should be held over, a view that liberals no longer held, believing that a call for white unity was either a call for the continuance of white domination or an excuse for an indefinite delay to the political emancipation of the non-white populace in South Africa.³⁶

The subtitle of *Coming of Age, Studies in South African Citizenship and Politics*³⁷, provides important insight into the garrison state origins in South Africa. *Coming of Age* was split into four chapters: "Problems of economic inequalities," "Provincial and local government," "South Africa and the Commonwealth" and last "South African Nationality." *Coming of Age* was also the analogy that can be used for South Africa during the 1930s and 1940s. In doing so it covered the essential issues which South Africa would grapple with

³⁵ Here it is also important to mention R. Vigne, *Liberals against apartheid: A history of the Liberal Party of South Africa, 1953–1968* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997). Though Vigne focuses on a later time period, the foundations for the Vigne's *Liberals* link back to the 1930s. Vigne extensively researched his book at the Alan Paton Centre, where the archives of the Liberal Party are held. A large focus of the Liberal Party was national unity.

³⁶ Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 170.

³⁷ E.H. Brooks et al., *Coming of age: Studies in South African citizenship and politics* (Cape Town: M. Miller, 1930); Brookes et al., *Coming of age: Studies in South African citizenship and politics*.

during the mid- to late-1930s. Issues of independence from Great Britain, sovereignty, and South Africa's status as a country within the British Commonwealth were all topics ripe for debate. *Coming of Age* laid the foundations for these debates and contextualised these issues. In later chapters, the Status of the Union Act³⁸ Union policy during the time of war (with special mention to a *Cape Times* article "Union in the Time of War"³⁹) as well as a 1935 pamphlet that was distributed entitled "Questions to Hertzog" which dealt with issues of South African sovereignty during the time of war, were all addressed.

The fear of the Nationalists during the 1930s was that South Africa would be obliged to join the side of Great Britain if a war should ever break out. The position of the Nationalists was one of neutrality, safeguarding South Africa's sovereignty, and ensuring that South Africa could make independent policy choices from Great Britain in relation to international affairs. This was in stark contrast to Smuts and his imperial internationalism which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. Both Hofmeyr and Smuts were great apologists for the British Empire with Hertzog even going as far as making a speech in late 1945 entitled "Reconciling Imperialism and Liberty." The publication of *Coming of Age* can also be seen as an attempt by the South African liberal intellectual class of the 1930s to contextualise and problematise some of the key issues and debates facing South Africa. Though the liberal themes found throughout the book bind it together, each chapter deals with differing issues and needs to be analysed separately due to their varying importance for the thesis.

The chapter titled "The problems of economic inequality: The poor white and the native," was coauthored by Frankel and Brookes. Sally Herbert Frankel was a professor of

³⁸ Status of the Union Act, No.69 of 1934 (1934).

³⁹ Anon., "Union in the time of war," *Cape Times*, 6 February 1935.

colonial economic affairs, prior to being appointed to the economics of underdeveloped countries at Oxford University after WWII. Edgar Harry Brookes was a South African delegate to the League of Nations. They took the position that at that time, there was no serious attempt to analyse the actual position which the “native peoples”⁴⁰ occupied in the economic organisation of the Union. Although they did not intend to say that the European electorate did not realise that its economic welfare was affected in a myriad of varying factors.⁴¹ Frankel and Brookes also spoke of an unwarranted tendency to speak of the “native question” as if it could be isolated from the main currents of South African life, a tendency which was enhanced by the official divisions, which suggested that “native affairs” were matters apart.⁴² Therefore, as a result, the fact was ignored that there could only be a single South African economy, that “for good or ill, each part of that economy, be it agricultural or industrial, poor or rich, economically strong or weak, black or white,” was indissolubly linked to, and influenced by, and in turn influenced, every other part.⁴³ This chapter, therefore, dealt mainly from a new angle with two questions which until then, were usually referred to respectively as the “Poor White Problem” and the economic

⁴⁰ As per the language used in the chapter.

⁴¹ S. H. Frankel and E. H. Brookes, "Problems of economic inequality: The poor white and the native," in *The coming of age: Studies in South African citizenship and politics*, ed. E. H. Brookes (Cape Town: Maskew Miller, 1930), 129.

⁴² Frankel and Brookes, "Problems of economic inequality: The poor white and the native," 130.

⁴³ Frankel and Brookes, "Problems of economic inequality: The poor white and the native," 130.

aspects of the “native problem.”⁴⁴ It should be noted that though these points mirror the insights of W. M. Macmillan, whose work they did not use in this chapter.⁴⁵

The chapter titled “Provincial and local governments” was authored by Hofmeyr. As with most instances throughout his career, whether it be academic, administrative, or political, Hofmeyr tended to focus on technocratic policy matters that the layman was not well-versed in. Though one could forgive the decision to have Hofmeyr write on administrative technicalities, it was an attempt to protect or safeguard him from having to offer opinions on controversial political issues when his own political career had just started. Thus, Hofmeyr could be shielded from any real criticism lodged against *Coming of Age*, or any potential claims of political contradictions within his party, as he did not render any profound or controversial opinions but merely wrote on administrative technicalities. Hofmeyr believed that most citizens had direct and personal interest in the functioning of those subordinate organs of government which dealt with the administration of local affairs.⁴⁶ Hofmeyr could clearly be criticised for being out of touch with the common man. This, as mentioned before, was a feature of Hofmeyr’s career. However, he was correct in saying that the life of the average person was touched more directly by the way local problems were dealt with than by most of the issues to which Parliament directed its

⁴⁴ Adam Ashforth’s *The politics of official discourse in twentieth-century South Africa. The Politics of Official Discourse in Twentieth Century SA* was an important contribution in terms of framing the ‘Native Problem.’ Ashforth’s work is also relevant in providing the first detailed examination of the reports of the commissions of inquiry that influenced the history of South Africa, such as the Fagan Commission, which features prominently later in this research. In all there were six commission reports on the Native Problem that Ashforth dealt with. Ashforth also focused on a central issue of the South African state whereby South Africa used black labour, however it did not incorporate Black people into the economy or white society.

⁴⁵ See W. M. Macmillan, *The South African agrarian problem and its historical development* (Witwatersrand: Central News Agency, Council of Education, 1919).; W. M. Macmillan, *Complex South Africa: An economic footnote to history* (Faber and Faber, 1954).

⁴⁶ J. H. Hofmeyr, “Provincial and local government,” in *The coming of age: Studies in South African citizenship and politics*, ed. E. H. Brookes (Cape Town: Maskew Miller, 1930), 297.

attention.⁴⁷ But it ignored that the average man cared more about issues in Parliament than Hofmeyr realised. Hofmeyr continued the lacklustre chapter by focusing on various sections of the Act of the Union.

The chapter titled "South Africa and the Commonwealth" was authored by Oliver Schreiner. Oliver Deneys Schreiner was a judge of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa from 1945–1960 and served as judge of the Transvaal Provincial Division from 1937–1944. Schreiner looked at two main questions about South Africa and the Commonwealth. The first was, what should the attitude of the individual South African be towards the Commonwealth?⁴⁸ The second was, what policy in relation to the Commonwealth would one like to see pursued by South African governments?⁴⁹ Schreiner saw these two questions as being connected. The chapter was important as it spoke to vital issues that would later have an impact on South African independence and sovereignty within the Commonwealth. Schreiner foresaw one of the serious issues that would destabilise South African politics during the mid-1930s, namely what would happen if war should break out?

Schreiner compared the individual who commonly related their point of view to the practical policy which they wanted to see in operation, while the statesmen in framing their policy would inevitably bear in mind the tendencies of public feeling on the subject. Nevertheless, there was a real difference between the aspects of the problem represented by the two questions, a difference that it is important to emphasise. Schreiner approached the issue in that, just as individual feelings differed in respect of loyalty to city, province,

⁴⁷ Hofmeyr, "Provincial and local government," 297.

⁴⁸ O. D. Schreiner, "South Africa and the Commonwealth," in *The coming of age: Studies in South African citizenship and politics*, ed. E. H. Brookes (Cape Town: Maskew Miller, 1930), 87.

⁴⁹ Schreiner, "South Africa and the Commonwealth," 87.

country, mutatis mutandis, so they must naturally and necessarily vary regarding the Commonwealth of which South Africa was a part of.⁵⁰ Schreiner then arrived at the crux of the chapter. What would happen if a war should break out? Conceivably a conflict might arise for South Africans between provincial and national loyalty. However, for Schreiner, the solution was relatively simple. It was natural in this connection to consider the position of South Africa in the partnership of the Commonwealth. The Imperial Conference of 1926, "which dealt so wisely"⁵¹ with the question of the status of the several associated nations, declared in unequivocal terms the complete equality of the partners in a voluntary association. Great Britain and the dominions were designated as:

Autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.⁵²

While some South Africans may not have felt, personally, any sense of subordination, so long as such a sense existed in the minds of any of their fellow citizens the steps taken were essential to further progress.

It was clear for Schreiner that all partners in the Commonwealth were equal, in so far as any legal anomalies remained as an impairment of that equality. Thus, there was no need to consider nations to secede from the Commonwealth. Schreiner, like Smuts and Hofmeyr, could be considered a British Empire apologist when one considers this imperial-internationalist argument. Schreiner then continued to heap great praise on the Commonwealth and highlighted its benefits:

⁵⁰ Schreiner, "South Africa and the Commonwealth," 89.

⁵¹ According to Schreiner, "South Africa and the Commonwealth."

⁵² Schreiner, "South Africa and the Commonwealth," 89.

We members of the Commonwealth have a wonderful estate to administer, and it is our resolve to improve and develop it by all the means in our power. This is an age of cooperation. States as well as individuals are coming to recognize more and more how tremendous is the power of combined effort as compared with the possibilities of isolated endeavour. We look forward, therefore, with confidence to great advances in the direction of practical cooperation between the members of the Commonwealth.

Schreiner continued:

The Commonwealth stands in a unique position to save the world from catastrophe. Its power and influence are immense and must grow as the populations of the still only partially filled dominions increase. If the partners are united in a firm resolve that peace shall remain with us, it is not too much to say that they can guarantee that it shall be so.

This quote can be linked to the broader idea of the garrison state being under attack by external threats to its sovereignty. If these sentiments shared by Schreiner proved to be true, the existence of the garrison state would be threatened more by the idea of an imperial power like the British Commonwealth. This is an opportune time to mention again that Smuts and Hofmeyr were pro-British Commonwealth and two of the most important agents of the garrison state. This shows that Lasswell's concept of the garrison state does not 'fit' perfectly to the South African case study. This scenario also emphasises how the garrison state is indeed a state phenomenon, and this will be discussed in more detail later in the thesis.

The chapter titled "South African Nationality: Its meaning, possibilities and limitations" was coauthored by Currey and Haarhoff. Dr. R. F. Currey was the tenth headmaster of St. Andrews School (1939–1955) in Grahamstown in the Eastern Cape. Professor Theodorus Johannes Haarhoff was a South African writer and classicist. He made

significant contributions to Afrikaans literature with his translations of ancient Greek and ancient Roman poems. They started the chapter by looking at the history of the Union and how that Union became a nation. On 31 May 1910, the Union of South Africa was formally proclaimed and South Africa became a nation.⁵³ The date was significant, for it was the anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Vereeniging.⁵⁴ For Currey and Haarhoff, this date was even more remarkable as it was only eight short years since the close of what was then considered as the most melancholy passage in the country's history – the South African War of 1899–1902.⁵⁵ Haarhoff and Currey focused on Renan's⁵⁶ definition of a nation: consisting of those who "have done great things together and desire to do more of them."⁵⁷ The definition may appear antiquated, but one has only to think, for instance, of Switzerland, or Ireland, to realise at once how immensely difficult it is to find concepts sufficiently comprehensive to cover all the nations with which we are familiar today.⁵⁸ Haarhoff and Currey thought no definition based on geographical or political considerations to be adequate; neither did community of race, language or religion, or any combination of these, afford clues to what they were seeking.⁵⁹

Renan's definition is of great value for one reason, however: by using the word "desire" he made it clear that the basis of nationality was to be sought, not in any external

⁵³ R. F. Currey and T. J. Haarhoff, "South African nationality: Its meaning, possibilities and limitations," in *The coming of age: Studies in South African citizenship and politics*, ed. E. H. Brookes (Cape Town: Maskew Miller, 1930).

⁵⁴ Currey and Haarhoff, "South African nationality: Its meaning, possibilities and limitations," 17.

⁵⁵ Currey and Haarhoff, "South African nationality: Its meaning, possibilities and limitations," 17.

⁵⁶ Joseph Ernest Renan was a French Orientalist and Semitic Scholar, expert of Semitic languages and civilizations, historian of religion, philologist, philosopher, biblical scholar, and critic. He wrote influential and pioneering historical works on the origins of early Christianity, and espoused popular political theories especially concerning nationalism and national identity

⁵⁷ Currey and Haarhoff, "South African nationality: Its meaning, possibilities and limitations," 17.

⁵⁸ Currey and Haarhoff, "South African nationality: Its meaning, possibilities and limitations," 20.

⁵⁹ Currey and Haarhoff, "South African nationality: Its meaning, possibilities and limitations," 20.

or material tie, but in the “hearts and minds” of the men and women who form the nation.⁶⁰

It is also important to place these ideas and comments in historical context. For example, during the 1930s in Germany, the ideas of the nation and nationalism were very closely aligned. This also brings to the fore the idea of the garrison state and its relationship with nationalism as the garrison state does encompass many nationalist traits. However, as previously noted, political ideology does not determine a garrison state. Currey and Haarhoff observed that at the time they spoke of the South African nation⁶¹ most people would understand them to mean those persons who had come to South Africa from overseas or are the descendants of others who have done so.⁶² However, at the very outset they found themselves confronted with what may well be a fundamental objection. “How” it would be asked, “can you speak of the South African nation when you expressly exclude three-fourths of those whose homes are in South Africa?”⁶³ For Currey and Haarhoff clearly, no discussion of South African nationality which failed to take account of the “native and coloured peoples (*sic*)”, and the part they have to play in the national life, could be anything but one-sided and hopelessly incomplete.⁶⁴ Equally clearly, to treat non-whites as full “nationals” would be merely to be blind to the facts as the writers perceived them. The most enthusiastic protagonist of a *white South Africa* would not deny that these peoples, too, in some sense at least, were South Africans. This was a very controversial statement, giving nationhood or universal citizenship within a nation was seen as a threat to white interests.

⁶⁰ Currey and Haarhoff, “South African nationality: Its meaning, possibilities and limitations,” 20.

⁶¹ This was leaving aside for the moment the question whether that nation was already in being or still in the process of becoming.

⁶² Currey and Haarhoff, “South African nationality: Its meaning, possibilities and limitations,” 21.

⁶³ Currey and Haarhoff, “South African nationality: Its meaning, possibilities and limitations,” 21.

⁶⁴ Currey and Haarhoff, “South African nationality: Its meaning, possibilities and limitations,” 21.

Coming of Age was written during a crucial time in South African history and attempted to unpack many controversial issues from the perspective of the so-called new liberalism. The chapters and the debates covered, relating to nationality, citizenship, and the British Commonwealth were microcosms of what was being debated within the political-intellectual discourse of the time. The book provided an impressive summary of the political-intellectual discourse at the time. However, many of these were ideological and philosophical issues which to the laymen could have appeared impractical. *Coming of Age* did attempt to address the key issue of the great Depression and the South African economy, however it was not an in depth study. The great Depression dominated the global economic landscape during the early 1930s and had both a social and political impact in South Africa.

South African Politics and the Great Depression 1930–1933

South African politics of the early 1930s and the impact of the great Depression were intertwined. The economic policy South Africa should follow was at the forefront of the political-intellectual discourse of the time. Lasswell, in his proposition of the garrison state, included characteristics specifically related to the economy such as unemployment and how the Garrison State would react to it.

On 17 June 1929 South Africa's electorate went to the polls for what would be the Union's sixth general election.⁶⁵ The result of the election proved favourable for the incumbent NP and Labour Party coalition government which was in power since 1924.⁶⁶ Because of the growth of the NP, Hertzog, who was the leader of the NP and the sitting prime minister, did not need the help of the Labour Party to continue to govern.⁶⁷ The rural

⁶⁵ Stultz, *Afrikaner politics in South Africa 1934–1948*, 7.

⁶⁶ Stultz, *Afrikaner politics in South Africa 1934–1948*, 7.

⁶⁷ Stultz, *Afrikaner politics in South Africa 1934–1948*, 7.

Afrikaner base of the NP contributed to its growth and helped secure its victory. Thus, South Africa had a “coming of age” with the election of a nationalist political party that could govern due to an outright majority. However, with the outbreak of the great Depression, the possibilities (both economic and political) that Hertzog envisioned came to an untimely halt. The impact of the great Depression on South Africa was especially severe in the rural farming communities, the primary voting base for the NP. The difficulties were also compounded by the worst drought in the country’s history.⁶⁸

Even before the outbreak of the great Depression, from 1926, rural parts of the Orange Free State and Cape Province experienced a great decline in their population as many left the countryside and moved to urban areas looking for economic relief. In the cities, unemployment mounted as the labour market could not absorb the new unskilled arrival. The Carnegie Commission determined that between 1929 and 1930 approximately three hundred thousand white South Africans were considered “very poor” with the majority of these thought to be Afrikaners.⁶⁹ If the NP had been in opposition, this dire economic situation would have been a catalyst to stimulate Afrikaner nationalism.⁷⁰ Yet the NP government, led by Hertzog, failed to provide assistance to farmers, and many of its policy decisions had an adverse impact on Afrikaners.⁷¹ Hertzog’s requirement that South Africa maintained the gold standard, as well as a series of new taxes, proved to be very unpopular in many sectors of South African society.

An overlooked aspect of how the great Depression impacted South Africa was the response of the state to counter economic hardship and unemployment. A crucial

⁶⁸ Stultz, *Afrikaner politics in South Africa 1934–1948*, 24.

⁶⁹ Stultz, *Afrikaner politics in South Africa 1934–1948*, 24.

⁷⁰ Stultz, *Afrikaner politics in South Africa 1934–1948*, 24.

⁷¹ Stultz, *Afrikaner politics in South Africa 1934–1948*, 24.

characteristic, Lasswell argued, would be that unemployment would be “obsolete in the garrison state” as it implied uselessness.⁷² In the garrison state, as Lasswell envisioned it, there had to be “work (and the duty to work) for all.”⁷³ If we put this into historical context, the great Depression had a formative impact on the concept of the garrison state, especially regarding labour, employment and perceptions regarding the “uselessness” of the unemployed. In retrospect, the great Depression created a situation ripe for manipulation. The pride and identification with labour formed an important aspect of rural Afrikaner farmer identity. Farmers had suffered losses after expecting a satisfactory season in 1930, however, due to “the reduced incomes” because of the continued lowering of “prices for agricultural products,” farmers were not able to “liquidate their debts,” which were worsened when the next season saw no improvement in pricing.⁷⁴ The yearly income from wool for farmers was not sufficient to cover expenses and pay off debts.⁷⁵ For farmers who had lost greatly on bonds⁷⁶ their “position was even more serious, and at the ruling prices there was much concern that many of them would be unable to meet heavy interest charges out of a depleted income.”⁷⁷

By the beginning of 1930, “the market for farm property was also stagnant” as owners were unwilling to accept lower values unless they were compelled to do so. Ironically, the financial situation of the farmers was exacerbated in 1930 by a good season across South Africa, “which led to an overabundance in the supply of good stock.” Farmers attempted to “build up their stock numbers” to combat low prices, however most were

⁷² Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” 459.

⁷³ Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” 459.

⁷⁴ A. Minnaar, “The effects of the Great Depression (1929–1934) on South African white agriculture,” *South African Journal of Economic History* 5, no. 2 (September 1990): 83-108.

⁷⁵ Minnaar, “The effects of the Great Depression (1929–1934) on South African white agriculture,” 88.

⁷⁶ They did not receive their interest payments.

⁷⁷ Minnaar, “The effects of the Great Depression (1929–1934) on South African white agriculture,” 88.

barely making ends meet via the widespread utilisation of “overdraft facilities,” which only worsened their debt.⁷⁸

By June 1931, Minnaar writes, the circumstances had worsened even more—specifically in small towns which were the hubs of “sheep-rearing districts.”⁷⁹ These towns, having no “wage-earning class,” no “railway workshops, universities, many civil servants, harbour officials or other commercial personnel,” were teetering on the brink of bankruptcy, since they were completely dependent upon the success of the farming community. “Income from wool” had fallen radically since 1929. The farmers’ struggles with debt were intensified during 1931 by the difficult “exchange rates,” which were particularly severe for the wool farmers. Australia left the gold standard at the beginning of 1931, and “the position was complicated by the devaluation of the Australian pound by 20 percent.”⁸⁰ As Minnaar explains, “This situation allowed the British wool buyer in Australia to pay more in Australian currency for wool sold in the Commonwealth, but also made Australian wool cheaper in London.”⁸¹ “The depreciated Australian currency” negatively impacted the purchases of “wool from South Africa, as the higher nominal price in Australia involved” a relatively lower price when compared to European currencies.⁸² The Australian market stayed secure in 1931, and this was a great benefit for the Australian wool farmers, which “accounted for the bulk of the buying orders going to Australia” rather than to South Africa.⁸³ As Minnaar shows, “European, American, and Japanese buyers could afford to pay 10 to 15 percent more for Australian wool” yet sell it in their countries at lower cost “than

⁷⁸ Minnaar, “The effects of the Great Depression (1929–1934) on South African white agriculture,” 88.

⁷⁹ Minnaar, “The effects of the Great Depression (1929–1934) on South African white agriculture,” 83.

⁸⁰ Minnaar, “The effects of the Great Depression (1929–1934) on South African white agriculture,” 83.

⁸¹ Minnaar, “The effects of the Great Depression (1929–1934) on South African white agriculture,” 83.

⁸² Minnaar, “The effects of the Great Depression (1929–1934) on South African white agriculture,” 83.

⁸³ Minnaar, “The effects of the Great Depression (1929–1934) on South African white agriculture,” 83.

any other wool” due to the undervaluation of their currency.⁸⁴ Thus South Africa was failing to compete economically within the Commonwealth.

As previously mentioned, by 1932, the Native Services Contract Act was passed, which made breach of contract by African farm and mine workers a criminal offence and meant they could not legally leave their jobs without their employers’ consent.⁸⁵ Even with this new legislation, an attempt to use the control of black labour to assist white farmers and mine owners, the impact of the great Depression remained. “In May 1932, South African wool farmers had found, for the first time since 1922, Cape top-line wools were cheaper than the Australian” equivalent on the London market.⁸⁶ Thus, it was not unexpected, that “with sheep and wool prices having fallen to a level well below cost of production,” adding the fact of the decreased value of other primary products, “that wool growers felt that their survival as farmers was threatened.”⁸⁷ Most of these farmers were generally incapable to meet their financial duties. Therefore, during 1932, although farmers were supported by “various legislative relief measures, notably provided by the export subsidies,” they still experienced a noticeable decline in their debt situation. Agricultural insolvencies “increased by 28 percent between 1928 and 1929 and by a staggering 62 percent in 1930.”⁸⁸

At the start of the Depression, the farmers had to face the unwillingness of the government to provide farmers with the necessary financial assistance, which the government considered to be charity. As Minnaar shows, “as the Depression worsened, the

⁸⁴ Minnaar, “The effects of the Great Depression (1929–1934) on South African white agriculture,” 83.

⁸⁵ M. Cornell, “The statutory background of apartheid: A chronological survey of South African legislation,” *The World Today* 16, no. 5 (1960): 181-194; *Native Service Contract Act*.

⁸⁶ *Native Service Contract Act*.

⁸⁷ *Native Service Contract Act*.

⁸⁸ Minnaar, “The effects of the Great Depression (1929–1934) on South African white agriculture,” 83.

prices received for many primary products fell below the farmer's cost of production."⁸⁹ It became clear to government officials that "financial assistance would have to" be provided to all farmers "still on the land if only to allow them to continue to produce."⁹⁰ Prior to 1932 it was challenging for the government to provide substantial financial aid due to limited funds; however irrespective of this constraint legislation to "redress specific problems was passed."⁹¹

On Monday, 30 January 1933, Edwin Conroy, an NP MP, spoke with Hertzog to inform him that there was much talk about the question of cooperation with Smuts.⁹²

Hertzog was quoted as saying:

I emphasised that we could not win the next election, relying upon our own strength, as the National Party would have to do in the circumstances, and that by rejecting his offer (of cooperation with Smuts), we would drive Smuts into the arms of these people and of Roos⁹³ and they would compel him after the election, as they had already said they would do, to give Natal the necessary means of federation to banish the Afrikaans language from Natal.⁹⁴

Hertzog's anxieties were noticeably clear, and he thus felt compelled to work with Smuts. Similarly to nine years before, the creation of a new government towards the end of 1933 "marked the beginning of better times for South Africa."⁹⁵ Yet, not all the political and economic issues had been solved. To cite Minnaar again, "In addition to the economic difficulties of the Depression," the farming sector had to face the added problems of "natural adversities; one of the most severe droughts ever recorded, outbreaks of various

⁸⁹ Minnaar, "The effects of the Great Depression (1929–1934) on South African white agriculture," 83.

⁹⁰ Minnaar, "The effects of the Great Depression (1929–1934) on South African white agriculture," 83.

⁹¹ Minnaar, "The effects of the Great Depression (1929–1934) on South African white agriculture," 83.

⁹² J. Seekings, "The Carnegie Commission and the backlash against welfare state-building in South Africa, 1931–1937," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 34, no. 3 (2008): 523.

⁹³ Tielman Roos, former Transvaal Nationalist leader, was at this time agitating for a "National Government."

⁹⁴ D. W. Kruger, *South African parties and policies* (Cape Town: Human & Rousseau, 1960), 81.

⁹⁵ E. Walker, *A history of Southern Africa* (London: Longmans Green, 1957), 637.

animal diseases, floods and a large-scale invasion of locusts.”⁹⁶ “These all delayed the economic recovery of agriculture and prolonged the farmer’s hardships and suffering.”⁹⁷ It is important to note that if the government had not provided financial assistance to farmers, especially to “the extent it did, many of these farmers would have left the land” and moved to urban areas.⁹⁸

Beyond the mining industry, South Africa’s manufacturing at the time was not able to absorb the sudden influx of white workers. This was particularly true in the light of the government’s enforcement of the “civilised labour policy” which forced industries to pay increased wages to white labourers compared to black workers.⁹⁹ This did not promote competitiveness and was not seen as a viable solution. This is why the government began several employment schemes, targeted specifically at the rural unemployed, and this was done to prevent the rural unemployed from moving to the cities. Politically speaking, the “rural exodus and unemployment” was also a sensitive issue since the government was struggling, at the time, with the problem of poor “whiteism.”¹⁰⁰ This issue would have been greatly worsened if those in the rural areas, “impoverished by the Depression,” were permitted to vacate the land.¹⁰¹ Notwithstanding the aspirations the government had that unproductive farmers would be pushed out of farming, the government found itself, for political reasons, obliged to assist struggling farmers who would alternatively “not have survived the normal market forces of the Depression,” to stay on the land.¹⁰² The *Carnegie Report* was launched in order to address the issue of poor “whiteism.”

⁹⁶ Minnaar, "The effects of the Great Depression (1929–1934) on South African white agriculture," 107.

⁹⁷ Minnaar, "The effects of the Great Depression (1929–1934) on South African white agriculture," 107.

⁹⁸ Minnaar, "The effects of the Great Depression (1929–1934) on South African white agriculture," 107.

⁹⁹ Minnaar, "The effects of the Great Depression (1929–1934) on South African white agriculture."

¹⁰⁰ Minnaar, "The effects of the Great Depression (1929–1934) on South African white agriculture," 108.

¹⁰¹ Minnaar, "The effects of the Great Depression (1929–1934) on South African white agriculture," 108.

¹⁰² Minnaar, "The effects of the Great Depression (1929–1934) on South African white agriculture," 108.

Carnegie Report: The Poor White Question

The *Carnegie Report*, officially titled *The Poor White Problem in South Africa: Report of the Carnegie Commission* (1932)¹⁰³ provided additional insights into the impact of the great Depression on white South Africans specifically. Similar to previous commissions, the Carnegie Commission recognised “poor whites” as people who had been unable to adapt sufficiently to economic change in the rural areas.¹⁰⁴ The chief investigators were E. G. Malherbe, a former principal of Natal University and a founding member of the National Commission of Education; M. E. Rothmann, an Afrikaans writer, social worker¹⁰⁵ and co-founder of the Voortrekkers Youth Movement; J. F. Grosskopf, an agricultural-economist; W. A. Murray, a medical doctor; R. W. Wilcocks, a former chancellor of the University of Stellenbosch; and finally J. R. Albertyn, a prominent reverend of the Dutch Reformed Church and expert on poverty and welfare.¹⁰⁶ The report consisted of five volumes, each one dealing with the subject matter of the commission’s investigation. The report was split as follows: (1) Economic Report: “Rural Impoverishment and Rural Exodus,” by J. F. W. Grosskopf; (2) Psychological Report: “The Poor White,” by R. W. Wilcocks; (3) Educational Report: “Education and the Poor White,” by E. G. Malherbe; (4) Health Report: “Health Factors in the Poor White Problem,” by W. A. Murray; (5) Sociological Report: “The Poor White and Society,” by J. R. Albertyn; and finally, (6): “The mother and daughter of the poor family,” by M. E. Rothmann.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ Carnegie Commission of Investigation on the Poor White Question in South Africa et al., *The poor white problem in South Africa. Report of the Carnegie Commission* (Stellenbosch: Pro ecclesia, 1932), 1.

¹⁰⁴ Seekings, “The Carnegie Commission and the backlash against welfare state-building in South Africa, 1931–1937,” 515–537.

¹⁰⁵ This was the chief reason why she was asked to be part of the commission.

¹⁰⁶ Carnegie Commission of Investigation on the Poor White Question in South Africa et al., *The poor white problem in South Africa. Report of the Carnegie Commission*, 1.

¹⁰⁷ Carnegie Commission of Investigation on the Poor White Question in South Africa et al., *The poor white problem in South Africa. Report of the Carnegie Commission*, 1.

The problem of being “unable to adjust adequately to economic change in the countryside was attributed in part to poor education.”¹⁰⁸ However, the commission emphasised, there were also “psychological traits” or a “type of mentality” that “retarded adjustment.”¹⁰⁹ Here it is also important to remember, as Seekings argues, the global impact of the Eugenics movement at the time.¹¹⁰ In its “Joint Findings and Recommendations,” the commission referred to a “narrowness of outlook,” a “lack of enterprise,” “a dread of the strange world outside the farm,” “poor business management,” “a lack of initiative and self-reliance among the younger generation,” and even a persistent “lack of industrious habits” (although this was disappearing) and a “confused outlook on life.”¹¹¹ “The Carnegie Commission’s analysis of the poor white problem was essentially psychological, in contrast to the structural analyses of the Economic and Wages Commission and the Pienaar Committee.”¹¹²

According to the Carnegie Commission, “the redress of poverty would require eliminating vice and ignorance.”¹¹³ Although the commission believed that there was “no justification for the view that all poor whites are pauperised or have sunk to a state of complete hopelessness,” the Commissioners did find that:

...a part of the poor white class is characterised by one or more of such qualities as improvidence and irresponsibility, untruthfulness and lack of a sense of duty, a feeling of inferiority and lack of self-respect, ignorance and credulity, a

¹⁰⁸ Seekings, “The Carnegie Commission and the backlash against welfare state-building in South Africa, 1931–1937,” 515.

¹⁰⁹ Seekings, “The Carnegie Commission and the backlash against welfare state-building in South Africa, 1931–1937,” 515.

¹¹⁰ Seekings, “The Carnegie Commission and the backlash against welfare state-building in South Africa, 1931–1937,” 515.

¹¹¹ Seekings, “The Carnegie Commission and the backlash against welfare state-building in South Africa, 1931–1937,” 515.

¹¹² Seekings, “The Carnegie Commission and the backlash against welfare state-building in South Africa, 1931–1937,” 519.

¹¹³ Carnegie Commission of Investigation on the Poor White Question in South Africa et al., *The poor white problem in South Africa. Report of the Carnegie Commission*, 1.

lack of industry and ambition, and unsettledness of mode of life. Some evidence poor social heredity (especially of home training and discipline), are of poor intelligence or suffer from some physical infirmity, or have failings of character, such as tendencies to intemperance or crime.¹¹⁴

The impoverished had to be “rehabilitated” via developing new personal and psychological qualities, not simply by providing them with opportunities: rehabilitation, it was argued, required “a change in the person,” not just a “change of circumstances.”¹¹⁵ They came to a consensus that “the poor ought to be trained in thrift, self-help, temperance, health, solidarity, and racial self-respect.”¹¹⁶

In relation to the question of job reservation, “The commission was opposed to protected employment (except perhaps as a partial and short-term solution) and emergency employment schemes.”¹¹⁷ Poor whites needed to be “trained to become good and, as far as possible, skilled workers” who were self-reliant rather than dependent on state or church.¹¹⁸ The commission was especially critical of state programmes which imposed a “fairly heavy burden on the country's taxpayers” but too frequently promoted dependence among poor whites.

The recommended “ways of rehabilitation” included, first and foremost, “measures for the discouragement and breaking down of dependency.”¹¹⁹ The investigators of the

¹¹⁴ Seekings, “The Carnegie Commission and the backlash against welfare state-building in South Africa, 1931–1937,” 520.

¹¹⁵ Seekings, “The Carnegie Commission and the backlash against welfare state-building in South Africa, 1931–1937,” 520.

¹¹⁶ Seekings, “The Carnegie Commission and the backlash against welfare state-building in South Africa, 1931–1937,” 520.

¹¹⁷ Carnegie Commission of Investigation on the Poor White Question in South Africa et al., *The poor white problem in South Africa. Report of the Carnegie Commission*, 1.

¹¹⁸ Seekings, “The Carnegie Commission and the backlash against welfare state-building in South Africa, 1931–1937,” 522.

¹¹⁹ Seekings, “The Carnegie Commission and the backlash against welfare state-building in South Africa, 1931–1937,” 522.

commission suggested that there should be more stigma attached to state charity, and recipients of state charity should be disfranchised. State charity should also be supervised strictly: "Proofs of gratitude, good conduct, the right use of the relief, etc. must be demanded."¹²⁰ The underlying principle was that "No one should get something for nothing, even the elderly and disabled should be obliged to do something in return."¹²¹ Forced labour camps were envisaged for homeless persons. The commission came out very strongly against any form of unemployment, state charity and financial dependence on external sources. The wording used by the commission was also very telling, referring to the unemployed as vagrants and loafers. Clearly the commission saw unemployment as a burden, not only on the state but on society. The commission was also fearful that unemployment would create a culture of dependence.

Lasswell mentions the following on unemployment in the garrison state:

Unemployment will be obsolete in the garrison state as it implies uselessness; in the garrison state there must be work—and the duty to work—for all; and lastly compulsion—a potent instrument for internal control of the garrison state and the duty to obey, to serve the state, to work—these are cardinal virtues in the garrison state.¹²²

Here one can see clear links between sentiments expressed in South Africa in the early 1930s and a crucial characteristic of a garrison state. Both expressed highly negative sentiments about unemployment as well as stating that there should be a duty and obligation to work and contribute to the state and society. Both the Carnegie Commission and the garrison state focused on compulsion of labour. It is also important to mention that

¹²⁰ Seekings, "The Carnegie Commission and the backlash against welfare state-building in South Africa, 1931–1937," 522.

¹²¹ Seekings, "The Carnegie Commission and the backlash against welfare state-building in South Africa, 1931–1937," 522.

¹²² Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 459.

the commissioners were people of their time and there exists a long tradition, going back to the early modern era (also in South Africa), of the notion of the *deserving poor*.

The Carnegie Corporation's involvement in South Africa must be seen as part of a much larger project of expanding American influence and philanthropy in the English-speaking world.¹²³ Cowlin explains how "the Americans wished to promote their culture as an alternative to British imperialism."¹²⁴ In this manner, influential organisations, such as those of Carnegie, Rockefeller and Ford were able to influence American domestic and foreign policy. E. G. Malherbe and Dr. C. T. Loram, a trustee of the commission, had both trained at Columbia Teachers College in the US. Cowlin writes how "The young professor of psychology and sociology at Stellenbosch University, Hendrik Verwoerd, had been impressed by the influence of American sociologists during his visit in 1927."¹²⁵ Both Malherbe and Verwoerd had a positive appreciation of social research, combined with an obsession for measurement. Though not all the Carnegie Commission's suggestions became law, it was clear that it expressed sentiments closely aligned to those of Lasswell's garrison state only barely less than a decade later. This could be because of the similarities between how South Africa and America dealt with the issue of white poverty. Thus, the Carnegie Commission helped to foster a climate that was ripe for the development of some garrison state ideals especially regarding the critical issue of labour and employment.

"Work colonies" or "labour camps can be seen as a manifestation of these garrison state ideals". These so-called work colonies or labour camps had been part of South African society since the 1890s.¹²⁶ They were first implemented due to white poverty in the latter

¹²³ J. Cowlin, "Pathways to understanding white poverty in South Africa 1902 to 1948" (Unpublished master's dissertation, Stellenbosch University, 2018), 36.

¹²⁴ Cowlin, "Pathways to understanding white poverty in South Africa 1902 to 1948," 36.

¹²⁵ Cowlin, "Pathways to understanding white poverty in South Africa 1902 to 1948," 36.

¹²⁶ N. Roos, "Work colonies and South African historiography," *Social History* 36, no. 1 (2011): 54.

stages of the 1800s.¹²⁷ They were originally started by the Dutch Reformed Church to assist impoverished whites. The initial goal of these colonies were to combat further impoverishing of whites, social and moral decline and the disintegration of families.¹²⁸ After South Africa became a Union in 1910, work colonies were created and ran by the state together with those of the church. At first, white men who were deemed to be socially undesirable because of alcohol dependence and perceived “idleness” were sent to these state work colonies as a form of punishment.¹²⁹ This was the custom during the 1930s and 1940s until the NP came to power in 1948. From 1948 until 1960 when the colonies were dismantled, the NP sought to change the nature of these camps by focusing on so-called social “re-education.”¹³⁰ These colonies were also used to promote the racial agenda of the state. Due to urbanisation there existed a fear that rural South Africa would lose its white population.¹³¹ These colonies can then be seen as a tool to combat white urbanisation for the state to maintain a racial hierarchy in the rural areas especially on farms.

The poor whites in South Africa would become a prime target for the specialists on violence as they became a demographic that would depend on a garrison state to provide a better life for them. It cannot be said that only Afrikaner Nationalism was the saving grace. Afrikaner Nationalism followed an ideology that would help establish a clear identity for the poor white. However, it leaves an important gap in the history as it does not cover all the characteristics that a garrison state does.

Malherbe had written for the *Cape Times* in 1921 explaining:

¹²⁷ Roos, "Work colonies and South African historiography," 54.

¹²⁸ K. Visser and K. Du Pisani, "Die vestiging van Skanskopeiland besproeiingnederstelling as mylpaal in selfwerksame armoedeverligting," *Historia* 57, no. 1 (2012): 107.

¹²⁹ Roos, "Work colonies and South African historiography," 54.

¹³⁰ Roos, "Work colonies and South African historiography," 54.

¹³¹ Visser and Du Pisani, "Die vestiging van Skanskopeiland besproeiingnederstelling as mylpaal in selfwerksame armoedeverligting," 105.

Today we have over 100,000 so-called poor whites. They are becoming a menace to the self-preservation and prestige of our white people, living as we do in the midst of the native population which outnumbers as 5 to 1. We shall never solve the poor white problem adequately until we get a thorough and first-hand knowledge of the causes underlying this malady: the cumulative result of some maladjustment in our society in the past. The causes seem to be more psychological than otherwise. Much has already been done. But what is needed more than anything else is a case study of each of the hundreds of these families. We must get down to the very bedrock facts, by living right with these people and thus tracing carefully the personal history in each individual case. Only when we have made a correct diagnosis and we are certain of the causes, can we remedy them. Much of the praiseworthy efforts of the past failed to bring the expected results because some factors had not been sufficiently investigated. Such work can be done satisfactorily only by men trained in psychological, economic and sociological research. The results must be published so as to be accessible to the whole public. The seeking of a solution to this problem must become a national project.¹³²

The commission's proposals on social policy were in important aspects a profoundly conservative response in reaction to the "modernising impulses represented by the Pienaar Commission and the Old-Age Pension Act."¹³³ Albertyn et al. wrote frankly, "the state should undertake as little purely charitable work as possible."¹³⁴ "State paternalism" and "material charity" were seen as influential causes to poor "whiteism," not as solutions.¹³⁵ The church alone, exercising substantial discretionary powers, could ensure that the psychological or

¹³² E. G. Malherbe, "Educational research: A plea for a bureau," *Cape Times*, 18 June 1921.

¹³³ Seekings, "The Carnegie Commission and the backlash against welfare state-building in South Africa, 1931–1937," 522; Old Age Pensions Act, No.22 of 1928, (1928).

¹³⁴ Seekings, "The Carnegie Commission and the backlash against welfare state-building in South Africa, 1931–1937," 522.

¹³⁵ Seekings, "The Carnegie Commission and the backlash against welfare state-building in South Africa, 1931–1937," 522.

moral bases of poor whiteism were sufficiently addressed.¹³⁶ As an alternative to running emergency employment schemes and paying old-age pensions indiscriminately, “the state should provide financial support to the church to run institutions in which the poor would be rehabilitated, probably brutally, and should let the church administer non-institutional assistance.”¹³⁷ Thus the church would become a parallel institution to the state, though it would be state-funded. It was important for the commission that the church was seen as a rehabilitator and supporter of the poor, and not the state.

The commission's opposition to the state and support for the church's leading role in addressing poverty among white people did not mean that they were completely accepting of the church. The commission called for an original tactic to social work. In general, “social work” was understood by the commission as simply the pastoral work of the church, but there were sporadic references to professional social work. The commission found that the church-led local committees that would administer assistance to the poor “should be served by salaried and trained social workers.”¹³⁸ These “thoroughly trained social workers” would perform “sound social diagnoses” of the requirements of individual poor whites.

The expectation of economic prosperity in a post-great Depression era urged the government to consider the reorganisation and expansion of the United Defence Force. These expectations led to an announcement to Cabinet by Oswald Pirow on 16 October 1933 of his intent to re-evaluate the Union's security situation and to implement the expected reorganisation resulting from the re-evaluation by means of a five-year plan. The

¹³⁶ Seekings, "The Carnegie Commission and the backlash against welfare state-building in South Africa, 1931–1937," 522.

¹³⁷ Seekings, "The Carnegie Commission and the backlash against welfare state-building in South Africa, 1931–1937," 522.

¹³⁸ Seekings, "The Carnegie Commission and the backlash against welfare state-building in South Africa, 1931–1937," 522.

five-year plan was announced in Parliament on 2 May 1934 and with time, became known as “Oswald Pirow’s five-year plan” or alternatively, Pirow’s “five-year plan”.

Conclusion

The economic strife caused by the great Depression had a significant impact especially in the agricultural sector in the early 1930s in South Africa. This economic turmoil was a feature of Hertzog’s government though he could not be blamed for all the problems as the great Depression was an international phenomenon. The South African government adopted many of the commission's recommendations, leading to policies that prioritised the upliftment of impoverished whites while reinforcing racial segregation and inequality. These policies included job reservation, wage differentiation, and social welfare programs. The report recommended creating employment opportunities specifically for white South Africans to reduce white poverty. The government implemented policies that reserved certain jobs for white workers, including the Job Reservation Act,¹³⁹ which later became formal apartheid legislation. This was part of a broader strategy to ensure that whites had preferential access to skilled and semi-skilled jobs. The locus of the economic building blocks of the garrison state can be found in the impacts of the great Depression as well as the recommendations of the Carnegie Report to “solve” the issues relating to poor whiteism. The actions taken by the state to address the economic turmoil of the time can be seen as an economic component of a garrison state. The manner in which poverty and unemployment were dealt with are reminiscent of garrison state characteristics. The era of the early 1930s and the impact of the great Depression provides an opportunity to

¹³⁹ Mines and Works Amendment Act, No.25 of 1926, (1926).

investigate an aspect which is not often done, namely the how the garrison state addresses issues surrounding the economy, poverty, and unemployment.

CHAPTER 3

The Beginning of Endless Trouble (1934–1938): The Contributions of Hertzog and Pirow to the Garrison State

The principle of these Bills will be the beginning of endless trouble. The African people finding themselves left completely outside South African national life, will have, to organise a national life of their own.

Political Activist and Journalist R. V. S. Thema on the Hertzog Bills, *The Star*

Considered as the beginning of endless trouble, the Hertzog bills were cited as their namesake's grandest achievement. The "endless trouble" caused by these bills stretched even further than the blatant racism and discrimination they promoted. The bills signalled a new pattern in legislation that sought to isolate and discriminate and to create fear and animosity between the different racial groups in South Africa. These perceived threats were posed to the white populace by the so-called natives and the "native problem." The chapter argues that the Hertzog bills were the beginning of the development of the "state machinery" that the NP post-1948 would later use to implement apartheid. This was a significant garrison state characteristic that was developing in South Africa. In a garrison state, as Lasswell theorised it, perceived threats, real or imagined, were used to manipulate society by using fear. Although Lasswell's concept of the garrison state does not address any form of potential racial discrimination, nonetheless the same "state machinery" that was used to implement racial segregation and later the policy of apartheid was also used to foster developing garrison state characteristics. The garrison state as a concept does not specify who or what the perceived threats, real or imagined, could be. In the actual garrison

state of South Africa race and ideology (specifically the so-called *swart gevaar* and *rooi gevaar*) became manifestations of these threats.

From 1934-1938 Hertzog and Pirow respectively, sought to shape South Africa politically and militarily. The political activist and journalist, Selope Thema, would prove to be correct with his prediction that the Hertzog bills would bring “endless trouble.” However, when he was writing for *The Star*, his focus was on the disastrous immediate effects the Hertzog bills would have on the non-white populace of South Africa. Yet Thema also predicted the issues facing South African politics for the next fifty years. Similar to when Maskew Miller published *Coming of Age*, Thema was not aware of how accurate his simple words “beginning of endless trouble” would be and how it would change South African society.

By the end of April 1935, shortly before Thema’s prediction, Hertzog’s two Native bills were presented to Parliament in their final form.¹ The Native Trust and Land Bill provided additional land for African occupation to that scheduled in the 1913 Natives’ Land Act.² These additional areas were not set apart as areas in which only Africans could acquire land, but were “released” from the prohibition imposed by Section 1 of the Natives’ Land Act of 1913, and within them, under certain specified conditions, land could be purchased or leased or otherwise acquired by Africans or by the Native Trust for Africans. This was however on the condition that:

Without the approval of the Governor-General, no land could be acquired outside the scheduled areas by an African from a European, when such land

¹ The Parliament of the Union of South Africa, *Reports and proceedings of the joint committee on the representation of natives and coloured persons in parliament and provincial councils and the acquisition of land by natives* (30 April 1935 1935), <http://historicalpapers-atom.wits.ac.za/historical-papers-research-archive-library-university-of-witwatersrand>. For detailed analyses of the two Bills see Anon., “Analysis of two Bills,” *Race Relations* II, no. i (August 1935).

² Sections 1, 2 & 3 of the Natives’ Land Act, No.27 of 1913, (1913).

was wholly surrounded by land held by Europeans, and, on the other hand, no European could, in like circumstances, acquire land in a released area from an African.³

This section focused on advancing territorial segregation by stopping the creation of “white or black islands”. It was supplemented by additional machinery, which supplied the means for the removal of such “islands.”⁴ Hertzog was instrumental in shaping land-ownership in South Africa and creating not only political and economic divisions based on race, but also actual physical divisions to ensure that races did not mix. The issue of white or black islands posed a problem to Hertzog and his colleagues as even though they wanted segregation of the races, they could not afford the creation of an archipelago based on race. A common feature of segregationist ideology was “an unashamed paternalism towards Africans and an unquestioning commitment to the maintenance of white supremacy.”⁵ There were differences in terms of how white supremacy was enacted.⁶ As Dubow notes, “By the early 1920s the major white political parties, together with significant elements of African opinion, had come to accept segregation in its broadest terms.” There was unity to some extent about segregationist policies, however, not enough to ensure that it was completely welcomed. Disagreements regarding its content tended to focus on matters of differences in interpretation, instead of on the generally accepted principle of “consolidating a racially differentiated society.”⁷

As previously mentioned, Hertzog was celebrated for this “contribution.” While Hendrik F. Verwoerd is known as the “architect of apartheid,” the historian Peter Molotsi

³ Section 12 of the *Natives' Land Act*.

⁴ Sections 13, 14 & 15 of the *Natives' Land Act*.

⁵ S. Dubow, “The elaboration of segregationist ideology,” in *Segregation and apartheid in twentieth century South Africa*, ed. W. Beinart and S. Dubow (London: Routledge, 1995), 168.

⁶ Dubow, “The elaboration of segregationist ideology,” 168.

⁷ Dubow, “The elaboration of segregationist ideology,” 168.

sees Hertzog as the original architect.⁸ Molotsi argues the foundations were laid by Hertzog for what would later become Apartheid South Africa. One can even take this argument one step further and say that, together with Pirow, Hertzog inadvertently helped to lay the foundation of a garrison state. Hertzog's "contribution" would be the foundation of the state machinery later used, and Pirow's "contribution" would be his five-year plan. Hertzog and Pirow were close political associates during the early to mid-1930s. However, due to the rise of National Socialism, and Pirow's embrace of the doctrine, he and the NP split, and the leadership baton was not passed to Pirow but rather Malan. It can be argued that Pirow was too much of an extremist, even for the NP, especially due to his close links with fascism in Europe. Barely six years after his death in 1942, Hertzog's ideas triumphed in South Africa.⁹

His erstwhile Lieutenant, Malan, won an electoral victory and became prime minister in the general election of 1948.¹⁰ Malan proceeded to form the first all-Afrikaner cabinet since the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910.¹¹ With their triumph and their policy of apartheid, Afrikaner Nationalists were assured ascendancy in politics which, once in effect, was translated into the realm of economics. The privileged position of white South Africans was entrenched, and the subjugation of Africans was prepared and carried out. The crowning achievement was the 1961 referendum which established an independent republic and led to South Africa's withdrawal from the British Commonwealth of Nations. None of this could have happened without Hertzog. In retrospect, one could argue that the

⁸ P. Molotsi, "General J.B.M. Hertzog, 1866–1942: Architect of Apartheid," *The Journal of Ethnic Studies* 11, no. 1 (Spring 1983): 1.

⁹ Molotsi, "General J.B.M. Hertzog, 1866–1942: Architect of Apartheid."

¹⁰ Africans were not participants because according to the constitution citizenship and franchise were limited to a "British subject of European descent."

¹¹ Molotsi, "General J.B.M. Hertzog, 1866–1942: Architect of Apartheid," 1.

withdrawal of South Africa from the British Commonwealth had its roots in the sovereignty debates that were raging in South Africa during the mid-1930s.

The tenets of what would become “apartheid” took root in Hertzog’s mind towards the close of the last century and he nurtured these ideals through turbulent political struggle, laying a firm foundation that would result in its victory in the twentieth century.¹² Hertzog developed a multifaceted program of action. He found it necessary to neutralise the liberal British influence on South African affairs, champion the cause of the equality of Afrikaners, the Afrikaner language (Afrikaans), with English, the formation of an Afrikaner political party, the development of labour and land policies which would increase the Afrikaners’ stake in and preserve White domination of the economy and the provision of the political framework for a final solution to the “native problem.”

Dubow argues that “Hertzog is usually credited with having made two fundamental policy initiatives”;¹³ first his central role as an Afrikaner Nationalist leader looking to establish equality between English- and Afrikaans-speakers, second his “native policy.”¹⁴ At first sight there appears little to connect these policy initiatives, but Dubow shows the relationship was in fact close. The creation of a unified “white nation” under the rubric of “South Africanism” was the replica of the subordination and exclusion of Africans from society.¹⁵ “The success of each was conditional, to at least some extent, on the fulfilment of the other.” There would be a tendency to characterise South African history during the period 1934–1938 purely through the actions of Hertzog with the inception of the Native bills, however, several important speeches made by Hofmeyr must be noted. Hofmeyr

¹² Molotsi, “General J.B.M. Hertzog, 1866–1942: Architect of Apartheid,” 1.

¹³ S. Dubow, “The passage of Hertzog’s Native Bills, Part One,” in *Racial segregation and the origins of apartheid in South Africa, 1919–36*, ed. S. Dubow (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989), 131.

¹⁴ Dubow, “The passage of Hertzog’s Native Bills, Part One,” 131.

¹⁵ Dubow, “The passage of Hertzog’s Native Bills, Part One,” 131.

provided a different lens through which to view South African history, and the precarious position he found himself in, trying to balance the politics of the day with his own morals, adds to the interest and complexity of this lens. The crucial shift in Afrikanerdom seems to have taken place from within. It moved away from the imperial internationalism of Smuts and Hofmeyr towards the authoritarian Afrikaner nationalism of Hertzog and Malan.

Various noteworthy events took place during the mid-1930s including but not limited to: South Africa's recovery from the great Depression, Hertzog's bills and opposition to them by key figures such as D. D. T. Jabavu,¹⁶ Pirow's UDF reorganisation, Hofmeyr's political aspirations and growing anti-Semitism in Europe charged by Hitler and the Nazis. In the early 1930s, as South Africa was grappling with the effects of the great Depression, Hofmeyr began, after a difficult start, to climb the political ladder in the shadow of Smuts. However, a key feature that cannot be ignored during the period of 1934–1938 is the issue about South Africa's sovereignty and independence spearheaded by the Status Act. As the political climate in Europe deteriorated in the 1930s with the rise of fascism, the South African political class became concerned about the role it would play if war should break out in Europe. This would generally not have been a concern, but South Africa's position within the British Commonwealth, its close association with the British monarchy, and pro-imperialist politicians such as Smuts, made the situation far more complex than first thought. These ideas would stand in strong contrast to those of Afrikaner Nationalists, especially those with

¹⁶ He was the founder of the All-African Convention (AAC), which sought to unite all non-European opposition to the segregationist measure of the South African government. Jabavu was also involved in the following: editor of *Imvo Zabantsundu* (an African newspaper founded with the assistance of sympathetic whites in 1888) President, Cape Native Voters' Convention; President, South African Native Teachers' Federation; Organiser, Ciskei & Transkei Native Chiefs' Conventions; Chairman, Non-European Conference; Founder, South African Native Farmers' Congress and other associates.

political power and influence, who did not see Great Britain as a benevolent force in South Africa.

Paton's biography of Hofmeyr includes an exhaustive examination of Hofmeyr's stand against the Native bills in April 1936.¹⁷ Autobiographies by white liberals such as Sir James Rose Innes, W. H. Macmillan and Edgar Brookes are not exceptionally instructive on the real opposition to the bills, "though they do contribute to an understanding of tensions within white liberalism."¹⁸ Unfortunately white liberalism in the 1930s did very little to combat the growing problems in South African society. Only in Martin Legassick's paper, "The Rise of Modern South African Liberalism," which regrettably only focuses on the mid-1920s, is there an extensive examination of the reaction of white liberals to the bills.¹⁹ Hofmeyr became increasingly more prominent as a politician during the time-period 1934 to 1938 as he became more closely aligned to Smuts and as he became more antagonistic against policies he disagreed with. In 1936 Hofmeyr opposed the Representation of Natives Bill in a stand which shook Parliament and certainly jarred South Africa. At a joint session of the House of Assembly and the Senate he was very much a voice in the wilderness, one man alone, condemning a bill which was said to have the origins for the settling of the "native problem" in South Africa. He then reached what was arguably one of his greatest hours. He was ready to burn his political bridges. He was going contrary to his prime minister, General Hertzog.²⁰

¹⁷ R. Hains, "The opposition to General J.B.M. Hertzog's Segregation Bills, 1925–1936: A study in extra-parliamentary protest" (Unpublished master's dissertation, University of Natal, 1978), 2.

¹⁸ Hains, "The opposition to General J.B.M. Hertzog's Segregation Bills, 1925–1936: A study in extra-parliamentary protest."

¹⁹ Hains, "The opposition to General J.B.M. Hertzog's Segregation Bills, 1925–1936: A study in extra-parliamentary protest."

²⁰ Macdonald, *Jan Hofmeyr: Heir to Smuts*, 57.

This was a unique circumstance as Hofmeyr was known for capitulating to the politics of the day, even if it was against his personal moral values. However, in this instance he cannot be criticised for doing that. The criticism and anger he faced was not only of the Nationalists, but many of the men in his own UP, who turned against him from the moment he told them: “It is the Natives who have done all the giving and none of the taking.” Hofmeyr was then minister of interior and of public health and education. The extreme racists on the Nationalist side argued against the concessions which were offered to the black people under the bill. Within the governing party the Hertzog and the Smuts supporters mostly agreed that the bill was a step forward in race relations. In spite of fusion, there were distinct camps of Hertzog and Smuts men within the UP, and often the political truce was uneasy, but there were issues on which both camps agreed and there was sufficient agreements on the “native problem.” That was why Hofmeyr found himself in complete disagreement not only with Hertzog, but also with Smuts.²¹ Hofmeyr was used to being in opposition to ideas proposed by Hertzog. However, opposing Smuts was breaking new ground for him. This placed Hofmeyr in an exceedingly difficult position, both politically and morally. To better understand Hofmeyr’s predicament, it is important to unpack the Hertzog bills and the opposition to the bills by other prominent people such as D. D. T. Jabavu.

²¹ Macdonald, *Jan Hofmeyr: Heir to Smuts*, 57.

The Hertzog Bills 1934–1935

Hertzog's planning of the national future was originally based on four bills, but the joint committee later reduced these from four to three, and finally, to two.²² The Native Trust and Land Bill and the Representation of Natives Bill, which were drafted by the Select Committee of the South African Parliament, differed in details instead of in principle from the bills initially drafted by General Hertzog as early as 1926.²³ Their significance was bound up with a proposed Urban Areas Bill of an oppressive character which had not yet had the full attention of the Select Committee, but which, nevertheless, the government had been thinking of introducing in the 1936 session.²⁴

The bills rested upon the supposition that Native and European lives were essentially separable. As Edgar Brookes observed, "Up to a point, they may be said to embody the principle of parallel or differential development." Regrettably, the application of the principle of "parallelism" had very rarely (if ever) been fair, and while theoretically equal rights and prospects could be accorded to a black populace under the different system, this was in practice so rarely done as to make the black population and those who were interested in their progress "suspicious of any proposals which purport to be built upon the foundation of these principles."²⁵

The first of these was the Native Representation Bill. It proposed to admit no more Africans to the parliamentary roll, but to leave the 11,000 existing voters as they were.²⁶ In compensation for this it divided black South Africans into four constituencies, Cape

²² Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 219.

²³ E. H. Brookes, "The South African Native Bills," *The Journal of the Royal African Society* 35, no. 138 (January 1936): 65.

²⁴ Brookes, "The South African Native Bills," 65.

²⁵ Brookes, "The South African Native Bills," 65.

²⁶ Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 219.

Western, Cape Eastern, Natal and Free State-Transvaal, each of which would return a white representative to the Senate and the first two of which would each return one white representative to the Cape Provincial Council. These constituencies would return three Africans each to the Natives Representative Council, where they would be joined by four nominated African and five white chief native commissioners without vote, all under the presidency of the secretary for native affairs.²⁷

The second piece of legislation was the Native Trust and Land Bill, which would provide for the purchase of 15 million acres in addition to the existing 22 million acres of the native reserves.²⁸ Although the total available for African ownership would then be only one-seventh of the land area of the Union, the aim of the bill was to make the practice of segregation more easily justifiable and more practicable.²⁹ Segregation in South Africa had always been a mixture of white idealism and white supremacy, and each was used to justify the other. The idealism of the Native Trust and Land Bill was sharply modified by the embodiment in the bill of the drastic provisions of the Native Service Contract Act, which Hofmeyr had opposed in 1932, namely the taxing of squatters, the empowering of African parents to send their young children to labour in any part of the Union, the holding of whole families responsible for individual breaches of contract, and empowering of the courts to order whippings for breaches of contract by males under 18.³⁰

Dubow notes the wider consultation process involved in the drafting of the legislation, noting that "Hertzog's Native bills were extensively discussed within extra-parliamentary political circles."³¹ A range of white and African political groups gave evidence

²⁷ Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 219.

²⁸ Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 219.

²⁹ Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 219.

³⁰ Paton, *Hofmeyr*, 219.

³¹ Dubow, "The passage of Hertzog's Native Bills, Part Two," 149.

to specially constituted Select Committees, produced memoranda, and submitted representations to the government. Common themes can be deduced from the evidence. For the most part the response of the extra-parliamentary opposition was to: “welcome the Native Council Bill (with amendments); insist on a more generous land provision for Africans; and reject the proposed abolition of the Cape African franchise.”³² On numerous occasions, Hertzog was requested to let go of his “insistence on the interdependence of the bills to consider them on their individual merits.” This did not take place. With increasing frequency groups and individuals disagreed within the bounds of segregationist debates in the hope of obtaining a concession. By 1936, the focus on open communication meant that “very few organisations, either white or black, could claim not to have participated in the segregationist process.”

Dubow observes how “the language and tone” of the conference deliberations showed a more unclear “approach to the Native bills.”³³ The events were substantially influenced by “a sense of gratitude” that the government had “entered into dialogue with African spokesmen,” with delegates assuring Hertzog of their “willingness to cooperate with him in the adjustment of the racial relationship between the black and white races.” This could possibly be seen as a diplomatic attempt “to manipulate the government” by the evasion of forceful language, which could be viewed as a challenge to its influence.³⁴

³² Dubow, “The passage of Hertzog’s Native Bills, Part Two,” 149.

³³ Dubow, “The passage of Hertzog’s Native Bills, Part Two,” 149.

³⁴ Dubow, “The passage of Hertzog’s Native Bills, Part Two,” 149.

Opposition to the Hertzog Bills 1934–1935

In 1934, Jabavu was planning a critique of the Hertzog bills, published as a pamphlet in 1935. Though the pamphlet was intended to critique the Hertzog bills, it can also be said that this pamphlet indirectly gave a critique of the garrison state mentality. Jabavu's relationship with Hofmeyr is also of importance as he is mentioned on numerous occasions in Paton's biography of Hofmeyr. As previously mentioned, the white liberal establishment did little if anything to combat the Hertzog bills, and Hofmeyr was fighting a solitary but losing battle to oppose the bills in parliament.

According to Jabavu, Hertzog was not the only one to blame. In fact, the Union government had "taken ten years (1925–1935) to evolve its Native bills" that intended to be a permanent model for ruling its African subjects in the "Union and the prospective protectorates."³⁵ Most of the black population impacted by the then-proposed piece of legislation could not even access its contents, as it was originally only published in English. The contents were only "translated into Xhosa, Zulu, Sotho and Tswana" and circulated from town to town and village to village at a much later date than the original publication. It was a terribly slow distribution of vital information. Whether this was done deliberately or because of a lack of concern for those involved, was open to debate. This slow distribution also meant that only a few individuals were able to find a copy. This implied that each "headman, blockman and chief" only had a copy of these bills in their home language, as was similar for groups like advisory boards and organisations of "teachers, ministers, agriculturists, farmers, vigilance associations and the numerous economic and political units" falling outside of their "tribal society."³⁶

³⁵ D. D. T. Jabavu, *Criticisms of the Native Bills (Pamphlet One)* (Lovedale: Lovedale Institution Press, 1935), 2. <https://cudl.lib.cam.ac.uk/view/PR-RCS-C-00005-00007/1>.

³⁶ Jabavu, *Criticisms of the Native Bills (Pamphlet One)*, 2.

What was most likely, was that the Native Affairs Department needed “four months to translate and publish these documents” in the required languages, and even more time to clarify them methodically to those concerned. The latter would have subsequently required “a lot of time to hold their own meetings for discussion so as to furnish their respective spokesmen with agreed views” which could be “tabled at a government conference” that would have been “summoned by the minister for native affairs in 1936 or 1937.”³⁷ The Native Affairs Act³⁸ provided for government consultations to determine “native opinion” on all vital discussed legislation impacting the so-called natives.

There were the two sensible procedures accepted in 1922 in “connection with the promulgation of the 1923 Urban Areas Act,³⁹” and those bills were more important.⁴⁰ The South African government, “like all other legislative bodies,” was “supported by influential daily journals” that defended and justified its approach. The case for the “inarticulate Bantu,” as Jabavu states, was either never heard or was “severely handicapped by the lack of a strong press to educate public opinion.” During the 1930s, the singular public opinion that mattered for parliamentary purposes in South Africa was the public opinion of the white populace. This publication was a “humble attempt to readjust the balance” so that the failings, the injustices, and the deficiencies of the bills under consideration “could be better understood.”⁴¹ The most important aspect of these bills was “universally admitted to be the abolition of the Cape Native Franchise.” It was unfortunate that these proposals reached representation in the statute books in their present form without their framers completely understanding the political inaccuracy that was reflected there from a South African

³⁷ Jabavu, *Criticisms of the Native Bills (Pamphlet One)*, 2.

³⁸ Native Affairs Act, No.23 of 1920, (1920).

³⁹ Natives (Urban Areas) Act, No.21 of 1923, (1923).

⁴⁰ Jabavu, *Criticisms of the Native Bills (Pamphlet One)*, 3.

⁴¹ Jabavu, *Criticisms of the Native Bills (Pamphlet One)*, 3.

history point of view. Many white people mistakenly thought that was to be their exclusive concern. The black population were concerned by the Union government when it unwittingly embarked “on a policy censured by the rest of modern civilisation, because and only because of not knowing the evil repercussions of such a policy upon the future of South Africa and Africa as a whole.” Here, Thema’s words of “endless trouble” again ring true. Jabavu believed that the future of South Africa would “not be a happy one” if it were built on these principles, even if the “pretext of protecting the political” institutions of South Africa was used as a justification.

Jabavu stated that:

. . . we hope to get together some expressions of views that deserve the notice of our legislators, views excerpted from various publications. Our aim in doing this is to invite cooperation, willing cooperation between the African subjects of the King and the Union Government in the construction and evolution of a policy that will make for future peace, loyalty and contentment among the diverse peoples that constitute the Union of South Africa.⁴²

The Native bills exemplified in the “report and proceedings of the joint committee issued by the parliament of South Africa” shocked the intelligence of black people in South Africa. Jabavu believed that it was “fortunate for the government” of South Africa that the majority of black people were not cognisant of what was happening in Parliament, as they were left deliberately uneducated and most, if not all of Parliaments’ proceedings were not translated into the vernaculars of black South Africans. Regarding this situation Jabavu stated that:

This, however, is no security for the European race; for the intelligent Blacks have a way of passing on the information and thus act as an agency to create

⁴² Jabavu, *Criticisms of the Native Bills (Pamphlet One)*, 3.

distrust in the rule of White people.⁴³ The bills clearly indicate that the future settled policy of the land is going to be one of repression, or at least the removal of all advantages hitherto regarded as safe for the native people.⁴⁴

Jabavu was accurate in his prediction. The Hertzog bills were extremely repressive and laid the foundation for future repressive policies. Pirow and Hertzog's goal of reshaping South Africa was not only built on racial repression. As the minister of defence, Pirow realised that the South African Military would need to be upgraded in terms of personnel, strategic capabilities, and armaments manufacturing.

Oswald Pirow's "Five-Year Plan" 1934–1938

As early as November 1929, Pirow was already laying the foundation for an improved, reorganised South African military. "The interwar years, specifically the 1930s, inevitably saw an erosion of the UDF's conventional capabilities."⁴⁵ This would become a trend whenever "South Africa found itself relatively at peace."⁴⁶ Thus, there was a need for the reorganisation of the South African Defence Force. Pirow's five-year plan had to be implemented during a difficult time for the South African military after the impact of the great Depression. It was implemented after two severe budget cuts. First taking place during the 1930/31 financial year where the budget was cut by £172,499, and the second took place over a two year period where military expenditure was cut by £328,000.⁴⁷ Major General A. J. E. Brink, as quoted in Ian van der Waag's *A Military History of Modern South Africa*, reported on the struggles of the South African military:

⁴³ Jabavu, *Criticisms of the Native Bills (Pamphlet One)*, 3.

⁴⁴ Jabavu, *Criticisms of the Native Bills (Pamphlet One)*, 3.

⁴⁵ E. Kleynhans and D. B. Katz, *20 Battles: Searching for a South African way of war 1913–2013* (Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 2023), 300.

⁴⁶ Kleynhans and Katz, *20 Battles: Searching for a South African way of war 1913–2013*, 300.

⁴⁷ Van der Waag, *A military history of modern South Africa*, 156–157.

I much regret to report that the urgent necessity for economy which has curtailed the activities of most departments of state has severely intervened with the training of citizen forces . . . The defence organisation is called upon to curtail so a large portion of its activities.⁴⁸

After the initial budget cuts of the early 1930s, South Africa had a recovering economy as well as a new coalition government which gave the military the means to start a process of improvement.⁴⁹ Thus came Pirow's five-year plan. The importance of Pirow's five-year plan cannot be underestimated as it forms part of a vital argument for the thesis. The chapter argues that Pirow created the foundation for the development of key garrison state characteristics that would later be used by Smuts and the UP during WWII. However, it is important to note that Pirow's five-year plan should not be viewed in isolation with regards to South Africa exhibiting developing garrison state characteristics. It is not an unusual phenomenon for a state to strengthen and develop its military and its military capabilities. The investment in and development of a military in and of itself does not constitute a garrison state. The tumultuous period of the 1930s together with the aggressive actions of entities such as imperial Japan, fascist Italy and Nazi Germany as well as the Soviet Union, meant that states would need to take precautions to protect their sovereignty. These precautions would take the form of investment and development of their respective militaries. What is important for the purposes of this thesis is that Pirow's five-year plan is but one of many developing garrison state characteristics that South Africa exhibited. If viewed in isolation, Pirow's five-year plan would not necessarily constitute a developing garrison state characteristic, however viewed together with other developing garrison state characteristics we see that it is but one of many pieces of a greater puzzle. Militarisation on

⁴⁸ Van der Waag, *A military history of modern South Africa*, 157.

⁴⁹ Van der Waag, *A military history of modern South Africa*, 159.

its own does not constitute a garrison state, however when viewed together with other garrison state characteristics we move closer to what Lasswell envisioned his concept would look like in real life.

As with a garrison state, external threats, real or imagined, are needed to use fear and coercion so that the militarisation of society can take place.⁵⁰ Pirow was the minister of justice in 1929, and on 19 November he commented on the Durban raids at a political meeting.⁵¹ Pirow said that the nation faced widespread and serious “native unrest”⁵² fanned by numerous organisations in many cases closely allied and in all cases in touch with the Communist Party and directly and definitely instructed by the Third International.⁵³ He added what he described as a significant fact, namely that “native unrest” was not confined to the Union, but was beginning to extend to Southern Rhodesia. Pirow declared that it was agreed on all sides that “native unrest” in the Union had reached a dangerous stage. Pirow quoted definite instruction given by the Third International to its friends in South Africa. He described the Third International as:

. . . the power behind the Bolshevik movement, the avowed apostles of world revolution by all means, fair or foul, so unscrupulous in its methods that the Soviet government has formally dissociated itself from its activities.⁵⁴

Pirow said that the following instructions were received from the Third International and acknowledged in writing:

Wage a struggle against the Native bills and all other forms of oppression, not through petitions, but in a revolutionary manner. On December 16 (Dingaan’s

⁵⁰ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 457.

⁵¹ Anon., The Morning Post, 20 November 1929, Newspaper Article, Part of Collection P.S. 9/9/2, National Archives of South Africa (NASA), Pretoria.

⁵² The term as referred to by Pirow, *James Barry Munnik Hertzog*; and Pirow, "How far is the Union interested in the continent of Africa?."

⁵³ Anon., The Morning Post, 20 November 1929, Newspaper Article.

⁵⁴ Anon., The Morning Post, 20 November 1929, Newspaper Article.

Day) militant demonstrations to be conducted inter alia under the slogan of 'Long live the Native Republic.' Mines to be penetrated by all possible means, and a partial stoppage of work to be called for on December 14. All available organisations to be utilised for this purpose.⁵⁵

Pirow also stated that the organisations directly and indirectly implicated in the communications with the Third International were: the Communist Party, the ANC, the Natal Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union, the league of African Rights and the League against Imperialism and For National Independence. Not only was Pirow laying the groundwork for an external threat, but he was also, knowingly or unknowingly, laying the groundwork for terms such as *Rooi Gevaar* and *Swart Gevaar* which would later be used in South African political discourse.

Another key characteristic of a garrison state is how the specialist on violence (the military) become the most powerful group in society.⁵⁶ Pirow understood that with the unstable political climate in Europe, and the Afrikaner Nationalist push towards independence from Great Britain, South Africa would have to develop its military. Thus, during the mid-1930s South Africa engaged in a large-scale overhaul of its military powers. However, the origins of South Africa's military were modest. It was initially created by merging the military structures of the former British colonies and Boer republics that had become the four provinces of the Union. After unification in 1910, Smuts, then the Union's first minister of defence, prioritised the creation of a unified military out of the separate armies of the Union's four provinces. Ellis writes how "The South African Defence Act⁵⁷ made provision for a UDF that would be composed of a permanent force, an active citizen

⁵⁵ Anon., The Morning Post, 20 November 1929, Newspaper Article.

⁵⁶ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

⁵⁷ South African Defence Act, No.13 of 1912, (1912).

force (ACF) of temporary conscripts, a coast garrison force, and the royal naval volunteer reserve (South African Division) (RNVR(SA)).”⁵⁸ The 1912 Act also “obligated all white males between seventeen and sixty years of age to serve in the military, but this was not strictly enforced as there were many volunteers.”⁵⁹ The large number of volunteers do not necessarily indicate a garrison state characteristic, as joining the military had economic, employment and social benefits for many volunteers who otherwise would not have had access to such opportunities and benefits. In contrast to previous years, Pirow’s first defence budget was noticeably more impressive than previous years.⁶⁰ This was a reflection of the improved economy in South Africa as well as concerns due to the unstable international climate at the time and the need for improved military capabilities.⁶¹ This trend continued up to and including the outbreak of WWII.

In 1935, an article in the *Cape Times*, “Union in the time of War,”⁶² gave a glimpse into Pirow’s ideas for the Union’s military development. Pirow stated in the article that on taking part in “Oversea Adventure” might lead to civil war in South Africa.⁶³ The defence policy of the Union government was explained by the minister of defence, Pirow, in a speech at the opening of the Imperial Press Conference at the University of Cape Town, Groote Schuur. Pirow emphasised that the main purpose of the Union’s defence system was not to prepare for war but merely to obtain security against attack. For Lasswell, garrison states tended to use perpetual preparation for war as well as perceived threats as reasons

⁵⁸ J. Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies* 30, no. 2 (2000): 221.

⁵⁹ Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 221.

⁶⁰ Van der Waag, *A military history of modern South Africa*, 160.

⁶¹ Van der Waag, *A military history of modern South Africa*, 160.

⁶² Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 221.

⁶³ Anon., "Union in the time of war," *Cape Times*, 6 February 1935.

for a strong military.⁶⁴ Pirow made it clear that the Union looked at her defence policy chiefly from her own point of view. This again can be interpreted as a garrison state characteristic, though here it is more vague than many states with militaries that cannot be classified as garrison states. Pirow stated that there was no anti-British feeling in South Africa, a dubious claim at best from an Afrikaner Nationalist politician, but if war broke out and the government were to attempt rashly to commit the country to any war he was afraid that there would be large-scale disturbances, possibly even civil war.⁶⁵

This was an interesting contradiction, as South Africa was upscaling its military at the same time that it was stating that it did not want to involve itself in any conflict. In contrast to Pirow, Smuts reaffirmed South Africa's duty, stating that if Britain was in danger South Africa would join the conflict to defend Great Britain.⁶⁶ Another garrison state characteristic relevant to this was that expectations about the future may rest upon the extrapolation of past trends into the future.⁶⁷ This linked with the issue of South African sovereignty at the time, namely the Status Act, which will be discussed in more detail later on, as well as future predictions of conflict, thus ensuring that the military should be prepared.

Ellis observes how "The Union Defence Force (UDF) experienced constant changes in its size and organisation during the first few decades of existence since being established on 1 July 1912."⁶⁸ Whilst WWI was raging, its size increased, only to decrease again after the war.⁶⁹ "Another upward trend was experienced over the period 1922–1926, with the first line of defence increasing in number during 1924 from 10,000 to 25,000."⁷⁰ The great

⁶⁴ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

⁶⁵ Anon., "Union in the time of war," Cape Times, 6 February 1935.

⁶⁶ Anon., "Union in the time of war," Cape Times, 6 February 1935.

⁶⁷ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 456.

⁶⁸ Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 222.

⁶⁹ Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 223.

⁷⁰ Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 223.

Depression put an end to this trend causing the “disbandment of no less than forty-nine ACF units.” In 1933, though, it became unmistakable that the Depression was ending and economic resurgence in South Africa was a real possibility. It was “during 1933 [that] the top management within the ministry of defence as well as the UDF were replaced.” “Pirow was appointed as minister of defence and Maj. Gen. A. J. E. Brink as secretary of defence. Sir Pierre van Ryneveld was appointed as chief of the general staff (CGS).”⁷¹ Sir Pierre van Ryneveld was knighted after his epic flight from Cape Town to London in 1920.⁷² He was a dominant figure with his autocratic and unorthodox style of centralised command.⁷³ He also saw a clear distinction between the UDF and the Department of Defence.⁷⁴ For Pirow, this made van Ryneveld a difficult person to deal with; however, during WWII van Ryneveld had worked hand-in-hand with Smuts. Van Ryneveld saw Smuts as his mentor, with Smuts acting as both prime minister and minister of defence during WWII.

The prospect of economic success pushed the latest top command to think about the “reorganisation and expansion of the UDF.”⁷⁵ These anticipations caused a declaration to “Cabinet by Oswald Pirow on 16 October 1933 of his intent to re-evaluate the Union’s security situation” and to ensure the expected restructuring caused by the reassessment by “means of a five-year plan.”⁷⁶ As previously mentioned, “the five-year plan was announced in Parliament on 2 May 1934” and with time, became known as “Oswald Pirow’s five-year plan.” However, it is clear that it was van Ryneveld and not Pirow who had the competence to ensure the success of such an undertaking. Ellis confirms that it was “Pierre van Ryneveld

⁷¹ Ellis, “Oswald Pirow’s five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939,” 223.

⁷² I. Van der Waag, “Van Ryneveld vs Blaine: The UDFI as a civil-military relations football, 1939–1945,” *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies* 30, no. 1 (2000): 34.

⁷³ Van der Waag, “Van Ryneveld vs Blaine: The UDFI as a civil-military relations football, 1939–1945,” 34.

⁷⁴ Van der Waag, “Van Ryneveld vs Blaine: The UDFI as a civil-military relations football, 1939–1945,” 34.

⁷⁵ Ellis, “Oswald Pirow’s five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939,” 224.

⁷⁶ Ellis, “Oswald Pirow’s five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939,” 224.

as CGS . . . [who] was responsible for most of the planning and for drawing up the plan.”⁷⁷

As minister of defence, Pirow was the public figure with whom the plan was associated, hence the name: “Oswald Pirow’s five-year plan.”⁷⁸ Frustrations in the implementation of the plan within the army were also present in the implementation with regard to the air and naval capacities of the UDF. The Union Defence Policy was formulated during 1926 and remained unchanged. It contained a four-part aim namely: (1) the prevention and suppression of internal unrest; (2) the military training of a part of the young men of the Union; (3) the protection of the Union against an external threat; and finally (4) considering preparations for an expedition force should the Union become involved in a European War. From this it is clear that the deterrence and “suppression of internal unrest enjoyed a high priority within the Union.” Although the policy did not state it specifically, this aim was interpreted as referring to uprisings by black people.⁷⁹

By 1938, Pirow announced in the Union House assembly that the government proposed to spend five million pounds on additional arms, equipment and defence works, and one million pounds on coastal defence.⁸⁰ The present defence scheme, he declared, represented the minimum compatible with national safety. Pirow said that the Union was training land forces, which under Southern African conditions, were likely to be superior to any enemy they met. The equipment of the air force would, within limits, bear comparison with that of any air force inside or outside of the Commonwealth. According to Pirow, the coastal defence scheme was sound, and at least two harbours were to be more strongly

⁷⁷ Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 224.

⁷⁸ Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 225.

⁷⁹ Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 226.

⁸⁰ Anon., South Africa, 10 September 1938, Newspaper Article, Part of Collection P.S. 9/9/2, National Archives of South Africa (NASA), Pretoria.

fortified than those of any other dominion.⁸¹ Pirow also addressed the issue of what role black people would play in the Union's defence. Pirow referred to this as the "native's part." Pirow stated that while South Africa "would never sanction the training of non-Europeans" in the use of arms, he said, the "natives" could be trained into useful service units to relieve the white man of all but actual military duties and acting as ammunition carriers right into the front lines. In addition, he envisaged that "selected labour battalions from the Rand mines operating under skilled miners" with an unlimited quantity of dynamite could be of great military value.⁸²

In his reassessment of the Union's security van Ryneveld saw two possibilities from which danger could emerge.⁸³ Since the Union's borders included both coastal and land borders, these were first, a "maritime threat," where one of the global "powers could make a coastal assault on the Union"; or second, the Union could be "threatened by means of an attack from the north over land." With regards to a "maritime threat", van Ryneveld accepted that the British Navy would be "willing and able to protect the Union against attacks from any opponent". The prerequisite to this, however, was "early warning in order to enable the British Navy to deploy toward South Africa or to cut off the attacking navy on sea". He recognised that "Since early warning was not always possible," that the Union must at least have the capability to "delay the attacking navy" to such an extent that adequate time would be gained to allow the British Navy to "mobilise and to redeploy towards South African waters." The financial cost in buying the ships necessary to achieve this, however, was too expensive. Ellis argues how "Given the strategic importance of South Africa's harbours on the sea route to India," preserving the ability to safeguard the harbours against

⁸¹ It was not specified which harbours these were due to security reasons.

⁸² Anon., South Africa, 10 September 1938, Newspaper Article.

⁸³ Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 226.

the threat of mines by means of minesweepers was seen as the best answer. Thus, as a result, "The only alternative therefore was to strengthen the existing coastal defences."⁸⁴ Cape Town, for example, was made "safe from attacks by battleships."⁸⁵ As a result of discussions with England, Pirow noted that a scheme had evolved which by the time it was completed, would make Cape Town safe from battleship attacks for the following fifteen years, potentially longer.⁸⁶ By 1937, Simonstown would also be designated as an imperial base⁸⁷ that would be used for the British navy.

Unfortunately, there were still two major problems with the existing coastal garrisons that needed attention. According to Ellis "the coastal garrisons at the time were immobile defences protecting only South Africa's harbours."⁸⁸ Even though these were seen as a necessity, it was decided that the existing garrisons were to be "enhanced with mobile artillery and infantry units."⁸⁹ "These units would then be in a position to serve a dual purpose since it could be deployed as coastal defence or as part of a land force." The second issue related to the range of the coastal batteries or artillery, "especially against cruisers." Cruisers back then were fitted with guns that could fire up to 127.5 kilometres.⁹⁰ Thus, cruisers could fire at targets while still being out of sight. In addition, cruisers also carried one "aircraft used to direct fire" and a partial capability to bomb aggressors. This meant that the coastal batteries were highly exposed and at risk when facing cruisers. For van Ryneveld, who was also an accomplished pilot and loyal to the air force,⁹¹ aircraft was

⁸⁴ Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 226.

⁸⁵ Anon., *The Morning Post*, 14 July 1936, Newspaper Article, Part of Collection P.S. 9/9/2, National Archives of South Africa (NASA), Pretoria.

⁸⁶ Anon., *The Morning Post*, 14 July 1936, Newspaper Article.

⁸⁷ Anon., *The Morning Post*, 16 April 1937, Newspaper Article, Part of Collection P.S. 9/9/2, National Archives of South Africa (NASA), Pretoria.

⁸⁸ Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 227.

⁸⁹ Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 227.

⁹⁰ Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 227.

⁹¹ Van der Waag, "Van Ryneveld vs Blaine: The UDFI as a civil-military relations football, 1939–1945," 34.

the solution to this. These “Aircraft could not only be used against surface ships,” but he regarded them as “just as effective against submarines.” In addition, “aircraft were highly mobile” and could be used in several dissimilar roles, including assistance to the army, in a land battle or during internal unrest and for numerous other support tasks.⁹²

On the use of the air force in a garrison state, the sociologist Jay Stanley who collaborated with Lasswell noted that:

The crucial technological development that prompted Lasswell’s reflections and resulted in the garrison state construct was the introduction of air power to military efforts. He perceived that military air power would make civilians as vulnerable to attack as were military installations and personnel. In essence, he argued that the development of military air power generated a democratization of risk.⁹³

With regards to a threat from the African continent, van Ryneveld, in his reassessment, stated that he was “concerned about the possibility of an invasion by the black masses (*sic*) to the north of the Union.”⁹⁴ He reiterated his position on this by arguing that it was essential to be prepared against such a threat since the “maintenance and supremacy of our white civilisation” relied on this.⁹⁵ In addition, he promoted his argument by communicating his anxiety about what he described as “the policies of France, Belgium and Portugal to arm Blacks in their colonies in an attempt to strengthen their own military capabilities in Africa.” This, he argued, would “supply the weapons to those Blacks in southern Africa that were constantly searching for methods to free themselves from European domination.”⁹⁶ The only practical solution to counter such a threat was seen as a

⁹² Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 227.

⁹³ J. Stanley, "Harold Lasswell and the idea of the Garrison State," *Society* 33, no. 6 (1996): 46.

⁹⁴ Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 228.

⁹⁵ Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 228.

⁹⁶ Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 228.

highly mobile, compact force equipped with improved weapons. In response, van Ryneveld contended that the black population of Africa could only be able to “launch an attack on the Union if they were supported by the European colonial powers, and then only as part of a bigger European war.”⁹⁷ In such a war, he argued, “the European power would only be able to open an additional front in southern Africa when Britain had been removed from Africa north of the Sahara.” The most effective way of keeping South Africa safe was thus to help Britain in North Africa, should a European war transpire, which is what took place in WWII. Van Ryneveld successfully convinced Pirow that the fourth aim instructed in the Defence Policy, namely that of “considering preparations for an expedition force, should the Union become involved in a European War.”

Other factors influencing Pirow’s five-year plan included pressure exerted from numerous sources such as Maj. Gen. A. I. E. Brink.⁹⁸ In 1924, when Brink was still the CGS, he stressed that expanding the first line of defence to 25,000 men was inadequate. According to Pirow, the number was not enough to “delay an invading force long enough.” Pirow was now able to shape policy. Another factor was the great Depression. As already mentioned, the readiness of the ACF was negatively impacted by the great Depression. The Union's ability to sustain a war effort with available resources was a major focus of discussion.⁹⁹ By 1934, there was a general move towards mobilising the military, which included the need for locally produced motor and aircraft engines.¹⁰⁰ Previously, this would have been problematic as the Union had a limited industrial capacity, which would have only been worsened by the economic turmoil caused by the great Depression. The high costs of

⁹⁷ Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 228.

⁹⁸ Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 229.

⁹⁹ J. van Wyk, "Die Unieverdedigingsmagte op die vooraand van die tweede Wêreldoorlog (1934–1939)," *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies* 6, no. 4 (1976): 24.

¹⁰⁰ van Wyk, "Die Unieverdedigingsmagte op die vooraand van die tweede Wêreldoorlog (1934–1939)," 24.

production as well as the rapid obsolescence of aircraft models also made local manufacturing challenging.¹⁰¹ Because of difficulties in importing even outdated aircraft, the decision was made to assemble Hawker Hartebeests domestically.¹⁰² Despite these efforts, the situation remained inadequate by August 1938, with only sixty-nine Hartebeests and seven Hawker Furies available.¹⁰³ This inefficiency was recognised within the country. There were also British expectations that weighed heavily on South Africa. Incidentally two aspects require more explanation: first, increasing the size of the UDF; and second, after WWI, and more specifically under the umbrella of the Geneva Convention, “the European powers were constantly pressured to reduce the size of their military, both in terms of size and weapons.” In the 1920s this received a new impetus. As Ellis writes, “In spite of numerous meetings in this regard, the nations involved could not come to an agreement, and by 1929 it seemed as if the negotiations would come to an unresolved end.”¹⁰⁴

Britain had suggested that the size of a country’s military must be “restricted to a percentage of its population.”¹⁰⁵ The suggestion was that the defence forces of most European nations was too large, but that those of the colonies were still too small, “especially when Blacks were included in the total number of the population.” Writing to Brink, the imperial war office proposed that this should be used as a suggestion promoting increasing the size of the UDF. This was likely the reason behind France, Portugal, and Belgium's policy of arming black people in their colonies. In South Africa’s case, however, “within the mindset of maintaining white superiority,” black people were deliberately

¹⁰¹ van Wyk, "Die Unieverdedigingsmagte op die vooraand van die tweede Wêreldoorlog (1934–1939)," 24.

¹⁰² van Wyk, "Die Unieverdedigingsmagte op die vooraand van die tweede Wêreldoorlog (1934–1939)," 24.

¹⁰³ van Wyk, "Die Unieverdedigingsmagte op die vooraand van die tweede Wêreldoorlog (1934–1939)," 24.

¹⁰⁴ Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 229.

¹⁰⁵ Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 229.

excluded, causing a white UDF and the “increased militarisation of the white South African community.”¹⁰⁶

There were also conflicting messages from Britain. In direct interaction between the British government and South Africa it was stated that “the nature and extent of assistance that Britain would expect from South Africa will entirely depend on the decision of the South African government.”¹⁰⁷ However, at the Imperial Conferences of both 1930 and 1933 it was directly communicated during meetings of for example the “Committee of Experts on the Fighting Services” that the preparedness of the UDF must improve for South Africa to be able to “fulfil its responsibilities towards Britain.” Pirow agreed to this obligation since, on 16 October 1933 he stated to the “Cabinet that the Union would have to improve” its capability to help Britain during a war.¹⁰⁸ The objectives of reorganisation from all these organisational goals were clear. First, the army must develop “the ability to deploy a compact, highly mobile force with superior weapons to be deployed anywhere in Africa for both the defence of South Africa and assistance to Britain.” Second, the naval service must be able to “protect the Union’s important harbours against mines and the rest of the maritime border by delaying any assault long enough to allow time for the British Navy to arrive in South African waters.” Finally, the air force must develop the “ability to support the army in a war anywhere in Africa and the naval service in the protection of the Union’s maritime border.”¹⁰⁹

Armaments also played a vital role. South Africa started to produce its own weapons and ammunition during Pirow’s tenure as minister of defence. By 1938, military advisors to

¹⁰⁶ Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 229.

¹⁰⁷ Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 230.

¹⁰⁸ Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 230.

¹⁰⁹ Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 230.

the government had been in consultation with the engineering industry of South Africa as well as with foreign makers of armaments, after which approval was given to the manufacturing of two types of weapons.¹¹⁰ Howitzers of 4.5-inch and 3.7-inch calibre were chosen as it was within the scope of local equipment and it would have supplied the most immediate need at the time.¹¹¹ South Africa had also built a new munitions factory in Pretoria by 1938 which could produce ten million cartridges a year.¹¹² "At the end of the five-year period, the infantry organisation of the South African Army, at least on paper and in terms of personnel, was in a significantly stronger position than they were in 1933."¹¹³ Regarding support weapons, "namely mortars, machine guns and antitank weapons, the units were totally under equipped."¹¹⁴

The improvements made by Pirow's five-year plan proved to be vital later for Smuts in bolstering South Africa's military role in the fight against fascism. Pirow assisted in laying the basis for the garrison state that would later fight against the very political ideology for which he personally stood. As noted, Pirow had toured fascist Europe only months before the outbreak of WWII and he had the reassurance of Hertzog's belief in South African neutrality if a war were to break out in Europe. Hertzog's belief in South African sovereignty will be dealt with in the following section. Ian van der Waag notes that Pirow had a gradual decline in popularity.¹¹⁵ As the realities of fascism became clear in Europe, Pirow became an outcast in the mainstream politics of South Africa. Pirow believed that the South African

¹¹⁰ Anon., Evening News, 22 February 1938, Newspaper Article, Part of Collection P.S. 9/9/2, National Archives of South Africa (NASA), Pretoria.

¹¹¹ Anon., Evening News, 22 February 1938, Newspaper Article.

¹¹² Anon., African World, 18 June 1938, Newspaper Article, Part of Collection P.S. 9/9/2, National Archives of South Africa (NASA), Pretoria.

¹¹³ Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 234.

¹¹⁴ Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939," 234.

¹¹⁵ Van der Waag, *A military history of modern South Africa*, 162.

military should not be used outside of Africa.¹¹⁶ However, by the time Smuts took over, Hertzog made this concession¹¹⁷ that together with the outbreak of WWII, it became clear that this would no longer be the case. Pirow should be seen as an inadvertent agent of the garrison state. As the garrison state can be viewed as a counterintuitive response to fascism, and Pirow was a renowned Fascist, ironically he assisted with South Africa's preparation to eventually help fight fascism with his five-year plan. The success of Pirow's five-year plan can be debated, as South Africa could never compete with the military capabilities of many other countries and eventual super powers which would emerge during the Cold War. However, this was never the intended goal, and it would not be a fair assessment of what Pirow achieved as he undoubtedly helped to improve South Africa's military capabilities.

Hertzog and South African Sovereignty 1935

In 1935, a pamphlet issued by the UP was published on the specific question of South Africa's sovereignty. This pamphlet was titled "Questions to Hertzog." More than just addressing sovereignty issues, it was also looking at what could be described, in Lasswell's terms, as a garrison state characteristic, namely how "expectations about the future may rest upon the extrapolation of past trends into the future."¹¹⁸ During WWI, South Africa was expected to send troops to support Britain. As South Africa was a dominion within the British Empire in 1914, when Britain declared war, South Africa's participation in the war was taken for granted. Thus, with the unstable political situation in Europe during the mid-1930s, another garrison state characteristic came to the fore within South African politics, namely that the rulers of the garrison state would "depend upon war scares as a means of

¹¹⁶ Van der Waag, *A military history of modern South Africa*, 162.

¹¹⁷ Van der Waag, *A military history of modern South Africa*, 162.

¹¹⁸ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 456.

maintaining popular willingness to forgo immediate consumption.”¹¹⁹ Thus the scare of looming war in Europe, and South Africa’s previous experience of being expected to send troops to fight on behalf of Great Britain, played well into the hands of Hertzog.

The first question concerned whether South Africa was a sovereign state, independent of the Empire? In response, it was affirmed that General Hertzog had already declared that South Africa was a sovereign state, independent of the Empire, and bound to it by no more than a tie of friendship which was severable at the will of the Union.¹²⁰ The second question addressed when South Africa would cease to be an integral and indivisible part of the British Empire, and if the people of South Africa would ever be consulted by means of a general election as to this constitutional change? Hertzog’s response pointed that on 14 September 1927 in Durban, General Smuts had said that the Balfour Declaration did not make South Africa independent of the Empire: “that (he said) would mean isolation.” For Hertzog, nothing was further (he said) from the minds of the great statesmen (as he referred to Smuts and company) gathered in London.¹²¹ The third question asked pointedly: “who is our King?” Was he the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British dominions beyond the seas, or was he, what General Hertzog called “The King of South Africa?” There was strangely no response to this question.

The fourth question focused on whether the Governor-General was appointed by the Union Cabinet under the signet of the Union and if his instructions as Governor-General were laid down by the cabinet? Hertzog responded that he had issued a proclamation to

¹¹⁹ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 456.

¹²⁰ J. H. Hofmeyr, Questions to Hertzog, 12 March 1935, United Party Pamphlet, Politics: General, ZA HPRA A1-D-Dm/1935, Historical Papers Research Archive, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, <https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/status-act>.

¹²¹ Hofmeyr, Questions to Hertzog, 12 March 1935, United Party Pamphlet.

that effect in Pretoria on 31 December 1934.¹²² Fifth, the pamphlet raised the crucial question whether, when the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the dominions beyond the seas was at war, was South Africa necessarily at war, or could she remain neutral? General Hertzog stated that he had already said that South Africa, in the case of war, would be neutral. The sixth question followed on to ask if South Africa, when Great Britain was at war, could sell goods to enemy cruisers visiting Union ports for supplies? General Hertzog stated that he had already stated that South Africa could sell goods to the enemy of Great Britain while at war. Furthermore, it questioned whether in the event of Great Britain being at war, the Union government had the right, if it desired, to order the British Admiral to quit Simonstown? General Hertzog responded that there was no obligation whatsoever towards the Empire.¹²³

The eighth and final question asked if persons born in South Africa were subjects of the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the dominions beyond the seas and if, while in South Africa, they were entitled to describe themselves as such and to claim that the Union government should likewise describe and treat them as such? General Hertzog responded by saying that he had already stated that the Union government would not treat such persons in any other light than Union nationals and Union subjects of the King.¹²⁴ Pirow likewise stated that there was no nationality in South Africa today other than Union nationality.¹²⁵

¹²² Hofmeyr, Questions to Hertzog, 12 March 1935, United Party Pamphlet.

¹²³ Hofmeyr, Questions to Hertzog, 12 March 1935, United Party Pamphlet

¹²⁴ meaning "his" "King of South Africa"

¹²⁵ J. H. Hofmeyr, The middle of the road: speech at Sea Point to the United South African National Party, 12 February 1935, United Party Speech, Speeches by Hofmeyr in English: General, ZA HPRA A1-E-Ea-Ea1-141-Ea77/1935, Historical Papers Research Archive, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, <https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/toast-of-society-at-annual-dinner-of-chemical-metallurgical-and-mining-society-of-south-africa>.

What is evident from the information contained in this pamphlet is that Hertzog had no intention of fighting a war on the British Empire's behalf, even stating that South Africa would still trade with the enemy of Great Britain. Hertzog was very protective of South Africa, whereas Smuts and Hofmeyr were completely pro the British Empire. This neutrality and isolationism that Hertzog promoted were reminiscent of certain garrison state characteristics which was previously mentioned, namely that "expectations about the future may rest upon the extrapolation of past trends into the future."¹²⁶ Although Lasswell's focus was more on "specific items—like population and production curves,"¹²⁷ in the South African case Hertzog's concerns were based on past expectations by Great Britain to involve South Africa in external wars. Getting dragged into foreign wars is not suitable in a garrison state, as a garrison state only requires the perception of an external threat. This shows how Lasswell's concept, especially regarding the origins of the South African garrison state, can be contradictory in nature. In the case of Hertzog, the South African garrison state needed isolationism, especially from Great Britain. In the case of Smuts and Hofmeyr, the garrison state was a response to fascism. This shows that both sets of leaders aspired to contradictory aspects of Lasswell's garrison state. However, prior to 1939, Hofmeyr wanted to promote his moderate political stance, advocating for a balanced approach, avoiding extremes on either side of the political spectrum via his "Middle of the Road" speech.

Hofmeyr's "The Middle of the Road" Speech 1935

On Tuesday 12 February 1935 Hofmeyr delivered a speech at Cape Town. Hofmeyr started his speech with the justification for fusion. The previous time he had spoken was four years earlier under the auspices of the old SAP. Hofmeyr stated that he could

¹²⁶ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 456.

¹²⁷ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 456.

remember saying on that occasion that the party had always stood for principles which he “believed to be right principles: principles which must and would prevail.”¹²⁸ That previous occasion “defined the fundamental principle” of the SAP as national unity: “unity based not on the absorption of one element by the other, not on the domination of one element over the other, but unity based on equality, and on readiness on either side” to appreciate the other side’s point of view. He also said that, while at that time the politicians seemed to be lagging behind in terms of liberal evolution, there “was a real advance on the part of the mass of the people” towards the ideal of unity based on equality. There also existed a determination to make goodwill effective, and a realisation that providence had meant the peoples of South Africa “to be joined together, and that the politicians must not be allowed to keep them asunder.” According to Hofmeyr it was just that popular determination that brought into being the UP.¹²⁹

Hofmeyr provided a more specific justification for fusion. He referenced two meetings which took place the previous Friday. First, “Pirow made a speech to the press conference on defence.” That specific speech was “attacked on Friday evening by Malan at Malmesbury and by Colonel Stallard.” It was attacked by Malan on the grounds that it meant that South Africa was “robbed of its right of neutrality,” as well as the belief that “South Africa would be dragged inevitably into any war in which Britain was involved.” It was criticised by Colonel Stallard because it would mean total non-cooperation from the beginning to the end, and a statement in advance of neutrality in any war. Hofmeyr’s argument was that these statements could not both be true: they cancelled out one

¹²⁸ Hofmeyr, The middle of the road: speech at Sea Point to the United South African National Party, 12 February 1935, United Party Speech.

¹²⁹ Hofmeyr, The middle of the road: speech at Sea Point to the United South African National Party, 12 February 1935, United Party Speech.

another. Hofmeyr was pointing out the conflict among the opposition, which was an astute political move.

That was typical of the time. When the fusion terms were announced, the newspaper *Die Burger* came out with a banner headline: “The New South African Party.”¹³⁰ However, the *Natal Mercury* also came out with a banner headline, “Smuts Capitulates to Nationalism.” *Die Burger* declared that the Nationalist “Federal Council had to reject everything unacceptable to the SA Party”; but the *Mercury* said that “the basis represents almost a complete surrender by General Hertzog to ‘Malanism.’”¹³¹ *Die Burger* wrote that “the new party will be a stronghold of imperialism,” while the *Mercury* stated that “Dr. Malan has gained fully everything he has wanted”—presumably Malan wanted a stronghold against imperialism in South Africa. Ever since the new party came into being, *Die Burger* had been saying that General Smuts and his friends had swallowed up the old Nationalists, while the *Mercury* had been saying that General Hertzog had swallowed up the old SAP. The *Mercury* referred to the new party as the United Nationalist Party; *Die Burger* spoke of it as the Unionist Party. Again, Hofmeyr’s argument was that both newspapers could not be correct.

Hofmeyr referred to all of the above as a “peace without victory.” He spoke in greater detail on some of the matters he initially touched on. First there was the question: for whom does fusion represent a victory? As previously mentioned, the *Mercury* said the Nationalists swallowed up the SAP; *Die Burger* said the SAP had swallowed up the Nationalists. Hofmeyr’s reply was that there had been no victory. The peace made was a

¹³⁰ Hofmeyr, The middle of the road: speech at Sea Point to the United South African National Party, 12 February 1935, United Party Speech.

¹³¹ Hofmeyr, The middle of the road: speech at Sea Point to the United South African National Party, 12 February 1935, United Party Speech.

peace without victory. The SAP had not won a victory. The Nationalists had not won a victory. Hofmeyr saw the only victory as a common-sense victory of the people of South Africa.

In previous years there was a real conflict of principle between the SAP and the Nationalists. Gradually those issues of principle disappeared and at the last the parties were fighting over personalities, artificial issues, and the memories of the past but the principles for which they stood were by no means incompatible. In addition, that is why, when they drew up a *program of principles* for the UP, it was found there was nothing left for them to quarrel about. Hofmeyr believed all that was needed was to remove misunderstandings and suspicions. He stated that:

Let me be more specific. What were the essential principles of the Nationalists? First the assurance of full language equality, and the ungrudging acceptance of Afrikaans. And secondly, the assurance of South Africa's status as a free nation. Now we of the SA party were not opposed to those things. We were certainly not opposed to Afrikaans; and through our leaders we had played a big part in building up South Africa's status of freedom. General Hertzog, even in the days of party strife, had acknowledged the part played by Generals Botha and Smuts in that regard. We knew where we stood in those matters; but in the atmosphere of suspicion, of party strife, there was no lack of misapprehension and misrepresentation among our opponents of those days in regard to our position. Well, in the coalition agreement we gave General Hertzog our assurances on these points. In the discussions of the Status Bill, we proved our sincerity. Further confirmation was given in the fusion basis. And as a result, all doubts as to the safeguarding in the new party of the points which were essential from the old Nationalist point of view fell away.¹³²

¹³² Hofmeyr, The middle of the road: speech at Sea Point to the United South African National Party, 12 February 1935, United Party Speech.

Hofmeyr focused on the principle of national unity, and a fair deal for all—no absorption and no superiority—the equal South Africanism of Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking South Africans. Another crucial factor was the maintenance of South Africa’s connection with the British Commonwealth. Hofmeyr then continued to speak about the British Commonwealth, South Africa’s dominion status and its sovereign independence:

The Dominion Party attacks us because we want to deprive citizens of the Union of their status as British subjects and would like us to abolish Union nationality. The Malanites attack us because we refuse to abolish the status of British subjects based on allegiance to the King and want us to limit our citizens to Union nationality.¹³³

The Malanites as Hofmeyr called them, wanted the association with the British Empire to be severed. The DP on the other hand criticised the UP because they described the position of South Africa in terms of sovereign independence, and not those of dominion status. Hofmeyr wondered how many people there were in the room, or indeed in South Africa, who understood the difference between dominion status and sovereign independence as defined in the Status Act. He then looked at the issue of dominion status and what it meant. Hofmeyr stated that only one authoritative definition of it had been given: at the Imperial Conference of 1926 with all the weight of the British Empire behind it. In terms of that definition Great Britain and the dominions were:

...autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external

¹³³ Hofmeyr, The middle of the road: speech at Sea Point to the United South African National Party, 12 February 1935, United Party Speech.

affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated within the British Commonwealth of Nations.¹³⁴

Hofmeyr proceeded to focus on the sovereign independence of the Status Act. In the preamble to that Act it began with a definition of dominion status. It went on to say: “And whereas it is expedient that the status of the Union of South Africa as a sovereign independent state as herein before defined shall be adopted.”¹³⁵ Thus, according to Hofmeyr’s interpretation, the sovereign independence mentioned in the Status Act was simply dominion status as defined in 1926, rebranded. The sovereign independence of the Status Act was the sovereign independence of states which were seen as masters of their own destiny but were in a special relationship to one another within the British Empire. Hofmeyr did not believe that this implied a limitation of South Africa’s sovereign independence.

What is also important to mention is Hofmeyr’s interpretation of what the British Empire was. He believed the “real trouble” came from a misunderstanding as to what the British Empire was. The British Empire of the 1930s was called the Third British Empire.¹³⁶ There was the First British Empire where Great Britain tried to rule her American colonies from Westminster. Then came the Second British Empire, in which it evolved the principles of self-government for the colonies. The colonies received a large measure of freedom in their local affairs, but Great Britain retained the power of control. The parliament of Westminster had residual sovereignty. The ultimate basis of the second empire was the power, if need be, to exercise compulsion. However, according to Hofmeyr, that second

¹³⁴ Hofmeyr, The middle of the road: speech at Sea Point to the United South African National Party, 12 February 1935, United Party Speech.

¹³⁵ Hofmeyr, The middle of the road: speech at Sea Point to the United South African National Party, 12 February 1935, United Party Speech.

¹³⁶ A. Jackson, *The British Empire: A very short introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 72.

empire had gradually developed, broadening out from precedent to precedent, into the Third British Empire of the 1930s, the Empire which was based on the acceptance by Great Britain of the dominions as equal partners in a free association.¹³⁷

Hofmeyr saw the basis of the British Empire of the 1930s as not of force, but freedom, friendship, and faith. Hofmeyr also criticised what he perceived as the ambitions of Colonel Charles Stallard, the South African lawyer, politician, and member of the SAP until he became the leader of the DP, in terms of South Africa's decision whether to join Great Britain if a war were to break out. Stallard had objected to Pirow's declaration that South Africa alone should decide on the extent of its participation in war. Stallard wanted a vital decision like that to be taken outside South Africa, which even Hofmeyr opposed. Stallard wanted it to be possible for South Africa to be forced to participate in a war.

Hofmeyr then spoke about Joseph Chamberlain in 1900, who he described as the "the patron saint of the old imperialism."¹³⁸ When introducing the Bill for the Federation of Australia in the House of Commons, Chamberlain claimed that:

We have got to a point in our relations with our self-governing colonies in which I think we recognize once for all that these relations depend entirely on their free will and consent. The links between us, the present time, are very slight—almost a touch might snap them—but tender and slight as they are, if they are felt irksome in any of our great colonies, we shall not force them to wear them.¹³⁹

¹³⁷ Hofmeyr, The middle of the road: speech at Sea Point to the United South African National Party, 12 February 1935, United Party Speech.

¹³⁸ Hofmeyr, The middle of the road: speech at Sea Point to the United South African National Party, 12 February 1935, United Party Speech.

¹³⁹ Hofmeyr, The middle of the road: speech at Sea Point to the United South African National Party, 12 February 1935, United Party Speech.

Finally, Hofmeyr spoke on the issue of nationality. The UP was attacked by the DP because, it was said, the UP wanted to surrender the status of British subjects as far as the people of South Africa were concerned.¹⁴⁰ The UP was also attacked by the Malanites because they wanted to maintain that status. The issue came from a misunderstanding as to the meaning of the term “British subject.” While many thought it meant subjection to the British government, for Hofmeyr it meant nothing of the kind. For Hofmeyr, being subjects of King George V as ruler of the whole of the Empire and Commonwealth was that South Africa owed him an allegiance—and everything that that status of “British subject” connoted arose from that fact of allegiance.

According to Jackson, some “British subjects” reflected “nationalism, ‘race patriotism,’ and an emergent pride in the creation of a British-shaped world order, a veritable British world.”¹⁴¹ Hofmeyr admitted that in the United Kingdom “British subject” meant more than that. It meant allegiance to the King as ruler of the whole Empire, but it also meant a complex of local obligations and rights in relation to the United Kingdom itself. It meant therefore both the common status based on allegiance and the status of membership of the United Kingdom community. In South Africa it could not mean both these things. By virtue of South Africa’s common status as British subjects based on allegiance, South Africa could assume that status of membership of the United Kingdom community, just as was the case with a British subject coming from the United Kingdom to South Africa. However, for as long as South Africans lived in South Africa, they did not have that status. What South Africa had, in addition to its common status, was something parallel

¹⁴⁰ Hofmeyr, The middle of the road: speech at Sea Point to the United South African National Party, 12 February 1935, United Party Speech.

¹⁴¹ Jackson, *The British Empire: A very short introduction*, 5.

to it: the status of membership of the South African community. For Hofmeyr that was why, to his mind, most South Africans were both British subjects and Union nationals.

This is relevant to a garrison state as with a garrison state an imperial umbrella power such as the British Commonwealth would be seen as an external threat to the garrison state. Yet with Smuts and Hofmeyr, with regards to their relation to a developing garrison state in South Africa, they were for the idea of an imperial umbrella power. This again shows that the South African garrison state does not fit the Lasswell model perfectly. Between 1935 and 1938 the South African garrison state shifted from Hertzog's isolationism to Smuts and Hofmeyr's anti-fascist stance. The global atmosphere had dramatically changed, and South Africa was not immune. The rise of fascism in Europe had also impacted South Africa. Europe hurtling towards war combined with the spreading hatred of Jews reverberated in South Africa. After Hofmeyr's disappointing debate performance regarding the Immigration Quota Act against Malan earlier in the decade he needed to reassure the Jewish community in South Africa. He did this with a series of speeches such as "Israel's Gift to Humanity" in which Hofmeyr tried to re-establish his close ties to the Jewish community.

Hofmeyr's "Israel's Gift to Humanity" Speech 1938

As the threat of war in Europe grew ever more real, and anti-Semitism and fascism swept the continent, in 1938 Hofmeyr, as the minister of mines, social welfare and labour, made a speech at the Keren Hayesod Banquet held at the Carlton Hotel before a large gathering. He referred to the notable contributions made by the Jewish people in the past and to the great gifts they were likely to bring to humanity in the future. Titled "Israel's Gift to Humanity," the main message was "You will be better South Africans because you are

Zionists.”¹⁴² The speech was printed in the *Zionist Record* on 24 June 1938.¹⁴³ Hofmeyr regarded it a great honour and privilege to be able to speak to this gathering, in support of a cause which he saw as vital as any other in the world at the time. Hofmeyr placed a great emphasis on the Jewish people being welcome in South Africa:

You have already realised that you are welcome in South Africa. You have learned that here in South Africa Gentile no less than Jew, Afrikaans-speaking no less than English-speaking, endorses the ideal of Zionism. We who are Gentiles in South Africa, no less than you who are Jews, have reason for interest and sympathy with the Zionist cause. Those who are of British stock will, I am sure, ever count it a matter of grateful memory that the establishment of the Jewish national home in Palestine was the result of a supreme act of British statesmanship.¹⁴⁴

It is also important to look at how international trends influenced South Africa. In 1938, with Europe on the brink of war, and the rise of anti-Semitism and fascism, Hofmeyr provided an alternative view from that of the Nationalists in South Africa. Though it should be noted that not all NP members were outright fascist such as Pirow, they did not support South Africa's participation in a potential war against Germany. Furlong argues that Afrikaner Nationalist Opposition saw a Nazi victory in WWII as the gateway to take control of South Africa.¹⁴⁵ Germany saw South Africa as both a strategic and economic opportunity, together with the possibility that South Africa could assist Germany in regaining the South

¹⁴² J. H. Hofmeyr, Israel's gift to humanity: address at Keren Hayesod Banquet of Rand Jewry, *Zionist Record*, 24 June 1938, United Party Speech, Speeches by Hofmeyr in English: General, ZA HPRA A1-E-Ea-Ea1-141-Ea91, Historical Papers Research Archive, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, <https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/israels-gift-to-humanity-address-at-keren-hayesod-banquet-of-rand-jewry>.

¹⁴³ Hofmeyr, Israel's gift to humanity: address at Keren Hayesod Banquet of Rand Jewry, *Zionist Record*, 24 June 1938, United Party Speech.

¹⁴⁴ Hofmeyr, Israel's gift to humanity: address at Keren Hayesod Banquet of Rand Jewry, *Zionist Record*, 24 June 1938, United Party Speech.

¹⁴⁵ P. J. Furlong, "Pro-Nazi subversion in South Africa," *Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies* 16, no. 1 (1988): 27.

West Africa territory.¹⁴⁶ The Nationalists thought of Germany as an ally, a country with a shared heritage with Afrikaners, as well as the fact that Germany up to that point had never shown any military aggression against South Africa, but on the contrary, has been very pro South African. The issues with fighting on the side of Great Britain were quite clear. The negative history due to the Anglo-Boer War as well as South Africa's participation in WWI made it a non-starter for many in the NP. Hofmeyr and Smuts, however, as previously shown, were pro-British imperial politicians compared to the isolationist nature of NP members. Thus, it was clear for Hofmeyr what course of action should be taken. South Africa would not only be politically, but also morally obliged to join the war effort. This would serve South Africa two-fold, he argued. First, it would strengthen ties with Great Britain and, they would help defend a persecuted people, namely the Jews of Europe. Hofmeyr did this by supporting the Zionist cause in his speech and trying to create links between British imperialism and Zionism. Hofmeyr stated:

It was the British nation which, through the late Lord Balfour, for the first time for 2,400 years, hailed the Jewish people as one of the family of nations of the world, and handed to that people the title-deed of their nationhood. That will always be a matter of honour to the British nation and to the British Empire.¹⁴⁷

Hofmeyr had been very generous with his welcome, noting "I rejoice in the fact that I can welcome these ambassadors of Zionism."¹⁴⁸ Hofmeyr hailed the Jewish people as a "People of the Book."¹⁴⁹ This phrase was both a reference to Jewish people being literate,

¹⁴⁶ Furlong, "Pro-Nazi subversion in South Africa," 27.

¹⁴⁷ Hofmeyr, Israel's gift to humanity: address at Keren Hayesod Banquet of Rand Jewry, Zionist Record, 24 June 1938, United Party Speech.

¹⁴⁸ Hofmeyr, Israel's gift to humanity: address at Keren Hayesod Banquet of Rand Jewry, Zionist Record, 24 June 1938, United Party Speech.

¹⁴⁹ Hofmeyr, Israel's gift to humanity: address at Keren Hayesod Banquet of Rand Jewry, Zionist Record, 24 June 1938, United Party Speech.

story-tellers and having those characteristics as part of their culture, but it was also a reference to a religious aspect namely the Holy Book(s) of the Jewish people. Hofmeyr tried to draw commonalities between South African Christians and Jews, stating that South Africans had a special reason for sympathy with, and interest in, the Zionist cause. Hofmeyr believed that South Africans were also a “People of the Book”¹⁵⁰ and that Palestine was also a holy and sacred land for South Africans. Hofmeyr described Zionism as a great symbol, and defined it as:

. . . the manifestation of the perpetual and undying spirit of Judaism, maintained by contact with the holy city of Zion, and the hills of Judea. Right from the beginning of the Jewish history, there was given a symbol that has proved an outstanding characteristic: the symbol of the burning bush—the bush that was not consumed.¹⁵¹

Hofmeyr then referenced the struggles the Jewish people had endured throughout their history up until that point. Hofmeyr spoke of the 2,400 years of national tragedy that the Jewish people had faced and that they saw, to their shame, a new outburst of anti-Semitism in Europe, which Hofmeyr called “the vehicle of the violence and unrest of the human race”¹⁵² and that “In our day once again, the Jew stands out as the scapegoat in the battle between civilisation and the pagan conception of the State.”¹⁵³ Hofmeyr saw a connection between the prosperity of a Gentile nation and the way in which it has dealt with and treated its Jewish population. Repeatedly in history the persecution of the Jews has been the commencement of a nation’s decline. Thus, according to Hofmeyr, harming an

¹⁵⁰ Both in a religious and cultural sense.

¹⁵¹ Hofmeyr, Israel's gift to humanity: address at Keren Hayesod Banquet of Rand Jewry, Zionist Record, 24 June 1938, United Party Speech.

¹⁵² Hofmeyr, Israel's gift to humanity: address at Keren Hayesod Banquet of Rand Jewry, Zionist Record, 24 June 1938, United Party Speech.

¹⁵³ Hofmeyr, Israel's gift to humanity: address at Keren Hayesod Banquet of Rand Jewry, Zionist Record, 24 June 1938, United Party Speech.

oppressed Jewish population, would also be oppressing the nation they occupy. Hofmeyr also spoke of the way in which the Jewish people maintained their continuity despite oppression and persecution.

Hofmeyr finished his speech reiterating the amazing way in which Judaism has maintained its continuity. For Hofmeyr It was one of the miracles of history. In direct opposition to these ideas expressed by Hofmeyr was the Ossewa-Brandwag (OB). This organisation became an internal threat of fascism to which the South African garrison state had to respond.

The Rise of the Ossewa-Brandwag 1938

It is important to show how the period 1933–1938 was a very tumultuous time in South African history and what the consequences were. South Africa was highly influenced by international events, and its own insecurities about its sovereignty only added fuel to the fire. The period 1933–1938 was a time of extremes: from Hertzog's bills to Pirow reorganising the military. A split in the political establishment due to South Africa's support of Great Britain, as well as South Africa's involvement in WWII, gave rise to extreme right-wing Afrikaner Nationalist organisations such as the OB. Christoph Marx notes how "In the first years of its existence, the OB was an Afrikaner nationalist mass movement comprising all social strata of the Afrikaner population."¹⁵⁴ It was a varied group made possible only by the absence of a definitive ideology. As with any new organisation it did not want to exclude or alienate the possibility of new members joining its ranks, and so instead the OB drew mainly on Afrikaans popular culture with its stimulus from the symbolic Ox Wagon Trek of 1938.¹⁵⁵ Historian Mariana Kriel argues that the *Groot Trek* (Great Trek) marked "the

¹⁵⁴ C. Marx, "The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 20, no. 2 (1994): 195, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2637387>.

¹⁵⁵ Marx, "The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941," 195.

rise of Boer nationalism, which entailed the transformation of white Dutch-speaking farmers on the eastern border of the British-ruled Cape Colony into ethnic Boers.”¹⁵⁶

The OB tried to highlight its republican and nationalist ideals without pledging itself to any definite goals, thus being as vague as possible, and contained in its ranks very different interest groups.¹⁵⁷ The aim of the OB was to influence aspects of the Afrikaner social life, to endeavour towards complete republicanism.¹⁵⁸ The OB also had a cultural and social aspect in which all members took part.¹⁵⁹ By highlighting *volkseenheid* (“national unity”) and by rejecting South Africa’s involvement in WWII as Great Britain’s ally, it was able to join together an assembly of several nationalist organisations.¹⁶⁰ This was of great significance to the political turmoil of the mid-1930s South Africa faced, together with the split in the political establishment. Many of the OB’s members were looking for a new political home as they felt betrayed, not only by South Africa’s involvement in WWII as Britain’s ally, but also because of the lack of a clear policy by the political elites. Interestingly, it was only when the OB’s new leadership started to define its ideology and developed its own policy from the middle of 1941 onwards, that the OB’s membership started to subside. It was only once their popularity declined that the OB changed into a fascist organisation. This is also an apt time to remember that 1941 as an important date, as this coincides with Lasswell’s first publication of the garrison state and his observations of

¹⁵⁶ M. Kriel, "boere into Boere (farmers into Boers): The so-called great trek and the rise of Boer nationalism," *Nations and Nationalism* 27, no. 4 (2021): 1198.

¹⁵⁷ Marx, "The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941," 195.

¹⁵⁸ C. Blignaut, "Volksmoeders, spinwiele en wol: 'n historiese verkenning van die aard van vrouearbeid in die Ossewa-Brandwag," *South African Journal of Cultural History* 28, no. 1 (2014): 1.

¹⁵⁹ Blignaut, "Volksmoeders, spinwiele en wol: 'n historiese verkenning van die aard van vrouearbeid in die Ossewa-Brandwag," 1.

¹⁶⁰ Marx, "The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941," 195.

anti-democratic practices becoming more prevalent in the US in reaction to the rise of fascism.

The OB gained its greatest support during WWII.¹⁶¹ It was “openly anti-British, pro-German and followed a National Socialist agenda together with strong undercurrents of Afrikaner Christian (Calvinist) Nationalism.”¹⁶² The OB represented what can be seen as the lowest common denominator in Afrikaner Nationalist beliefs. What it believed in could be accepted, in principle, by every Afrikaner Nationalist,¹⁶³ making it extremely tempting to join the organisation. The OB’s objectives could be condensed into three main and very general ideals, with these ideals explaining why the OB was initially so successful. These were: (1) national unity (*volkseenheid*); (2) rejection of South Africa’s participation in WWII; and (3) the establishment of a republic.¹⁶⁴ *Volkseenheid* had long been the main goal of Afrikaner Nationalists. The split that took place within the NP in 1933–1934 betrayed people’s trust in parliamentarianism and the political parties involved. People also felt betrayed by parliamentary procedures. It should be noted that the trust that did exist in parliamentarianism, the parliamentary process, as well as the political parties involved (even some of the politicians themselves), was widespread. This trust, however, was very fragile at best. When we look at the populist structure and culture of South African political parties of the 1930s, with some political parties having a general aim of *volkseenheid* within the

¹⁶¹ C. Blignaut, “Kan die vrou haar volk dien deur haar huis?": Afrikanerpolitiek en vrou in die Ossewa-Brandwag, 1942 tot 1954," *Journal for Contemporary History* 40, no. 1 (2015): 1, <https://doi.org/10.38140/sjch.v40i1.306>.

¹⁶² Blignaut, “Kan die vrou haar volk dien deur haar huis?": Afrikanerpolitiek en vrou in die Ossewa-Brandwag, 1942 tot 1954," 1.

¹⁶³ Marx, "The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941," 195.

¹⁶⁴ Marx, "The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941," 195.

parliamentary-constitutional framework, these parties “already contained the seeds of a mass movement like the OB.”¹⁶⁵

The rise of the OB “was only one among many” Afrikaner Nationalist organisations that grew all over South Africa in the aftermath of the beforementioned symbolic 1938 Ox Wagon Trek.¹⁶⁶ “Most of these groups had their origins on the Witwatersrand and in Pretoria.”¹⁶⁷ However, the OB had substantial support in “the Orange Free State, with headquarters in Bloemfontein.”¹⁶⁸ The OB, at first, therefore presented a marginal “phenomenon.” Marx raises the question “why it was the OB of all organisations that prevailed over all the others.”¹⁶⁹ First, “the answer seems to lie in the fact that the OB had” the most unclear ideology of all these organisations in that it “contained cultural goals of a highly general nature only, combined with broad declarations of intent.” Thus, Afrikaner Nationalists could “cherry pick” how they wanted to view the programme. Many “other organisations made the mistake of specifying too strongly their aims.” Since its inception, “they were therefore much more restricted in terms of potential” members. “Its name linked the OB closely to the mass event of 1938, with the ox wagon as the symbol of Afrikanerdom,” and gave the impression of being the guardian of Afrikaners’ interests. Significantly in such organisations, “with their strong emphasis on hierarchy,” is the personality of their leader. “Colonel Laas was the first *kommandant-generaal*”¹⁷⁰ (KG).”

The OB made an especially vital “contribution to the nationalist movement as a whole” because of its efforts to convince Afrikaners that nationalism would be the ultimate

¹⁶⁵ The National Party and later Oswald Pirow’s New Order could be seen as examples.

¹⁶⁶ F. Hale, “Defending the Great Trek myth: Afrikaner nationalists’ campaign in the Cape against Stuart Cloete’s *Turning Wheels*,” *Kronos: Journal of Cape History* 26, no. 1 (2000): 102.

¹⁶⁷ Marx, “The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941,” 195.

¹⁶⁸ Marx, “The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941,” 195.

¹⁶⁹ Marx, “The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941,” 195.

¹⁷⁰ It should be noted that this was not a military rank, but rather a title bestowed upon the leader(s) of the OB

“solution to all their problems.” Mostly, these efforts were successful. However, once its leaders “tried to bring to bear a distinct ideology, membership numbers declined” and the movement lost impetus. “As the NP proved, there actually was no alternative” to a parliamentary path to political power. The OB was willing to take power by any means necessary, including by force. However, an overthrow was impossible as the OB did not have the manpower, funds or the strategic ability. This weakness was combined with the South African government of the time’s ability to crush rebellion of any nature. Even if the OB’s course proved impractical and eventually futile, it was still an extremely important phenomenon that evolved and that helps us understand the social and political climate that existed in the late 1930s leading into the outbreak of WWII. During the late 1930s and early 1940s it seemed as if the Afrikaner Nationalist movement had lost its momentum, however, as history shows us, it was just biding its time and waiting for the opportune moment to strike in 1948. With Smuts having left South Africa in a political vacuum, standing in as field marshal for Churchill, Hofmeyr’s inability to capture the attention of the common man in South Africa, combined with the resentment and betrayal many South Africans felt, made the UP vulnerable to a nationalist movement.

Conclusion

Continuing from the OB, it is noteworthy that Lasswell did not address the core issues of social movements within a garrison state. Lasswell also does not address the issues of social movements having political aspirations and motivations. The South African garrison state is a complex case study and part of its origins lie in the creation and reaction to social movements such as the OB. Another characteristic of the South Africa garrison state which Lasswell does not address is the issues of segregation. This is an interesting omission as the US, specifically in the south, had segregationist practices. This is an opportune moment to

compare South Africa and the US. Lasswell, drawing on his observations in the US, would have noted the impact of racial segregation, and the role it could play in developing a garrison state. Segregation during the 1930s and 1940s is a shared characteristic between South Africa and the US. It was an opportunity missed by Lasswell to address a crucial matter. Segregation in the US and South Africa did not end with civil society, it extended to the military. The US was a complex case study for segregation because its federalist nature meant that policies differed from state to state. The US did not have blanket legislation such as the Hertzog bills. This does not, however, provide an answer as to why Lasswell did not address the issue of race and racial segregation within a garrison state. It also does not address how a garrison state would respond to those opposing racial segregation such as Jabavu opposing the Hertzog bills. Another example relating to Hertzog was the issue of sovereignty. The US did not have the influence of an umbrella power such as the British Empire in the way South Africa did. For Hertzog the British Empire was a threat, as it would drag South Africa into conflicts. Lasswell does not address the issue of sovereignty in a garrison state and also neglected to focus on how a garrison state would respond to a threat to its sovereignty.

For Smuts and Hofmeyr sovereignty was less prominent as both leaders were for the continued development of South Africa within the bounds of British influence. What was at the forefront of military elites, both in South Africa and the US, was the development of military power. Ironically, the five years covered by Pirow's plan coincided with the last five years of peace before the world was plunged into the second major conflict of the century.¹⁷¹ It is interesting, therefore, to consider to what extent Pirow prepared South

¹⁷¹ van Wyk, "Die Unieverdedigingsmagte op die vooraand van die tweede Wêreldoorlog (1934–1939)," 24.

Africa's Defence Force for the war to come. However, what is not debatable is that without Pirow's intervention South Africa would have been in a far worse position. When the plan was launched South Africa's economy and military position was poor and during the preceding years (1929–1932) the country had been gripped by an economic depression which coincided with the severest drought ever experienced in the country.¹⁷² Although Lasswell does address economic components of a garrison state, he did not consider the impact on industrial armaments manufacturing, or lack thereof, could have on a garrison state. The US was able to convert its industrial might into armaments manufacturing for WWII. South Africa did not have that capacity. The Depression had an impact on nearly every facet of the South African economy, including the public sector and the defence budget. Lasswell's focus was more on the issue of employment and the duty to work within a garrison state.

In the next chapter, the focus moves to the changing international situation as the European dictatorships began to disturb the balance of power in Europe. In South Africa, this gave rise to a new crisis of divided loyalties, culminating in arguments about the country's international responsibilities and role in any future conflict. The chapter that follows will focus on how South Africa became involved in WWII.

¹⁷² van Wyk, "Die Unieverdedigingsmagte op die vooraand van die tweede Wêreldoorlog (1934–1939)," 24.

CHAPTER 4

A Divided Nation (1939–1943): South Africa Enters World War II

Politicians and sharpshooters such as Dr. Malan and Pirow did announce the end of the war and a Hitler victory as early as August 1940, but these prophets are now discredited and have less influence in South Africa than ever.

O.A. Oosthuizen, General Secretary of the UP, *United Party Newsletter*

When O. A. Oosthuizen, general secretary of the UP, was sitting in his office in Pretoria, writing this short-sighted prediction, he was attempting to score cheap political points. But he could not have been more wrong when it came to Malan and Pirow's influence in domestic politics in South Africa. The mistake was seeing them both as being discredited, whereas in reality it was only Pirow. Post-1939, Pirow never again became part of a South African cabinet. However, a mere six years after Oosthuizen attempted to discredit him, Malan became prime minister in 1948. Stating that Pirow would have less influence in South Africa was an easy argument to make, especially if one considers both his pro-Nazi stance and how he was supportive of greater fascism in Europe. It was a political death that became unavoidable especially after the revelations of the Holocaust. Pirow was on the wrong side of history and had hitched his wagon to the wrong political ideology. Mark Sanders, professor of comparative literature notes that in the wake of WWII and the Holocaust, "state racism no longer commanded the political, moral, and intellectual respectability it had."¹ The impact of the Holocaust was more than just the most extreme fruition of anti-Semitism. As Israeli historian Yehuda Bauer mentions:

¹ M. Sanders, "'Problems of Europe': N. P. van Wyk Louw, the intellectual and Apartheid.", *Journal of Southern African Studies* 25, no. 4 (1999): 608.

It seems that the Holocaust has become a code in Western civilization, a code that signifies the evil in human society, that stands for the negation of the value of human life, and most of the contemporary dealing with it relates to the almost desperate desire to fight against the increasing threatening crisis in world civilization: mass murders, ethnic conflicts, hatred of the other, potential or actual genocides.²

There was no political return for Pirow. Even after the NP won the election in 1948, he was not part of the cabinet under Malan. There has been too much political damage done to Pirow's reputation. His open support of Hitler, the Nazis and fascism was just too unpalatable for most South African voters, even those conservatives who used to admire Pirow as a Hertzogite and appreciated his contribution to Hertzog's legacy by authoring his biography. Thus, as Oosthuizen states, Pirow's political career was over, however the question needs to be asked how Oosthuizen could have been so wrong about the political influence Malan would wield.

In 1943 South Africa went to the polls in a wartime election, with the UP victorious with eighty-nine seats versus the forty-three seats for Malan's NP.³ This was referred to as a "khaki election" with the government's victory being driven by the "army vote," where the UP received 78 percent, versus 3 percent for the NP, of the army's votes.⁴ This was a unique predicament for Malan. Although he wanted to capture the military it was incredibly loyal to Smuts, and proud of his war efforts as field marshal for Churchill. However, if the military could be mobilised as a voting bloc, it was certainly there to be exploited for the gains of the NP. This military voting bloc should not be perceived as a form of "mystic democracy" which

² Y. Bauer, "The impact of the Holocaust," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 458, no. 1 (November 1996): 15.

³ Stultz, *The Nationalists in opposition 1934–1948*, 89.

⁴ Stultz, *The Nationalists in opposition 1934–1948*, 89.

Lasswell refers to as one of the characteristics of the garrison state concept. It is not a unique garrison state phenomenon for members of the military to have a political preference and to vote according to that preference. The concept of *mystic democracy* will be discussed in greater detail in the conclusion of the thesis. It is important to separate the military voting bloc, the garrison state characteristic of mystic democracy and the process of militarisation.

The NP needed to build on existing military structures to garner support and continue the process of the militarisation of South African society. The military foundations existed; it simply needed the correct political leadership to unlock its influence on South African society. At the time of the outbreak of WWII, the active and permanent citizen forces (ACF) were rurally based and overwhelmingly Afrikaans.⁵ Many of these men did not support the war. Although South Africa had made great strides in developing and investing in its military capabilities, the number of active military men were insufficient and it took great efforts from Smuts and Hofmeyr to improve this scenario.⁶ By the end of WWII, 342,792 full-time volunteers served in the UDF.⁷

Even though the NP suffered a defeat in 1943, it was still able to consolidate its place as the “major political force” among Afrikaners.⁸ Though Oosthuizen was correct in the short term, with the UP being victorious in the 1943 election, the next election cycle would prove to be disastrous. Thus, the period of 1939–1945 is a crucial one in South African domestic politics. It was a period that created the assumption, especially within the UP ranks, that Malan and the NP were discredited and would have less influence in South Africa

⁵ Van der Waag, *A military history of modern South Africa*, 173.

⁶ Van der Waag, *A military history of modern South Africa*, 173.

⁷ Van der Waag, *A military history of modern South Africa*, 175.

⁸ Stultz, *The Nationalists in opposition 1934–1948*, 89.

than ever. Men such as Oosthuizen never considered the impact of a potential garrison state, or the locus of such a state starting to form. Oosthuizen made the politically fatal mistake of trying to discredit political leaders in a simplistic, short-sighted manner. Though Pirow was labelled an extremist, and even though he did not ever feature as an important figure in the mainstream political scene after WWII, Pirow had been a major impact in the militarisation of South African society as early as the mid-1930s. Malan became the ultimate benefactor.

The 1948, NP election victory has been framed primarily within the bounds of racism and Afrikaner nationalism. However, this does not consider the issue of how South African society had become increasingly militarised. This, combined with insecurities on South Africa's sovereignty previously mentioned, makes it easier to understand how the UP lost the 1948 election, and not necessarily because of racial policies alone. Before the lead-up to the 1948 election can be analysed, together with the election itself, it is important to look at the WWII period (potentially even earlier than that). It can be argued that the build-up to the 1948 election started much earlier than simply the end of WWII. Though Smuts was the prime minister, he played a marginal role in the domestic affairs of South Africa during the period. Thus, this period can be categorised by his lack of influence on South African domestic affairs, and more by the creeping and ever-growing influence of a garrison state.

Though we must give credit where credit is due; Smuts was regarded by all as a statesman of international stature, well above party politics. He was even considered the symbol of all that was good and magnanimous in the British Empire.⁹ He was a man who had first become known to the British public as a Boer general boldly resisting the Empire on the

⁹ G. Shimoni, "Jan Christiaan Smuts and Zionism," *Jewish Social Studies* 39, no. 4 (September 1977): 269, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4466970>.

battlefields of South Africa. Yet only some fifteen years later, at the start of WWI, he personally came to help England and her Empire in their hour of need. True, he was not the only political leader from the dominions to come to Britain and join the Imperial War Conference and Cabinet, but when the imperial war cabinet broke up in May 1917, these colleagues had left and Smuts alone had stayed behind.¹⁰ He served in the war cabinet and went on to become one of the great architects of the British Commonwealth. Between 1933 and 1939 he was second to Prime Minister Hertzog in the South African government; thereafter, until his election defeat in 1948, he was again prime minister as well as a British field marshal. Though all his accomplishments are noted, his legacy remains forever tainted by the defeat in 1948.

In retrospect, the underlying central theme of political developments in South Africa between 1934 and 1948 was the rise of the NP. That was hidden from many contemporaries but because its results denoted a considerable growth of support for the HNP¹¹, the 1943 general election was a significant milestone in the HNP/NP's journey from small beginnings to the power that it enjoyed uninterrupted for forty years.¹² It was the NP, as it is argued throughout the thesis, that benefited from the garrison state characteristics that developed under the rule of the UP. This later led to the actual South African garrison state of the 1970s and 1980s that Magubane refers to.

¹⁰ Shimon, "Jan Christiaan Smuts and Zionism," 269.

¹¹ The HNP was an abbreviation for "*Herenigde Nasionale Party*" which was a political merger between Malan's "*Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party*" and Afrikaner Nationalists under the leadership of Hertzog who broke away from the UP.

¹² F. D. Tothill, "The South African general election of 1943," *Historia* 34, no. 1 (1989): 78.

The Ossewa-Brandwag Continued

The excitement during the initial rise of the OB was not sustainable. After a preliminary period of substantial growth, the OB began to lose members and would eventually implode but then the “outbreak of the war came to its rescue and gave it a decisive impetus.”¹³ The formation of the OB as a “paramilitary Afrikaner nationalist-cultural” organisation happened at the time of the symbolic 1938 Voortrekker Centenary celebrations. The reasons for its phenomenal growth and the role the OB played as a cultural organisation and not a political one could be ascribed to the lack of success by the NP, especially during the early years of WWII.¹⁴ Even though the OB at the time promoted its non-political attitude, that also waned dramatically. A social movement with political aspirations played an important role in the development of garrison state characteristics in South Africa. For a garrison state to flourish, according to Lasswell, a range of factors needed to align. It is not only the experts on violence that take control of the political systems of the country, but a garrison state also requires certain societal perceptions to exist. Fearmongering and the focus on threats (real or imagined) play key roles in the development of a garrison state. However, these are all aspects the government involves itself in. The type of social engineering needed to militarise a society so that the product resembles that of 1970s and 1980s South Africa is quite extreme to say the least. This is where an organisation such as the OB played a crucial role. This chapter frames the OB as a social and anti-parliamentarian movement that helped promote fascist sentiments among the Afrikaner populace. The chapter argues that the OB was cast as a fascist threat *from within* South Africa which intensified the rationale for the garrison state. The OB was a

¹³ C. Marx, *Oxwagon sentinel: Radical Afrikaner nationalism and the history of the Ossewabrandwag* (Berlin: LIT, 2008), 5.

¹⁴ Marx, *Oxwagon sentinel: Radical Afrikaner nationalism and the history of the Ossewabrandwag*, 5.

“mass movement” styled organisation which Lasswell does not cover in his garrison state concept.

As with the garrison state, it is important to recognise that in South Africa not all subversive elements embodied ideas imported from abroad. South African Nazism and South African fascism can and did exist independently from foreign influences. While finding inspiration in the European revolution, they were nevertheless a South African product. Nazism and fascism did not invade South Africa from abroad. Here the OB is a particularly good example of an ideological movement that was not simply imported from abroad, but developed independently, whilst drawing on influences from abroad. Afrikaner Nationalism was a domestic product, together with South African fascism.¹⁵

The OB was an organisation that attempted to keep “Afrikaner idealism” going. “If the OB wanted to preserve its mass appeal, it had to side-step all political issues, at least for some time.”¹⁶ As an alternative, its main focus was to achieve the “unification of Afrikaners based on the best possible common denominator.”¹⁷ This meant advancing cultural issues such as the promotion of the Afrikaans language as well as preserving Voortrekker graves. “This approach was followed until the OB started to propagate a separation from the British Empire, opting for a republic.” However, the NP saw this differently and accused the OB of interfering with NP matters. It should be noted that internally, the OB did not possess an agreement with regards to constitutional matters and the structure of a forthcoming republic. Expectations of a split from the British Empire were remarkably present in the

¹⁵ Stultz, *The Nationalists in opposition 1934–1948*, 78.

¹⁶ Marx, *Oxwagon sentinel: Radical Afrikaner nationalism and the history of the Ossewabrandwag*, 6.

¹⁷ Marx, *Oxwagon sentinel: Radical Afrikaner nationalism and the history of the Ossewabrandwag*, 6.

Transvaal and were “widespread throughout its Afrikaans population because of its republican past.”¹⁸

The commando (“kommando”) was the structural formation used by the OB. This was a group roughly the size of a military company (100 to 250 members), comprised of people who resided in the same town or in the same area in a larger town. Originally both men and women were allowed to become members, which helped the OB rise in numbers quite rapidly. However, this policy was later changed and only men were allowed to become members. The OB developed its own identity. It had its own uniform, its own flag, salute, and badge.¹⁹ These symbols drew on Afrikaner history and identity and cultural norms as well as inspiration from the Nazis.

OB leaders were elected at each level of the organisation’s hierarchical structure. *Kommandos* held parades, organised public discussions regarding cultural and historical topics related to Afrikanerdom, and organised sporting and cultural outings for its members. The OB presented an informal civilian army at times. After the outbreak of WWII, the OB became increasingly militarised.²⁰ On 4 February 1941, Malan informed the House of Assembly that the OB had approximately between three hundred thousand and four hundred thousand members, although these numbers were likely exaggerated as the fearmongering came from both the OB as well as the government.²¹ The rise of a dynamic organisation of “national-minded” Afrikaners of such a large size could not but be welcomed by Malan, provided that the OB restricted itself to the accomplishment of its affirmed non-political ends and did not impinge nor disrupt the political goals of the HNP. Malan claimed

¹⁸ Marx, *Oxwagon sentinel: Radical Afrikaner nationalism and the history of the Ossewabrandwag*, 328.

¹⁹ Stultz, *The Nationalists in opposition 1934–1948*, 79.

²⁰ Stultz, *The Nationalists in opposition 1934–1948*, 79.

²¹ Anon., *House of Assembly Debates* vol.41 col.2195 (1940–1941).

for the HNP the absolute right to select all political issues for “national-minded” Afrikaners.²² Gradually the OB created its own distinctive political outlook, at odds and fundamentally incompatible with the democratic and parliamentary outlook of the HNP.²³ This was essentially the beginning of the end of the cooperation between the OB and the HNP as the OB had now encroached on HNP territory and had become a disruption for Malan.

During the same year as the formation of the Afrikaner Party (AP) in 1941 and the rise of the New Order within the HNP, another challenge arose to the claim of the Malanite leadership of the HNP. This claim spoke only to the “national-minded” Afrikanerdom, this time from a source outside the framework of the parliamentary system: the OB. Throughout 1941, the OB threatened to “not only usurp the role of the HNP, but in leading a growing number of Afrikaners into extra-parliamentary and even extra-constitutional avenues of political expression.”²⁴

As Stultz remarks, it was as if the German political scientist, Franz Neumann’s, hypothesis that groups “losing status” are prone to refuse the “rules of the game” was coming to life.²⁵ Neumann’s idea suggested that when groups experience a decline in status or power, they may become more resistant to following established norms and regulations. This hypothesis can be seen as particularly relevant in situations where societal or political changes lead to shifts in power dynamics. Groups that perceive themselves as losing status may feel disenfranchised or marginalised, leading to a rejection of the existing rules or systems that they perceive as contributing to their decline. Neumann’s work provides

²² Stultz, *The Nationalists in opposition 1934–1948*, 80.

²³ Stultz, *The Nationalists in opposition 1934–1948*, 80.

²⁴ Stultz, *The Nationalists in opposition 1934–1948*, 78.

²⁵ Stultz, *The Nationalists in opposition 1934–1948*, 78.

valuable insights into understanding social and political dynamics, especially during times of upheaval or transition. It highlights the importance of addressing underlying grievances and power imbalances to maintain stability and social cohesion. Neumann also helps us understand propaganda and ideology and how it differs between totalitarianism and democracy.²⁶ This helps us understand what the OB was trying to accomplish with its actions and propaganda in terms of its extra-parliamentary and extra-constitutional political expressions. Neumann states that:

In its external form, as propaganda, totalitarian ideology differs from democratic ideology not only because it is single and exclusive, but because it is fused with terror. In the democratic system, an ideology is one among many.²⁷

Beginning in 1941 “and for reasons that had to do with the OB’s involvement in acts of sabotage” as well as distributing a circular letter proposing a republican constitution, the government used a “war measure” that took the form of an “emergency decree” and prohibited “state officials to be OB members.”²⁸ This placed the new *Kommandant-Generaal* Johannes van Rensburg into a “difficult situation right at the beginning of his leadership.”²⁹ His reaction was shrewd, however, allowing the particular members an “honourable discharge.”³⁰ Thus, he ensured that these former members were not denounced as a result of vacating the OB for fear of becoming unemployed.³¹ However, OB resignation lists could be found in daily newspapers such as *Die Transvaler*, *Die Volksblad* and *Die Burger*.³² Malan

²⁶ F. L. Neumann, *Behemoth: The structure and practice of national socialism*, trans. D.E. Lee (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), 38.

²⁷ Neumann, *Behemoth: The structure and practice of national socialism*, 38.

²⁸ Marx, "The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941," 216.

²⁹ Marx, "The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941," 216.

³⁰ Marx, "The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941," 216.

³¹ Marx, "The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941," 216.

³² See examples: Anon., *Die Transvaler*, 3 October 1941; Anon., *Die Volksblad*, 3 October 1941; Anon., *Die Burger*, 3 October 1941.

had also called on all “HNP members to resign from the OB.”³³ Members of the OB were part of a deliberate campaign to sabotage, Pirow himself admitted this, the war efforts and there were even clashes between OB members and soldiers on leave, some of these clashes even resulted in riots.³⁴ This gave the government additional reason to clamp down on OB members and activities.

Losing an entire section of its members was damaging for the OB. “One of the *kommandos* in Pretoria,” lost up to 75 percent of its membership, and most of these (now former) members were state officials.³⁵ The group impacted “included, for example, the railway employees”³⁶ as well as teachers.³⁷ In various locations, the unavailability of such members was severely felt.³⁸ “The teachers in particular, with their higher education, were needed both as organisers and as propagandists.”³⁹ As shown by the “membership lists of rural *kommandos*, teachers were very often the only persons with a higher education.”⁴⁰ Resulting from the government’s pronouncement, numerous *kommandos* became increasingly united as well as “socially homogeneous.” Numerous OB members were not ready to acknowledge (as well as link themselves with) the outright dismissal of parliament and party politics that characterised the OB from 1941 as well as later years. Populism was a characteristic that was very evident among OB members throughout its existence.

The *kommando* system’s hierarchical structure impacted significantly on the “self-destruction of the OB as it made the articulation of grass roots opinion impossible.”⁴¹ The

³³ Anon., *The Star*, 3 October 1941.

³⁴ Van der Waag, *A military history of modern South Africa*, 177.

³⁵ Hoofkommandant Pretoria East, Kommando 6C1, July 1941, Annual Report, MSFG Coll. 1/7, Ossewa-Brandwag, Pretoria.

³⁶ potentially playing an important part in a potential *coup de’ tat* or to help with sabotage activities

³⁷ Marx, “The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941,” 216.

³⁸ Marx, “The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941,” 216.

³⁹ Marx, “The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941,” 216.

⁴⁰ Marx, “The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941,” 216.

⁴¹ Marx, “The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941,” 216.

impact was that when leaders emerged with a separate policy, members felt they had no choice but to vacate the OB since it was not possible to effect any change, with “neither a dismissal of the leaders nor an election of new leaders being possible.” However, as previously shown, that was not the only problem. The government’s OB membership prohibition, focusing on state officials, marked the start of a process that hugely diminished the OB’s membership base. After 1941 this worsened by the clash with the HNP and Malan on the republican constitution issue.

The situation became even worse for the OB after the “turning point” of WWII against Germany and her allies, “and still more so when the war eventually came to an end.”⁴² Anti-war sentiments, closely connected to Afrikaner nationalism, were normal during WWII.⁴³ As its populist base became more diminished, this led to the change of the OB’s profile, since it became increasingly ideological in nature. Farmers became the dominant demographic in the rural *kommandos*. Marx notes that “In university cities, meanwhile, intellectuals began to play a more prominent role.”⁴⁴ In industrial areas, the OB saw a particularly substantive decline “that began in 1942 and can be traced back to the fact that many of its younger active members were drawn away from the OB as such,” instead joining the *stormjaers*.⁴⁵ There were few governmental war measures that “caused a similarly steady wave of protests, or were so frequently and consciously counteracted, or were in a similar manner compensated for by the militant-activist *stormjaers*.”⁴⁶ The war

⁴² Marx, “The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941,” 216.

⁴³ A. La Grange, “The Smuts’ government’s justification of the emergency regulations and the impact thereof on Ossewabrandwag, 1939–1945,” *Scientia Militaria South African Journal of Military Studies* 48, no. 2 (2020): 36.

⁴⁴ Marx, “The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941,” 216.

⁴⁵ The elite para-military group of the OB, its very own “Stormtroopers.”

⁴⁶ Marx, *Oxwagon sentinel: Radical Afrikaner nationalism and the history of the Ossewabrandwag*, 6.

became exceedingly important as it combined long-term issues⁴⁷ and short-term plans⁴⁸ and framed them with equal importance. The confiscation of farmers' rifles, proclaimed in 1940, was one example of these war measures; a "*boer* lacking his *roer*"⁴⁹ was seen as an incomplete individual.⁵⁰

The increased influence that Albert Hertzog and his "reform" movement exerted within the Mine Workers Union also contributed to the OB becoming a superfluous social and political force.⁵¹ The son of J. B. M. Hertzog and a politician in his own right Albert Hertzog would go on to serve as a cabinet minister in the 1950s and 1960s. In response, "The OB developed into a conglomerate of different segments, each of which had its own and very diverse social outlook."⁵² Changing the OB into a *volksbeweging* ("people's movement") had as its aim a more "efficient coverage of these diverse social groups by creating sub-organisations of a distinct social and occupational character."⁵³ South Africans were split between "*die volk* (the white people who constituted a nation) and *die bevolking*, (the total population, most of which did not belong to the nation)."⁵⁴ Some Afrikaners saw the split more radically by viewing "only white Afrikaans-speaking individuals (Afrikaners) as part of the *volk*, and everyone else as only part of the *bevolking*."⁵⁵ However, it was

⁴⁷ like poverty and social discrimination

⁴⁸ such as the dismissal of Afrikaner nationalists from the army and the war measures taken by the government

⁴⁹ a *Roer* is an Afrikaans term for a rifle

⁵⁰ Marx, *Oxwagon sentinel: Radical Afrikaner nationalism and the history of the Ossewabrandwag*, 333.

⁵¹ Marx, "The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941," 217.

⁵² Marx, "The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941," 217.

⁵³ Marx, "The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941," 217.

⁵⁴ La Grange, "The Smuts' government's justification of the emergency regulations and the impact thereof on Ossewabrandwag, 1939–1945," 41.

⁵⁵ La Grange, "The Smuts' government's justification of the emergency regulations and the impact thereof on Ossewabrandwag, 1939–1945," 41.

precisely this which can be seen as an indicator of the OB's downfall. At this point the OB had already lost its character as a "populist mass movement."⁵⁶

After August 1941, the OB became an organisation in continuous decline. The HNP had suddenly discovered the merits of democracy as they saw it and "emphasised the usefulness of parliamentary structures while the OB drifted towards fascism."⁵⁷ It was a power struggle focused on political ideals, with "ideological issues emerging only later."⁵⁸ Ensuing events confirmed that the HNP⁵⁹ chose the correct course of action to "gain power via parliamentary majorities."⁶⁰ Plausible alternatives to this strategy did not exist at the time.

There were several other explanations as to why the OB imploded: the lack of political experience among OB leaders; and the higher organisational skills and the stronger grass roots links of the NP. This was thanks to its internal democratic structure and the subsequent "purge" among OB leaders,⁶¹ but also due to the "no nonsense" approach of the Smuts government.⁶² Smuts had to play a dual role in WWII. First, "he had to manage South Africa's participation in the war," and second, "he had to ensure that the internal situation in South Africa was controlled so that his position as leader was not undermined."⁶³ The OB needed to engage various interest groups as well as address their ideological requirements. "The attempt at reorganising the OB into a *volksbeweging* shows such an orientation."⁶⁴ As the OB continued to see its membership shrink, "the more the ideological hardliners came

⁵⁶ Marx, "The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941," 217.

⁵⁷ Marx, "The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941," 218.

⁵⁸ Marx, "The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941," 218.

⁵⁹ later as the NP under Malan's leadership

⁶⁰ Marx, "The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941," 218.

⁶¹ removing such OB sympathisers like Meyer and Diederichs for example

⁶² Marx, "The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941," 218.

⁶³ La Grange, "The Smuts' government's justification of the emergency regulations and the impact thereof on Ossewabrandwag, 1939–1945," 41.

⁶⁴ Marx, "The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941," 218.

to the foreground, representing regional and social strongholds.”⁶⁵ The OB therefore moved away from being a populist mass movement, instead turning into an extremely fascist organisation.⁶⁶

The history of the organisation was written mainly for propagandist reasons during the period of conflict between the OB and the NP. After the OB was disbanded in 1952, those who had remained until the end felt a need to write up the history of their movement.⁶⁷ H. M. van der Westhuizen, professor of Afrikaans cultural history at the University of Pretoria and a leading OB activist, took the task upon himself, but did not progress beyond some initial notes and a collection of materials.⁶⁸ Former OB members repeatedly called for historical studies, although they would certainly not have welcomed an objective critical analysis that would have highlighted the shortcomings of the organisation. The leader of the OB, van Rensburg, continued the history of the OB himself via the publication of his memoirs in the late 1950s.⁶⁹

In the end, the OB became its own worst enemy, verging into the political domain, and not being able to withstand the pressures of South African politics of the 1940s. However, there existed a brief moment where it would have been possible for the OB to have a lasting impact regarding its interactions with the garrison state, whether as a fascist threat to Smuts and Hofmeyr, or as an ally to Malan after WWII and the 1948 elections.

⁶⁵ Marx, "The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941," 218.

⁶⁶ Marx, "The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941," 218.

⁶⁷ Marx, *Oxwagon sentinel: Radical Afrikaner nationalism and the history of the Ossewabrandwag*, 5.

⁶⁸ Marx, *Oxwagon sentinel: Radical Afrikaner nationalism and the history of the Ossewabrandwag*, 5.

⁶⁹ Marx, *Oxwagon sentinel: Radical Afrikaner nationalism and the history of the Ossewabrandwag*, 5.

Malan and Pirow Split:

Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika (The New Order for South Africa) 1940

The Afrikaner Nationalist movement suffered a massive blow from the continued rift between the Malanites and Hertzog's supporters.⁷⁰ Malan's leadership was primarily "complicated by the radical and pro-Nazi oriented opposition within the party, led by Oswald Pirow."⁷¹ Pirow's travels in fascist Europe before WWII had only strengthened his fascist political convictions. The direction of Pirow's group was principally based on his pamphlet entitled "Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika" (New Order for South Africa) from 1940.⁷² The group also derived its name from the title of this pamphlet.⁷³ Pirow wagered his career on a German military victory with the founding of the fascist New Order for South Africa (NO) on 25 September 1940 as a group within the HNP.⁷⁴ Although the original programme was inspired by the Salazar regime in Portugal,⁷⁵ its starting point was anti-capitalist and Christian-Republican.⁷⁶ One would have expected that Pirow, with his German background and admiration of German fascism, would have based his party on Hitler's National Socialists, however, from a theoretical standpoint, Pirow found Salazar's fascism more pragmatic. Gradually, the speeches of members of the New Order became increasingly inspired by National Socialism.⁷⁷

Despite considerable support, especially in the Transvaal, Pirow, unlike other opposition leaders, did not question Malan's position as party leader, and Malan also tried

⁷⁰ M. Touška, "Divided union: South African nationalist opposition from 1939 to 1943," *Prague Papers on the History of International Relations* 2 (2019): 83.

⁷¹ Touška, "Divided union: South African nationalist opposition from 1939 to 1943," 83.

⁷² Touška, "Divided union: South African nationalist opposition from 1939 to 1943," 83.

⁷³ Touška, "Divided union: South African nationalist opposition from 1939 to 1943," 83.

⁷⁴ F. A. Mouton, "'Beyond the Pale': Oswald Pirow, sir Oswald Mosley, the enemies of the Soviet Union and Apartheid, 1948–1959," *Journal for Contemporary History* 43, no. 2 (2018): 18.

⁷⁵ one of the countries that Pirow visited

⁷⁶ Touška, "Divided union: South African nationalist opposition from 1939 to 1943," 83.

⁷⁷ Touška, "Divided union: South African nationalist opposition from 1939 to 1943," 83.

to persuade Pirow that the New Order should only function as a platform within the HNP.⁷⁸ These efforts, however, were considered empty gestures by the radical members of the opposition faction and the ongoing tension between the New Order and Malan's HNP leadership led to the New Order's closer cooperation with the OB mass movement. Pirow did not attempt to turn his group into a new political party. Instead, he believed that with the support of the OB, of which he was a member, he would succeed in the elections planned for 1943. Gradually, the New Order became the group which formulated the ideology and programme of the OB.⁷⁹ The close connection between the New Order and OB finally led to candidates of the New Order not being included in the HNP list of candidates, and to them running independently and eventually failing completely in the 1943 elections.⁸⁰ Eventually, Pirow's split from Malan and his continued belief in radical fascism ultimately led to his political irrelevance.

It is important to unpack Pirow's descent. Pirow's perilous position in the political sphere was precipitated in Parliament when Smuts mercilessly savaged his tenure as minister of defence on 14 March 1940, especially Pirow's "bush cart" strategy.⁸¹ The "bush carts," the brainchild of Pirow, were a type of Scotch cart with one shaft and two large, spoked wheels pulled by two oxen or mules, to convey material in rough terrain for bush warfare in sub-tropical Africa.⁸² This was seen as a very outdated method for a military at the time, and was embarrassing for a man of the stature of Pirow who was deemed extremely competent, even by his most staunch opponents. Hofmeyr, as an example of one

⁷⁸ Touška, "Divided union: South African nationalist opposition from 1939 to 1943," 83.

⁷⁹ Touška, "Divided union: South African nationalist opposition from 1939 to 1943," 83.

⁸⁰ Touška, "Divided union: South African nationalist opposition from 1939 to 1943," 83.

⁸¹ Mouton, "'Beyond the Pale': Oswald Pirow, sir Oswald Mosley, the enemies of the Soviet Union and Apartheid, 1948–1959," 18.

⁸² Mouton, "'Beyond the Pale': Oswald Pirow, sir Oswald Mosley, the enemies of the Soviet Union and Apartheid, 1948–1959," 18.

of those staunch opponents, never viewed Pirow as incompetent. But Smuts had managed to turn Pirow into a figure of ridicule within the political class.⁸³ Pirow also became marginalised in the HNP, and thus desperate to keep his political influence, he hitched his ambitions to all appearances (at the time) to the unstoppable military might of Nazi Germany.⁸⁴ After the collapse of France in June 1940 and the defeat of an isolated Britain seemingly inevitable, he started to embrace fascism and anti-Semitism.

Working within the HNP was only a starting point for Pirow as he had greater ambitions to grow the movement. In the widely distributed pamphlet, *Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika*, Pirow argued that the Afrikaner had to follow the example of the “new order” which had emerged in fascist countries in Europe such as Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal.⁸⁵ He promoted the idea that South Africa should follow an authoritarian political system based on state authority and the discipline of its people.⁸⁶ For the HNP leadership Pirow had crossed the proverbial “Rubicon” from which there was no political return. Malan saw the NO as a threat to the HNP and the notion of a fascist style dictatorship was rejected as alien to the national character of the Afrikaner and as such was prohibited from becoming official policy within the HNP.⁸⁷

In January 1942 Pirow was cast into the political wilderness by the HNP.⁸⁸ By 1943 his hope of an international order dominated by fascism, which would place him in a position of strength as leader of the NO, vanished with the catastrophic implosion of fascist

⁸³ B. Schoeman, *My lewe in die politiek* (Johannesburg: Perskor, 1978), 63.

⁸⁴ Mouton, “Beyond the Pale’: Oswald Pirow, sir Oswald Mosley, the enemies of the Soviet Union and Apartheid, 1948–1959,” 18.

⁸⁵ Mouton, “Beyond the Pale’: Oswald Pirow, sir Oswald Mosley, the enemies of the Soviet Union and Apartheid, 1948–1959,” 18.

⁸⁶ ironically these could be linked to certain Garrison State characteristics

⁸⁷ Mouton, “Beyond the Pale’: Oswald Pirow, sir Oswald Mosley, the enemies of the Soviet Union and Apartheid, 1948–1959,” 18.

⁸⁸ Mouton, “Beyond the Pale’: Oswald Pirow, sir Oswald Mosley, the enemies of the Soviet Union and Apartheid, 1948–1959,” 18.

Europe.⁸⁹ In a sense it is possible to draw a comparison between the political career of Pirow and certain fascist dictators such as Hitler, Mussolini and Philippe Pétain⁹⁰ of Europe. They share a similar timeline in that Pirow, as well as the beforementioned fascists, came to political prominence during the 1930s yet by the conclusion of WWII their political end, as well as that of Pirow, was all but inevitable. This is unlike Salazar and Franco who survived WWII. After rejecting parliamentary democracy, it was impossible for Pirow to contest the 1943 general election. However, even if he had contested the election, he would have suffered a humiliating defeat as the NO had limited support at best. In fact, the NO ended its life as a mocked organisation, being referred to as “a collection of generals without an army.”⁹¹ This would be the political legacy of Pirow, a man who helped strengthen South Africa’s response to the very ideology he vehemently supported, and in essence, helped to lay the foundation for some of the most important garrison state characteristics in South Africa during the 1930s and 1940s.

The Rising Sun—A Message from Hofmeyr 1940

After seeing the immense influence that Afrikaner Nationalism was having on South African society via the OB and the HNP, Hofmeyr understood that he needed to reach out to different communities, whether it be black African or Jewish, or as in the case with *The Rising Sun*, the Indian community. This was the first special issue of *The Rising Sun*, which was establishing a position as an educational and cultural magazine for the Indian community in South Africa. This was also one of Hofmeyr’s more insightful political moves within his “new liberalism” movement. In 1940, the Indian community would not have been

⁸⁹ Mouton, “‘Beyond the Pale’: Oswald Pirow, sir Oswald Mosley, the enemies of the Soviet Union and Apartheid, 1948–1959,” 18.

⁹⁰ leader of the French Vichy movement

⁹¹ M. Roberts and A. E. G. Trollop, *The South African opposition 1939–1945: An essay in contemporary history* (London: Longmans, 1947), 147.

a focus of South African domestic politics, especially with the war, race relations with black African people and anti-Semitism both in Europe and at home taking more prominence. Yet, Hofmeyr saw an opportunity to build a bridge with a marginalised community, something he would be heavily criticised for in the conservative sectors of society. This did not seem to deter Hofmeyr.

The message by Hofmeyr appeared at a time when Hindus the world over were celebrating the festival of *Diwali*. This was symbolic on two fronts as not only was Hofmeyr reaching out to the Indian community, but Diwali can also be interpreted as commemorating the fall of evil and the victory of truth and good.⁹² Hofmeyr saw that faith in the ultimate triumph of good over evil was one of the essentials of religion. He stated that faith had a deeper basis than mere wishful thinking. It was not just a matter of identifying one's cause with that which is good and noble, and believing that good must prevail. It was also important for Hofmeyr to remind the readers that they must always remember that in time of conflict there were those in the ranks of South Africa's opponents no less convinced that their cause was right and that it would prevail. It was an astute political move of Hofmeyr, to use the war as a means of reaching out to the Indian community.

Hofmeyr continued his message by referring to faith and conviction of how good would triumph over evil. For such faith, he said, to have real value it had to have a deeper foundation. It had to proceed from the conviction that there is a divine power controlling the universe, that though it moved in a way which may seem mysterious at the time, it had nonetheless ordained the ultimate triumph of good over evil. Hofmeyr ended with an important final message in his usual academic style of writing:

⁹² Anon., A message from Henry, The Rising Sun, 1940, Newspaper Article, Speeches by Hofmeyr in English: General, ZA HPRA A1-E-Ea-Ea1-141-Ea104-125, Historical Papers Research Archive, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

The enthronement of absolute right in all human relations is surely the “one far-off” divine event to which the whole creation moves. And we can promote that happy consummation not least by an unwavering faith that, it may not be in our time, yet certainly in the time of the Divine Ruler of the universe, it will be realised.⁹³

As previously mentioned, Hofmeyr saw an opportunity to build a bridge with a marginalised community. The idea of national unity was extremely important, but unfortunately, he was constrained by race relations. Hofmeyr believed that before race-based national unity could be achieved, national unity between Afrikaners and the English in South Africa would need to be achieved.

The Problem of South African National Unity by 1940

National unity was always one of the fundamental issues Hofmeyr focused on during his political career. There are numerous examples, whether it be trying to reconcile the relationship between Afrikaner and English-speaking South Africans or reaching out to marginalised communities. Thus, it would stand to reason that Hofmeyr would make speeches in his official capacity as a member of cabinet to promote it. With the UP, national unity was a more important topic than it was for the HNP or later the NP, both of which were focused more on the wants and needs of Afrikaners. In a speech that was later published, Hofmeyr reached out to an organisation known as the Truth Legion. The Union Unity Truth Service (UUTS), or Truth Legion, was a non-governmental organisation propaganda service, which operated outside state institutions like the Intelligence Services and UDF.⁹⁴ The purpose was to develop an institution in which loyal civilians, concerned

⁹³ Anon., A message from Henry, The Rising Sun, 1940, Newspaper Article.

⁹⁴ P. Dickens, "The truth legion: A search for the ... truth ... legion!," The Observation Post: South African Military History, updated 20 May, No date, accessed 19 December 2023, <https://samihistory.com/tag/the-truth-legion/>.

with the rise of Nazi propaganda and extremism in South Africa would establish a truth service to counter it. The UUTS was established in September 1939, in the same month that Smuts rose to prime ministership and declared war against Nazi Germany. It was inspired by Sir James Rose Innes, Brigadier General H. N. W. Botha, Colonel Sir W. Dalrymple and Sir Charles Smith. They appealed to the public for a publicity fund to finance a nationwide campaign to support Smuts' government. They wanted to combat propaganda from abroad and misrepresentations at home and to promote mutual understanding between all sections of people of South Africa.⁹⁵

The fund, known as the Union Unity Fund, underpinned the objectives of the UUTS movement, which were defined as providing intellectual, moral, and political support for Smuts and the national government in the prosecution of the war.⁹⁶ The South African public was called upon to both support and contribute financially to the Unity Fund and the UUTS. Its headquarters were based in Johannesburg, and Thomas Robertson, a *Rand Daily Mail* journalist, was appointed as its director. He positioned it as "The New Crusade" with General Jan Smuts as its commander in chief. The Truth Legion attempted to combat the propaganda and "Nazification" of the Afrikaner right. It was a perfect platform for Hofmeyr to provide a greater push for his ideas and to elicit an emotional response from a crowd sympathetic to his and Smut's ideas.

One of the vital ideals of the Truth Legion was to achieve of national unity.⁹⁷ It was linked with the campaign for a greater Southern Africa. Hofmeyr began his speech by quoting the constitution of the Truth Legion which read: "The Legion will endeavour to foster a true South African patriotism and culture based on the recognition of the common

⁹⁵ Dickens, "The truth legion: A search for the ... truth ... legion!."

⁹⁶ Dickens, "The truth legion: A search for the ... truth ... legion!."

⁹⁷ Hofmeyr, Address on national unity, 12 June 1940, Speech.

task which faces the people of Southern Africa in the building of a new world.”⁹⁸ In his speech, which the Truth Legion reproduced, Hofmeyr examined the implications of the meaning of national unity as he saw them. At the time, there were people in South Africa who preached a national unity based on the Nazi conceptions of race and blood. This was in direct opposition to what Hofmeyr and Smuts, together with the UP stood for, Hofmeyr argued. It should be noted that the UP and organisations like the Truth Legion were not perfect if judged by today’s standards of race relations, but they were a voice of reason during a very troubling time. Hofmeyr saw that organisations such as the Truth Legion would have the inevitable effect of dividing the European peoples of Southern Africa⁹⁹ and weakening the improving of race relations, which still required more attention. Hofmeyr provided a clear and brilliant analysis of this aspect of national unity and the need to strive towards it. The speech came at an opportune moment for both the UP and the Truth Legion and was delivered to the political discussion group of the UP in Johannesburg on 12 June 1940.

National unity is a term that is often used. The questions Hofmeyr was trying to answer in his speech was: What is meant by national unity? What is the best way to attain it? Hofmeyr believed that it was a worthwhile effort to articulate answers to these questions. Hofmeyr commenced his speech by recalling the six-and-a-half-years of what he called the “old UP government.” These were some of the most fruitful years in South Africa’s history, according to Hofmeyr: years of great achievement and progress. Hofmeyr spoke of the progress that was made possible by the spirit implied in the ideal of national unity, which was at the root of the UP.¹⁰⁰ It was the desire to express that ideal. Hofmeyr

⁹⁸ Hofmeyr, Address on national unity, 12 June 1940, Speech.

⁹⁹ as referred to by Hofmeyr

¹⁰⁰ Hofmeyr, Address on national unity, 12 June 1940, Speech.

would then also recall the general election of 1938, and the outright victory of the Party. It was the appeal of that ideal of national unity which struck a responsive note with the people of South Africa, and resulted in a UP victory. The “people of South Africa” was in effect only the white electorate. This was one of the limitations of the speech made by Hofmeyr.

Then came the crucial days of 4 and 6 September. On those days, the decisions were taken that would forever have an impact on the history of South Africa. On 4 September 1939, the UP caucus refused to accept Hertzog's stance of neutrality in WWII and replaced him with Smuts. Upon becoming prime minister on 6 September Smuts declared South Africa officially at war with Germany and the Axis powers. As a result of the decision to join the war, the UP split. This was an interesting development. In Lasswell's garrison state the rulers of the garrison state will depend upon war scares and not necessarily actual fighting. At the time it looked as if the ideal of national unity was destroyed. It was declared with great acclamation that Afrikanerdom was reunited. Except for a few outliers such as Smuts, Reitz and Hofmeyr, the whole Afrikaner nation had the opportunity to form a solid political bloc. This meant that, if successful, South African politics would come to be identity-based, and that South Africa would be sharply divided into two identity blocs namely Afrikaners and English-speaking South Africans. This is exactly what Hofmeyr was afraid of, although it should be noted that this still ignores race as the Afrikaners and English were still the minority.

Hofmeyr posited national unity as a way of life. At the time of the speech, nine months had passed, and according to Hofmeyr they had now recovered their perspective.¹⁰¹ There were certain things that had become clear as a result. The first was that the ideal of

¹⁰¹ Hofmeyr, Address on national unity, 12 June 1940, Speech.

national unity was still just as essential to South Africa as ever. The second was that the ideal had not lost its grip on most South African people. One need only point to the way in which an exceptionally large section of Afrikaans-speaking people had stood firm, according to Hofmeyr by that ideal despite appeals to their sentiment in those charged times.¹⁰²

Hofmeyr optimistically saw the UP as the party of cooperation in the spirit of national unity, and that following the war, it would regain all of its support.¹⁰³ However, during that turbulent time, the ideal of national unity should be kept alive, according to Hofmeyr, not merely in the spheres of party politics, but also in the normal social and intellectual life of the nation. National unity, Hofmeyr would emphasise, was not just a political creed, it was also a way of life. It was in this spirit of national unity as a way of life that Hofmeyr wanted to speak to his audience. Hofmeyr stated:

Let me again go back a bit in our history. I have read the history of South Africa. Very largely it is concerned with the results of the meeting of two peoples – each with a great past, a proud history, a strong individuality. It would have been impossible for either to allow itself to be swallowed up by the other. So, quarrels between them are inevitable. We have paid dearly for those quarrels.¹⁰⁴

It should be noted that Hofmeyr had blatantly ignored black history. This was also a considerable blind spot for liberal historiography. Magubane states that “In the 1920s and 1930s, while liberal historians were agonising about the “threat” of the Africans who were “refusing” to succumb to Darwin’s laws, a New African Movement was questioning African

¹⁰² Hofmeyr, Address on national unity, 12 June 1940, Speech.

¹⁰³ Hofmeyr, Address on national unity, 12 June 1940, Speech.

¹⁰⁴ Hofmeyr, Address on national unity, 12 June 1940, Speech.

historiography as it was then written and taught.”¹⁰⁵ Magubane critiques South African liberal history as it “rarely ventured beyond a timid empiricism” and suffered from subjectivism.¹⁰⁶ The quarrels that Hofmeyr was referring to were the numerous instances of conflict between Afrikaners and the British, or later English-speaking South Africans. This conflict had now moved into the political sphere of South Africa. However, Hofmeyr and Smuts found themselves not on the side of their fellow Afrikaners. Though it should be noted that while not all Afrikaners supported the idea of neutrality during the war, a large section certainly did. Throughout that turbulent history Hofmeyr had also seen a golden thread of unity running it.¹⁰⁷ For Hofmeyr, the Afrikaners and English-speaking South Africans may be two peoples, speaking two languages, but they were kindred peoples, and the languages belonged to the same family. Furthermore, both groups had no deep-seated religious differences, and they had many political traditions in common, for instance, a common love of liberty. The example used by Hofmeyr was no accident. Hofmeyr thought that it should have been easy for both groups to become a united nation—as it was only “the little things that separate us.”¹⁰⁸ Many South Africans believed that they had attained that ideal in 1910—and they believed it again when fusion triumphed in 1938. By the time of Hofmeyr’s speech, especially after the events of the last few months preceding it, South Africans (particularly white South Africans) were only too painfully conscious of the inadequate realisation of those hopes.

¹⁰⁵ B. Magubane, “Whose memory – whose history? The illusion of liberal and radical historical debates,” in *History making and present day politics: The meaning of collective memory in South Africa*, ed. H. E. Stolten (Stockholm: Elanders Gotab AB, 2007), 258.

¹⁰⁶ Magubane, “Whose memory – whose history? The illusion of liberal and radical historical debates,” 268.

¹⁰⁷ Hofmeyr, Address on national unity, 12 June 1940, Speech.

¹⁰⁸ Hofmeyr, Address on national unity, 12 June 1940, Speech.

Hofmeyr did not see South Africa as a fully developed nation. He saw South Africans as still being overly conscious of the things that divided them and that they continued to emphasise these points of difference. Hofmeyr was looking to change this and to make national unity a way of life. To do that, he believed that the way South Africans viewed history had to change. Hofmeyr stated that:

First, I would speak of the cultivation of a right view in relation to the past. A modern writer has said that past history is present politics. It is certainly true in relation to South Africa. The past is ever with us in our politics. Our controversies derive most of their sustenance from the past. And our past is a colourful past: full of dispute and controversy and strife.¹⁰⁹

He continued:

Happy is the nation, it has been said, that has no history. That cannot be said of South Africa. But happy also is the nation which, having a history, learned to view that history aright, and we can make that true of South Africa. For that, the first essential is perfect frankness. We must not seek to forget the past. We must not shut (*sic*) over the past, crying peace where there is no peace. Let us admit no less frankly that there have been mistakes on both sides. It would have been strange if we had not quarrelled in South Africa—it would have been stranger still if in those quarrels either side had always been right. It is well that we should remember that on both sides and, remembering that be loath to pick up and fling the first stone.¹¹⁰

Hofmeyr saw this as the negative side of South Africa's past in relation to national unity. However, he also saw a positive side. He saw the struggles of the past as valuable especially from the point of view of national unity. Hofmeyr believed that, rightly viewed, a struggle was the best basis for mutual respect. In South Africa, the very length and

¹⁰⁹ Hofmeyr, Address on national unity, 12 June 1940, Speech.

¹¹⁰ Hofmeyr, Address on national unity, 12 June 1940, Speech.

bitterness of the struggle should increase the mutual respect for each other's persistence and strength of character. Thus, for Hofmeyr, there was much "hidden gold" for the South African nation even in the remembrance of past struggles.¹¹¹ The relationship between national unity and the garrison state is complex. While a keen sense of national unity can contribute to a nation's defence and security, an overemphasis on military power and security concerns at the expense of other societal needs can undermine social cohesion and democratic values, potentially leading to tensions within society. Striking a balance between national security and preserving democratic principles is a challenge faced by many nations.¹¹²

Hofmeyr then delved deeper in the history of South Africa, focusing more on the issues of national unity and former struggles. Hofmeyr viewed, and rightly so, South African history as complex. He stated that: "Our history is not just a history of struggles between Dutch and British."¹¹³ He also saw it as a history of steady, solid work in the building-up of a new land, pioneering and paying the price of pioneering, of taming the waste spaces, of opening strange roads.¹¹⁴ This could be fruitfully compared with the frontier tradition of the USA. While both the USA and South Africa have frontier traditions characterised by exploration, settlement, and conflict with indigenous peoples, the specific historical contexts and experiences differ significantly between the two countries. George Fredrickson states that:

Yet, the histories of both America and South Africa are filled with wars between white settlers and indigenous groups fighting to maintain their

¹¹¹ Hofmeyr, Address on national unity, 12 June 1940, Speech.

¹¹² See for example A. Du Pisani, "Democratic governance and security: A conceptual exploration," in *Security and democracy in Southern Africa*, ed. G. Cawthra, A. du Pisani, and A. Omari (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2007).

¹¹³ Hofmeyr, Address on national unity, 12 June 1940, Speech.

¹¹⁴ Hofmeyr, Address on national unity, 12 June 1940, Speech.

territory. Celebrants of white expansionism have thus been unable to ignore entirely the historical record of conquest and dispossession. To justify the forcible displacement and subjugation of American Indians or indigenous Africans, they have resorted to the ethnocentric—and at times downright racist—argument that the encroaching white civilization was so vastly superior to the way of life of "savages" who got in its way that human progress or the will of God was served by its triumphant march.¹¹⁵

The interaction between frontier traditions and the garrison state in South Africa can be seen in various historical events, such as the Anglo-Zulu War and the Anglo-Boer Wars. These events involved the use of military force to establish and defend colonial frontiers, as well as to enforce policies that marginalised indigenous populations. In that context Dutch and British both had a part to play, sometimes cooperatively, sometimes separately, but both had made their contributions.

Hofmeyr went as far as saying that in recent years they had specially honoured the Voortrekkers and rightly so, but they had no monopoly of pioneering in South Africa.¹¹⁶ This was a risky statement, and it would not have won Hofmeyr any friends among the conservative Afrikaner groups in South Africa. Hofmeyr would have known that a statement like that could easily be taken out of context. He pandered further to his audience by ending his speech noting:

Even at Dingaan's kraal there was one of British blood among the slain; there were several others in subsequent fighting between Voortrekkers and Zulus in Natal. A community of sacrifice is no unworthy foundation of unity of equal nationhood. And don't let us forget the other British contributions to the building-up of South Africa: the labour of British missionaries, and all that

¹¹⁵ G. M. Fredrickson, *The comparative imagination on the history of racism, nationalism, and social movements* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 38.

¹¹⁶ Hofmeyr, Address on national unity, 12 June 1940, Speech.

British capital, and ability, and energy have done in laying the foundations of our industrial welfare.¹¹⁷

Hofmeyr's specific brand of liberalism was an integral part of Britain's late imperialism. Hofmeyr did not consider the settler colonialism that caused the infighting. The concept of settler colonialism can be defined as a system of oppression based on genocide and colonialism, which aimed to displace a population of a nation (oftentimes indigenous people) and replace it with a new settler population. Settler colonialism in South Africa refers to the historical process by which European settlers, primarily of Dutch and British origin, established control over the indigenous peoples and land of the region. This process began with the arrival of the Dutch East India Company in the mid-seventeenth century, followed by the establishment of the Dutch Cape Colony at the Cape of Good Hope. Settler colonialism suggests that settler colonial phenomena possess a mimetic character, and that a recurrent need to disavow produces a circumstance where the actual operation of settler colonial practices is concealed behind other occurrences.¹¹⁸

Lasswell Publishes *The Garrison State* 1941

Though the garrison state has already been covered in detail, the chronology of this thesis makes it important to highlight Lasswell's publication of "The Garrison State" in 1941. At this point, Lasswell observed a correlation between diminishing democratic values and altered trends in global politics.¹¹⁹ For example, he noted the movement away from symbols and practices which characterised a free society. This was often accompanied by a move toward slogans, doctrines, and structures of despotism. Lasswell visualised a downward flow of authority that would ultimately result in impotency for civilian politicians and

¹¹⁷ Hofmeyr, Address on national unity, 12 June 1940, Speech.

¹¹⁸ L. Veracini, *Settler colonialism: A theoretical overview* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 14.

¹¹⁹ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

democratically oriented institutions.¹²⁰ As the garrison state model assumed equal vulnerability by civilians and military personnel, the military elite specialists would develop managerial abilities, thereby becoming an important factor among the ruling elite. Consequently, Lasswell conceived of the garrison state as the eventual result of the increased centrality in society of the specialists on violence. In directing society towards a state of constant readiness for war, this would force the militarisation of the civil order as distinctions between civilian and military institutions were eliminated.¹²¹ These changes could be accepted as totalitarian regimes were accepted by some western intellectuals who did not grasp, or played down, the military aspects of government while embracing ideological claims to social justice, economic rights, material progress, and increased political participation. Indeed, Lasswell conceived of the garrison state construct as the logical result of the movement from the militarised societies of WWII. Similarly, he noted that De Tocqueville, writing during the mid-nineteenth century, suggested that if a military government were to be established among any of the nations of the times it would result in a regular, clear, exact, and absolute system of government where the people would become a reflection of the army, and the community regimented like a garrison.

Acceptance of the garrison state, too, would be facilitated by a more egalitarian distribution of income, which would reduce the resistance of the less privileged, even though economic production would be shifted from consumer to military goods.¹²² Interestingly, enhancement of the distribution of material goods to the poor is reflective of a basic premise in the development of a welfare state. It was at this moment (1940s) that

¹²⁰ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

¹²¹ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

¹²² Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

South Africa's welfare state was introduced.¹²³ Here, however, the perception of a more democratic distribution of economic resources was conceived as a component of the development of a warfare state.¹²⁴ Where and how does Lasswell's garrison state apply in the post-Cold War world? This question can be the basis for further investigation.

At this stage, South Africa exhibited several developing garrison state characteristics. By the end of 1941, the militarisation of South African society was embedded. The foundation was laid by Pirow but with Smuts at the helm, South Africa was a prime example of a country where the "specialists on violence" was in control of the government. The fight against Nazism and joining the Allied forces in WWII functioned to entrench the garrison state within South Africa as Lasswell foresaw.

United Party Newsletter—National Socialism: What it Means

In 1942, the UP issued a newsletter on National Socialism and the state of WWII at the time.¹²⁵ The newsletter provided a definition of National Socialism as well as criticising opposition politicians such as Malan and Pirow for their stance against South Africa's participation in WWII. Again, it is important to mention that large sections of the population, mostly Afrikaners, were against Smut's war policy from the outset of the war.¹²⁶ Some were motivated by political reasons and hoped that a German victory would promote a republican ideal for South Africa.¹²⁷ It was important for the UP to combat these ideas, and they used various forms of propaganda. This newsletter provides an interesting example of pro-war propaganda from the 1940s. It also gives insight into how the UP tried to take

¹²³ Seekings, "Visions, hopes and views about the future: The radical movement of South African welfare reform," 44.

¹²⁴ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

¹²⁵ Hofmeyr, Address on national unity, 12 June 1940, Speech.WHP, A1/Ea 104-125, "National-Socialism: What it means", 1942, no pagination.

¹²⁶ Van der Waag, *A military history of modern South Africa*, 178.

¹²⁷ Van der Waag, *A military history of modern South Africa*, 178.

control of the narrative regarding South Africa's participation in WWII. The newsletter began by looking back at June 1940 and Dunkirk.¹²⁸ "The Battle of Dunkirk" (also known as the "Evacuation of Dunkirk") took place in 1940 when hundreds of thousands of Allied troops had to be evacuated from the harbour and beaches of Dunkirk, France. It focused on the fortunate discovery that Nazi Germany had amassed armaments on a scale which had previously been unheard of: "No nation or combination of nations could then hope to stand against the Nazi horde."¹²⁹ This is an interesting wording used to refer to the Nazis as a "horde." At the time Britain still had breathing space before the "Huns"¹³⁰ could invade.¹³¹ The language being used by the UP should again be noted. Within the space of two sentences the Nazi's were referred to as a "Horde" and "Huns." This was important on two fronts: first, the demonisation of the Nazis, and second, to link Pirow and Malan to "Hordes" and "Huns." The newsletter then pivoted to honouring Churchill: "The hour created the man Churchill to lead a country determined to fight alone."¹³² After Dunkirk, Britain and the dominions entered the war in earnest. The newsletter admitted that Britain and her dominions made mistakes during the war, however, in an attempt to create a positive impression, the mistakes made by Britain and her dominions were compared to those of Hitler and the Nazis, and according to the newsletter Hitler had made far more mistakes.¹³³ Hitler's mistakes were also amplified by saying: "Without these mistakes the world would have lain at his feet."

¹²⁸ R. Atkin, *Pillar of fire: Dunkirk 1940* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1990), 1.

¹²⁹ J. H. Hofmeyr, National-Socialism: What it means, 1910–1948, Speeches by Hofmeyr in English: General, ZA HPRA A1--E-Ea-Ea104-125, Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, <https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/c6uwr>

¹³⁰ as the UP referred to the Nazis

¹³¹ Hofmeyr, National-Socialism: What it means, 1910–1948, Speech.

¹³² Hofmeyr, National-Socialism: What it means, 1910–1948, Speech.

¹³³ Hofmeyr, National-Socialism: What it means, 1910–1948, Speech.

The newsletter continued by saying:

The year 1941 gave Hitler more and more victories, but his unhappiness increased. Paradoxically enough the greater the number of his victories, the stronger the chief opponent became, and greater the misery into which he landed his own people and that of his allies. The year 1942 opens a new era. Britain and the dominions no longer fight alone. Holland, Free France, and Norway have larger armies ready to fight against Hitler than they had in 1938, and that in spite of them being occupied countries. Every occupied country has its quota ready to fight for freedom.¹³⁴

The newsletter then turned towards America's participation and entrance into the war. The newsletter referred to the United States of America as "The world's greatest democracy."¹³⁵

This raises an interesting point of the extent to which the USA had an influence on the direction other countries took domestically, which implied Lasswell's theory could have wider application than perhaps even he recognised. Adam Tooze argues for the emergence of the US as a global power post WWI not because of the exercise of the military power that it possessed, but rather because of a "privileged detachment" from costly international matters.¹³⁶ America would be carrying on their war against Hitler in a manner as effective as the march of regiments and was now involved in the war: "boots and all," as General Smuts had "prophesied."¹³⁷ Russia was also still able to deal hard blows after six months of war.¹³⁸

By saying this, the newsletter was also trying to show how the losses that Russia had suffered at the time were not as severe as previously thought. It is interesting to note that

¹³⁴ Hofmeyr, National-Socialism: What it means, 1910–1948, Speech.

¹³⁵ Hofmeyr, National-Socialism: What it means, 1910–1948, Speech.

¹³⁶ A. Tooze, *The Deluge: The Great War and the remaking of global order, 1916–1931* (London: Penguin Books, 2015).

¹³⁷ Hofmeyr, National-Socialism: What it means, 1910–1948, Speech.

¹³⁸ Hofmeyr, National-Socialism: What it means, 1910–1948, Speech.

the newsletter mentions Russia and not the Soviet Union. This could have been an attempt to separate the communist ideology from the Soviet Union which was an ally. Ian Liebenberg notes in his review of South African relations with Russia in the twentieth century, that “While some South Africans admired communism (and the Soviet state), others feared and loathed the “new Russia” and its ideology.”¹³⁹ Thus, referring to “Russia” allowed the government to signal an ally while downplaying communism. The 1940s and 1950s can be connected via the perceived threat to the garrison state of Communism. As Liebenberg states, in the 1950s before South Africa became a white republic, “The Suppression of Communism Act¹⁴⁰ declared communism unlawful. The Act stated that Communists were those following the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Trotsky.”¹⁴¹

Pirow and Malan now became primary targets. The newsletter stated that: “No statesman may longer believe that Hitler will win the war. Crime does not pay—the police get you in the end.”¹⁴² This was a direct reference to Pirow and Malan. Pirow and Malan were referred to as the “politicians and sharpshooters” who had “announce[d] the end of the war and a Hitler victory as early as August 1940.”¹⁴³ As shown by the opening quote of this chapter, Pirow and to an extent, Malan, had been discredited and had less influence in South Africa than ever. The newsletter was also trying to link Pirow and Malan to Hitler and finally pushed for the further discrediting of Hitler by saying: “Gangsters such as Hitler will fight to the last drop of other people’s blood, but the stars foretell that before 1942 is out

¹³⁹ I. Liebenberg, “Viewing “the other” over a hundred and a score more years: South Africa and Russia (1890–2010),” *The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa* 6, no. 1 (December 2010): 443. Ian Liebenberg, “Viewing “the other” over a hundred and a score more years: South Africa and Russia (1890–2010)” *The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa* 6, no.1 (December 2010): 443.

¹⁴⁰ Suppression of Communism Act, No.44 of 1950, (1950).

¹⁴¹ Liebenberg, “Viewing “the other” over a hundred and a score more years: South Africa and Russia (1890–2010),” 444. Liebenberg, “Viewing,” 444.

¹⁴² Hofmeyr, National-Socialism: What it means, 1910–1948, Speech.

¹⁴³ Hofmeyr, National-Socialism: What it means, 1910–1948, Speech.

we will have arrived at the turning point.” This was clearly propaganda. In light of the garrison state, it is also important to show how, even though South Africa was very militarised at the time, it was anti-Nazi. The garrison state can be seen as a product of the democratic struggle with fascism.

The newsletter then continued to focus on National Socialism and its ideological content. For the purposes of the newsletter, it was of little use going to a dictionary to define the term “National Socialism.” The newsletter split the words “National” and “Socialism.” “National” meant “referring to a people or nation” and sometimes “that which refers to a geographical group.” “Socialism” referred to a society wherein the means of production, distribution and exchange was owned by the society or state. In the Socialist state there could be no private ownership of land or farms. The newsletter used Russia as an example of a Socialist or Communist state. It also stated that socialism and communism were synonymous terms: the first indicating the “good of society, and the second, “the good of the community.”¹⁴⁴

The newsletter then stated:

Mr. O. Pirow, like his hero, Hitler, makes use of the words “National Socialism” and, at the same time, seeks to destroy the “Communists” or those who want to propagate “Socialism.” This paradox needs to worry you, for as we shall see later from this article, both Hitler’s and Pirow’s doctrines are full of paradoxes. How does Hitler, the anti-communist, come to use the word Socialism? (Incidentally, we may remark that the word Nazi contains the initial letters of the German words for “The National Socialist Workers” Party”).

¹⁴⁴ Hofmeyr, National-Socialism: What it means, 1910–1948, Speech.

It continued:

When Hitler initiated his movement in Germany, the chief slogans were: “Germany must stand alone. All contracts and treaties entered into with foreign governments must be repudiated. We must become strong enough to defy all nations. We need more room to live, and we need raw materials now monopolised by others.”¹⁴⁵

It was this policy of Germany alone, and for herself, that gave Hitler’s movement the title of “National.” Since Hitler’s theories at the outset did not make much appeal to the merchants and wealthy classes of Germany, he set out to gain the favour of the working class. It had been charged against him that his recruits were drawn from the lower and criminal classes. As a large number of German workers were Socialists by conviction, Hitler’s adoption of the words “National Socialism” helped him to obtain adherents. The word “Socialism” had no meaning in the title of Hitler’s party, and it had no meaning when used by Pirow in relation to his movement or New Order, the newsletter argued.¹⁴⁶ The newsletter then tried to explain that to arrive at an understanding of “National Socialism” as referring to Germany or to “Mr. O. Pirow’s kindergarten in Pretoria,” we have to disassociate the words from their common meaning and treat them as new words introduced into the language by Hitler.¹⁴⁷ In a similar way to the ways in which the terms garrison state acquire new meaning in the way used by Lasswell. The newsletter then concluded by quoting Hitler’s explanation of National Socialism:

Democracy is worn out. Parliament is useless. The people must have a leader and obey him. The State is the ideal. The State is the supreme being. The individual must conform to the ideal of the State, and the State itself is

¹⁴⁵ Hofmeyr, National-Socialism: What it means, 1910–1948, Speech.

¹⁴⁶ Hofmeyr, National-Socialism: What it means, 1910–1948, Speech.

¹⁴⁷ Hofmeyr, National-Socialism: What it means, 1910–1948, Speech.

represented in the führer or dictator. The church, the press, and every thought and action of society must conform to the State and the guidance of the führer.¹⁴⁸

It is also important to look at other definitions and explanations of National Socialism considering the UP newsletter.

The Yad Vashem provides us with an important background of National Socialism. According to the Yad Vashem, the notion of combining the concepts of *national* and *social* became popular in Germany even before WWI.¹⁴⁹ It is commonly believed that National Socialism only became a popular concept in the late 1920s or early 1930s in Germany. However, already in 1919, an anti-Semitic right-wing political party called the *Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (German Workers' Party) was founded in Munich. It is important to note that this party adopted the combined "national-social" ideology. This is the same ideology that was mentioned in the UP newsletter. Also, in 1920 the party added "national socialist" to its name and thus became the *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (National Socialist German Workers' Party or NSDAP or Nazi Party). A year later in 1921 Adolf Hitler, who started out as a public speaker for the party, became its undisputed leader, the führer.¹⁵⁰

National Socialism was not only popular in Germany. The National Socialist ideology was an outgrowth of earlier political theories that also gave birth to fascism, a political movement that became popular in Italy even before the Nazis took over in Germany.¹⁵¹ The Yad Vashem also provides us with a background of the racist element within National

¹⁴⁸ Hofmeyr, National-Socialism: What it means, 1910–1948, Speech.

¹⁴⁹ Y. Vashem, "National Socialism," 2023, accessed 19 December 2023, <https://collections.yadvashem.org/en/about/o5941>. "National-Socialism", Yad Vashem, accessed December 19, 2023, <https://collections.yadvashem.org/en/about/o5941>

¹⁵⁰ Vashem, "National Socialism." "National-Socialism", Yad Vashem

¹⁵¹ Vashem, "National Socialism." "National-Socialism", Yad Vashem

Socialism. Nazism combined the ideas of racial anti-Semitism.¹⁵² Another aspect of National Socialism that tends to be overlooked is Social Darwinism, an ideology that believes that certain individuals or ethnic groups are dominant because of their inherent genetic superiority.¹⁵³ In South Africa, the concept of “scientific racism” was applied.¹⁵⁴ Racial ideologies were shaped and justified through pseudo-scientific means, particularly within the context of South African society. Scientific theories were employed to support and perpetuate racial hierarchies, discriminatory policies, and segregationist practices. The rise of scientific racism occurred during the late nineteenth century.¹⁵⁵ It is important to consider the complex relationship between theories of essential racial difference and the political rise of segregation and apartheid.¹⁵⁶ Finally *lebensraum*, which was the belief that Germans needed more “living space,” more territory, particularly in Eastern Europe was another major tenet of National Socialism.¹⁵⁷

The issue about the fight against National Socialism and the war effort dominated the build-up to the 1943 Election in South Africa. This election was another opportunity for Smuts and Hofmeyr together with the rest of the UP to strengthen their grip on political power in South Africa. It was also an opportunity for the continued development of a garrison state in the country.

¹⁵² specifically that Jews were inferior by virtue of their race, or genetic makeup

¹⁵³ Vashem, “National Socialism.” “National-Socialism”, Yad Vashem

¹⁵⁴ S. Dubow, *Illicit union: Scientific racism in modern South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 1. Saul Dubow, *Illicit Union: Scientific Racism in modern South Africa*, (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1995), 1.

¹⁵⁵ Dubow, *Illicit union: Scientific racism in modern South Africa*, 1. Dubow, *Illicit Union*, 1.

¹⁵⁶ Dubow, *Illicit union: Scientific racism in modern South Africa*, 1. Dubow, *Illicit Union*, 1.

¹⁵⁷ Dubow, *Illicit union: Scientific racism in modern South Africa*. “National-Socialism”, Yad Vashem

The Election of 1943

In 1943 the election presented a different picture for South Africans than the previous election.¹⁵⁸ A wartime election always presents the electorate with questions vital to national security. The results of the 1943 election, the chapter argues, provided the UP with a false sense of security as Smuts, being a military man, enjoyed greater support in wartime. Yet, it should be noted that the cost of war was a source of concern even for supporters of the government.¹⁵⁹ The particular insistence of Jan Smuts in September 1939 that the Union government declare war on Germany appeared to contradict the principle of “South Africa first” on which Afrikaners and English South Africans had come together in 1934, and that decision pushed Afrikaners by the tens of thousands from adherence to the UP, which had until that moment, been the embodiment of the policy of conciliation.¹⁶⁰ Even if these desertions were not so numerous as to result in the necessary defeat of the UP at the next general election, as would seem to be the case, they did at least eliminate the electoral margin of safety for the government and thereby virtually ensured, Stultz argues, that Prime Minister Smuts would be beaten whenever the political tide should next turn against him.¹⁶¹

This view of the importance of the 1939 war vote for South African politics, and specifically its contribution to the defeat of Smuts in 1948, has largely been overlooked because it did not result in an immediate change of government, and four years later Smuts and the truncated UP were returned to power at the general election of 1943. It can be argued, as Stultz did, that the 1943 election results exaggerated the true level of partisan

¹⁵⁸ Van der Waag, *A military history of modern South Africa*, 203. van der Waag, *A Military History*, 203.

¹⁵⁹ Van der Waag, *A military history of modern South Africa*, 203. van der Waag, *A Military History*, 203.

¹⁶⁰ Stultz, *Afrikaner politics in South Africa 1934–1948*, 5. Newell M. Stultz, *Afrikaner politics in South Africa 1934–1948*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 5.

¹⁶¹ Stultz, *Afrikaner politics in South Africa 1934–1948*, 5. Stultz, *Afrikaner*, 5.

attachments to the UP because of temporary and special political conditions. From this perspective, the victory of the Nationalists over Smuts in 1948 in terms of electoral realignment is less dramatic and owes less to the eleventh-hour appeal of the doctrine of race apartheid than most customarily supposed.

The year 1943 also followed shortly after the issuing of the Atlantic Charter (1941) which was a “statement that set out American and British goals for the world after the end of WWII.” A. B. Xuma, the president-general of the African National Congress, responded to the Atlantic Charter from the African perspective:

In South Africa, Africans have no freedom of movement, no freedom of choice of employment, no right of choice of residence and no right of freedom to purchase land or fixed property from anyone and anywhere. Under the guise of segregation, they are subjected to serious educational, political and economic disabilities and discriminations which are the chief causes of their apparent slow progress.¹⁶²

Xuma also used Smuts’ own words against him by quoting his dismissal of the ANC as agitators:

Do not mind being called agitators. Let them call you any names they like, but get on with the job and see that matters that vitally require attention, Native health, Native food, the treatment of Native children and all those cognate questions that are basic to the welfare of South Africa are attended to.¹⁶³

The 1943 general election was the ninth in the Union’s history.¹⁶⁴ During the lead-up to the election, Smuts issued a statement saying that the 1943 election should be seen as a

¹⁶² Xuma, "Africans' claims in South Africa 14 December 1943."

¹⁶³ Xuma, "Africans' claims in South Africa 14 December 1943."

¹⁶⁴ Stultz, *The Nationalists in opposition 1934–1948*, 85.

referendum to decide the gravest issue South Africa had ever faced.¹⁶⁵ Smuts was quoted as saying:

We ask you to decide, and therefore I have called this election, which is not merely one of ins-and-outs. It is not an ordinary election at all. This is a referendum of the people of this country on the gravest issue it has ever faced in its history, more grave than any other we may have to face for generations to come. You have to give your decision now.¹⁶⁶

Smuts posed this election not only as a referendum, but also as a duty for South Africans, arguing an electoral victory for the UP would facilitate a military victory in the war.¹⁶⁷ Smuts also saw this as a potential national victory to unite South Africa.¹⁶⁸ After four years of war, it seemed as if the South African public did not show overt signs of war-weariness.¹⁶⁹ The election was framed as a single issue election, namely whether South Africa remained at war, or if it moved to a policy of neutrality.¹⁷⁰ Outside of South Africa, it was noted that Great Britain had taken a keen interest in the 1943 election.¹⁷¹ This was not surprising as Smuts had a clear pro-British attitude in his important role as field marshal to Churchill. The six main political parties taking part in the election were split into two separate caucuses, one pro-war, the other pro-neutrality.¹⁷² The pro-war caucus was made up out of three parties namely the UP, Labour and the DP.¹⁷³ The pro-neutrality caucus was also made up out of three parties namely the NP, the AP and *Volkseenheid*.¹⁷⁴

¹⁶⁵ Anon., "Gen. Smuts issues stirring call to nation," *Rand Daily Mail*, 6 July 1943.

¹⁶⁶ Anon., "Gen. Smuts issues stirring call to nation," *Rand Daily Mail*, 6 July 1943.

¹⁶⁷ Anon., "Union polls today in vital election," *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 July 1943.

¹⁶⁸ Anon., "Union polls today in vital election," *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 July 1943.

¹⁶⁹ Anon., "Nation's pulse is firm after 4 years of war," *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 July 1943.

¹⁷⁰ Anon., "War or neutrality the only issue," *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 July 1943.

¹⁷¹ Anon., "Britain shows keen interest," *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 July 1943.

¹⁷² Anon., "UP majority over all parties," *Rand Daily Mail*, 30 July 1943.

¹⁷³ Anon., "UP majority over all parties," *Rand Daily Mail*, 30 July 1943.

¹⁷⁴ Anon., "UP majority over all parties," *Rand Daily Mail*, 30 July 1943.

In the 1943 election there were also a record number of Independents, most of whom supported the government's war policy, as did the Communist Party and the minuscule Independent Labour Party, which also nominated candidates.¹⁷⁵ The coalition won a striking victory, obtaining 105 seats to the HNP's 43, the only opposition candidates elected. With eighty-nine seats the UP alone enjoyed a majority of twenty-five seats over all other parties and groups in the House of Assembly.

Quoting Southey on the Battle of Blenheim, Smuts called it a "famous victory," a view that still seems to be accepted.¹⁷⁶ Conversely, some contemporary observers believed that the HNP had experienced "a political catastrophe." The perception of a UP "triumph" in 1943 continues to give rise to difficulties about the gulf between the magnificence of that victory and the poverty of the UP's performance five years later. Attempts to bridge the disparity have also inspired a search for what are thought to be the special aspects of 1948, such as the HNP's new apartheid policy, which could have turned Afrikaner voters against the UP in large numbers. The explanation is obvious. There was only the illusion of a "triumph" in 1943. The signs were evident at the time. The extent of the victory, even the victory itself, stemmed from a combination of factors, some contrived by the government, others fortuitous. Collectively, however, they contributed to a misleading impression of the UP's strength in the country in 1943. If the artificial nature of its victory in 1943 is accepted, then the UP's defeat in 1948 is easier to grasp.¹⁷⁷ The perception of an external threat in Nazi Germany and the attenuate patriotism can also more broadly be used as explanations.

It is important to look at previous elections and note how the support of the Afrikaner electorate influenced the result as their support would not be consistent for

¹⁷⁵ Stultz, *The Nationalists in opposition 1934–1948*, 85.

¹⁷⁶ Tothill, "The South African general election of 1943," 77.

¹⁷⁷ Tothill, "The South African general election of 1943," 77.

Smuts in later elections. There can be no doubt that the NP achieved its victory in the 1929 election due to the support of the Afrikaner electorate.¹⁷⁸ The traditions of the party, the nature of its program, its Afrikaans propaganda, together with its largely rural base made it clear that its constituency was not the English South African community. Afrikaners were nearly unanimous in their support for the party. When Smuts and Hertzog concluded their coalition agreement in February 1933, neither intended that the arrangement should be any more than a temporary and ostensible political truce.¹⁷⁹ Smuts' political strategy in the crisis year of 1932 had been to emphasise the broad-based "national" appeal of this SAP, in contrast to what he hoped to portray as the narrow sectionalism of Hertzog's NP. His invitation to Hertzog to participate in a coalition government at the end of January 1933 was probably intended as a tactical *coup*.

The substantial drop in the UP's Afrikaner support between 1938 and 1943 had to do with circumstances prevailing in South Africa at the time, including the Hertzogites departure in 1939.¹⁸⁰ The outcome of the war debate of 4 September 1939 brought about a complete change in South African politics and led to a new political orientation.¹⁸¹ Nationalist Afrikanerdom was subjected to twin political pressures during the war: from the side of the government and from within its own ranks.¹⁸² The first was a unifying factor while the second, manifested as a leadership struggle, had a propensity to drive Afrikaners apart. Judging by the election results, government pressure was the stronger of the two. Even so, the Afrikaner internal conflict had a direct and measurable effect on the outcome

¹⁷⁸ Stultz, *Afrikaner politics in South Africa 1934–1948*, 5.

¹⁷⁹ Stultz, *The Nationalists in opposition 1934–1948*, 85.

¹⁸⁰ Tothill, "The South African general election of 1943," 80.

¹⁸¹ A. Wessels, "South Africa and World War II: The decisive first two years on the home front," *Journal for Contemporary History* 24, no. 2 (1999): 2.

¹⁸² Tothill, "The South African general election of 1943," 80.

of the 1943 general election by contributing to the pressure of third-party candidates in many Transvaal and Orange Free State constituencies, especially on the *platteland*. In four cases these cost the HNP the seat.¹⁸³ It also seemed as if the divisions of 1939 had not fully healed. It is important to note that Hertzog was convinced that the outcome of the voting of the war debate of 4 September 1939 was not a correct representation of the feelings of the voters and advised Governor-General Sir Patrick Duncan, to dissolve parliament and call a general election.¹⁸⁴ In addition, in the 1943 election, Afrikaner voters in *platteland* constituencies in all four provinces stayed away from the polls, in some instances letting in the UP candidate.¹⁸⁵

Smuts' takeover of the government by a narrow parliamentary majority, what the opposition called "a parliamentary *coup d'état*," and the precipitation of the country into war on that basis, increased the feeling of alienation between Afrikaner and English speakers evident from the beginning of Union.¹⁸⁶ The bitterness unleashed by the war, on the Afrikaner side at least, would endure for years.¹⁸⁷ With the end of the fusion era, the old political battle-lines between Afrikaans and English-speaking white South Africans were to a large extent once again drawn.¹⁸⁸ English speakers, not all of whom were of British origin, generally inhabited and controlled the major urban areas, even Pretoria and Bloemfontein where Afrikaners were in the majority. Most cities were therefore noticeably "British" in sentiment and provided a backdrop for the jingoism so abhorrent to Afrikaners. Overt and

¹⁸³ Tothill, "The South African general election of 1943," 80.

¹⁸⁴ Wessels, "South Africa and World War II: The decisive first two years on the home front," 2.

¹⁸⁵ Tothill, "The South African general election of 1943," 80.

¹⁸⁶ Tothill, "The South African general election of 1943," 80.

¹⁸⁷ Tothill, "The South African general election of 1943," 80.

¹⁸⁸ Wessels, "South Africa and World War II: The decisive first two years on the home front," 2.

covert government actions contributed greatly to the divisions between the two language groups.

A leading cause of friction was the State of Emergency set in motion by Proclamation 201 of 14 September 1939.¹⁸⁹ The series of emergency regulations issued under the proclamation formed the framework for the management of the wartime economy and the internal security situation.¹⁹⁰ This was very garrison state-like. Afterwards a round-up of enemy aliens commenced. The internment of Union nationals, at first mainly naturalised citizens, soon followed. The number of “native born” internees eventually exceeded the naturalised ones. The internment policy may have been the greatest single cause of the discontent among Afrikaners during the war. That many of the younger internees came to occupy prominent positions in the national life, including B. J. Vorster, the country’s seventh prime minister, heightens the sense of drama which still surrounds this issue.¹⁹¹ The HNP never deviated from the view, which persisted, that the internments were “aimed and directed against the great majority of Afrikaners who are opposed to the war policy of the government.”¹⁹²

Dan O'Meara saw that the intra-Afrikaner battles of the early 1940s “present an often bewildering array of issues and disputes.”¹⁹³ Michael Roberts and A. E. G. Trollip believed that they were fought over principles rather than representing “the manifestation

¹⁸⁹ Anon., “State of Emergency: Proclamation 201,” *Government Gazette* (The Union of South Africa), 14 September 1939. State of Emergency, Proclamation 201, 14 September 1939, The Union of South Africa, *Government Gazette*

¹⁹⁰ Tothill, “The South African general election of 1943,” 80.

¹⁹¹ D. Dalcanton, “Vorster and the politics of confidence 1966–1974,” *African Affairs* 75, no. 299 (1976): 163. David Dalcanton, “Vorster and the politics of confidence 1966–1974,” *African Affairs* 75, no. 299 (April 1976): 163.

¹⁹² Tothill, “The South African general election of 1943,” 80.

¹⁹³ D. O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme: Class, capital and ideology in the development of Afrikaner nationalism 1934–1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 124. Dan O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme: Class, Capital and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism 1934–1948* (Johannesburg: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 124.

of the rival ambitions of ruthless professionals.”¹⁹⁴ This should be regarded as a struggle for power, primarily between the HNP and the OB, involving their leaders rather than the organisations.¹⁹⁵ The leaders of both organisations were not known to be men who easily conformed to the ways of others. Malan’s problem with Dr. J. P. J. (Hans) van Rensburg, the OB commandant-general, and *vice versa* was that neither was prepared to subordinate himself to the other.¹⁹⁶ The fact that, of the opposition groups, only the HNP was a properly organised political party with a strong constituency infrastructure was vital in its struggle to assert itself against the others. In fact, it finally achieved dominance as a result of the 1943 general election. Van Rensburg’s hopes were pinned on Germany winning the war, failing which the cards were stacked against him and his best chance of gaining power was to capture the HNP and its machinery. There he failed dismally if he seriously set out to do so. However, the HNP leadership was aware of the danger of “white anting”¹⁹⁷ and it took particular care that only convinced party supporters, free of OB connections or sympathies, were adopted as candidates for parliamentary and provincial council seats.¹⁹⁸

The UP’s victory in 1943 was less “famous” than Smuts believed. The triumph was flawed. It was, in fact, mainly the soldiers’ vote which created the illusion of a triumph.¹⁹⁹ All other factors remaining the same, including the struggle for power within the ranks of Afrikanerdom, the UP would have won the general election without the soldiers’ vote, but

¹⁹⁴ Roberts and Trollip, *The South African opposition 1939–1945: An essay in contemporary history*, 4.M. Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip, *The South African Opposition 1939–1945: An Essay in Contemporary History* (London: Longmans Green, 1947), 4.

¹⁹⁵ L. M. Fourie, “Die Ossewa-Brandwag in die Suid-Afrikaanse politiek, 1939–1952,” in *Geskiedenis van die Ossewa-Brandwag*, ed. P. F. van der Schyff (Unpublished report, 1984), 2–3. LM Fourie. “Die Ossewa-Brandwag in die Suid-Afrikaanse politiek, 1939–1952”. In PF van der Schyff (ed), *Geskiedenis van die Ossewa-Brandwag*. Unpublished report. Department of History, PU for CHE, 1984, 2–3.

¹⁹⁶ Tothill, “The South African general election of 1943,” 81.

¹⁹⁷ A term often used in reference to groups such as political parties or organisations where information from group insiders is ‘leaked’ or used to undermine the goals of the group.

¹⁹⁸ Tothill, “The South African general election of 1943,” 81.

¹⁹⁹ Tothill, “The South African general election of 1943,” 94.

the results would more accurately have reflected its real standing in the country.²⁰⁰ If there had been no soldiers' vote and if nationalist Afrikanerdom had been united, the election, at least in terms of seats, could have been closely run, producing something approaching the 1948 result.²⁰¹ Louis Esselen, secretary general of the UP, was one of the few associated with the UP who appreciated that the 1943 victory was not a guarantee of future success.²⁰² Esselen was a friend of Smuts's from the days before the Anglo-Boer War.²⁰³ Esselen would have been prepared to give Smuts unpleasant facts in a way that successors in the organisation would not.²⁰⁴ It may also be true that the long continuance in office of an old friend in a post requiring energy and ingenuity is an illustration of a general failure on Smuts's part to recruit new men or to take questions of organisation seriously enough. In a despatch reporting on the depressing "picture of his party's future" Esselen had drawn in one of their conversations, the American minister quoted him as having said that "we must do something—a lot of things—constructive in this country, and that soon, or people will turn against us." What Esselen did not realise was that most Afrikaners had already done so.²⁰⁵

There had been deep disunity in South Africa on the war-issue, thus the general election was not postponed.²⁰⁶ The issue between participation in the war and withdrawal from it was central. Polling took place on 7 July.²⁰⁷ Smuts faced the electorate with vastly increased prestige.²⁰⁸ He had delivered on his promises. Pursuing a moderate policy at

²⁰⁰ Tothill, "The South African general election of 1943," 94.

²⁰¹ Tothill, "The South African general election of 1943," 94.

²⁰² Tothill, "The South African general election of 1943," 94.

²⁰³ Hancock, *Smuts: The fields of force 1919–1950*, 283.

²⁰⁴ Hancock, *Smuts: The fields of force 1919–1950*, 283.

²⁰⁵ Tothill, "The South African general election of 1943," 94.

²⁰⁶ Anon., "The South African election," *The Spectator Archive*, 1 July 1943, <http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/2nd-july-1943/1/the-south-african-election>.

²⁰⁷ Anon., "The South African election," *The Spectator Archive*, 1 July 1943. "The South African Election"

²⁰⁸ Anon., "The South African election," *The Spectator Archive*, 1 July 1943.

home, he had created a strong military (which owed much to Pirow), in which men of Afrikaner origin were a majority, and he enabled his country to take part successfully in a war which promised victory for the newly-coalescing “United Nations.”²⁰⁹ The Dominion and the Labour Parties stood with the UP, on a common front in favour of the war policy, whereas the opposition was divided. Indeed, Malan, leader of the NP, at that time holding forty-one seats, refused to join with other opposition groups, partly because he hoped ultimately to absorb all Republican elements into his own party, and partly because he had no expectation of attaining power in the 1943 election, being too deeply committed on the subject of the war.²¹⁰ What Malan hoped to do was to keep together a compact opposition under his leadership.²¹¹ However, the tactics he adopted meant in many cases a split opposition vote, diminishing the chances of all the groups opposed to Smuts.²¹²

A principal factor in Smuts’ significant victory was, among other things, the fact that UDF members, including those serving overseas, had the right to vote. It is assumed that most voting soldiers supported General Smuts in the election, however, the results of the 1943 elections can also be seen from a unique perspective outside of the UP’s convincing victory. The opposition lost a total of twenty-three seats in the House of Assembly, but those losses came at the expense of the AP and the independent candidates of Pirow’s New Order. The HNP, however, as the successor to the prewar GNP, won sixteen new seats compared to the 1938 election. The HNP became the only opposition political party with representation in the House of Assembly and in the new parliamentary term it pragmatically dropped the topic of ending the state of war. It turned out that breaking with radical pro-

²⁰⁹ Anon., "The South African election," The Spectator Archive, 1 July 1943.

²¹⁰ Anon., "The South African election," The Spectator Archive, 1 July 1943.

²¹¹ Anon., "The South African election," The Spectator Archive, 1 July 1943.

²¹² Anon., "The South African election," The Spectator Archive, 1 July 1943.

Nazi groups such as Pirow's New Order and the OB, and its shift towards broader issues, particularly appeals against the dangers of communism and the racial question, were the right choice.

Conclusion

South Africa's participation in WWII was accompanied by internal political strife. The initial split was regarding whether South Africa should participate in the war, and here the OB as a social movement with political aspirations would play an important role. As previously mentioned, Lasswell did not address the issue of social movements within a garrison state. When this point is further developed, the para-militaristic structure of certain social movements, specifically *kommandos* with regards to the OB, was not addressed specifically as to how it could have impacted a garrison state.

There was also the rift among the opposition between Malan and Pirow. Lasswell failed to address how a garrison state could capitalise on the opportunity of a divided opposition to ensure its grip on power is maintained and further entrenched. Hypothesising how a garrison state could take advantage of a rift within its opposition would have been a great contribution to the concept. The new coalition government, led by Hertzog's long-time political rival Jan Smuts, had to face strong nationalist opposition.²¹³ This opposition, either wanting to remain neutral in the war, or wanting to support Nazi Germany, was formidable, but it became fragmented, causing it to be defeated in the 1943 elections.²¹⁴ This fragmentation is what the garrison state could have capitalised on and it could have served as a developing garrison state characteristic in the South African case.

²¹³ Touška, "Divided union: South African nationalist opposition from 1939 to 1943."

²¹⁴ Touška, "Divided union: South African nationalist opposition from 1939 to 1943."

The ultra-conservative and fiercely anti-British politician Malan became the undisputed leader of the opposition and then later led the NP to an electoral victory in 1948 capitalising on a false sense of security by the UP under Smuts.²¹⁵ Regarding Malan, historian Lindie Koorts states that “the Afrikaner Nationalist leaders created the impression of men who were united in their determination to implement the policy of apartheid in order to protect Afrikaner Nationalist interests.”²¹⁶

Smuts’ first war cabinet had to deal not only with the country’s lack of preparation for the war, and the failures of the anti-Hitler coalition on the battlefield, but (unlike most warring states) also with a formidable, though as previously mentioned fragmented, opposition sabotaging its war effort.²¹⁷ Smuts’ attempts to re-establish “white unity” failed. His electoral victory in 1943, over a divided opposition, within a political climate which favoured the status quo, was not as great a victory as Smuts and his allies would have thought at the time. Lasswell also fails to adequately address the issue of elections in a garrison state. He does make mention of how decisions in a garrison state would be more dictatorial than democratic by stating:

. . . institutional practices long connected with modern democracy will disappear. Instead of elections to office or referendums on issues there will be government by plebiscite. Elections foster the formation and expression of public opinion, while plebiscites encourage only unanimous demonstrations of collective sentiment.²¹⁸

This does not adequately capture the importance of elections in a garrison state, nor does it show how a garrison state can be a state phenomenon with various political parties

²¹⁵ Touška, "Divided union: South African nationalist opposition from 1939 to 1943." 94-95.

²¹⁶ L. Koorts, "An ageing anachronism: D. F. Malan as prime minister, 1948–1954.," *Kronos* 36, no. 1 (2010).

²¹⁷ Touška, "Divided union: South African nationalist opposition from 1939 to 1943," 94-95.

²¹⁸ Lasswell, "The Garrison State." Lasswell, "Garrison State," 461.

irrespective of their political ideology taking advantage of the characteristics offered by a garrison state. South Africa is an important example as there was a transition within the garrison state between two political parties with varying political ideologies. Lasswell's concept of "mystic" democracy²¹⁹ within a garrison state also does not address real democratic processes that can occur in a garrison state. Without addressing the importance and intricacies of the 1943 election, it would not be possible to address the developing garrison state characteristics in South Africa of the time-period. The role of the opposition in a garrison state also needs emphasis. In 1943, although Smuts was victorious, it allowed for Malan to consolidate his electoral base. The 1943 election, specifically for the nationalist opposition, was a period marked by the diversity of individual concepts and currents and the inability to agree on a common vision. Further developments led to the consolidation of nationalists under Malan's leadership and the marginalisation of its competitors.

After the war election of 1943, Prime Minister Smuts might have considered the opposition totally defeated. Thus, Smuts was lulled into a false sense of security from the election victory. The opposition representation in the House of Parliament was so weak that it did not represent a serious obstacle to the second war cabinet of Jan Smuts.²²⁰ This period of UP dominance, however, lasted only one parliamentary term. Further developments showed that not only Smuts' complacency and mistakes in domestic and foreign post-war politics, but above all, the focus of Malan's HNP on the issue of the future form of racial segregation, the improvement of the position of Afrikaners, and the danger of the spread of communism, appealed to voters better than anti-war and pro-Nazi rhetoric.²²¹ Over the next five years, the HNP consolidated its status as the main opposition force, and in the first post-

²¹⁹ Lasswell, "The Garrison State." Lasswell, "Garrison State," 462.

²²⁰ Touška, "Divided union: South African nationalist opposition from 1939 to 1943," 94-95.

²²¹ Touška, "Divided union: South African nationalist opposition from 1939 to 1943," 94-95.

war elections in May 1948, it achieved a defining victory for Malan and changed the future of South Africa.²²²

The Smuts government was just as eager to reassure its citizens that they were fighting for a better future.²²³ Following the British example, it appointed wartime commissions to formulate health and welfare schemes.²²⁴ These schemes and measures were supposed to provide a better standard of living for South Africans. It did not matter that the state could not immediately put the plans into action, the important thing was to keep people's minds concentrated on the post-war era, when a much-expanded economy and welfare-minded government would supposedly deliver all things to all people.²²⁵ The government naturally enlisted the assistance and expertise of its civil servants. Officials from the Departments of Labour, Public Health, Social Welfare, and Native Affairs helped draw up plans and programmes to effect change.²²⁶ However, these measures could not convince South Africans to keep the UP and Jan Smuts in power.

²²² Touška, "Divided union: South African nationalist opposition from 1939 to 1943," 94-95.

²²³ D. Duncan, "The origins of the welfare state in pre-apartheid South Africa," *Collected Seminar Papers* 45 (1993): 108.

²²⁴ Duncan, "The origins of the welfare state in pre-apartheid South Africa," 108.

²²⁵ Duncan, "The origins of the welfare state in pre-apartheid South Africa," 108.

²²⁶ Duncan, "The origins of the welfare state in pre-apartheid South Africa," 108.

CHAPTER 5

A Rude Awakening (1944–1948): The Build-Up to the 1948 Election

The disappearance of the sturdy, independent-minded freedom-loving individual, and his replacement by a servile, standardised mass-mentality is the greatest human menace of our time.

Jan Smuts, St. Andrew's University, *Rectoral address*

In retrospect, the above quote from Smuts is contradictory as he was an agent of the garrison state in South Africa, and yet he describes what could be referred to as characteristics of “garrison state citizens” as the “greatest menace of our time.” Similar to Hofmeyr and Pirow, no evidence currently exists that Smuts was aware of or engaged with the work of Lasswell or his concept of the garrison state. Yet, he was such a proponent of the actual garrison state in South Africa. If one looks at the concept of the garrison state, it is clear that “independent-minded freedom-loving individual(s)” would be a great threat to the structures of a garrison state. However, in terms of the South African example of an actual garrison state, Smuts promoted the garrison state, and still he was against the idea of a servile and passive populace that could be easily manipulated. Thus the argument could be made that the garrison state as a concept is limited as to how it can be applied to Smuts as an agent of the garrison state, and yet the thesis will show how he can be viewed as a “specialists on violence” in Lasswellian terms.

From the end of WWII up until the election of 1948, South Africa had started to exhibit characteristics aligned to that of a garrison state. Jan Smuts, with his military background, was the leader of the nation. This military background of Smuts together with his leadership position allows us to view him as a “specialist on violence” in Lasswellian

terms as previously mentioned. The military was the most powerful group in South African society. The political elites, from both parties, continued to place their chief reliance upon propaganda, as was evident in the lead-up to the 1948 election. It is important to investigate whether the lead-up to the 1948 election, and the results of the 1948 election itself, could tell us more about South Africa exhibiting garrison state characteristics.

However, it is important to note that the lead-up to the 1948 election was very misleading. Between 1943 and 1948, the Smuts government looked stable with plenty of support. Smuts had achieved several major political victories including winning the decision to join Great Britain in WWII against Nazi Germany, winning the 1943 wartime election, and playing a significant role in supporting Churchill defeating the Axis powers. This all bode well for the UP and Smuts.

However, a rude awakening awaited in the 1948 election. Hofmeyr may have warned against the disappearance of the freedom-loving individual, but for many the cost of this perceived freedom came at too great a price, namely the close association with the British Empire. This was not the only issue influencing the political landscape in South Africa, as the highly militarised nature of the South African society under Smuts and the UP during WWII, as well as the suppression of dissent against the government's decision to join Great Britain in WWII, did not suggest a safe society for freedom-loving individuals. Hofmeyr himself, due to his liberal views, was also used as a political bogey by the NP to scare potential voters for the UP.

To better understand the garrison state, one needs to understand the personal insights of main political figures of the 1930s and 1940s. On Friday 22 August 1947, Hofmeyr started keeping a diary, a unique insight into his thoughts in the lead-up to the 1948 election. It is an extremely rare primary source, although admittedly the content is limited.

It is also the final captured thoughts of Hofmeyr before his premature death in 1948 not long after the election. It is not any great mystery as to why Hofmeyr started to write in the diary. He notes in one of the opening pages that the diary was a gift and that he thought it would be beneficial for him.¹ However, there is no specific indication why Hofmeyr started a diary so late in life. Much of the diary is used as a scheduling book, usually for appointments, public appearances, going to church and cricket and tennis matches. This makes up most of the diary except for certain sections where one gets a rare glimpse into Hofmeyr's thoughts.

One of the more interesting sections at the beginning of the diary was when Hofmeyr mentions a book that he intended to read, *When Smuts Goes* (1947) by Arthur Keppel-Jones.² By the late 1940s, Keppel-Jones had become famous in South Africa as a historian who had tried to predict the future. *When Smuts Goes* laid out a disastrous future facing his white countrymen if they did not begin to make fundamental changes.³ The book, which was subtitled *A History of South Africa from 1952 to 2010*, was written over a few weeks in 1946 and appeared the following year. The American-based South African historian C. W. de Kiewiet called it "a study in historical extrapolation," with the book predicting a future extrapolated from the propaganda and policy pronouncements of Malan's NP.⁴

Brief reference to the political context of the time is necessary to explain just how profoundly shocking this book's vision of the future was for most of its white readers. In 1947, South Africa's descent into the status of the world's outcast was only beginning. India

¹ J. H. Hofmeyr, Diary entry of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, 22 August 1947–26 November 1948, Diary Entry, Papers of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, ZA HPRA A1-A-Ab-Ab1, Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, <https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/km0fd>.

² A. Keppel-Jones, *When Smuts goes* (Cape Town: Shuter & Shuter, 1947), 1.

³ A. H. Jeeves, "Arthur Keppel-Jones: Scholar, teacher, liberal intellectual," *Southern African Historical Journal* 32, no. 1 (May 1995): 24.

⁴ Jeeves, "Arthur Keppel-Jones: Scholar, teacher, liberal intellectual," 24.

gained independence and started to publicly criticise South Africa at the UN. The country had long been a respected member of the British Commonwealth and its important role, together with the role played by Smuts in both world wars was universally acknowledged. Only two years before *When Smuts Goes* appeared, Smuts had been invited to draft the preamble for the Charter of the new United Nations.⁵ Despite the beginnings of severe criticism of the country's race policies in early sessions of the General Assembly, Smuts' authoritative presence in the councils of the Western democracies testified to South Africa's continued high international standing. Keppel-Jones correctly predicted that all of this would change very quickly and very dramatically, and that South Africa would become the focus of mounting international censure and loathing, the condemnation of the world community would grow and eventually lead to economic sanctions and even invasion under Malan.⁶

Notably, not all the predictions made by Keppel-Jones came true. South Africa was not invaded during Malan's tenure; however, it most certainly became an international outcast during the post-WWII era. Setting aside the accuracy, or lack thereof, of the predictions of Keppel-Jones, the main question he posed was: What would the future of South Africa look like without the leadership of Smuts? We can extrapolate this further and relate it to the garrison state. Was a South African garrison state inevitable? How different would the future of South Africa been if Smuts had been victorious in 1948? Hofmeyr was clearly interested in the future of South Africa, and even thought of possible eventualities such as what South Africa would look like without Smuts at the helm. Hofmeyr's ideas

⁵ Mazower, *No enchanted palace: The end of empire and the ideological origins of the United Nations*, 4, 28.

⁶ Jeeves, "Arthur Keppel-Jones: Scholar, teacher, liberal intellectual," 24.

surrounding the possibilities of South Africa's future will be discussed later in this chapter by analysing articles he wrote.

As soon as Hofmeyr became deputy to Smuts, he was always seen as the "heir" to Smuts, as Macdonald put it. However, Hofmeyr was not hungry for power. By 25 March 1948 he mentions in his diary the Lord Acton quote of "Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely" in relation to Hitler.⁷ Hofmeyr states here that he would not mourn the loss of his own power, indicating that he was never an eager successor to Smuts.⁸ Instead, what is most likely is that Hofmeyr saw political service as a duty to his country that he needed to perform, and that he did not hold personal ambitions of leadership. From 11 May to 1 June 1948 Hofmeyr focused on the lead-up to the election and the election itself. He also mentioned his feelings of disappointment at the results of the election immediately after.⁹ On 26 November 1948 Hofmeyr wrote his final entry in his diary, where he mentioned Smuts briefly.¹⁰ His diary ended prematurely as he died of a heart attack on 3 December 1948. As was shown in Chapter 1, with the example of counter-factual history, the case of Hofmeyr's political career was one of "what if?" What would have happened had Hofmeyr not passed away prematurely? Would Hofmeyr have been able to exact the change that he wanted? Would he have remained stuck in Smuts' imperial internationalism? One would have to borrow from the school of Keppel-Jones *what if* predictions regarding what could have been for both South Africa and Hofmeyr and the garrison state.

⁷ Hofmeyr, Diary entry of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, 1947–1948, Diary.

⁸ Hofmeyr, Diary entry of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, 1947–1948, Diary.

⁹ Hofmeyr, Diary entry of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, 1947–1948, Diary.

¹⁰ Hofmeyr, Diary entry of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, 1947–1948, Diary.

Smuts: Imperial Internationalism

Churchill had an unbreakable faith in and deep admiration for Smuts. Churchill's faith in Smuts was rooted in their strong friendship and shared values, particularly during times of adversity, such as WWII. Smuts had played a significant role in British politics and military strategy during both World WWI and WWII. He served as a trusted advisor to Churchill during WWII, offering valuable insights and contributing to important decisions. Churchill had profound respect for and reliance on Smuts, highlighting the importance of trust and loyalty in their relationship, especially in challenging times. They shared a unique bond and a mutual confidence. The leadership shown by Jan Smuts during WWII had proved extremely valuable to the Allied forces. Smuts had a remarkable career which included his involvement in both WWI as well as the Anglo-Boer War. During various points of his political career, he also served as prime minister and in 1947 he hosted the British Royal family. Smuts was held in extremely high esteem within the Commonwealth. Smuts was also the only signatory to the Charter of the new United Nations organisation who had also participated in the League of Nations.¹¹ He helped to draft the inspiring preamble to the United Nations Charter and was largely responsible for the inclusion there of the phrase "human rights."¹² However, as much as Smuts and his accomplishments were celebrated, he was equally hated especially among right-wing conservatives and fascists. The anti-fascism stance Smuts took throughout his political career informed his imperial internationalism and by extension for the purposes of this study his prominent position within the developing South African garrison state.

¹¹ Dubow, *Apartheid 1948–1994*, 2.

¹² Dubow, *Apartheid 1948–1994*, 2.

Smuts was a figure of the British Empire,¹³ although by the time of WWI, Britain had been overtaken by the US as a global power. From the time the Boer War ended he loomed large in South African politics. He had produced the constitution of the Union of South Africa and helped to ensure the war-torn country's reincorporation into the British imperial system. Between 1910 and 1924 the former Boer leader was constantly in office, the last five years as premier. He served as minister of justice before leading the country into WWII as premier for a second time. Strangely, the former Boer general became an important proponent of British imperialism on the international stage. He became a trusted member of the Imperial War Cabinet in WWI, the creator of the British Royal Air Force, and an ideologue for the new British Commonwealth.¹⁴ Although it is important to show that Smuts had a more nuanced take on imperialism similar to that of L. T. Hobhouse who differentiated between "sane imperialism" and "insane imperialism."¹⁵ Hobhouse stated that "If imperialism means a high sense of the honour of the Empire and its duties to subject races, then we cannot have too much imperialism."¹⁶ Smuts saw the Anglo-Boer War as an example of "insane imperialism" which Hobhouse spoke of. Both Hobhouse and Smuts saw the role of imperialism as a "civilising" mission. These racist undertones are clear today but were completely acceptable at the time. Here the South African case study again does not fit Lasswell's concept. Imperialism has garrison state characteristics in its militaristic nature, however, again Lasswell neglects the issue of race and of how a garrison state can be used a force for "civilising" the "uncivilised" world.

Smuts believed in this "civilising mission" and stated that:

¹³ Mazower, *No enchanted palace: The end of empire and the ideological origins of the United Nations*, 4, 28.

¹⁴ Mazower, *No enchanted palace: The end of empire and the ideological origins of the United Nations*, 4, 28.

¹⁵ D. Boucher and B. Ngqulunga, "Introduction: The enigmatic Smuts," in *Reappraising the life & legacy of Jan C Smuts*, ed. D. Boucher and B. Ngqulunga (Johannesburg: UJ Press, 2024), 4.

¹⁶ Boucher and Ngqulunga, "Introduction: The enigmatic Smuts," 4.

I for one consider the position of the white race in South Africa one of the gravest and responsibilities and difficulty. They must be guardians of their own safety and development and at the same time they are trustees for the coloured races...¹⁷

This idea of trusteeship that Smuts believed in was based on the hierarchical idea that the dependent subjects within a trusteeship are not capable of ruling themselves and do not know what is in their best interest.¹⁸ This was also an international idea, and not only an imperial one. This provides us with an apt opportunity to address the concept of imperial internationalism which Smuts was a proponent of. It is important to understand this term and what it means by breaking it into its two main components: *imperialism* and *internationalism*. Internationalism is a political and economic ideology that emphasises cooperation and interaction among nations. Jeremy Bentham, the English philosopher, coined the term *international* in 1770 to describe the interrelationships between nation-states.¹⁹ Imperial internationalism is not a widely recognised or standardised term, and its meaning can vary depending on the context in which it is used. It is a commonplace that historians have no general definition of the term *imperialism*.²⁰ Mazower argues that the real intellectual future of early twentieth-century internationalism was self-proclaimed democrats who believed that expanded voting rights would take power away from warmongering “hawks.”²¹ This would allow for peace to prevail which would not suit the “hawks” who are reminiscent of the “specialists on violence” of a garrison state. The peace

¹⁷ Boucher and Ngqulunga, "Introduction: The enigmatic Smuts," 5.

¹⁸ C. Allsobrook and C. Boisen, "Illusions of sovereignty with postcolonial governmentality: Jan Smuts, trusteeship, and the league of nations," in *Reappraising the life & legacy of Jan C Smuts*, ed. D. Boucher and B. Ngqulunga (Johannesburg: UJ Press, 2024), 181.

¹⁹ W. F. Kuehl, "Concepts of internationalism in history," *Peace and Change* 11, no. 2 (1986): 1.

²⁰ H. Wright, "Imperialism: The word and its meaning," *Social Research* 34, no. 4 (1967): 660.

²¹ Mazower, *No enchanted palace: The end of empire and the ideological origins of the United Nations*, 4, 28.

movement in Great Britain and the US called for the emergence and promotion of an international “civic principle” that would replace nationalism.

Reshaping older ideas, figures like the sociologist Leonard Hobhouse argued that humanity should overcome “artificial units of loyalty” like the nation and join in “international union.”²² The American pacifist and feminist Crystal Eastman foresaw a trend toward “un-nationalism” in which people would act directly, not through their governments.²³ In the US, the issue of civil liberties also became important. Indeed, many early architects of the civil liberties movement were themselves sceptics of the idea of rights and builders of the kinds of modernist legal institutions that sought to consign rights talk to a nineteenth-century past.²⁴

Others disagreed vehemently with this approach and wanted to get to the same destination by another route; they felt that nationalism was not bad in itself. However, it was not being controlled by the preferred people such as intellectuals.²⁵ The English economist, J. A. Hobson, a fierce critic of “imperialism,” and who also spoke of “sane imperialism” and “insane imperialism”,²⁶ saw “democratic nationalism” as “a plain highway to internationalism.”²⁷ In 1912, he discussed the idea that “a federation of civilised states” might be powerful enough to keep order in the world. In fact, he regarded that as “the supreme test of modern civilisation” whether such a federation would be a force for good, or simply “a variant of the older empires,” enforcing a *pax Europaea* (the period of relative

²² Mazower, *No enchanted palace: The end of empire and the ideological origins of the United Nations*, 4, 29.

²³ Mazower, *No enchanted palace: The end of empire and the ideological origins of the United Nations*, 4, 29.

²⁴ T. Haskell, “The curious persistence of rights talk in the ‘Age of Interpretation’,” *The Journal of American History* 74, no. 3 (1987): 324.

²⁵ Mazower, *No enchanted palace: The end of empire and the ideological origins of the United Nations*, 4, 29.

²⁶ Boucher and Ngqulunga, “Introduction: The enigmatic Smuts,” 5.

²⁷ Mazower, *No enchanted palace: The end of empire and the ideological origins of the United Nations*, 4, 29.

peace experienced by Europe)²⁸ on the world rather than acting in the interests of humanity.²⁹

The fact that Smuts was a complex figure is highlighted by the contradictions of his great democratic victories against fascism and his failure to address the issue of race: his “sphinx” problem as referred to by Saul Dubow.³⁰ Smuts existed at a complex intersection where he was not a fascist warmongering “hawk” and yet he was a solid statesman and a “specialist of violence” in the Lasswellian sense who promoted imperial values (but only if they were “sane”). Smuts provides one with a link between Lasswell’s garrison state concept which was highly influenced by his American experiences and the world of imperialism, trusteeship and imperial internationalism. Smuts also went to great lengths to try and reconcile his ideas on imperialism with freedom within an imperial structure which is also what Hofmeyr attempted to do, as discussed in the following section.

Reconciling Imperialism and Liberty: Hofmeyr 1945

In Chapter 1, brief mention was made to Hofmeyr’s speech “Reconciling Imperialism and Liberty: South Africa’s Contribution to the Solution of World Problems.” This section will provide a more complete analysis. For Hofmeyr, South Africa’s contribution to the solution of world problems occurred within the confines of the British Commonwealth. Hofmeyr addressed the members of the Royal Empire Society at a lunch hour meeting in London. Hofmeyr looked at a pattern for the world.

In introducing Hofmeyr, Lord Addison, a former leader of the House of Lords, said he was not only the deputy prime minister of the Union, but represented the spirit of the

²⁸ L. Tsoukalis, *What kind of Europe?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1.

²⁹ Mazower, *No enchanted palace: The end of empire and the ideological origins of the United Nations*, 4, 29.

³⁰ S. Dubow, “Jan Smuts and his ‘sphinx problem’,” in *Reappraising the life & legacy of Jan C Smuts*, ed. D. Boucher and B. Ngqulunga (UJ Online Press, 2024), 219.

British Commonwealth of Nations.³¹ “We know how much South Africans contributed to the conquest of Somaliland, Abyssinia, and other Italian colonies in Africa,” Addison added “but we know much more than that, we know that they rallied of their own free will to the support of the cause for which we fought and continued with us through the dark days to the very end.”³² Thereby Addison thought that, if humanity could, it should begin to learn a lesson. Addison wanted to portray the unity within the Commonwealth stating that:

No man in London would think of putting an atomic bomb on Cape Town. No man in Cape Town would think of putting an atomic bomb down on London, except a person who had been universally recognized as one who ought to be shut up as dangerous to society. The same thing would apply whether we took Sydney or Ottawa or any other city in the British Commonwealth. The thing is just unthinkable. What is unthinkable to us should we hope, in course of time be unthinkable all over the world, and it is only by straight dealing between nations, the dispelling of suspicion and infinite patience, that we shall get the world into the right frame of mind. But at all events we have—and we can proudly say it—in the British Commonwealth of Nations an international association which is the most promising and best that the world presents at the present time.³³

Hofmeyr was warmly welcomed with applause by his audience. He expressed his pleasure at finding himself once more in contact with the Royal Empire Society:

I came here first as a student with still untarnished respectability. I came here the second time just after I had laid down the post of Administrator of the Transvaal province. One can best suggest what that means when I recall an answer which was once given by a schoolboy in a school of that province in question, ‘What is an Administrator?’ The answer was ‘There are various kinds

³¹ Paton, Reconciling imperialism and liberty, 27 October 1945, Speech.

³² Paton, Reconciling imperialism and liberty, 27 October 1945, Speech.

³³ Paton, Reconciling imperialism and liberty, 27 October 1945, Speech.

of administrators. The man who gives gas at an operation is also an administrator'³⁴

This was met by laughter from his audience. In typical Hofmeyr fashion, he used his dry humour to win over his audience at the beginning of his speech. Hofmeyr continued "Now I come here as a politician, which represents, I suppose the last infirmity of noble minds with no respectability left."³⁵ Again this was met with laughter by his audience. Hofmeyr continued how he could recall when he addressed the society sixteen years ago, he referred to the new conception of the British Commonwealth of Nations as it had been defined in the Declaration of the Imperial Conference in 1926.³⁶ It was believed that this was a conception of a free association of autonomous states, consciously working in unison towards ever improving cooperation. That specific conception represented the bringing into harmony of the two principles of Imperialism and liberty: that of freedom and order, and that of cooperation and independence.

The problem of reconciling imperialism and liberty was one of the age-old problems of history according to Hofmeyr. In the Roman Empire, a partial solution was found along the lines of a world state—as complete as a world state but based on a common nationality. However, in the British Commonwealth of Nations he claimed a more complete solution of that problem along the harder path of developing that Commonwealth as an effective means of association and partnership between independent nations. Hofmeyr continued:

The implication of that conception of the British Commonwealth has been of special significance in relation to South Africa where, because of past history, imperialism had come to be regarded as synonymous with domination, and where it was essential, if there was to be national unity between the two main

³⁴ Paton, Reconciling imperialism and liberty, 27 October 1945, Speech.

³⁵ Paton, Reconciling imperialism and liberty, 27 October 1945, Speech.

³⁶ Paton, Reconciling imperialism and liberty, 27 October 1945, Speech.

sections of our European population, that any suggestion of dependence on the Mother Country of one of those two elements in our population should be eliminated.³⁷

That really meant that South Africa was happy to regard itself as a member of the partnership of the British Commonwealth, but not if it meant any impairment of its liberty. It meant that South Africa was prepared to accept the obligations of a partnership only as far as those obligations might be considered as having been imposed by itself. Hofmeyr emphasised the point that the Commonwealth stood the test of time. Since Hofmeyr had spoken to the society sixteen years earlier, major events had changed the world. The British Commonwealth had sustained a deadly challenge, and in that process the principle of free cooperation as the basis of the Commonwealth had been triumphantly vindicated. In that process the success of the British Commonwealth solution of that age-old problem to which Hofmeyr had previously referred had been made clear for all who could see.³⁸

The dominions, Hofmeyr averred, entered World War Two not because of any constitutional obligation or because of any pressure, direct or indirect from Downing Street. They did so of their own free volition, as free agents. One would think that events of September 1939 must have made two things clear to all the world although sometimes Hofmeyr wondered if those two things were yet sufficiently appreciated. One was that the nations that made up the British Commonwealth were free nations, fully endowed with the power of determining their own destinies. The other was that among those nations there was a community of ideals and of interest which constituted an immensely powerful bond of association. The relationship between them was that of free association, and the strength

³⁷ Paton, Reconciling imperialism and liberty, 27 October 1945, Speech.

³⁸ See Hobsbawm, *Age of extremes: The short twentieth century 1914–1991*. Eric Hobsbawm's *Age of Extremes* for context

of that association was not impaired—it was increased—because it was based on freedom. Some people would still talk about the question of divisibility of the Crown. Hofmeyr thought it would be correct to say, especially in the light of what happened in September 1939 that the question was entirely unimportant in comparison with the substance and the strength of common allegiance to the Crown which was demonstrated at that time. That was why, according to Hofmeyr, Mr. Wendell Willkie, the Republican nominee for President of the United States in 1940, was able to describe the British Commonwealth of Nations as the most exciting experiment in international democracy which the world had ever known at the time. It was also why Lord Addison said the British Commonwealth was the only successful large-scale form of international cooperation.

Hofmeyr would echo the hope that, based on the principles which it enshrined, there would gradually be built up a larger cooperation between the nations based on community of ideals and community of interest, which was essential if humanity were not to perish. This may strike one as an almost opposite ideal to the garrison state, which sees security in military and internal organisation, rather than this form of *external* organisation. However, it is important to note that Lasswell also spoke of the possibility of a community of garrison states. Thus, various garrison states that interact on an international level.

Hofmeyr then spoke of South Africa's war decision. As Hofmeyr had said, South Africa went into the war was the result of the free decision of a free parliament and a free people. Hofmeyr did not mention the objections by the Nationalists such as Malan and Pirow. South Africa was prepared to accept the obligations and to sustain the perils which resulted from that decision, but it did so of its own free, deliberate choice, and it rendered a contribution the quality of which was undoubtedly enhanced by the spirit of freedom according to Hofmeyr. Perhaps the significance of that contribution was all the greater in

view of the circumstances in which the decision came to be made. The outbreak of war found South Africa with a divided government. It was a divided parliament that took the decision, with only a slender majority in favour of South Africa's participation. Hofmeyr continued by saying:

I can still recall the attitude of mind with which those of us who were called upon to form the new government to give effect to that decision regarded the task that lay ahead of us. We knew that in Parliament we should have to face vigorous and determined opposition. We knew that opposition was confident—not without some show of justification—that it would be able to mobilise a united Afrikaans-speaking, meaning 60 percent of our European population, against our war policy.³⁹

Hofmeyr continued by looking at the Nazi influence:

We knew that Nazi intrigues had been afoot in our country before the war, we did not know how far they had gone. Therefore, we entered the war with a limited objective. That was all that seemed possible. South Africa, we felt, had gone on record as an opponent of Nazism, and that was something, but we had little expectation at that stage that we would be able to make anything more than a negligible contribution to the destruction of Nazism.⁴⁰

According to Hofmeyr, South Africa felt that they were cast for a merely defensive role and that all that it could do would be to stand on guard in their own country and play their part in preventing the great sea lane from east to west around the Cape from falling into enemy hands. That was South Africa's limited objective in September 1939, yet that limited objective came to be transformed into what Hofmeyr later could argue was a

³⁹ Paton, Reconciling imperialism and liberty, 27 October 1945, Speech.

⁴⁰ Paton, Reconciling imperialism and liberty, 27 October 1945, Speech.

worthwhile contribution to the common war effort. South Africa's continued militarisation also benefited as it ensured that South Africa's defences were up to standard.

The Fagan Commission vs. The Sauer Commission 1946–1948

In the previous section Hofmeyr attempted to reconcile imperialism and liberty. This was a grand aim for Smuts and Hofmeyr to legitimise the UP's pro-British stance. However, Hofmeyr and Smuts neglected important domestic issues such as race to focus on grander ones. An attempt to address the issue of race in South Africa was made by two important commissions. Both the Fagan Commission and the Sauer Commission played a significant role in segregationist and apartheid era policies. In the following section it will be shown how these two commissions also highlight the role of the South African state during the mid- to late-1940s. It is important to understand the role of the state as it can reveal potential garrison state characteristics. These two commissions revealed the extent to which the South African state was interventionist in nature during the 1940s. This in turn provides insights into the nature of the South African garrison state.

The Native Laws Commission, commonly known as the Fagan Commission, was appointed by the South African government in 1946 to investigate changes to the system of segregation.⁴¹ To contextualise: the war needs resulted in a massive increase in industrialisation, which needed black workers and hence relaxed segregation. It was a contentious matter, with Verwoerd describing the Fagan Commission as the "political Bible of the United Party."⁴² Its members were: H. A. Fagan, A. S. Welsh, A. L. Barrett, E. E. von Maltitz, and S. J. Parsons with the report of the commission submitted in February 1948.⁴³

⁴¹ H. A. Fagan et al., *The Native Laws Commission (The Fagan Commission)* (1946–1948).

⁴² I. Evans, "Bureaucracy and race native administration in South Africa," 1997, accessed 24 September 2024, <https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft2n39n7f2&chunk.id=s1.2.9&toc.id=s1.2.9&brand=ucpress>.

⁴³ H. Suzman, *Report of the Native Commission (Report of the Fagan Commission)* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1948),

The commission was tasked to inquire into and report on: (a) The operation of the laws in force in the Union relating to “natives” in or near urban areas, and in areas where “natives” are congregated for industrial purposes other than mining; (b) the operation of the Native Pass Laws and any laws requiring the production by “natives” of documents of identification; (c) the employment in mines and other industries of migratory labour; (d) its economic and social effects upon the lives of the people concerned; (e) the future policy to be followed in regard thereto; and (f) to draft such legislation as may be necessary to give effect to the recommendations of the commission.⁴⁴

Referred to by Ivan Evens, an assistant professor of sociology, as “Arguably the most liberal official document produced in the segregation era,”⁴⁵ the report of the Fagan Commission took off where Smuts’ oft quoted perception that “segregation has fallen on evil days” left off. The report captured the liberal disillusionment with segregationist policies immediately after WWII by emphasising two broad issues.⁴⁶ First, the report insisted that the differentiation of the urban African population into settled and migrant communities should be accepted and expressed in a benign policy that merely regulated but did not retard African urbanisation.⁴⁷ It rejected the policy of total territorial segregation as “utterly impractical” and brushed aside the view that “migratory labour should therefore be regarded as normal and the only desirable form of “native” labour in the urban areas.”⁴⁸ The report advocated an “elastic policy” of transitional segregation premised on a less rigid pass

<https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft2n39n7f2&chunk.id=s1.2.9&toc.id=s1.2.9&brand=ucpress>.

⁴⁴ Suzman, *Report of the Native Commission (Report of the Fagan Commission)*.

⁴⁵ Evans, "Bureaucracy and race native administration in South Africa."

⁴⁶ Evans, "Bureaucracy and race native administration in South Africa."

⁴⁷ The Report of the Native Commission, par. 61 as cited in Evans, "Bureaucracy and race native administration in South Africa."

⁴⁸ Suzman, *Report of the Native Commission (Report of the Fagan Commission)*, par. 61.

system, which would gradually be relaxed to a point where race would be eroded as an organising principle in South Africa's socioeconomic structure.⁴⁹ "Labour stabilisation" in the urban areas therefore dominated the recommendations put forward in the report.

The second broad issue that undergirded the report's recommendations was a call for the rationalisation of urban administrative structures, principally through the establishment of a centralised system of labour bureaus. However, this structure would be implemented on a voluntary basis, since its function would be merely to "guide and regulate the labour stream," not to "direct" labour across the economy.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, the report noted that administrative arrangements could indeed be used to distinguish "the settled, well-known Native" from "other Natives" whose transience in urban areas made the evasion of law and authorities easier. In the interests of efficiency, the report recommended that the central state—more specifically, either the Department of Labour or the Department of Native Affairs—should control the centralised pass system. The net emphasis on only a moderate degree of state intervention to balance the numbers of permanent and migrant workers in urban areas accorded well with the labour needs of industry and commerce in the urban areas. This seems a move away from the garrison state approach in relation to its economic characteristics. Also, since the report studiously excluded the mining industry from its recommendations, agriculture stood to lose most from the liberalisation of the pass system.

Thus, the Fagan Commission report was in keeping with the liberal distrust of extensive state involvement in the economy, a creed seemingly vindicated in the war against fascism.⁵¹ It should be noted that contentious issues within the UP were generally

⁴⁹ Suzman, *Report of the Native Commission (Report of the Fagan Commission)*, par. 61.

⁵⁰ Suzman, *Report of the Native Commission (Report of the Fagan Commission)*, par. 61.

⁵¹ Evans, "Bureaucracy and race native administration in South Africa."

dealt with by deciding to “leave it to the *Oubaas*.”^{52,53} However, Smuts attached an overweening importance to the commission he had appointed in 1946 and so deferred all questions about Native Affairs. The result was that the year-long investigation weakened “native” administration even before its report was published. When summarising the conclusions of the Fagan Commission it should be noted that legal provisions or an administrative policy calculated to perpetuate migratory labour and to put obstacles in the way of stabilisation of labour were seen as fundamentally wrong, having a detrimental effect.⁵⁴ The Fagan Commission advocated for a policy that facilitated and encouraged stabilisation of migratory labour.⁵⁵ The commission also noted that migratory labour could not be prohibited by law or terminated by administrative action and the most that could be done was to try to provide facilities, for example, by an energetic continuation of the housing programme for workers to have their families with them if they so desired; and to turn legislation and administration in a direction which would make the worker feel that in the town “where he works he can find a home, not merely a temporary dormitory from which he may in the near future be expelled.”⁵⁶

The “*Verslag van die Kleurvraagstuk-Kommissie van die Herenigde Nasionale Party*” which was commonly referred to as the Sauer Report or the Report by the Sauer Commission, was tasked to investigate and find solutions to the conflicting ideas of what apartheid should be.⁵⁷ Its members were P. O. Sauer, G. B. A. Gerdener, E.G. Jansen, J. J.

⁵² *Oubaas* was the Afrikaans nickname for Smuts, meaning “Old Boss” if directly translated from Afrikaans to English.

⁵³ A. Hepple, *Verwoerd (political leaders of the twentieth century)* (Ann Arbor: Penguin, 1967), 121.

⁵⁴ Suzman, *Report of the Native Commission (Report of the Fagan Commission)*, 17.

⁵⁵ Suzman, *Report of the Native Commission (Report of the Fagan Commission)*, 17.

⁵⁶ Suzman, *Report of the Native Commission (Report of the Fagan Commission)*, par. 63.

⁵⁷ P. Sauer et al., *Verslag van die kleurvraagstuk-kommissie van die Herenigde Nasionale Party (Report of the Sauer Commission)* (Johannesburg, 1947).

Serfontein and M. D. C. De Wet Nel.⁵⁸ The Sauer Commission is usually seen as a response to the Fagan Commission. This is indeed so; however, it does not tell the full story. As will be shown in greater detail later in this chapter, while apartheid was an election slogan before 1948, it was not a readily implementable policy that was both ideological and practical in nature. The issue was that there was a debate about what apartheid should be. The main question was to what extent should South Africa be segregated along racial lines? It was also part of the Sauer Commission's task to answer this question. In sharp contrast to the laissez-faire liberalism of the Fagan Commission, the report of the Sauer Commission demanded a strong, interventionist state, or a garrison state of sorts.⁵⁹ The document sketched a comprehensive program of state intervention to reverse African urbanisation, diminish the dependence of whites on African labour, and promote self-government in the reserves.⁶⁰

The competing ideas of what apartheid should be were presented in the Sauer Commission in two different ways. First, in its declaration of the long-term objectives of apartheid,⁶¹ and second, in its proposals on how these objectives would be achieved.⁶² The Report on the Sauer Commission began by advocating for the "total apartheid between whites and natives" as the "eventual ideal and goal."⁶³ It also advocated for "the gradual extraction of natives from industries in white areas, although it is recognised that this can

⁵⁸ D. Posel, "The meaning of Apartheid before 1948: Conflicting interests and forces within the Afrikaner nationalist alliance," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 14, no. 1 (1987): 136.

⁵⁹ Sauer et al., *Verslag van die kleurvraagstuk-kommissie van die Herenigde Nasionale Party (Report of the Sauer Commission)*, 1.

⁶⁰ Posel, "The meaning of Apartheid before 1948: Conflicting interests and forces within the Afrikaner nationalist alliance," 136.

⁶¹ Posel, "The meaning of Apartheid before 1948: Conflicting interests and forces within the Afrikaner nationalist alliance," 136.

⁶² Posel, "The meaning of Apartheid before 1948: Conflicting interests and forces within the Afrikaner nationalist alliance," 136.

⁶³ Report of the Sauer Commission, 3. as cited in Evans, "Bureaucracy and race native administration in South Africa."

only be achieved in the course of many years.”⁶⁴ Thus, the practical conception of apartheid and that which was considered to be the ideal were at odds with each other.⁶⁵ Before the ideal of apartheid could be achieved, the Sauer Commission proposed that there were certain guidelines which should be observed in relation to the use of black labour in white areas.⁶⁶ The Sauer Commission believed that these guidelines would not endanger the preservation of the white race and Western civilisation in South Africa.⁶⁷

Ideologically speaking, the Sauer Commission was committed to total segregation, as it also advocated for the ultimate removal of urbanised black communities from white areas.⁶⁸ This was done on the basis that “the urbanisation of natives conflicts with the policy of apartheid.”⁶⁹ This is an example of circular logic as this argument attempted to prove the conclusion of the supposed conflict without the “policy of apartheid” being decided on by this time. Although it had certain ideological convictions, the Sauer Commission also acknowledged the importance of practical considerations, stressing that the implementation of “apartheid” would have been “as far as it was practically possible, be pursued gradually, always taking into account the national needs and interests and with the necessary care to avoid the disruption of the country’s agriculture, industries, and general interests.”⁷⁰

⁶⁴ Posel, “The meaning of Apartheid before 1948: Conflicting interests and forces within the Afrikaner nationalist alliance,” 136.

⁶⁵ Posel, “The meaning of Apartheid before 1948: Conflicting interests and forces within the Afrikaner nationalist alliance,” 136.

⁶⁶ Posel, “The meaning of Apartheid before 1948: Conflicting interests and forces within the Afrikaner nationalist alliance,” 136.

⁶⁷ Sauer et al., *Verslag van die kleurvraagstuk-kommissie van die Herenigde Nasionale Party (Report of the Sauer Commission)*, 11.

⁶⁸ Posel, “The meaning of Apartheid before 1948: Conflicting interests and forces within the Afrikaner nationalist alliance,” 136.

⁶⁹ Sauer et al., *Verslag van die kleurvraagstuk-kommissie van die Herenigde Nasionale Party (Report of the Sauer Commission)*, 11.

⁷⁰ Sauer et al., *Verslag van die kleurvraagstuk-kommissie van die Herenigde Nasionale Party (Report of the Sauer Commission)*, 11.

There always remained a lingering question whether the ideal of apartheid would be accomplished at all.⁷¹ Posel argues that this uncertainty stemmed from the split within the Afrikaners between those who believed in the practical implementation of apartheid and those who believed in trying to implement the ideological ideal.⁷² It should be noted that this unresolved division impacted only the magnitude of state intervention, not its central importance.⁷³ The Sauer Commission promoted the idea that the state should play a major interventionist role in society. Within the so-called urban native administration, this role would be particularly prominent and influential. An important recommendation promoted by the Sauer Commission was the establishment of a nationwide system of labour bureaus which was similar to the Fagan Commission. The Sauer Commission stated that:

The entire migration into and from the cities should be controlled by the state which will enlist the cooperation of municipal bodies. Migration into and from the reserves shall likewise be strictly controlled. Surplus Natives in the urban areas should be returned to their original habitat in the country [i.e., white farming] areas or to the reserves. Natives from the country areas shall be admitted to the urban areas or towns only as temporary employees obliged to return to their homes after the expiration of their employment.⁷⁴

The Sauer report provided an initial idea to the interventions that would emerge in the 1950s and the authoritarianism that would define “native affairs” in particular.⁷⁵ Immediately after 1948, the state did not possess the infrastructural capacity for the extensive interventions needed for the establishment of labour bureaus or for the

⁷¹ Posel, "The meaning of Apartheid before 1948: Conflicting interests and forces within the Afrikaner nationalist alliance," 136.

⁷² Evans, "Bureaucracy and race native administration in South Africa."

⁷³ Evans, "Bureaucracy and race native administration in South Africa."

⁷⁴ Sauer et al., *Verslag van die kleurvraagstuk-kommissie van die Herenigde Nasionale Party (Report of the Sauer Commission)*, 11.

⁷⁵ Evans, "Bureaucracy and race native administration in South Africa."

extrication and separation of white, African, Indian, and coloured “population groups” authorised by the Group Areas Act of 1950.⁷⁶ This capacity still needed to be built from the ground up.⁷⁷ Though it should be noted that the lack of infrastructure to implement apartheid policies did not mean that developments towards a garrison state could not occur. This meant that the implementation of apartheid, and not *apartheid*—the election slogan—meant that institutions inherited from the segregationist years would have to be developed to accommodate the new policy.

Both the Fagan Commission and the Sauer Commission reveal important aspects of state intervention. The Sauer Commission was decidedly pro-interventionist as the state needed to intervene to implement apartheid policies. The Smuts government did not believe the state should be overtly interventionist. In terms of the garrison state, interventionism is a key characteristic of a garrison state. Lasswell states that in a garrison state the state will be highly centralised, and power will be highly concentrated.⁷⁸ The state cannot be interventionist if it does not concentrate and centralise power. It is interesting to note that the Malan government, specifically in terms of race relations was far more interventionist, thus resembling the garrison state more. This is not to say that the Smuts government did not intervene at all. Thus, it is important to understand what the UP stood for specifically in terms of policy, which is what the following section will deal with.

In Their own Words: What the United Party Stood for 1946–1948

The NP used Hofmeyr on numerous occasions to scare potential voters by stating that he was too liberal for South Africa’s white population. Since the NP leader, Malan,

⁷⁶ Evans, "Bureaucracy and race native administration in South Africa."; Group Areas Act, No.41 of 1950, (1950).

⁷⁷ Evans, "Bureaucracy and race native administration in South Africa."

⁷⁸ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 458.

decided to exploit the race question for electioneering purposes, the lesser leaders in the party had been spreading all sorts of alarmist reports with a view of stampeding the electorate to vote for NP candidates.⁷⁹ The story was spread that Hofmeyr had advocated the removal of all “colour bars.” It was also said that Hofmeyr favoured political equality between white people and other races. The NP also promoted the idea that he had pressed for an extension of the vote to eight million black people and that he supported the removal of race distinctions in schools. Finally, the NP contended that he favoured equality and assimilation and wanted to make South Africa a “black man’s country.”⁸⁰ At the UP Congress at Bloemfontein on 26 November 1946 Hofmeyr dealt with these alleged falsehoods which the NP was spreading, and said: “I deny most empathetically these things which the Nationalists impute to me.” He went on to point out that what he had said in the House of Assembly was that: “The colour bar in respect of political representation, which makes it impossible for non-Europeans to be represented by non-Europeans, cannot be retained forever.”

The UP, at least partially true to its name, wanted to portray itself as being a unifying party. In the statement released by the UP, it provided a comprehensive breakdown of its policy. The UP attempted to position itself as a party that stood for national unity and cooperation between English-speaking South Africans and the Afrikaners.⁸¹ In the statement it was adamant that it stood for the maintenance of what it called “white civilisation and of the way life known as Western Democracy,” with unwavering opposition to fascism, Nazism,

⁷⁹ J. H. Hofmeyr, Nationalist Party lies on the Native Policy, 1946, United Party Election Pamphlet, Papers of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, ZA HPRA A1-A-Ab-Ab1/1946, Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, <https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/km0fd>.

⁸⁰ Hofmeyr, Nationalist Party lies on the Native Policy, 1946, Pamphlet.

⁸¹ J. H. Hofmeyr, Statement of the United Party Policy, 1948, United Party Election Pamphlet, Papers of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, ZA HPRA A1-A-Ab-Ab1/1946, Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, <https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/km0fd>.

communism and all other forms of undemocratic government.⁸² The UP emphasised once more its cooperation with the British Commonwealth together with the promotion of international cooperation and the maintenance of world peace.⁸³ It saw the British Commonwealth as an essential necessity for world peace. Protection of the fundamental rights of the individual; especially freedom of speech, of religion and of the press was noted, however, the racial context within which these freedoms could take place should not be overlooked. The UP was less concerned with the freedoms of the black population of South Africa. A policy of social security based on full employment and special regard for the underprivileged was also promoted and promised by the UP. However, as with individual freedoms, the UP was not concerned with social security for black South Africans.

The statement also included the UP Defence Policy of preparedness for the security of the Union.⁸⁴ The “sound financial position” which the Union found itself in had to be maintained. The UP could not criticise its own economic policy, thus as election propaganda goes it had to promote its own perceived successes. This aligned with what the UP called “an equitable system of taxation,” although it did not provide any additional details as to what it meant by that. The provision of educational facilities as a primary right of the people⁸⁵ with special attention to technical education and vocational guidance was also promoted by the UP. The issue of immigration was also an important topic.

WWII had caused mass displacement and communities from especially war-torn areas were looking to resettle. The UP proposed “controlled and selective immigration into the Union, from countries of kindred stock and outlook,”⁸⁶ which can only be interpreted as

⁸² Hofmeyr, Statement of the United Party Policy, 1948, Pamphlet.

⁸³ Hofmeyr, Statement of the United Party Policy, 1948, Pamphlet.

⁸⁴ Hofmeyr, Statement of the United Party Policy, 1948, Pamphlet.

⁸⁵ reference being made specifically to the white population

⁸⁶ Hofmeyr, Statement of the United Party Policy, 1948, Pamphlet.

being white settlers who could assist in the rapid economic development of the Union. The statement also provided the UP's ideas on agricultural, mining, and industrial development as these were seen as crucial sectors for the South African economy. The UP wanted an agricultural policy leading to greater productivity and reasonable economic stability for farmers. This policy included the following: price fixing of produce, having due regard to the rights of producers, consumers, and the trade. The UP wanted to continue the development of new mining enterprises and the continuance for as long as possible of the lives of existing mines. The UP also addressed the issue of the standard of living for South Africa's wage-earners, and here the UP could not escape the glaring inequalities based on race. The UP justified this by stating that there were "different levels of civilisation of races in the Union,"⁸⁷ which was an acceptable racist trope for the time.

A policy of intensive industrial development and the encouragement of private enterprise supplemented by state enterprise was also believed to be essential by the UP, together with the encouragement of overseas industrialists to supplement the efforts of South Africans. The UP also wanted the development of foreign markets for South African goods in general and especially on the African continent.⁸⁸ The UP wanted the extension of further rights and functions to the Native Representative Council and other "native" bodies, subject to the authority of Government and Parliament, and their gradual equipment with powers to "run their own affairs."⁸⁹ This showed that the UP, although it was branded as a "liberal" party, did not believe that the so-called native population could "run their own affairs" and needed to be placed under the authority of a white parliament. This is an example of Trusteeship—the dominant paradigm of the Commonwealth at the time.

⁸⁷ Hofmeyr, *Statement of the United Party Policy*, 1948, Pamphlet.

⁸⁸ Hofmeyr, *Statement of the United Party Policy*, 1948, Pamphlet.

⁸⁹ Hofmeyr, *Statement of the United Party Policy*, 1948, Pamphlet.

The accommodation of a stable black labour force in separate townships was also important to the UP. The UP wanted the separate townships to be parallel to industrial areas thus providing ease of access to cheap black labour for various industries.⁹⁰ With regards to these parallel black townships, the UP believed that the government had a financial responsibility for the proper housing and health services for black people.⁹¹ Regarding other race groups, the UP recognised the traditional special position of the coloured people in the Western Cape as an “appendage to the white population” and for the Indian population reaffirmed and maintained the principles of the Asiatic Land Tenure Act.⁹² In summary, the UP tried to reaffirm its belief in national (white) unity, developing the economy and finally trying to articulate a coherent race policy. This stance was brought into higher relief when the UP attempted to address the NP’s proposed policy of apartheid.

In 1948 the UP released a pamphlet titled “What you Should Know: What is Apartheid?” and this was an attempt by the UP to discredit the policy, explaining why the party thought apartheid was impossible as well as why they deemed it to be dangerous. The UP actively campaigned against the NP’s apartheid policy, arguing that in their “*huisbesoek*”⁹³ (whispering campaign), the nationalists were trying to scare the voters out of their wits with stories of a “black peril.” The NP then promised Afrikaners a utopian white South Africa if only they will vote for the nationalist candidates and apartheid. However, the term apartheid remained a catchword.⁹⁴ According to Malan’s statement on 30 March 1948,

⁹⁰ A. Lemon, “The apartheid city,” in *South African urban change three decades after apartheid*, ed. A. Lemon, R. Donaldson, and G. Visser (Cham: Springer, 2021), 1.

⁹¹ Hofmeyr, Statement of the United Party Policy, 1948, Pamphlet.

⁹² Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act, No.28 of 1946, (1946). WHP, A1/Ab 1, “Statement of the United Party Policy”

⁹³ Translated into English as a “House Call” such as a doctor would make.

⁹⁴ J. H. Hofmeyr, What you should know: What is Apartheid, 1948, United Party Election Pamphlet, Papers of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, ZA HPRA A1-A-Ab-Ab1/1946, Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, <https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/km0fd>.

apartheid had as its aim the total separation of “Europeans” (white population) and “non-Europeans” (black, coloured, and Indian population) in South Africa. Eventually all people who were not white would have to live in reserves and have their own organs of government, industries, and commercial enterprises. Only black males would be allowed in the cities as temporary workers.

As the UP correctly argued, South Africa did not have enough land in the reserves to accommodate the entire black population. At the time in the Transvaal 600,000 Black people lived in reserves and 2,4 million outside the reserves.⁹⁵ The black population would have needed four times as much land in the Transvaal. In the Cape Province 62 percent of the natives were in reserves and 38 percent outside. The Transkei and Ciskei were fertile and beautiful parts of South Africa, but they could not accommodate the black population. Another Transkei would have had to be set aside in the Cape if Malan’s scheme was to be carried out. In Natal 940,000 black people were in reserves and 630,000 outside. An additional two Zululands would have had to be acquired in Natal for Malan’s scheme. In the Orange Free State 26,000 Black people were in reserves and 630,000 outside. For Malan’s apartheid the black population in the Free State would need twenty-five times as much land as what was available at that time. It should be noted that all figures were from the report of the Fagan Commission.⁹⁶ These were all arguments posed by the pamphlet. Two important questions were asked. First, where would all the land come from? And second, would white farmers be dispossessed all over South Africa to gain access to the required land?

⁹⁵ Hofmeyr, What you should know: What is Apartheid, 1948, Pamphlet.

⁹⁶ Hofmeyr, What you should know: What is Apartheid, 1948, Pamphlet.

The UP contended that to forcibly resettle almost two million black people would have caused hardship and resentment. The relationship between white and black people would deteriorate. Black people would rightly feel that they were being oppressed by the white population. The fear was that black people would become receptive to communist propaganda. The Fagan Commission pointed out that South Africa needed the black population for industrial development.⁹⁷ Malan wanted to reverse what the UP deemed to have been the progress it had made in race relations. The UP warned against economic disruption in the Union as a result of apartheid-based policies. The UP also warned that South African industrial life would be disrupted and that the unemployment, the misery, and the “poor whiteism” that was prevalent under the NP from 1929–1932 would be rife once more.⁹⁸ These warnings were valid; however, one cannot ignore the politicking that was taking place by the UP. The poverty that existed from 1929–1932 was not solely due to the policies of the NP, as the global economic hardships of the great Depression reached all corners of the world. Though the NP made numerous mistakes, the economic hardship of 1929–1932 cannot be placed solely at the feet of the NP.

Malan had countered these criticisms by arguing that the black population would be encouraged to start their own industries in “their own areas.”⁹⁹ Thus, they would be driven to industrialisation to exist under their own leaders or with foreign aid. The vision was that these black-owned industries would eventually compete with the industries of white South Africa. The low standard of living, which would have been even lower under the envisioned apartheid would enable black people to produce more cheaply than the white population could. Cheap labour was a massive threat which the UP guarded against. White-owned

⁹⁷ Hofmeyr, *What you should know: What is Apartheid*, 1948, Pamphlet.

⁹⁸ Hofmeyr, *What you should know: What is Apartheid*, 1948, Pamphlet.

⁹⁹ Hofmeyr, *What you should know: What is Apartheid*, 1948, Pamphlet.

industries would be undermined in this scenario. The UP saw cheap black labour as their greatest asset at the time, however it would then become an economic disaster for the white population if apartheid were implemented.¹⁰⁰ White artisans and workers would either be without work or would have to accept reduced payments. The theme of apartheid as the UP saw it was that the black population of South Africa must be allowed “to develop along his own lines in his own area.”¹⁰¹ The UP predicted that to bring this about a complete revolution would be necessary, and disastrous consequences would follow from which South Africa would not be able to recover.¹⁰² In contrast to the NP, the UP offered “sanity” arguing:

The United Party policy is sane, wise, and just. It protects and assures white civilization and the standard of living of the white man, and at the same time offers the natives justice and fair treatment. The United Party stands by General Hertzog’s Acts of 1936. They will not be changed under present circumstances. Those Acts provided for the representation of natives in Parliament by Europeans and for the limited enlargement of the reserves to alleviate existing overcrowding and to eliminate “black spots” in European areas. This Act was supported by all the Nationalist members of Parliament then in the House of Assembly and in the Senate.¹⁰³

Unfortunately, the promise of justice and fair treatment for the black population was an exaggeration. The conditions under which black people lived during the reign of the UP cannot be categorised as being exceptionally superior to the living conditions under the NP. The Hertzog Bills, societal racism and segregation, as well as a lack of economic opportunity made for deplorable living conditions for black people before apartheid was implemented as

¹⁰⁰ Hofmeyr, What you should know: What is Apartheid, 1948, Pamphlet.

¹⁰¹ Hofmeyr, What you should know: What is Apartheid, 1948, Pamphlet.

¹⁰² Hofmeyr, What you should know: What is Apartheid, 1948, Pamphlet.

¹⁰³ Hofmeyr, What you should know: What is Apartheid, 1948, Pamphlet.

a policy.¹⁰⁴ In contrast to the UP, whereby they tried to make providing black people with some sort of “fairness,” the NP did the complete opposite and used fearmongering to make Hofmeyr seem like the ultimate liberal threat to the white population.

The National Party and Hofmeyr

As is evident from the above, the UP were no strangers to political propaganda and tried to manipulate public narratives so that the opposition party, in this case the NP, were made to look like the worst option available to the voting public. It is also important to look at the other side of the coin. The NP had a long history of trying to manipulate narratives to make the UP seem like a dangerous option. The NP especially targeted Hofmeyr in various pamphlets they issued. For example, in a pamphlet focused on finance and industry, the NP used these aspects to direct criticism at Hofmeyr. Usually, however, it was his views on race and the British Commonwealth that were used as ammunition against him. The UP claimed all credit for the Union’s industrial advance.¹⁰⁵ Such advance, according to the NP, however, was not the product of either the brain or the policy of the UP, but the result of the industry and initiative of the individual Union citizens who were assisted by the demand for military equipment and the fortuitous flood of capital from Britain to the Union.¹⁰⁶

The NP rightly pointed out that Union industry, first, needed capital.¹⁰⁷ The NP asked: “What did the UP and Mr. Hofmeyr in particular, do to conserve or increase our capital resources?” With his excess profit levy, Hofmeyr stubbornly prevented Union

¹⁰⁴ H. Wolpe, "Capitalism and cheap labour power in South Africa: From segregation to apartheid," in *Capitalism and cheap labour power in South Africa: From segregation to apartheid*, ed. W. Beinart and S. Dubow (Routledge, 1995), 60.

¹⁰⁵ J. H. Hofmeyr, Why not to vote for Hofmeyr and the United Party in the 1948 General Election, 26 May 1948, United Party Election Pamphlet, Papers of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, ZA HPRA A1-A-Ab-Ab1/1948, Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, <https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/km0fd>.

¹⁰⁶ Hofmeyr, Why not to vote for Hofmeyr and the United Party in the 1948 General Election, 1948, Pamphlet.

¹⁰⁷ Hofmeyr, Why not to vote for Hofmeyr and the United Party in the 1948 General Election, 1948, Pamphlet.

industry from conserving and increasing such resources. On the contrary, he obliged South Africa to fritter away its national income in profit distributions, bonuses, increased salary and hidden "hot money"¹⁰⁸ which pushed South Africa's cost of living index (COL index) to a danger-mark. Because of this, mining and industry had to hunt overseas and drain the building societies and other saving institutions, in their bid for capital to finance new ventures and for the expansion of existing ones. The small industrialist and businessman had frequently been unable to raise the necessary funds. Ultimately, all the electioneering came to a crescendo with the 1948 election.

The Election of 1948

In 1948, to the surprise of everyone, even themselves, the Nationalists secured a majority of five seats in the lower house of Parliament.¹⁰⁹ Although only securing 39 percent of the votes cast, the Nationalists had thus secured power to put into practice their policy of apartheid, or racial separation. At the same time, they gained the power to entrench firmly the position of the Afrikaner people in the State. Since 1948 these two issues have dominated every other consideration in the Union of South Africa. The 1948 election thus deeply influenced the relations between first, the white and other races of the nation; and second, between the Afrikaner and British sections of the white community. The 1948 election was fought on those same issues, and its outcome affected the relations between these sections of the South African people.

In the 1948 election the Nationalists not only increased their percentage of the vote, but the UP also increased its proportion from 53 to 55 percent.¹¹⁰ This curious fact is accounted for by the virtual disappearance of independents and small parties. The fight was

¹⁰⁸ funds that are quickly moved in and out of countries in search of higher returns

¹⁰⁹ J. Hatch, "General election in South Africa," *Pakistan Institute of International Affairs* 6, no. 2 (June 1953): 64.

¹¹⁰ Hatch, "General election in South Africa," 64.

one between the Nationalists and the anti-Nationalists, the former united for the first time since 1929, the latter united in the one determination to remove the government. Yet whilst the increase in the government vote allowed it to more than double its majority, the opposition had increased its votes but reduced its seats from 73 to 65. This was due to the “weighting” of rural constituencies, allowed by the South Africa Act, which gave greater political influence to the country voters. Their constituencies were smaller, and therefore require fewer votes to win, and it was in the country districts that the Nationalists found their greatest strength.¹¹¹ In the 1948 election, both the Nationalists and the opposition had pulled out more of their supporters, but whilst great opposition majorities had been making their protest in strong anti-Nationalist areas, the Nationalists had been winning the marginal seats by small majorities and also making inroads into areas which previously had been controlled by the Opposition.¹¹²

The stunning victory of the NP was almost entirely unanticipated.¹¹³ Journalists, politicians and the general public had not believed the NP could take power. On the eve of the election, Hofmeyr recorded in his diary that the UP would maintain power and even improve its position.¹¹⁴ This could not have been further from the truth as not only did the UP lose the election, but Smuts even lost his own seat in rural Standerton.¹¹⁵ In the previous election in 1943, the UP had emerged with double the number of seats of the NP. This fed the idea that politicians such as Malan and Pirow were dead and buried politically and that their careers and relevance were practically over. As shown in the previous chapter, the UP leaned extensively into this narrative trying to highlight the stance of Malan and Pirow

¹¹¹ Hatch, "General election in South Africa," 64.

¹¹² Hatch, "General election in South Africa," 64.

¹¹³ Dubow, *Apartheid 1948–1994*, 1.

¹¹⁴ Hofmeyr, Diary entry of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, 1947–1948, Diary.

¹¹⁵ Dubow, *Apartheid 1948–1994*, 1.

during WWII. The surprise of Malan's victory was magnified by the idea that the important figure of Smuts could not be defeated within South African politics as he had such a prominent standing globally. Although, it is important to note that the trend in the Western world after WWII was to change governments and replace wartime leaders.

Afrikaner Nationalists charged Smuts with having sold out to capitalist imperialism by siding with Britain in both WWI and WWII and for supporting the mining industry against white workers in two separate strikes.¹¹⁶ Smuts had achieved great accomplishments, however, to the ordinary man these accomplishments did not mean much if Smuts could not deliver on the domestic front. This is where the Afrikaner Nationalists saw a clear opportunity to gain support. Smuts had neglected his domestic responsibilities. Dubow even suggests that "hubris" proved to be Smuts' undoing as he believed that his own people would never turn on him.¹¹⁷ The Afrikaner Nationalists also realised that the electoral system of South Africa at the time favoured white rural constituencies that were dominated by Afrikaner farmers.¹¹⁸ They used this to their advantage and targeted this group. Smuts was also unpopular among this group, as their feelings towards British imperialism and Smuts' internationalism evoked extreme negative feelings. In certain sectors Smuts was seen as a traitor, collaborating with "the old enemy" Great Britain. Malan saw the 1948 election as the outcome of a long and hard-fought process to secure Afrikaner power and to redress the wrongs of British imperialism. At his victory speech, Malan was quoted as saying "Today South Africa belongs to us once more. For the first time since Union, South Africa is our own, may God grant that it will always remain our own."¹¹⁹ Malan's victory exposed the

¹¹⁶ Dubow, *Apartheid 1948–1994*, 2.

¹¹⁷ Dubow, *Apartheid 1948–1994*, 2.

¹¹⁸ Dubow, *Apartheid 1948–1994*, 2.

¹¹⁹ Dubow, *Apartheid 1948–1994*, 2.

lethargy of the governing UP and showed that the wartime achievements of Smuts at an international level were not as significant to South Africans as they had seemed.

Smuts' UP, when it was still in power, could at least claim some credit for creating and upholding a relatively successful war economy during WWII. However, this was a meagre accomplishment if compared to what the NP were offering. Another extremely important economic issue, which the UP completely failed to address, was urban poverty which impacted Afrikaners. This again gave Malan and his NP a platform as the feelings of inferiority and insecurity were rampant among urban Afrikaners. A conference organised by the Dutch Reformed Church in 1947 showed that nearly 75 percent of Afrikaners in urban areas were working class and poorly educated.¹²⁰ The NP's official election campaign offered the country a choice between integration and national suicide.¹²¹ The NP also offered apartheid and the protection of the white race.¹²² The election campaign also focused on other issues besides race. Of course, the perception that Afrikaners were discriminated against by the UP and that Smuts had turned on his own people was important, but they also focused on other prominent issues.¹²³ Government incompetence, the threat of communism and the perception that the international community was busy turning against white South Africa were also promoted.

It is important to emphasise the point that the 1948 election was not just about apartheid as a proposed policy made by the NP. Again, the concept of the garrison state comes to one's aid. It is possible that South Africa was showing garrison state characteristics via its opposition party. The UP would not have necessarily promoted garrison state policies;

¹²⁰ Dubow, *Apartheid 1948–1994*, 4.

¹²¹ Dubow, *Apartheid 1948–1994*, 4.

¹²² Dubow, *Apartheid 1948–1994*, 5.

¹²³ Dubow, *Apartheid 1948–1994*, 5.

however, the NP would have been planning towards such policies. When the NP finally came to power, there were numerous questions surrounding the policy of apartheid and how it would be implemented. In reality it was uncertain how the idea of apartheid would look when it was finally implemented. Malan insisted that apartheid was a “positive and non-repressive policy.”¹²⁴ Malan acknowledged that full implementation of the policy would take several years. At this point in South Africa’s history, it seemed as if apartheid was more of an ideal to strive towards, instead of a policy which would be actively implemented. However, that would soon change as the government apparatus began to gain momentum.

The Results of the 1948 Election and the Garrison State

The fundamental question to ask from this time-period would be: Why did the NP win the 1948 election? Also, what does this victory tell one about garrison state characteristics South Africa may have exhibited? Hermann Giliomee, the South African historian known for his work on the history of the Afrikaners, for example, rightly questions the view that the policy of apartheid solely secured victory for the NP.¹²⁵ For Giliomee, assuming that the NP won the 1948 election mainly by propagating the policy of apartheid was highly unlikely as apartheid was a term first used in politics in 1943.¹²⁶ Thus, according to Giliomee, it could not determine the result of a general election five years later. However, it should be noted that the popularity of the policy of apartheid should not be questioned because the word itself was relatively new. Giliomee further illustrates this point by showing that in 1943 *Die Burger* was the first to use the word apartheid in print.¹²⁷ In 1944, Malan, leader of the NP, became the first person to employ it in Parliament. Finally, in 1945, the NP

¹²⁴ Dubow, *Apartheid 1948–1994*, 5.

¹²⁵ H. Giliomee, *The Afrikaners: A concise history* (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2020).

¹²⁶ Giliomee, *The Afrikaners: A concise history*.

¹²⁷ Giliomee, *The Afrikaners: A concise history*.

formally adopted apartheid as its policy. Giliomee mentions issues such as the war vote of 1939 as well as Afrikaner-English tensions as having a major impact on the result of the 1948 election.

Despite the existence of a substantial body of literature on apartheid, according to Giliomee no strong evidence has been presented for the view that apartheid, which had not been developed into a proper programme by 1948, secured the election for the NP.¹²⁸ What inflamed most Afrikaner voters at the time was not racial policy as such, with the ruling UP being caught being indecisive between segregation and integration, but South Africa becoming embroiled in a war that Britain had declared. WWII dramatically intensified the tensions between the English community, who supported South Africa's troops fighting the war, and the Afrikaner community in general. While rejecting any attempt to sabotage the war effort, NP leaders stated that they would do nothing to assist it.¹²⁹ One of the great Afrikaans poets, N. P. van Wyk Louw, personified the radicalisation the vote produced among the Afrikaner nationalist intelligentsia. He considered it "despicable" to fight "for those who have conquered your own people." Alternatively, English-speaking whites, in general, considered it their duty to assist the Allied forces, including acting against those in South Africa who opposed the war.¹³⁰

Although Giliomee goes much further than most in trying to explain the nuances of the NP victory in 1948, he neglects aspects of the war vote. Here the garrison state can assist in understanding the nuances of the time. The war vote was cast to allow South Africa

¹²⁸ Giliomee, *The Afrikaners: A concise history*.

¹²⁹ Giliomee, *The Afrikaners: A concise history*.

¹³⁰ See J. Lambert, "Their finest hour?: English-speaking South Africans and World War II," *South African Historical Journal* 60, no. 1 (2008): 60-84. Lambert investigates the reactions of English-speakers in South Africa to Britain's declaration of war on Germany in 1939. According to Lambert, English-speakers displayed a remarkable unanimity of purpose during WWII, supporting what they saw as both a British and a South African war.

to take part in WWII on the side of the Allied forces. This was in essence an anti-fascist decision that was made by the Smuts and the UP. The argument could be made that the decision to join WWII was due to the pro-British Commonwealth stance of Smuts and the UP. However, this would be an incomplete explanation as Smuts, together with the UP and the powers within the British Commonwealth knew of the threat that fascism posed at home and abroad. Thus, we can view the garrison state as a reaction to the outbreak of fascism in Europe and throughout the entire world. South Africa was not immune to flirtations with fascism, and it certainly had ideologues such as Pirow cheerleading for the cause. In South Africa, the formation of the garrison state can be seen as a response to fascism, which is what Lasswell envisioned. In South Africa, the state exhibited garrison state characteristics before and after the 1948 election, thus it is important to point out that the South African garrison state was not dependent on a specific political party. As the name would suggest, a garrison state, is a state phenomenon, and is not related to a political party.

Roger Southall believes that even if Smuts had been victorious in the 1948 election, there was no guarantee that South Africa would have moved in a different direction than what it did.¹³¹ Although Southall does not take the garrison state concept into account, he sees an inevitability in the NP taking power in 1953 even if the UP had won in 1948.¹³² Southall attributes this idea to the transfer of power from Smuts and Hofmeyr, due to their deaths in 1950 and 1948 respectively, to what he calls the “lacklustre leaders” in the UP who replaced them.¹³³ For Southall, white settler regimes such as South Africa were

¹³¹ R. Southall, "Smuts: Afraid of greatness," in *Reappraising the life & legacy of Jan C Smuts*, ed. D. Boucher and B. Ngqulunga (Johannesburg: UJ Press, 2024), 328.

¹³² Southall, "Smuts: Afraid of greatness," 328.

¹³³ Southall, "Smuts: Afraid of greatness," 328.

“inherently programmed to become more repressive”¹³⁴ due to the perceived threats from the black population. Southall does not engage with counter-factual history of “what if?” Smuts’ and Hofmeyr’s deaths occurred later, but rather his focus is on the repressive nature of the then South African state. Southall’s argument can be extended to the repressive nature of the South African example of the garrison state being inevitable irrespective of the political party in control of the government. It was this repressive nature that concerned Hofmeyr when he wrote “What of the Future” in 1948 which will be dealt with in the following section. Ironically, it could be argued that Hofmeyr contributed to the repressive nature of the South African state by aiding developing garrison state characteristics whilst he was deputy to Smuts.

What of the Future? 1948

Shortly before his death, Hofmeyr wrote a series of articles that were published in a booklet. These articles analysed the political climate under the rule of the NP. Hofmeyr was concerned with the future of South Africa, and this concern stretched beyond party allegiance although his writing may come across as being partisan. Hofmeyr would say that South Africa’s future depended on the UP’s vigilance. However, his analysis would go deeper than simply what the UP could provide South Africa with. The chapter argues that these articles should be viewed not only as a reaction to the 1948 election, but also as an expression of concern that the NP would take advantage of garrison state characteristics such as the extension of the War Measures Act of 1942. The general election of 1948 had resulted in a change of government, but this change was more than just a change of political parties. It was also a change of direction for South Africa. The UP, which for six years

¹³⁴ Southall, “Smuts: Afraid of greatness,” 328.

governed the country in coalition with the Labour and Dominion parties, and for a further two-and-a-half years on its own account, was now the main opposition party. Its place had been taken by a joint NP-AP government, but since all the AP members of Parliament held their seats by grace of the Nationalists, that party was not only numerically, but also tactically, a very weak member of the coalition.¹³⁵ It was the NP directing the course of South Africa's destiny. The question Hofmeyr was seeking an answer for was in what direction would it go?

The same question can be put differently. South Africa had made great economic progress. It had come to be recognised as one of the most fortunate countries in the post-WWII era, offering opportunities for development as few other countries did.¹³⁶ At the same time, the complex of race relations which it had to deal with had been attracting attention—for the most part the not very favourable attention—of other nations, as never before.¹³⁷ Now it had changed course. The question was what course would it follow? Would it continue to progress as it was promising to do under the previous regime? How would it fare in the handling of its race problems, from the point of view both of its internal peace and progress, and of its relations with other nations? These were crucial questions.

To stimulate thought as to South Africa's future Hofmeyer wrote these articles. Hofmeyr trusted that they would help to clarify ideas as to what South Africa's future would look like. In the first article Hofmeyr wanted to deal with the task that awaited the UP. That task was answering the question of what the UP stood for. If vigilance was the first quality looked for in an opposition party, in respect of what was it called upon to be vigilant?

¹³⁵ J. H. Hofmeyr, What of the future? 1948, Article, Papers of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, ZA HPRA A1-A-Ab-Ab1/1948, Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, <https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/km0fd>.

¹³⁶ Hofmeyr, What of the Future? 1948, Article.

¹³⁷ Hofmeyr, What of the Future? 1948, Article.

First, there was the UP's ideal of national unity: the building-up of a truly united nation on the foundations of equality and mutual tolerance. It was under this banner that Hertzog and Smuts came together to form the UP. Malan stood aside, and so the new NP came to be ranged against the UP. It was on the same issue that Hertzog and Malan split in 1940. Here then was the real break between the two parties.

The 1948 election illustrated this. Though the NP were most anxious to win English-speaking voters, they nominated no English-speaking South Africans as candidates.¹³⁸ However, the list of UP candidates was composed in almost equal numbers of English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans.¹³⁹ According to Hofmeyr that did not happen by design. And though at the election it was mostly the party's English-speaking candidates that succeeded, the UP in Parliament was still far more than any other representative of both sections of South Africa's white population. It was not as equally representative as it was in the past. Hofmeyr saw this as a defect and the UP wanted to repair this and it was determined to do so.¹⁴⁰

For Hofmeyr, it was the UP's task to be vigilant about anything that might impair the basis of national unity which it had been seeking to build up. At that moment, it was true, the new government was using conciliatory words, although some of its initial acts had not been equally conciliatory. At that moment its parliamentary position was weak. Hofmeyr saw conciliation as a tactical necessity. Although the NP had not raised the provocative issues in respect of which it committed itself so deeply in the early WWII years, it had never repudiated this attitude.

¹³⁸ Hofmeyr, What of the Future? 1948, Article.

¹³⁹ Hofmeyr, What of the Future? 1948, Article.

¹⁴⁰ Hofmeyr, What of the Future? 1948, Article.

Second, the UP believed that it stood for the principle of freedom, specifically democratic freedom.¹⁴¹ When that principle was in dire peril in 1939, the UP was prepared to fight for it, while the NP was not, according to Hofmeyr. He saw that the underlying NP political philosophy was one of control, of interference with private rights, of the impairment of fundamental human freedoms. Here then vigilance was called for. Hofmeyr predicted that in the coming sessions of Parliament the new government under the NP would be put to the test in this regard.¹⁴² There was the need for new legislation in regard to war measures.¹⁴³ Under the law at that time, all war measures expired at the end of 1948. However, it was almost certainly necessary to continue some of the war measures, for instance in regard to price controls and COL allowances. Hofmeyr had little doubt that the NP government would be tempted to propose the continuity of more war measures than would have been necessary at the time. Thus, the NP would use war measures to increase their administrative powers.

The legislation Hofmeyr was referring to would provide a pointer as to whether the NP would wish to govern along democratic lines, or if they would move increasingly towards unnecessary bureaucracy and despotism. This for Hofmeyr was a “canary in the coal mine” in terms of the direction in which South African politics would move in. Hofmeyr also focused on race and cooperation between “Europeans and non-Europeans” as he stated.¹⁴⁴ Hofmeyr pushed the idea that the UP had stood for cooperation between all sections of South Africa’s population up to a point where it was still politically feasible.¹⁴⁵ The UP stood for a policy of fairness and justice, and the provision of facilities to enable each section,

¹⁴¹ Though democratic freedom for all races was not deemed a priority.

¹⁴² Hofmeyr, *What of the Future?* 1948, Article.

¹⁴³ Hofmeyr, *What of the Future?* 1948, Article.

¹⁴⁴ Hofmeyr, *What of the Future?* 1948, Article.

¹⁴⁵ Hofmeyr, *What of the Future?* 1948, Article.

according to its ability¹⁴⁶ to make a contribution to the common welfare.¹⁴⁷ That was of course a very different thing from political and social equality. The NP policy, on the other hand, was one of repression, and the denial of opportunities to progress. The idea of progress, especially of the black population, certainly did not hold as much political potential as was evident by the results of the 1948 election. The UP was ultimately stuck trying to provide a policy on race relations that would be palatable to the electorate. It failed to convince the electorate and ended up in the opposition benches.

The Threat to Democratic Freedom may Come from Within

Hofmeyr continued his analysis on what he saw as the dangerous repressive nature of the NP. From the title, Hofmeyr took clear liberties with using the word “democracy” as South Africa at the time was not a democracy. First, democracy was denied to the majority of the population based on their race, and second, although limited voting was taking place for the white population at the time South Africa did not have true sovereignty due to its place within the British Empire. In true garrison state fashion, Hofmeyr also viewed the right-wing NP as a perceived threat that would emerge from within South Africa. In this article Hofmeyr discussed what democracy and freedom meant, and the distinction between freedom of the state and freedom in the state. Hofmeyr pointed out that the most insidious threat to democratic freedom may come from within the state.¹⁴⁸ It is significant that Smuts pointed out that the UP’s duty must be to prevent the Nationalists doing any harm to South Africa.¹⁴⁹ The UP, according to Smuts and Hofmeyr, stood for the principle of

¹⁴⁶ this was a vital caveat by Hofmeyr as this excused the oppression of the black population

¹⁴⁷ Hofmeyr, What of the Future? 1948, Article.

¹⁴⁸ J. H. Hofmeyr, The threat to Democracy may come from within. 1948, Article, Papers of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, ZA HPRA A1-A-Ab-Ab1/1948, Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, <https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/km0fd>.

¹⁴⁹ Hofmeyr, The threat to Democracy may come from within. 1948, Article.

democratic freedom. It fought for democratic freedom as a principle in world affairs during WWII. It was determined to maintain that principle in the internal affairs of South Africa. These were propositions which would receive ready assent. But among those assenting there would be many differences of opinion, conscious or unconscious, as to what the terms democracy and freedom meant.¹⁵⁰

Because of the importance of what was involved, because issues of great significance may come to be raised in South Africa, it was desirable that South Africa should seek clarity as to what it was that the UP stood for in this connection.¹⁵¹ Hofmeyr could not start better than by quoting some sentences from the Declaration of Freedom which Smuts made at the University of St. Andrew's in 1934 in his Rectoral address:

The disappearance of the sturdy, independent-minded freedom-loving individual, and his replacement by a servile, standardized mass-mentality is the greatest human menace of our time. Minorities are trampled upon; dissident views are not tolerated and are forcibly suppressed . . . Intellectual freedom is disappearing with political freedom. Freedom of conscience, of speech, of the press, of thought and teaching, is in extreme danger. The fight for human freedom is the supreme issue of the future.¹⁵²

This quote suggests a distinction which was not always clearly appreciated: the distinction between the freedom of the state and freedom in the state. Very often the ideal of South Africa's freedom has been asserted, conceived in terms of freedom from foreign rule and external interference. The type of freedom certain sections of South Africans enjoyed at that time. There were no external obligations, save such as might be incurred in the exercise of its free discretion. However, Hofmeyr saw that for the individual citizen

¹⁵⁰ Hofmeyr, The threat to Democracy may come from within. 1948, Article.

¹⁵¹ Hofmeyr, The threat to Democracy may come from within. 1948, Article.

¹⁵² Hofmeyr, The threat to Democracy may come from within. 1948, Article.

freedom in the state was more important than freedom of the state. Certainly, it would be a poor expression of South Africa's freedom if, while proudly acclaiming its independent statehood, while firmly declaring that South Africa shall resist any impairment of its sovereign rights, it were to limit and restrict the freedom of South African citizens. That was the freedom that General Smuts had mainly in mind in his Rectoral address. Of that freedom, freedom of association (within the limits required by the state's safety), freedom in criticism, freedom for development were among the main constituents.

It is important to note that when Hofmeyr was referring to the term "democracy," it was again necessary to draw a distinction. Was a government, so the question may be put, democratic merely because it was based on the people's will? It may be remembered that Hitler once declared himself to be the "arch-democrat."¹⁵³ That was enough to make South Africans at the time answer the question in the negative. The Soviet government of the late 1940s would also argue it reflected the will of the Russian people. It would indignantly repel any suggestion that it was not democratic. However, it hardly embodied the Western idea of democracy: it fell within the scope of General Smuts' description of the menace to democratic freedom.

Hofmeyr used the distinction drawn by H. J. Laski, the English political theorist and economist. Laski differentiated between a democratic society and a democratic government.¹⁵⁴ The essential feature of a democratic society was equality, the absence of special privileges, based on birth or wealth or race or creed.¹⁵⁵ On this basis, he said, the Russian society was more democratic than the British.¹⁵⁶ A democratic government,

¹⁵³ Hofmeyr, *The threat to Democracy may come from within*. 1948, Article.

¹⁵⁴ Hofmeyr, *The threat to Democracy may come from within*. 1948, Article.

¹⁵⁵ It is astonishing to think Hofmeyr said this having been part of a Government which promoted segregation laws based on race.

¹⁵⁶ Hofmeyr, *The threat to Democracy may come from within*. 1948, Article.

however, was one where the government was freely elected, submitted itself from time to time to the people's approval, and operated its authority in accord with procedures which prevented arbitrary decisions. Hofmeyr saw this as the Western conception of democracy. Hofmeyr used the example of Russia¹⁵⁷ to show how it was not a democracy in the Western conception. Of that Western conception of democracy, Hofmeyr saw freedom of criticism as one of the most important aspects.¹⁵⁸ For Hofmeyr, even the confirmation of the government's position from time to time by the democratic procedure of a free election was not enough. Regarding Laski, what Hofmeyr failed to mention was that a democratic government could thrive in an unequal society as Laski states that: "I do not believe that democracy can be maintained in an unequal society."¹⁵⁹ Laski even criticised the inequality within the British Commonwealth by saying:

That inequality has led to a regime of privilege which divides the Commonwealth into a small group of conquerors and a great mass of hewers of wood and drawers of water to whom life offers no prospect of rich fulfilment.¹⁶⁰

This is an example of Hofmeyr selectively choosing information which suited his argument. Clearly Hofmeyr could not engage fully with the work of Laski as it would not have been politically beneficial to do so. However, he did attempt to address the issue of inequality later on, though inadequately. For Hofmeyr it was more important to continue the freedom of the political minority, which was his own party the UP at that stage, to criticise a democratic government as was discussed earlier. There was always a possibility

¹⁵⁷ Hofmeyr did not use the term "Soviet Union", instead he used "Russia", "Russian society" or "Soviet Government"

¹⁵⁸ Hofmeyr, *The threat to Democracy may come from within*. 1948, Article.

¹⁵⁹ H. J. Laski, "The prospects of democratic government," in *The James Cutler lecture*. 22 (College of William & Mary Law School, 1939), 5.

¹⁶⁰ Laski, "The prospects of democratic government," 5.

that a government which had been elected democratically by a people that wants to retain its democratic rights may prove to be undemocratic in outlook and set about impairing those rights.¹⁶¹ As Hofmeyr already suggested, the most insidious threat to democratic freedom may come from within. There was another point that followed from Laski's distinction between Russian and Western democracies. The Western conception of democracy did not necessarily imply equality. Hofmeyr put the point concretely. He asked whether South Africa was undemocratic because they did not concede political equality to all races? Hofmeyr thought that South Africans accepted that as an essential part of the conception of democracy that all men were created equal. However, Hofmeyr also believed that that carried with it an implication not always fully realised. If it was not essential for democracy that all men should be regarded as equal, it was essential that all men should be regarded as free: free to develop to the full extent of their capacity, and that included political development.

Hofmeyr then returned to the possibility of a democratically elected government impairing freedom within the state. It was a very real danger at that time. It was a tendency of the time Hofmeyr was living in. In total war impairment of freedom was inevitable. Impairment of freedom should have been resisted when justification was no longer available. This was one of the matters where vigilance was called for. Although Hofmeyr failed to mention the brutal repression of the 1946 African Mine Workers Union Strike¹⁶² and Smuts invoking War Measure 1425 prohibiting a gathering of more than twenty people

¹⁶¹ Hofmeyr, *The threat to Democracy may come from within*. 1948, Article.

¹⁶² D. O'Meara, "The 1946 African mine workers' strike and the political economy of South Africa," *The Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 13, no. 2 (1975): 146.

at a proclaimed mine.¹⁶³ However, for Hofmeyr there were indications that such vigilance mentioned earlier was necessary in South Africa due to the NP government. Then Minister of Labour B. J. Schoeman, made a remark in regard to trade unions, implying an impairment of the freedom of associations, and the use to this end of communism for smelling-out purposes.¹⁶⁴ Communism as a totalitarian philosophy was not in accord with the democratic ideas of the UP, but there were far-reaching dangers in the use of the fear of communism as a basis for undemocratic action, as the development of Nazi Germany showed.

The Nationalists Party and National Unity

After the election in 1948 the NP repeatedly referred to national unity. In his radio address Malan laid great emphasis on it.¹⁶⁵ However, Hofmeyr pointed out that the NP had never defined what form that national unity would take—whether by absorption or by equality.¹⁶⁶ The government's actions, he pointed out, did not conform to its early pronouncements on national unity.¹⁶⁷ Hofmeyr believed that the UP's ideal of national unity—the building-up of a truly united nation on the foundations of equality and mutual tolerance—was one of the things in respect of which vigilance was needed.¹⁶⁸ Hofmeyr proposed to focus on that point specifically. Hofmeyr first focused on the meaning of national unity. He argued that as an ideal in South Africa, it had a long history. There was a time when national unity based on subjection of one element of what Hofmeyr called the “European population” to the other was contemplated. For Hofmeyr that failed. Then there

¹⁶³ P. O'Malley, "Racial legislation 1846–1947," No date, accessed 00 Month 0000, Pdraig O'Malley, "Racial Legislation 1846-1947" Nelson Mandela Foundation, Accessed September 24, 2024, <https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv01538/04lv01646/05lv01808.htm>.

¹⁶⁴ Hofmeyr, The threat to Democracy may come from within. 1948, Article.

¹⁶⁵ J. H. Hofmeyr, The Nationalist Party and National Unity. 1948, Article, Papers of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, ZA HPRA A1-A-Ab-Ab1/1948, Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, <https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/km0fd>.

¹⁶⁶ Hofmeyr, The Nationalist Party and National Unity. 1948, Article.

¹⁶⁷ Hofmeyr, The Nationalist Party and National Unity. 1948, Article.

¹⁶⁸ Hofmeyr, The Nationalist Party and National Unity. 1948, Article.

was the conception of national unity based on the absorption of one element by the other, the surrender by that one element of its distinctive cultural and political traditions, and its acceptance of the traditions of the other element. However, Hofmeyr failed to articulate that this was not national unity, but rather a form of repression. National unity within a garrison state would be based on the population unifying against a threat.

National unity remained based on equality; which meant a type of unity that took account of existing diversities, which would maintain all that is of value in those diversities and would comprehend them and enrich them in a larger whole. That was the type of national unity for which the UP stood Hofmeyr argued. In relation to the work of Laski, the issue of equality was always going to be a stumbling block for national unity in South Africa. What was the position to this regard at the time Hofmeyr was writing? At the time, and this was the first time in the history of the Union, a government all of the members belonged to one section of the South African nation. That did not necessarily imply that it would not further national unity and its initial declarations were certainly favourable to that ideal. It was not, however, indicated in specific terms the type of national unity that it stood for: one of absorption or one based on equality. The composition of the NP government could hardly have been anything different from what it was, in the view of the fact that the parliamentary parties from which it was drawn were also limited to one section.

A crucial decision of the new government of the NP was the withdrawal of the public service ban on the OB and the Afrikaner *Broederbond*.¹⁶⁹ Such an act sought justification from the point of view of Afrikaner solidarity, but neither organisations had exactly been a protagonist of national unity. The reputation of the OB was well known. Its aims were

¹⁶⁹ Hofmeyr, *The Nationalist Party and National Unity*. 1948, Article.

obviously sectional and exclusive. Moreover, it was attacked repeatedly and exposed by no less a person than Malan himself. At the time it was intricately linked with Havenga's AP,¹⁷⁰ it admittedly played a big part in the NP-AP victory, cooperation between it and the government was becoming increasingly close, and the Public Service ban on it had been withdrawn. Of the *Broederbond*, which, for Hofmeyr, was an even more sinister body than the OB, the public knew far less. It was a small body limited to a couple of thousand members—and it was a secret organisation.¹⁷¹ Attempts had been made to justify it by comparing it to the Sons of England and the Jewish Board of Deputies.¹⁷² However, these comparisons did not hold, for the *Broederbond* was a secret society with far-reaching political aspirations. For Lasswell's garrison state, an organisation such as the *Broederbond* could have important consequences. Secret or secretive organisations could either be framed as a threat to the garrison state, or it could be an ally that could assist the garrison state in terms of maintaining power.

In 1935 Hertzog, whose status as an Afrikaans-speaking South African no one at the time would impugn, exposed the aims and machinations of the *Broederbond*, pointing out that there was nothing to prevent it from being misused for organised action in conflict with the best interest of the State and the Public Service.¹⁷³ He also quoted inter alia the following from a circular issued in 1934 by the chairman and secretary of the bond:

Let us focus our attention on the fact that the primary consideration is whether Afrikanerdom will reach its ultimate destiny of "baasskap"¹⁷⁴ in South Africa.

¹⁷⁰ Which made it difficult to understand the persistence of the view that Havenga was a moderate.

¹⁷¹ Hofmeyr, *The Nationalist Party and National Unity*. 1948, Article.

¹⁷² Hofmeyr, *The Nationalist Party and National Unity*. 1948, Article.

¹⁷³ Hofmeyr, *The Nationalist Party and National Unity*. 1948, Article.

¹⁷⁴ "Baasskap" is an Afrikaans term that translates to "domination" or "bossiness" in English. It was historically used in South Africa to refer to the practice of white supremacy and racial domination during the apartheid era and before [it is also used in the historiography of colonial SA]

Brothers, our solution for South Africa's ills is that the Afrikaner Broederbond shall rule South Africa.¹⁷⁵

Without going into more detail about the *Broederbond*, one can say that there was not much of the spirit of true national unity in its conception and aims as outlined by Hofmeyr. Yet, up until that point, Malan, by his own admission was a member of the *Broederbond*, and when challenged during the election campaign to repudiate the declaration of its aims, he was not prepared to do so. Vice-Chairman of the bond Dr. Donges, was the minister of interior.¹⁷⁶ Other members of the bond sat in the cabinet. Two members of the central council of the bond sat in Parliament. There was reason to believe that more than half of the government's supporters in Parliament were members of the bond. Malan wanted to have it both ways. He wanted to give conciliatory words about national unity, while at the same time declining to repudiate the declared aims of the *Broederbond*, of which he was a member. Thus, Hofmeyr saw the needs for the special vigilance of the UP. Hofmeyr's fear of the threat to democracy in South Africa came from his beliefs that the NP would use repressive tactics to maintain power. The repressive tactics used by the UP during WWII such as the various war measures was then justifiable for Hofmeyr as it was used to combat—South Africa and the rest of the world. Yet these war measures were not singularly used against fascist opponents. For example, the war measure related to the 1946 African Mine Workers Strike had absolutely nothing to do with combating fascism, but rather the repression of black mine workers.

Conclusion

¹⁷⁵ Hofmeyr, *The Nationalist Party and National Unity*. 1948, Article.

¹⁷⁶ Hofmeyr, *The Nationalist Party and National Unity*. 1948, Article.

The repression of the 1946 African Mine Workers Strike may not have been to combat fascism. However, one can still link this to the economic component of a garrison state and its views regarding employment and the duty to work. Here the South African case fits Lasswell's garrison state concept better, however, as previously mentioned, Lasswell's failure to address the issue of race (which was central to the mine workers strike) within a garrison state leaves the concept lacking a vital component. Lasswell also does not address the role commissions could play in a garrison state, irrespective of the subject the specific commission could investigate. In South Africa, as shown by the examples of the Fagan Commission and Sauer Commission, the issue being investigated was race, and depending on the predominant ideology of the members of a commission, the outcome would promote the need for certain political decisions to be made. Thus, commissions, irrespective of what they investigate, could be a vital tool for a garrison state to use to further centralise power.

However, Lasswell was writing from an American perspective which does not provide one with an answer as to why he neglected the issue of race. Lasswell was also influenced by his time in Europe thus he was not writing solely from an American perspective. It then becomes noteworthy that Lasswell does not only neglect the issue of race, but he also neglects the vital issue of imperialism. Imperialism is not a concept that can be ignored, especially if one is conducting multidisciplinary research within the humanities such as Lasswell was doing. Lasswell also neglected the issue of trusteeship which could have also been a tool that a garrison state could use. The South African example can assist to create a more complete garrison state, addressing all the factors Lasswell neglected.

When looking at the decisions made by Smuts during WWII, the developing garrison state characteristics in South Africa takes on a unique iteration. When Lasswell first

published “The Garrison State,” he did not consider that countries that are part of a greater empire such as the British Empire could also start exhibiting garrison state characteristics. Lasswell was inward looking when it came to the concept of the garrison state. Though Lasswell did speak of the possibility of garrison states in plural form, he never addressed the possibility that decisions made by these garrison states were informed not only by domestic issues, but also by their membership to a greater empire. For example, in South Africa, the war measures Smuts invoked did not only benefit Smuts and the UP domestically, but it also benefited the British Empire and its fight against fascism.

This leads us to the final issue, namely which garrison state characteristics did South Africa exhibit during the 1930s and 1940s? This matter will be dealt with in the conclusion of this thesis.

CHAPTER 6

Conclusion: Malan takes Advantage of the garrison state

By 1948, as the new prime minister, Malan was the most important politician in South Africa. While most of the focus surrounding the 1948 elections centred on the surprise of the NP victory, Malan, not ignoring his own feelings of surprise, was determined to win the election.¹ On Friday 4 June 1948 the new cabinet was sworn in under his premiership.² This was the first cabinet in the history of South Africa that was entirely Afrikaans speaking. A week later, the first cabinet meeting was conducted entirely in Afrikaans. This was also a first for South Africa. The composition of the cabinet is important to note, as none of the cabinet members were “military men.” It was a composition of lawyers and career politicians with a theologian, Malan, at the helm. These were not the “specialists on violence” that Lasswell had foreseen. The only member of Malan’s cabinet with a military-style title was Frans Erasmus, the minister of defence, yet he received his title of “general,” not from any branch of the South African military, but rather from the OB. In the previous two cabinets, Smuts was the only clear representative in the cabinet of someone with a distinguished military career. Like Smuts before him, Malan was not only the prime minister, but he also assigned himself the position minister of external affairs. The international community saw the election of Malan as a move towards isolationism,³ not a characteristic that Lasswell addresses in the garrison state. However, it would follow that

¹ L. Koorts, "If neither capitalism nor communism, then what? DF Malan and the National Party's economic rhetoric 1895–1954," *Economic History of Developing Regions* 29, no. 2 (2014): 170.

² Anon., "New South African Cabinet," *Rand Daily Mail*, 4 June 1948.

³ Anon., "New South African Cabinet," *Rand Daily Mail*, 4 June 1948.

the more entrenched a garrison state becomes, the more it will become isolated from the international community and its interactions will be limited to other garrison states.⁴

Malan succeeded in securing an election agreement with Havenga and the AP.⁵ However, there was also a noticeable change in Malan's rhetoric.⁶ He presented the electorate with two main points: the policy of apartheid as well as the issue of the *rooi gevaar*.⁷ It would not be hyperbolic to say that Malan hated communism. This was seen as one of his few redeeming qualities by the international media.⁸ His change in rhetoric manifested itself in that here was no trace of the anti-capitalist, anti-mining rhetoric which he had employed in nearly every election since 1924.⁹ However, the NP was also reacting to the beginning of the Cold War and situating itself accordingly, thus the shift in rhetoric to *rooi gevaar* was also in reaction to international events such as Churchill's "iron curtain" speech in 1946 and the so-called Truman doctrine enunciated in 1947. Irrespective, Malan had evolved more nuanced approaches on these matters. In a post-WWII era, Malan became prime minister of South Africa at the age of seventy-four.¹⁰ Malan was part of a group of Afrikaner leaders who had received a nineteenth-century upbringing and who dominated South African politics during the first half of the twentieth century.¹¹ Unlike Smuts, Malan had no military record to speak of. He had not personally experienced the

⁴ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

⁵ Anon., "New South African Cabinet," Rand Daily Mail, 4 June 1948.

⁶ Koorts, "If neither capitalism nor communism, then what? DF Malan and the National Party's economic rhetoric 1895–1954," 170.

⁷ Koorts, "If neither capitalism nor communism, then what? DF Malan and the National Party's economic rhetoric 1895–1954," 170.

⁸ Anon., "New South African Cabinet," Rand Daily Mail, 4 June 1948.

⁹ D. F. Malan, Verkiesingsmanifest, 20 April 1948, Manifest, D. F. Malan Collection, 1/1/2390, Document Centre, J. S. Gericke Library of Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch.

¹⁰ L. Korf, "D. F. Malan: A political biography" (Unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 2010), 432.

¹¹ Korf, "D. F. Malan: A political biography," 459.

Jameson Raid, and he did not fight in the Anglo-Boer War.¹² Yet, as for many other Afrikaners of the time, these experiences shaped many of his beliefs regarding the direction South Africa needed to move in. This direction was primarily pro-Afrikaner, and anti-British.

It is also important to view the background of Malan. He was born in the Western Cape, in 1874, the son of a Swartland farmer.¹³ This region was one of the first to use politics to advance farming interests, first through the *boeren beschermingsvereniging* (BBV)¹⁴ and later through the Afrikaner Bond, under the leadership of *Onze Jan Hofmeyr*.¹⁵ "The party was established in response to excise duties on spirits, an issue which affected the wine farmers of the Western Cape."¹⁶ Malan arrived in the Netherlands in October 1900, where he undertook his doctoral studies in theology. He was a Cape Afrikaner, and while as mentioned earlier, he did not participate in the Anglo-Boer War. He was certain that the war was the root cause of the poverty and suffering of the Afrikaner community. For this reason, he undertook to study welfare initiatives in the Netherlands, in preparation for his future work. In 1913, as a minister in the Dutch Reformed Church, and after the 1913 mine workers' strikes on the Rand, Malan was invited to give a lecture on socialism. It so happened Malan that did not regard these strikes as a mere response to local conditions. Malan was convinced that socialism was inevitably followed by anarchism, violence, and destruction. Malan's final judgement on socialism was based on his nationalist convictions. He was aware that South Africa's social order was continually changing, this was evidenced

¹² Korf, "D. F. Malan: A political biography," 459.

¹³ Koorts, "If neither capitalism nor communism, then what? DF Malan and the National Party's economic rhetoric 1895–1954," 170.

¹⁴ The "Farmers Protection Organisation" in English.

¹⁵ Koorts, "If neither capitalism nor communism, then what? DF Malan and the National Party's economic rhetoric 1895–1954," 170.

¹⁶ Koorts, "If neither capitalism nor communism, then what? DF Malan and the National Party's economic rhetoric 1895–1954," 170.

by an ever-growing class of poor whites, which Malan believed made the Afrikaners vulnerable to organised money and labour. Malan was a consummate politician.¹⁷ He had the ability to develop political strategies and, in doing so, “to take the sentiments of his followers into account.”¹⁸ Malan had inherited a state with developing garrison state characteristics from his predecessor and he had been the leader who came to power towards the end of the period the thesis is focused on. Malan is an example of a politician who benefited from the garrison state even though his own political ideology was not necessarily aligned with anti-fascism.

Future Full of Danger for South Africa

With Malan and the NP in power, the opposition UP (which was still under the leadership of Smuts), became increasingly concerned. In “What of the Future,” Hofmeyr authored a final article that focused on the dangers with which South Africa was faced at that stage of its political history.¹⁹ These were issues that Hofmeyr attempted to bring to the forefront of the political-intellectual discourse. Hofmeyr looked at several key areas such as the economy, immigration, and domestic issues which were under threat within the short space of time that the NP had been in power. With regards to the economy, Hofmeyr first noted the reduction in the flow of capital to South Africa as well as the dollar gap in South Africa’s balance of payments which remained unbridged. Economic forecasts on South Africa’s ability to take out loans in the future were also dire. Havenga, then the minister of finance, had foreshadowed an increase in taxation. This did not bode well for South Africa’s future economic prospects.

¹⁷ Korf, “D. F. Malan: A political biography,” 460.

¹⁸ Korf, “D. F. Malan: A political biography,” 460.

¹⁹ J. H. Hofmeyr, Future Full of Danger for South Africa. No date, Article, Papers of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, ZA HPRA A1-A-Ab-Ab1, Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, <https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/km0fd>.

On the question of South Africa's essential freedoms, Hofmeyr continued with his theme of vigilance. It was significant that the War Measures further Continuation Bill did not merely extend for a specified period. Hofmeyr had previously expressed his concerns over the NP abusing the War Measures Bill to increase its administrative powers. The continuation proposed was for an indefinite time which was exactly what Hofmeyr had warned about. The NP government could thus decide when any War Measures would cease.²⁰ This impaired the South African parliament's authority to make laws.

The change in immigration policy was one of the most serious issues post the 1948 election for Hofmeyr. South Africa needed to increase its workforce both from the point of view of its present potentialities and opportunities. This need must be viewed within the context of South Africa's desirability to increase the proportion of Europeans in South Africa's population in relation to the prevailing attitudes towards racial problems. The state-sponsored scheme of the UP government had been based on a recognition of this fact, and, of the circumstances at the time favouring emigration from European countries. Action was being taken to impose barriers to the immigration of British subjects which previously was free, subject to certain specified disqualifications set forth in the law. Hofmeyr stated "For all this our country may yet have to pay dearly."²¹ Malan's nationalism as well as that of the NP was more exclusive and can be likened to the notion of "*bloed en volk*" (blood and people).²² The notion of race was crucial to the Nationalists' vision of the South African

²⁰ Hofmeyr, Future Full of Danger for South Africa. No date, Article.

²¹ Hofmeyr, Future Full of Danger for South Africa. No date, Article.

²² S. Peberdy, *Selecting immigrants: National identity and South Africa's immigration policies, 1910–2008* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2009), 106.

nation.²³ State officials referred to the potential of immigrants to “contaminate” or corrupt the “soul” of South Africa.²⁴

Hofmeyr then moved on to the matter of apartheid. The discussions on apartheid had revealed certain modifications on the original concept. It was clear that total territorial segregation was no longer contemplated as an ideal.²⁵ It was unlikely that there would be any considerable reduction of the number of black people living in white areas. However, it was also clear that it was not intended to regard those who did live there as part of the settled population of those areas. A new housing policy had been foreshadowed, which at the best took a considerable time to bring into operation, which left many in a deteriorating situation. Hofmeyr was also concerned about the fact that black people would be excluded from pensions and other benefits.²⁶ The prospects of apartheid were disturbing for Hofmeyr especially regarding the curtailment of political rights.

What Became of Pirow and Hofmeyr’s Visions for the Future of South Africa?

The opposing views for the future that Hofmeyr and Pirow had can be illustrated using numerous examples. For Hofmeyr his early start in politics was not as fortuitous as he had hoped. He had attempted without success to oppose Malan on the Immigration Quota Bill in the early 1930s. Hofmeyr wanted a more liberal approach to allow more Jewish immigration into South Africa, however, his inability to address practical matters on immigration allowed Malan to get the better of Hofmeyr during the parliamentary debates. This was a consistent issue that plagued Hofmeyr throughout his political career. His verbose nature hampered him especially during debates. As already shown, through his

²³ Peberdy, *Selecting immigrants: National identity and South Africa's immigration policies, 1910–2008*, 106.

²⁴ Peberdy, *Selecting immigrants: National identity and South Africa's immigration policies, 1910–2008*, 106.

²⁵ Hofmeyr, *Future Full of Danger for South Africa*. No date, Article.

²⁶ Hofmeyr, *Future Full of Danger for South Africa*. No date, Article.

involvement in the *Coming of Age* publication, his name was associated with a vision of a more liberal and inclusive society, already in the early 1930s. Hofmeyr followed in Smuts' footsteps of imperial internationalism and his belief of a more inclusive South Africa was limited to South Africa being part of the British Empire. The thesis made the argument that, although Hofmeyr had a liberal view for the future of South Africa, he was still conflicted between his moral beliefs and what was politically advantageous. This internal conflict allowed for political opponents to capitalise on his indecision and achieve important victories within the political-intellectual debates of the time. Hofmeyr combined anti-fascism with liberal-internationalism in the post-war visions of South Africa and the world shaped by the Atlantic Charter of 1941. His failure was to reconcile this with racial equality, however his technocratic nature meant that he lacked the vision to achieve this.

Pirow did not experience any moral qualms. His moral and political beliefs were more aligned and informed by his fascism. Thus, his political fall from grace should be intrinsically tied to his beliefs in fascism. By the end of WWII, the horrors of the Holocaust had become known globally, and those who were pro-Nazi, such as Pirow, had permanently damaged their political aspirations. What saved Malan's political career was that he was not pro-Nazi, but rather anti-participation in WWII. Despite later falling from grace, Pirow played a key role in establishing crucial garrison state characteristics in South Africa. As the garrison state can be seen as a response to fascism, it is ironic that Pirow helped establish these characteristics. Pirow's five-year plan focused on expanding and industrialising the South African military, making it a much more powerful and influential group within South African society, a crucial garrison state characteristic. The expansion of the military's capabilities, aided by the increase in personnel and the production in arms, assisted another garrison state characteristic, namely that the most powerful members of the society would

be drawn from the military, the “specialists on violence.” It is important to note that Pirow expanded the capabilities of the state by upgrading the military, and whichever political party took control of the state would benefit from that. Ultimately, neither Hofmeyr’s, nor Pirow’s vision for the future of South Africa came to fruition.

Which Garrison State Characteristics did South Africa Exhibit in the 1930s and 1940s?

A crucial caveat is that Lasswell stated that “The picture of the garrison state that . . . is no dogmatic forecast. Rather, it is a picture of the probable. It is not inevitable.”²⁷ Lasswell focused on potential developments, and he noted that “we consider alternative visions for the future.”²⁸ As previously mentioned, it was never a foregone conclusion that South Africa would become a garrison state, nor is it a certainty that South Africa was a definitive garrison state. Unlike Magubane, the thesis did not use the concept of the garrison state to understand a specific phenomenon, such as the militarisation of South African society in the 1970s and 1980s. Instead, the study took a more specific and nuanced approach. The concept was tested against 1930s and 1940s South Africa and the focus was on the potential development of garrison state characteristics, in the spirit in which Lasswell intended the concept to be used, as a form of “futures thinking.” Thus, one can see which garrison state characteristics 1930s and 1940s South Africa did, or alternatively, and no less important for the purposes of the thesis, did not exhibit. It could then be argued that this application of the concept is historically more accurate. The thesis contextualises the concept rather than using it as an anachronistic yardstick (the latter can be seen as a weakness of the political sciences approach).

²⁷ Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” 456.

²⁸ Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” 456.

The garrison state is a concept that is rooted in the American and European experiences of the twentieth century. The British had an alternative approach, which was to seek security in a global federation that would secure their interests and give what remained of their empire legitimacy. This is why the garrison state is an awkward fit for South Africa, given its close ties to the British Commonwealth. It could therefore only realise the garrison state once it had severed its ties with the Commonwealth in 1961. The thesis also argues that the garrison state as a concept fits South Africa better in the 1940s. Although key garrison state characteristics develop during the 1930s, the war period of the early 1940s presented South Africa with enhanced garrison state characteristics.

It is safe to determine that there was not one specific moment of inception for the South African garrison state, nor was there a specific incubation period. Rather, there were continuous developments that took place throughout the 1930s and 1940s. Thus, the thesis argues for the existence of *developing* garrison state characteristics in South Africa during the 1930s and 1940s. It is important to highlight the title of the thesis, whereby a question is asked regarding the origins of the garrison state in South Africa. The open-ended nature of the research is important to note. One cannot establish the exact origins of the garrison state in South Africa. However, one can, as the thesis has done, test the concept against a specific time-period. Besides the developing garrison state characteristics that can be observed during the 1930s and 1940s, one can also observe different versions of the South African garrison state, namely the anti-fascist and anti-communist versions which will be discussed later. Therefore, it is possible to speak of a South African garrison state, however it is not a complete concept. This could be attributed to both the shortcomings of the concept as well as the unique and obscure nature of the South African political landscape during the 1930s and 1940s. This is related to the “conditions of possibility” mentioned in

the introduction of the thesis as there were many “moving parts” during this time-period which are not all necessarily relevant to Lasswell’s garrison state concept. These conditions of possibility can, however, assist in creating an improved version of the garrison state which will be discussed later in the conclusion. The following section will focus on the developing garrison state characteristics in South Africa during the 1930s and 1940s.

Lasswell argued that in the garrison state the “specialists on violence” are the most powerful group in society.²⁹ If one looks at the power structure of South Africa from the late 1930s and throughout the 1940s, one can clearly see that military men were in control of South Africa. Jan Smuts would be the prime example of this. When Smuts took control of South Africa’s government and became prime minister in 1939, the first action he took was to involve South Africa in a war. Smuts was a benefactor of the work of Pirow to grow South Africa’s military and its ability to produce arms. The military background of Jan Smuts, combined with his role as field marshal to Churchill in WWII, as well as the strength of the South African military at the time, make for a clear garrison state characteristic. Lasswell also states that the military men who dominate a modern technical society will be vastly different from the officers of history and tradition. It is probable that the specialists on violence would include in their training a large degree of expertise in many of the skills traditionally accepted as part of modern civilian management.³⁰ This was also the case with Smuts as he was a trained lawyer. He was the top law student when studying at Cambridge and by the early age of twenty-eight he was appointed Attorney General of the Transvaal by Paul Kruger.³¹

²⁹ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 457.

³⁰ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 458.

³¹ J. Hyslop, "Jan Smuts and the world counter-revolution 1917–1923," in *Reappraising the life & legacy of Jan C Smuts*, ed. D. Boucher and B. Ngqulunga (Johannesburg: UJ Press, 2024), 50.

Another garrison state characteristic that South Africa exhibited was that the expectations about the future may rest upon the extrapolation of past trends into the future.³² Here one can use the example of South African sovereignty and its participation in both WWI and WWII. In the mid-1930s Hertzog's concern was that South Africa would be co-opted into participating in another world war if Britain were to take part, as was the case with WWI. Hertzog proved to be correct; when Britain declared war on Nazi Germany, the Smuts government followed in a way reminiscent of WWI and the Botha government. It is interesting to note that the ANC, as the leading political organisation for the black population, decided to support South Africa's participation in the war.³³ Yet, it was not as simple as the ANC lending support to the war effort. They chose to develop a sophisticated strategy.³⁴ The key ANC leaders, A. B. Xuma and Z. K. Matthews used the sentiments of "British and American liberal anti-fascism" in framing their demands, highlighting the ethical goals of the "British-American agreement, the Atlantic Charter, and Franklin Roosevelt's statement of the values" that America was promoting in his "Four Freedoms" speech.³⁵

It is also important to note how specialists on violence are more preoccupied with the skills and attitudes judged characteristic of nonviolence in a garrison state.³⁶ This is because, for Lasswell, military and civil skills needed to be merged in the garrison state. In South Africa during the 1930s and 1940s the military became increasingly equipped with different skills. For example, the "large-scale civilian enterprise" can be compared to the project of industrialising armaments manufacturing undertaken by Pirow. Lasswell argued

³² Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 456.

³³ Hyslop, Braskén, and Roos, "Political and intellectual lineages of Southern African anti-fascism," 20. Jonathan Hyslop, Kasper Braskén, and Neil Roos, "Political and Intellectual Lineages of Southern African Anti-Fascism," *South African Historical Journal* 74, no. 1 (January 2022): 20.

³⁴ Hyslop, Braskén, and Roos, "Political and intellectual lineages of Southern African anti-fascism," 20.

³⁵ Hyslop, Braskén, and Roos, "Political and intellectual lineages of Southern African anti-fascism," 20.

³⁶ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 458.

that within a garrison state civil enterprises would merge with military enterprises to the benefit of the military. The military would then use the civil industrial infrastructure for its own purposes.

For Lasswell, unemployment would be obsolete in the garrison state as it implied uselessness.³⁷ In the garrison state there must be work (and the duty to work) for all.³⁸ In South Africa the question of poor whiteism came to the fore especially during the 1930s and 1940s. The Carnegie Report came to fruition shortly after the great Depression. The focus on poor whiteism was to move away from charity and helplessness and to provide opportunities and employment for this group of people because, as Lasswell states, in a garrison state the unemployed are seen as useless even if they are given a “dole.” This also coincided with the considerable number of economic projects and race legislation that benefited the poor white class, for example, the practice of job reservation.

For Lasswell, in the garrison state, ruling elites would continue to put their chief reliance upon propaganda as an instrument of morale.³⁹ This characteristic can be universal and applicable to a variety of distinct types of states, authoritarian or not. Propaganda is a normal part of politics. Thus, even though South Africa did portray this during the 1930s and 1940s, this characteristic is not unique to a garrison state. Propaganda and censorship can work hand in hand, and Lasswell neglected the role of censorship in a garrison state. In South Africa censorship played a key role in maintaining control.⁴⁰

Lasswell did attempt to engage with the concept of democracy, specifically ‘democracy’ styled and influenced by the garrison state. Lasswell referred to this type of

³⁷ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 459.

³⁸ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 459.

³⁹ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

⁴⁰ See for example the Entertainments (Censorship) Act, No.28 of 1931, (1931).

democracy as “mystic” democracy.⁴¹ This may be found where authority and control are highly concentrated.⁴² For Lasswell this would occur if “instrumental” democracy was in a state of suspension or disuse. Instrumental democracy, according to Lasswell, “is found wherever authority and control are widely dispersed among the members of a state.”⁴³ In a mystic democracy, the state would speak “in the name of the people as a whole.”⁴⁴ Lasswell saw four main ideological patterns from which a garrison state could appear when he published the garrison state in 1941. Each of these had democratic elements. Lasswell identified: (a) National Democracy (United States and Great Britain); (b) National antiplutocracy (Germany, Italy and Japan); (c) World Proletariat (Russia); and finally (d) a “true world proletariat” which Lasswell believed did not exist at the time.⁴⁵ South Africa during the 1930s and 1940s could be characterised as a “mystic” democracy. Elections took place; however, they were not free and fair and they were characterised by racial discrimination. These elections were also influenced by issues of sovereignty, colonialism and imperialism. South Africa, during the 1930s and 1940s, presents one with two important mystic democracy characteristics. First, authority was highly centralised and concentrated in the hands of Smuts and Hofmeyr. Second, both Smuts and Hofmeyr had a tendency, especially during WWII, to speak on behalf of the entire South African population as if the entire country was for the involvement in the war when in fact large groups of dissidents existed.

It is also important to focus on the developing garrison state characteristics which Lasswell spoke of that South Africa did not exhibit. First, with the socialisation of danger the

⁴¹ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 462.

⁴² Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

⁴³ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 462.

⁴⁴ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 462.

⁴⁵ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 468.

nation becomes unified.⁴⁶ South Africa was not unified. The clear race divisions made this impossible. There was even division within groups. For example, within the Afrikaners, a major division occurred when the split between Smuts and Hertzog happened because of South Africa's participation in WWII. Although this period ended with the NP victory, and even with the existence of detractors noted, the NP managed to unify enough support that it remained in power until 1994. Another garrison state characteristic is the duty to obey, and to serve the state especially from a military perspective.⁴⁷ This did not immediately occur in South Africa, which only instituted conscription in 1967.⁴⁸

In a garrison state institutional practices long connected with modern democracy would disappear, Lasswell argued. As South Africa was not a modern democracy until 1994, it becomes difficult to argue that long standing institutional democratic practices disappeared during the 1930s and 1940s. South Africa was a particular type of democracy with voting limited to the white population. Race and the South African democracy have always been intrinsically linked, whether it be exclusive such as the periods of segregation and apartheid, or inclusive such as it has been post-1994. Lasswell never addressed the issue of race, race-based legislation, or race relations in a garrison state. In a garrison state there would be a government by plebiscite, Lasswell theorised.⁴⁹ South Africa's first referendum was only in 1960. Legislature would also be done away with, Lasswell argued.⁵⁰ This did not occur in South Africa, in fact the opposite as South Africa, in order to maintain the separation of races, had to invest in numerous legislative bodies. The tendency to ceremonialise rather than to fight would be particularly prominent among the most

⁴⁶ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

⁴⁷ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

⁴⁸ Defence Amendment Act, No.85 of 1967, (1967).

⁴⁹ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

⁵⁰ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

influential elements in a garrison state.⁵¹ This was not evident during the 1930s and 1940s, as South Africa was a participant in the most prominent war of that era, namely WWII. Finally, in a garrison state, decisions will be more dictatorial than democratic.⁵² In South Africa black rival political parties were suppressed along with the SACP⁵³ however, rival white political parties were not suppressed and were allowed to take part in elections and debate political matters of the day in parliament.

Lasswell's garrison state concept provides a sound foundation to understand the complexities of various characteristics that states exhibit. However, as the thesis has shown thus far, the concept is far from perfect. The following section will endeavour to show how the concept can be improved upon.

Improving the Garrison State Concept

As the thesis sought to contribute to Lasswellian scholarship and Lasswell's garrison state concept, it is important to focus on how the garrison state as a concept can be improved upon and clarified. The use of the concept can also be promoted in differing contexts. Although Lasswell presents us with a fascinating perspective, his garrison state concept is by no means perfect. It is important to focus on missing characteristics that Lasswell omits which would have the potential to improve the concept. A revised garrison state with other characteristics would make the concept more universal. This would mean that the garrison state would have a greater utility as a concept as it would then be possible to apply it to a wider context. As it stands, the garrison state does not reach its full potential in terms of its utility as it is limited in terms of the characteristics Lasswell proposed. This would then be an apt opportunity to pivot to the South African example. This section will

⁵¹ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

⁵² Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455.

⁵³ See *The Suppression of Communism Act*.

not be a repetition of which garrison state characteristics were developing in South Africa during the 1930s and 1940s, but rather an intensified look at the potential garrison state characteristics Lasswell omits which South Africa presented with.

The most important omission from Lasswell when we apply his garrison state concept to South Africa, is, as previously mentioned, the issue of race. The garrison state is obsessed with power and control, and it requires a threat (real or perceived) as a reason for it to exercise excessive power and control over its population. Here racism can be used as a weapon and the creation of a threat stemming from a specific racial group could prove extremely useful for a garrison state. Lasswell needed to expand on his ideas of potential threats and how garrison states could manipulate the public and use fear to legitimise its use of excessive control over society. The incorporation of race and racism into the garrison state concept could also add to the utility of it and make it more applicable to various contexts. This could aid scholars in understanding racism and systemic racial oppression in a different manner. Similar arguments in relation to race could be made in terms of religion, caste-systems and classism. This brings us back to the issue of Lasswell not expanding on the potential threats to a garrison state and the vague nature of that specific characteristic.

Lasswell also neglected the issue of decision-making within a garrison state. The decision-making would be done by the “specialists on violence” but Lasswell does not address the issue of what would motivate them. The nature of decision-making within a garrison state would not necessarily be solely influenced by domestic issues, as it would need to take international events into account as well. However, a garrison state, as with the example of South Africa, could also have its decision-making process influenced by an imperial or colonial power. A country that does not have complete sovereignty could exhibit garrison state characteristics, yet these characteristics could manifest themselves because

of the influence of an external imperial or colonial power. A country could then exhibit garrison state characteristics not for its own benefit, but rather for the benefit of the external imperial or colonial power. Lasswell should have addressed imperialism and colonialism as this is not simply a contextual or historical issue, but also a practical issue that could influence decision-making within a garrison state. Dominion status and trusteeship, or indeed any other form of an imperial or colonial power usurping the sovereignty of a nation could have potential consequences in relation to its garrison state status.

This is also relevant in relation to decision-making involving the military, as these decisions could be influenced by an imperial or colonial power. Unfortunately, Lasswell does not address military decision-making or military history to provide context. Staying with the subject of the military, although Lasswell published the garrison state in 1941 and would not have been aware of all the intricacies surrounding nuclear weapons, a revised version of the garrison state would be able to thoroughly address the role of nuclear weapons within a garrison state.

In relation to the transition from one political ideology to another, Lasswell also did not elaborate enough on the role of elections and how this could potentially cause a country to transform into a garrison state. Or alternatively, how an existing garrison state could be maintained via the transfer of political power from one political party to another irrespective of political ideology. In the modern global political landscape this transition of power whilst still maintaining a garrison state could be an important factor for scholars to consider. Another aspect Lasswell neglected was the issue of censorship as in a garrison state the control of information would be vital to maintain power.

In terms of future utility of the concept, Eyal Rubinson believes that it is possible to identify a garrison state prototype as well as the creation of a garrison state index to

measure the extent to which a country is exhibiting garrison state characteristics. Robinson identifies a garrison state prototype as “A modern-day Sparta should primarily centralize an unproportionate amount of its resources towards preparing for a real or perceived national security threat.”⁵⁴ The garrison state index is based on seven factors namely: (1) the amount of armed forces personnel; (2) military expenditure as a share of gross domestic product; (3) arms exports and arms imports; (4) terrorist attacks; (5) conflict recurrence; (6) military participation in government and military dimension index; and finally (7) civilian control scores are all relevant according to Robinson.⁵⁵ This index could serve as a modern version for the garrison state, although it should be noted that Robinson deviates quite substantially from the traditional garrison state characteristics that Lasswell proposed. If a revised version of the garrison state were to be produced, Robinson’s index could be included, together with the previously mentioned factors that Lasswell neglected to allow for the garrison state as a concept to be more widely used.

A Final Summary

The thesis sought to make a dual contribution to the body of knowledge, first to South African history, and second to Lasswellian scholarship and his garrison state concept. The thesis also sees its contribution to the body of knowledge in several other ways. First, Lasswell’s garrison state has never been applied to 1930s and 1940s South Africa, nor has it ever been applied to this extent. Magubane only focuses on the garrison state in South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, and he does not delve deeply to focus on specific garrison state characteristics, nor does he look at the garrison state as a developmental construct. The research is also the first scholarly work since Magubane to look at South Africa in

⁵⁴ E. Robinson, "Measuring Garrison States in international politics: Towards a new 'Garrison Index'," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 47, no. 10 (2024), <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2024.2347881>.

⁵⁵ Robinson, "Measuring Garrison States in international politics: Towards a new 'Garrison Index'."

conjunction with Lasswell's garrison state. Using Lasswell's work in a colonial context like 1930s and 1940s South Africa is also unique. Lasswell has also never been used in tandem with South African political figures such as Hofmeyr and Pirow. The thesis argues that the garrison state can provide insight into South African history. The research provides a more nuanced approach to how the future of South Africa was viewed during a crucial time of the 1930s and 1940s. Hofmeyr and Pirow had vastly different ideas for the future of South Africa which provides us with a retrospective view. These ideas, among others,⁵⁶ competed against each other in South Africa during the 1930s and 1940s. By unpacking the political-intellectual discourse of the 1930s and 1940s, the research was able to look at developing garrison state characteristics in South Africa.

South Africa during the 1930s and 1940s was not isolated from global events, and it was not immune from the rise of fascism. The garrison state would be a response to the rise of fascism. With the focus of the research being on South Africa and the garrison state, the position of the research is located within new scholarship on South African anti-fascism.⁵⁷ For anti-fascism historiography, South Africa presents a unique case study as leading right-wing figures of the interwar period came to power in 1948, after the military defeat of the major fascist states.⁵⁸ The garrison state adds another layer to the new scholarship on South African anti-fascism. Anti-fascism has been dominated by the traditions of "anarchist, socialist, and communist internationalism and New Left movements, but also with pan-Africanism, anti-colonialism, Third Worldism, Black Consciousness Movements, and different

⁵⁶ It should be noted that there were other visions for the future of South Africa as well, such as communism and African nationalism. However, these are not part of the focus of this thesis. It is not a unique feature in the history of any country that varying ideologies would compete. South Africa was not an exception.

⁵⁷ Hyslop, Braskén, and Roos, "Political and intellectual lineages of Southern African anti-fascism," 1.

⁵⁸ Hyslop, Braskén, and Roos, "Political and intellectual lineages of Southern African anti-fascism," 10.

anti-racist and anti-apartheid movements.”⁵⁹ Hyslop, Braskén and Roos note that there was not one anti-fascism, but a variety of anti-fascist responses that included both militant forms of resistance and cultural and intellectual manifestations of anti-fascism.⁶⁰ This thesis positions the garrison state as one of these manifestations of anti-fascism.

Exploring the examples of Pirow and Hofmeyr, as was shown earlier in the chapter, we see what South Africa’s future could have looked like. In the end, Malan together with the NP were victorious and elements of the garrison state were retained up until the 1970s and 1980s when the South African garrison state was arguably at its peak. Contextualising the 1930s and 1940s in the broader history of South Africa and the South African garrison state of the 1970s and 1980s, it is important to ask how the garrison state of the 1930s and 1940s would compare with the garrison state of the 1970s and 1980s Magubane described. The argument could be made that, although South Africa participated in a world war during the 1940s, in the 1970s and 1980s South Africa was a far more militarised state, with cadets, conscription and the involvement in the Border War being at the forefront of society. An argument could then be made that the garrison state of the 1930s and 1940s was the origin for the garrison state of the 1970s and 1980s. The NP and the “state machinery”⁶¹ also needs mentioning.

Without the strong state built up in the 1930s and 1940s (and before that), the NP would never have had the “state machinery” and confidence to implement apartheid. The very belief that the state had the capacity to alter the social landscape in the ways the NP

⁵⁹ Hyslop, Braskén, and Roos, "Political and intellectual lineages of Southern African anti-fascism," 5-6.

⁶⁰ Hyslop, Braskén, and Roos, "Political and intellectual lineages of Southern African anti-fascism," 5-6.

⁶¹ In this context, the term "state machinery" is used to refer to the system of government apparatus that carry out the functions of the government. This includes executive-, legislative- and judicial bodies. It also includes law enforcement and defence such as the police and the military. The state machinery enforces laws, delivers public services and maintains what is deemed by the ruling elites as acceptable standards of order within society.

believed shows us how much influence the state had. Commentators such as Jabavu showed how the Hertzog Bills would have a devastating impact on South Africa's black population.⁶² The *rooi gevaar* and *swart gevaar* were used as ever-present dangers for the garrison state in the post 1948 world.

The thesis argued that although Hofmeyr was seen as the political antithesis of Pirow, he cannot be absolved of liberal failures of the 1930s and 1940s. The way Smuts neglected domestic politics, especially during the 1940s, cannot be ignored either. Similarly, their combined failure to address key issues surrounding race in South Africa must be noted. Supporters of Smuts did not believe that he would turn his back on segregation.⁶³ There was a significant constituency of white Social Democrats and Liberals who saw the anti-fascist nature of the Smuts government as potentially securing the political succession to Smuts by Hofmeyr.⁶⁴ Hofmeyr, it was hoped, would begin a period of gradual racial reform.⁶⁵

Although both Smuts and Hofmeyr opposed the NP's proposed apartheid policy, it can be argued that the UP government between 1939 and 1948 benefited from the work of Pirow's five-year plan when he was minister of defence. South Africa would not have been able to make a significant contribution to the Allied forces if the military had not been upgraded under Pirow's watch. It is important to note how numerous governments (irrespective of their political ideology) benefited from the state machinery mentioned earlier. The influence of the "state" in "garrison state" thus cannot be underestimated. As previously mentioned, although Lasswell saw the development of the garrison state as a potential reaction to fascism, this would not stop a fascist government from using the state

⁶² Jabavu, *Criticisms of the Native Bills (Pamphlet One)*, 2.

⁶³ Hyslop, Braskén, and Roos, "Political and intellectual lineages of Southern African anti-fascism," 23.

⁶⁴ Hyslop, Braskén, and Roos, "Political and intellectual lineages of Southern African anti-fascism," 23.

⁶⁵ Hyslop, Braskén, and Roos, "Political and intellectual lineages of Southern African anti-fascism," 23.

machinery if it came to power. Under the rule of Smuts and Hofmeyr an anti-fascist garrison state was partly constructed against the fascist threat of the time. However, it was a version of the garrison state that then could be repurposed by Malan and the NP leaders who would succeed him for the sake of anti-communism. The threat (real or perceived) of African political power can be viewed as a shared trait for both versions (anti-fascism and anti-communism) of garrison states in the colonial context. Thus, it could be argued that a potential transfer from an anti-fascist to an anti-communist garrison state retained the fear of losing white superiority on the political front.

The thesis also argued that pro-British imperial politicians in South Africa could no longer use the excuse of anti-fascism to explain their use of the garrison state apparatus. Since fascism had been defeated by 1945, Smuts and Hofmeyr could not use it as an excuse in the 1948 election. Malan, however, could justify the need for authoritarian measures to his political constituents due to the perceived threats on South Africa's sovereignty by British imperialism and keep in place the emergency powers established for wartime.

Finally, the development of garrison state characteristics cannot be placed at the feet of a single political party. It can then be argued that, although Lasswell envisioned the garrison state as a reaction to fascism, at least in the South African case the government of the day sought to benefit from the state machinery provided by the garrison state.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Archives

- Anon. Debates of the House of Assembly Second Session, Sixth Parliament. Hansard Records, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
<https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/handle/10539/12791>.
- Anon. A message from Henry. Speeches by Hofmeyr in English: General. Historical Papers Research Archive, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
- Aschman, G. Defence dicator. Part of Collection P.S. 9/9/2. National Archives of South Africa (NASA), Pretoria.
- Malan, D. F. Verkiesingsmanifes 20 April 1948. D. F. Malan Collection 1/1/2390, Document Centre, J. S. Gericke Library of Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch.
- Hofmeyr, J. H. Address at Fort Hare graduation ceremony. Speeches by Hofmeyr in English: General. Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. <https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/address-at-fort-hare-graduation-ceremony>.
- — —. Address on national unity. Speeches by Hofmeyr in English: General. Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
<https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/address-on-national-unity>.
- — —. Christian principles and race problems. Publications and unpublished writings of J. H. Hofmeyr. Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. <https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/christian-principles-and-race-problems-johannesburg-s-institute-of-race-relations>.
- — —. Debating society address at South African College. Speeches by Hofmeyr in English. Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
<https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/debating-society-address-at-south-african-college>.
- — —. Diary entry of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr. Papers of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr. Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
<https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/km0fd>.

- — —. Diary entry of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr. Papers of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr. Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
<https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/km0fd>.
- — —. Israel's gift to humanity: address at Keren Hayesod Banquet of Rand Jewry. Speeches by Hofmeyr in English: General. Historical Papers Research Archive, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
<https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/israels-gift-to-humanity-address-at-keren-hayesod-banquet-of-rand-jewry>.
- — —. The middle of the road: speech at Sea Point to the United South African National Party. Speeches by Hofmeyr in English: General. Historical Papers Research Archive, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
<https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/toast-of-society-at-annual-dinner-of-chemical-metallurgical-and-mining-society-of-south-africa>.
- — —. Questions to Hertzog. Politics: General. Historical Papers Research Archive, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
<https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/status-act>.
- — —. S.A. enters a new Epoch. Politics: General. Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
<https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/liberalism>.
- — —. Studies in ancient imperialism, by J. H. Hofmeyr and T. Haarhoff. Publications and unpublished writings of J.H. Hofmeyr. Historical Papers Research Archive of University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
<https://researcharchives.wits.ac.za/studies-in-ancient-imperialism-by-j-h-hofmeyr-and-t-haarhoff>.
- Lasswell, H. D. Letter to Ann and Linden Lasswell. Harold Dwight Lasswell papers (HDLP). Series I: General files, 1920–1978. Archives at Yale, Yale.
https://archives.yale.edu/repositories/12/archival_objects/1529256.
- — —. Letters to Ann and Linden Lasswell. Harold Dwight Lasswell papers (HDLP). Series I: General files, 1920–1978. Archives at Yale, Yale.
https://archives.yale.edu/repositories/12/archival_objects/1529256.

- — —. Letters to Ann and Linden Lasswell. Harold Dwight Lasswell papers (HDLP). Series I: General files, 1920–1978. Archives at Yale, Yale.
https://archives.yale.edu/repositories/12/archival_objects/1529256.
- — —. The political science of contemporary China. Harold Dwight Lasswell papers (HDLP). Series II: Writings. Archives at Yale, Yale. <https://paton.ukzn.ac.za/core-collections/>.
- Paton, A. Apartheid and the native question. Alan Paton Centre unpublished works. Alan Paton Centre, University of Kwa-Zulu Natal, Pietermaritzburg.
<https://paton.ukzn.ac.za/core-collections/>.
- — —. The approach to the native problem. Alan Paton Centre unpublished works. Alan Paton Centre, University of Kwa-Zulu Natal, Pietermaritzburg.
<https://paton.ukzn.ac.za/core-collections/>.
- — —. The new world outlook. Alan Paton Centre unpublished works. Alan Paton Centre, University of Kwa-Zulu Natal, Pietermaritzburg. <https://paton.ukzn.ac.za/core-collections/>.
- — —. Reconciling imperialism and liberty. Alan Paton Centre unpublished works. Alan Paton Centre, University of Kwa-Zulu Natal, Pietermaritzburg.
<https://paton.ukzn.ac.za/core-collections/>.

Books

- Brooks, E.H., R.F. Currey, H. Herbert Frankel, T.J. Haarhoff, J.H. Hofmeyr, J.D. Reinhalt Jones, W.H. Ramsbottom, and O.D. Schreiner. *Coming of age: Studies in South African citizenship and politics*. Cape Town: M. Miller, 1930.
- Dubow, S. *Racial segregation and the origins of Apartheid in South Africa, 1919–36*. St Antony's Series. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989.
- Gibbs, H. *Twilight in South Africa*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950.
- Hofmeyr, J. H., and F. W. Reitz. *The life of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr (Onze Jan)*. Cape Town: Van de Sandt de Villiers, 1913.
- Jabavu, D. D. T. *Criticisms of the Native Bills (Pamphlet One)*. Lovedale: Lovedale Institution Press, 1935.
- Keppel-Jones, A. *When Smuts goes*. Cape Town: Shuter & Shuter, 1947.
- Macdonald, T. *Jan Hofmeyr: Heir to Smuts*. London: Hurst & Blackett, 1948.

- Macmillan, W. M. *Complex South Africa: An economic foot-note to history*. Faber and Faber, 1954.
- . *My South African years: An autobiography*. Cape Town: David Philip, 1975.
- . *The South African agrarian problem and its historical development*. Witwatersrand: Central News Agency, Council of Education, 1919.
- Mead, G. H. *The philosophy of the present*. Edited by A.E. Murphy. London: The Open Court Company, 1932.
- Park, R. E., and B. T. Washington. *The man farthest down: A record of observation and study in Europe*. New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1911.
- Paton, A. *Hofmeyr*. London: Oxford University Press, 1964.
- Pirow, O. *James Barry Munnik Hertzog*. Cape Town: Howard Timmins, 1950.
- Roberts, M., and A. E. G. Trollip. *The South African opposition 1939–1945: An essay in contemporary history*. London: Longmans, 1947.
- Smuts, J. C. *Jan Christian Smuts*. London: Cassell & Company, 1952.

Chapters in Books

- Currey, R. F., and T. J. Haarhoff. "South African nationality: Its meaning, possibilities and limitations," in *The coming of age: Studies in South African citizenship and politics*, edited by E. H. Brookes. Cape Town: Maskew Miller, 1930.
- Hofmeyr, J. H. "Provincial and local government," in *The coming of age: Studies in South African citizenship and politics*, edited by E. H. Brookes. Cape Town: Maskew Miller, 1930.
- Lasswell, H. D. "The structure and function of communication in society: A series of addresses." In *The communication of ideas*, edited by L. Bryson, 37–52. New York and London: Institute for Religious and Social Studies, 1948.
- Lerner, D., and H. D. Lasswell. "The policy orientation," in *The policy sciences: Recent developments in scope and method*, edited by D. Lerner, H. D. Lasswell, H. H. Fisher, E. R. Hilgard, S. K. Padover, I. de Sola Pool and C. E. Rothwell. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951.
- Laski, H. J. "The prospects of democratic government," in *The James Cutler lecture*. 22, 3–12: College of William & Mary Law School, 1939.

Commissions

- Carnegie Commission of Investigation on the Poor White Question in South Africa, J. F. W. Grosskopf, R. W. Wilcoks, E. G. Malherbe, J. R. Albertyn, and M. E. R. *The poor white problem in South Africa. Report of the Carnegie Commission*. (Stellenbosch: Pro ecclesia, 1932).
- Fagan, H. A., A. S. Welsh, A. L. Barret, E. E. Von Maltitz, and S. J. Parsons. *The Native Laws Commission (The Fagan Commission)*. (1946–1948).
- Sauer, P., G. B. A. Gerdener, E. G. Jansen, J. J. Serfontein, and M. D. C. De Wet Nel. *Verslag van die kleurvraagstuk-kommissie van die Herenigde Nasionale Party (Report of the Sauer Commission)*. (Johannesburg: 1947).

Journal Articles

- Brookes, E. H. "The South African Native Bills." *The Journal of the Royal African Society* 35, no. 138 (1936): 65–70.
- Frankel, S. H. "Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr." *African Affairs* 48, no. 191 (1949): 117–119.
- Lasswell, H. D. "The Garrison State." *American Journal of Sociology* 46, no. 4 (1941): 455–468.
- . "The triple-appeal principle: A contribution of psychoanalysis to political and social science." *American Journal of Sociology* 37, no. 4 (1932): 523–538.
- Pirow, O. "How far is the Union interested in the continent of Africa?" *Journal of the Royal African Society* 36, no. 144 (July 1937): 300–317.

Review Articles

- Davenport, T. R. H. "Hugh Macmillan and Shula Marks (eds.), *Africa and Empire*: W. M. Macmillan, historian and social critic. London: Temple Smith for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies." *Africa* 60, no. 3 (1990): 461–463. doi:10.2307/1160129.

Newspaper Articles

- Anon. *African World*, 18 June 1938.
- Anon. *Cape Times*, 24 January 1930.
- Anon. "Union in the time of war." *Cape Times*, 6 February 1935.
- Malherbe, E. G. "Educational research: A plea for a bureau." *Cape Times*, 18 June 1921.

- Anon. *Daily Mail*, 31 April 1938.
- Anon. *Daily Mail*, 31 October 1938.
- Anon. *Daily Telegraph*, 19 November 1938.
- Anon. *Die Burger*, 19 June 1929.
- Anon. "Dit is onmoontlik om Blanke Land te hou!" *Die Kruithoring*, 16 July 1947.
- Anon. *Die Transvaler*, 3 October 1941.
- Anon. *Die Volksblad*, 3 October 1941.
- Anon. *Evening News*, 22 February 1938.
- Anon. *Newsday London*, 31 October 1938.
- Anon. "Britain shows keen interest." *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 July 1943.
- Anon. "Gen. Smuts issues stirring call to nation." *Rand Daily Mail*, 6 July 1943.
- Anon. "Nation's pulse is firm after 4 years of war." *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 July 1943.
- Anon. "New South African Cabinet." *Rand Daily Mail*, 4 June 1948.
- Anon. "Union polls today in vital election." *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 July 1943.
- Anon. "UP majority over all parties." *Rand Daily Mail*, 30 July 1943.
- Anon. "War or neutrality the only issue." *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 July 1943.
- Hofmeyr, J. H. "South Africa should remain on gold unless the price becomes too heavy."
Rand Daily Mail, 12 February 1932.
- Anon. *Saturday Review*, 1937.
- Parliamentary correspondent. "Day of tension in the house." *The Argus*, March 1939.
- Anon. "The march of militarism." *Financial Mail*, 23 June 1978.
- Anon. *The Scotsman*, 11 April 1938.
- Anon. *The Scotsman*, 25 November 1938.
- Anon. *The Star*, 3 October 1941.
- Thema, R. V. S. "The Hertzog Bills." *The Star*, 1 May 1935.
- Anon. *Yorkshire Post*, 21 November 1938.

Reports

- Fourie, L. M. "Die Ossewa-Brandwag in die Suid-Afrikaanse politiek, 1939–1952." In
Geskiedenis van die Ossewa-Brandwag, edited by P. F. van der Schyff, 2–3:
Unpublished report, 1984.

Parliament of the Union of South Africa. *Reports and proceedings of the joint committee on the representation of natives and coloured persons in parliament and provincial councils and the acquisition of land by natives.* (30 April 1935 1935).

<http://historicalpapers-atom.wits.ac.za/historical-papers-research-archive-library-university-of-witwatersrand>.

Suzman, H. *Report of the Native Commission (Report of the Fagan Commission).*

(Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1948).

<https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft2n39n7f2&chunk.id=s1.2.9&toc.id=s1.2.9&brand=ucpress>.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Secondary Sources

Books

- Abadi, J. *Israel's quest for recognition and acceptance in Asia: Garrison State diplomacy*. London: Frank Cass, 2004.
- Anon. *Apartheid's genesis, 1935–1962*. Edited by Philip Bonner, Peter Delius and Deborah Posel. Braamfontein: Ravan Press, 1993.
- Anon. *Selections from the Smuts papers*. Edited by W.K. Hancock and J. van der Poel. Vol. 1–7, London: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Ashforth, A. *The politics of official discourse in twentieth-century South Africa*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
- Atkin, R. *Pillar of fire: Dunkirk 1940*. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1990.
- Brookes, E. H., R. F. Currey, S. Herbert Frankel, T. J. Haarhoff, J. H. Hofmeyr, J. D. Reinhardt, Jones, W. H. Ramsbottom, and O. D. Schreiner. *Coming of age: Studies in South African citizenship and politics*. Cape Town: Maskew Miller, 1930.
- Dubow, S. *Apartheid 1948–1994*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
<https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/apartheid-1948-1994/>.
- . *A commonwealth of knowledge: Science, sensibility, and white South Africa, 1820–2000*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199296637.001.0001>.
- . *Illicit union: Scientific racism in modern South Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Dubow, S., and A. Jeeves. *South Africa's 1940s: Worlds of possibilities*. Cape Town: Double Storey, 2005.
- Elazar, D. J., and P. Medding. *Jewish community in frontier societies: Argentina, Australia, and South Africa*. New York & London: Holmes & Meier, 1983.
- Fredrickson, G. M. *The comparative imagination on the history of racism, nationalism, and social movements*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997.

- Furlong, P. J. *Between crown and swastika: The impact of the radical right on the Afrikaner Nationalist Movement in the fascist era*. Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1991.
- Giliomee, H. *The Afrikaners: A concise history*. Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2020.
- Hancock, W. K. *Smuts: The fields of force 1919–1950*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968.
- Hepple, A. *Verwoerd (political leaders of the twentieth century)*. Ann Arbor: Penguin, 1967.
- Hobsbawm, E. *Age of extremes: The short twentieth century 1914–1991*. London: Abacus, 1994.
- Huntington, S. *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military*. Translated by E. Stern and M. Martin. Cambridge: Harvard, 1957.
- Jackson, A. *The British Empire: A very short introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Kim, Y. *Origins of the North Korean Garrison State: The people's army and the Korean war*. New York: Routledge, 2017.
- Kleynhans, E., and D. B. Katz. *20 Battles: Searching for a South African way of war 1913–2013*. Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 2023.
- Koorts, L. D. F. *Malan and the rise of Afrikaner nationalism*. Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2014.
- Kruger, D. W. *South African parties and policies*. Cape Town: Human & Rousseau, 1960.
- Kunitz, S. J. *Twentieth century authors first supplement: A bibliographical dictionary of modern literature*. Edited by V. Colby. New York: The H.W. Wilson Company, 1955.
- Lasswell, H. D. *Propaganda technique in the World War*. New York: Peter Smith, 1938.
- Leonard, R. *South Africa at War: White power and the crisis in southern Africa*. New York: L. Hill, 1983.
- Liebenberg, I., J. Risquet, and V. Shubin. *A far-away war–Angola 1975–1989*. Cape Town: Sun Press, 2016.
- Lipton, M. *Capitalism and apartheid, South Africa 1910–1986*. Aldershot, Hants: Wildwood House, 1989.
- Marx, C. *Oxwagon sentinel: Radical Afrikaner nationalism and the history of the Ossewabrandwag*. Berlin: LIT, 2008.
- Maylam, P. *South Africa's racial past: The history and historiography of racism, segregation, and apartheid*. London: Routledge, 2001. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315242736>.

- Mayo, E. *The human problems of an industrial civilization*. New York: Macmillan, 1933.
- Mazower, M. M. *No enchanted palace: The end of empire and the ideological origins of the United Nations*. Lawrence Stone Lectures. Vol. 4, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt7pfjg>.
- Milton, E. *The emerging American Garrison State*. New York: Palgrave Pivot, 2013. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137093653>.
- Mouton, F. A. *The opportunist: The political life of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1959*. Pretoria: Protea Boekhuis, 2021.
- Muth, R., M. M. Finley, and M. F. Muth. *Harold D. Lasswell: An annotated bibliography*. New Haven & Dordrecht: New Haven Press & Kluwer Academic, 1990.
- Nasson, B. *South Africa at war, 1939–1945: A Jacana pocket history*. Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2021.
- Neumann, F. L. *Behemoth: The structure and practice of national socialism*. Translated by D.E. Lee. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944.
- O'Meara, D. *Volkskapitalisme: Class, capital and ideology in the development of Afrikaner nationalism 1934–1948*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.
- Peberdy, S. *Selecting immigrants: National identity and South Africa's immigration policies, 1910–2008*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2009.
- Schoeman, B. *My lewe in die politiek*. Johannesburg: Perskor, 1978.
- Scholtz, L. *The SADF in the Border War 1966–1989*. Cape Town: Helion & Company, 2014.
- Shain, M. *A perfect storm: Antisemitism in South Africa 1930–1948*. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2015.
- Shimoni, G. *Jews and Zionism: The South African experience*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1980.
- Smith, K. W. *The changing past: Trends in South African historical writing*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989.
- Steyn, R. *Seven votes: How WW2 changed South Africa forever*. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2020.
- Strassler, R. B. *The landmark Herodotus: The histories*. Translated by A.L. Pervis. Edited by R. B. Strassler. New York: Anchor Books, 2007.
- Stultz, N. M. *Afrikaner politics in South Africa 1934–1948*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.

- — —. *The Nationalists in opposition 1934–1948*. Cape Town: Human and Rousseau, 1975.
- Tooze, A. *The Deluge: The Great War and the remaking of global order, 1916–1931*. London: Penguin Books, 2015.
- Tsoukalis, L. *What kind of Europe?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Van der Waag, I. *A military history of modern South Africa*. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2015.
- Van Vuuren, H. *Apartheid, guns, and money: A tale of profit*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Veracini, L. *Settler colonialism: A theoretical overview*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- Vigne, R. *Liberals against apartheid: A history of the Liberal Party of South Africa, 1953–1968*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997.
- Walker, E. *A history of Southern Africa*. London: Longmans Green, 1957.
- Weber, M. *The Methodology of the social sciences*. New York: Free Press, 1949.
- Yong, T. T. *The Garrison State: Military, government and society in colonial Punjab, 1849–1947*. California: SAGE, 2005.

Chapters in Books

- Allsobrook, C., and C. Boisen. "Illusions of sovereignty with postcolonial governmentality: Jan Smuts, trusteeship, and the league of nations." In *Reappraising the life & legacy of Jan C Smuts*, edited by D. Boucher and B. Ngqulunga. Johannesburg: UJ Press, 2024.
- Almond, G. A. "Harold Dwight Lasswell February 13, 1902–December 18, 1978." In *Bibliographical Memoirs*, edited by N. V. A. de Abreu, 248–275. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1987.
- Battistini, M., and H. D. Lasswell. "The 'problem of world order,' and the historic mission of the American middle class." In *Beyond the nation: Pushing the boundaries of US history from a transatlantic perspective*, edited by F. Fasce, M. Vaudagna and R. Baritono. Torino: Otto Editore, 2013.
- Bloomberg, C. "Christian-nationalism and the rise of the Afrikaner Broederbond." In *South Africa, 1918–48*, edited by S. Dubow. London: MacMillan, 1990.

- Boucher, D., and B. Ngqulunga. "Introduction: The enigmatic Smuts." In *Reappraising the life & legacy of Jan C Smuts*, edited by D. Boucher and B. Ngqulunga. Johannesburg: UJ Press, 2024.
- Du Pisani, A. "Democratic governance and security: A conceptual exploration." In *Security and democracy in Southern Africa*, edited by G. Cawthra, A. du Pisani and A. Omari. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2007.
- Dubow, S. "The elaboration of segregationist ideology." In *Segregation and spartheid in twentieth century South Africa*, edited by W. Beinart and S. Dubow. London: Routledge, 1995.
- . "Jan Smuts and his 'sphinx problem'." In *Reappraising the life & legacy of Jan C Smuts*, edited by D. Boucher and B. Ngqulunga, 219–245: UJ Online Press, 2024.
- . "The passage of Hertzog's Native Bills, Part One." In *Racial segregation and the origins of apartheid in South Africa, 1919–36*, edited by S. Dubow, 131–148. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989.
- . "The passage of Hertzog's Native Bills, Part Two." In *Racial segregation and the origins of apartheid in South Africa, 1919–36*, edited by S. Dubow. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989.
- Frankel, S. H., and E. H. Brookes. "Problems of economic inequality: The poor white and the native." In *The coming of age: Studies in South African citizenship and politics*, edited by E. H. Brookes. Cape Town: Maskew Miller, 1930.
- . "What of the future: South Africa's present day problems." In *To-day and to-morrow: XI, Analysed*, 1948.
- Hyslop, J. "Jan Smuts and the world counter-revolution 1917–1923." In *Reappraising the life & legacy of Jan C Smuts*, edited by D. Boucher and B. Ngqulunga. Johannesburg: UJ Press, 2024.
- Lemon, A. "The apartheid city." In *South African urban change three decades after apartheid*, edited by A. Lemon, R. Donaldson and G. Visser. Cham: Springer, 2021.
- Magubane, B. "The crisis of the Garrison State." In *The road to democracy in South Africa*, edited by South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET): Routledge, 2011.
- . "From détente to the rise of the Garrison State." In *The road to democracy In South Africa*, edited by South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET). Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2011.

- . "Whose memory – whose history? The illusion of liberal and radical historical debates." In *History making and present day politics: The meaning of collective memory in South Africa*, edited by H. E. Stolten. Stockholm: Elanders Gotab AB, 2007.
- Schreiner, O. D. "South Africa and the Commonwealth." In *The coming of age: Studies in South African citizenship and politics*, edited by E. H. Brookes. Cape Town: Maskew Miller, 1930.
- Seekings, J. "Visions, hopes and views about the future: The radical movement of South African welfare reform." In *South Africa's 1940s: Worlds of possibilities*, edited by S. Dubow and A. Jeeves. Cape Town: Double Storey, 2005.
- Shils, E. "Reflections on defence." In *Politics, personality and social science in the twentieth century: Essays in honor of Harold D. Lasswell*, edited by A. A. Rogow. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1969.
- Southall, R. "Smuts: Afraid of greatness." In *Reappraising the life & legacy of Jan C Smuts*, edited by D. Boucher and B. Ngqulunga. Johannesburg: UJ Press, 2024.
- Wolpe, H. "Capitalism and cheap labour power in South Africa: From segregation to apartheid." In *Capitalism and cheap labour power in South Africa: From segregation to apartheid*, edited by W. Beinart and S. Dubow: Routledge, 1995.

Conference Papers

- Koorts, L. "An unlikely charismatic leader: D. F. Malan in a Weberian light." Paper presented at the Charisma and Emergent Social Movements Conference, University of Groningen, Institute of Biography, 6–7 November 2008.

Conference Proceedings

- Anon. "University of Chicago Round Table." Chicago, 3 November 1940.

Interviews

- Lasswell, H. D. "Meeting minutes of the Rockefeller Foundation." *Library of Congress*. 15 November 1940.

Journal Articles

- Aaron, P. G. "The idolatry of force (Part II): Militarism in Israel's Garrison State." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 48, no. 2 (2019): 58–78.
- Ahrari, E. M. "The Pakistan Garrison State: Origins, evolution, consequences (1947–2011)." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 24, no. 11 (2013): 112–117.
- Anon. *House of Assembly Debates* vol.41 col.2195 (1940–1941).
- Anon. "Analysis of two Bills." *Race Relations* II, no. i (August 1935).
- Aron, R. "Remarks on Lasswell's 'The Garrison State'." *Armed Forces & Society* 5, no. 3 (1979): 347–359.
- Baack, B., and E. J. Ray. "The political economy of the origins of the military-industrial complex in the United States." *The Journal of Economic History* 45, no. 2 (1985): 369–375.
- Bauer, Y. "The impact of the Holocaust." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 458, no. 1 (November 1996): 15.
- Bell, W. "H.D. Lasswell and the futures field. Facts, predictions, values and the policy sciences." *FUTURES* 3, no. September 1993 (1993): 806–813.
- Blignaut, C. "'Kan die vrou haar volk dien deur haar huis?': Afrikanerpolitiek en vrou in die Ossewa-Brandwag, 1942 tot 1954." *Journal for Contemporary History* 40, no. 1 (2015): 102–124. <https://doi.org/10.38140/sjch.v40i1.306>.
- . "Volksmoeders, spinwiele en wol: 'n historiese verkenning van die aard van vrouearbeid in die Ossewa-Brandwag." *South African Journal of Cultural History* 28, no. 1 (2014): 1–23.
- Braskén, K. "South African anti-fascism and the Nazi foreign office: Antisemitism, anti-communism and the surveillance of the Third Reich's international enemies." *South African Historical Journal* 74, no. 1 (2022): 30–54.
- Cornell, M. "The statutory background of apartheid: A chronological survey of South African legislation." *The World Today* 16, no. 5 (1960): 181–194.
- Dalcanton, D. "Vorster and the politics of confidence 1966–1974." *African Affairs* 75, no. 299 (1976): 163–181.
- . "Saul Dubow, Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa, 1919–36. London: Macmillan & St Antony's College Oxford." *Africa* 60, no. 3 (1990): 461–463. doi:10.2307/1160129.

- Dubow, S. "Smuts, the United Nations and the rhetoric of race and rights." *Journal of Contemporary History* 43, no. 1 (2008): 45–74.
- Duncan, D. "The origins of the welfare state in pre-apartheid South Africa." *Collected Seminar Papers* 45 (1993): 106–119.
- Edwards, D. "Authoritarianism in South Africa: A conceptual challenge to social science." *The High School Journal* 68, no. 4 (1985): 261–268.
- Ellis, J. "Oswald Pirow's five-year plan for the reorganisation of the Union defence force, 1933–1939." *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies* 30, no. 2 (2000): 221–234.
- Fitch, S. J. "The Garrison State in America: A content analysis of trends in the expectation of violence." *Journal of Peace Research* 22, no. 1 (1985): 31–45.
- Furlong, P. J. "Fascism, the Third Reich and Afrikaner nationalism: An assessment of the historiography." *South African Historical Journal* 27, no. 1 (1992): 113–126.
- . "Pro-Nazi subversion in South Africa." *Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies* 16, no. 1 (1988): 26–40.
- Gibson, J. L. "Political intolerance and political repression during the McCarthy Red Scare." *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2 (1988): 511–529.
- Hagemann, A. "Very special relations: The 'Third Reich'." *Southern African Historical Journal* 27, no. 1 (1992): 127–147.
- Hale, F. "Defending the Great Trek myth: Afrikaner nationalists' campaign in the Cape against Stuart Cloete's *Turning Wheels*." *Kronos: Journal of Cape History* 26, no. 1 (2000): 102.
- Harrington Hall, M. "A conversation with Harold Dwight Lasswell." *Psychology Today* October (1968): 56–63.
- Haskell, T. "The curious persistence of rights talk in the 'Age of Interpretation'." *The Journal of American History* 74, no. 3 (1987): 984–1012.
- Hatch, J. "General election in South Africa." *Pakistan Institute of International Affairs* 6, no. 2 (June 1953).
- Hyslop, J., K. Braskén, and N. Roos. "Political and intellectual lineages of Southern African anti-fascism." *South African Historical Journal* 74, no. 1 (2022): 1–32.
- Jeeves, A. H. "Arthur Keppel-Jones: Scholar, teacher, liberal intellectual." *Southern African Historical Journal* 32, no. 1 (May 1995): 24.

- Johns, S. "Invisible resurrection: The recreation of a communist party in South Africa in the 1950s." *African Studies Quarterly* 9, no. 4 (2007): 7–24.
- Koorts, L. "An ageing anachronism: D. F. Malan as prime minister, 1948–1954." *Kronos* 36, no. 1 (2010): 108–135.
- . "If neither capitalism nor communism, then what? DF Malan and the National Party's economic rhetoric 1895–1954." *Economic History of Developing Regions* 29, no. 2 (2014): 170–196.
- Kriel, M. "boere into Boere (farmers into Boers): The so-called great trek and the rise of Boer nationalism." *Nations and Nationalism* 27, no. 4 (2021): 1198–1212.
- Kuehl, W. F. "Concepts of internationalism in history." *Peace and Change* 11, no. 2 (1986).
- La Grange, A. "The Smuts' government's justification of the emergency regulations and the impact thereof on Ossewabrandwag, 1939–1945." *Scientia Militaria South African Journal of Military Studies* 48, no. 2 (2020): 39–64.
- Lambert, J. "Their finest hour?: English-speaking South Africans and World War II." *South African Historical Journal* 60, no. 1 (2008): 60–84.
- Levy, J. S. "Counterfactuals, casual inference and historical analysis." *Security Studies* 24, no. 3 (2015): 378–402.
- Liebenberg, I. "Viewing 'the other' over a hundred and a score more years: South Africa and Russia (1890–2010)." *The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa* 6, no. 1 (December 2010).
- Marx, C. "'Dear listeners in South Africa': German propaganda broadcasts to South Africa, 1940–1941." *Southern African Historical Society* 27, no. 1 (1992): 148–172.
- . "The Ossewabrandwag as a mass movement, 1939–1941." *Journal of Southern African Studies* 20, no. 2 (1994): 195–219. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2637387>.
- Minnaar, A. "The effects of the Great Depression (1929–1934) on South African white agriculture." *South African Journal of Economic History* 5, no. 2 (September 1990): 83–108.
- Molotsi, P. "General J.B.M. Hertzog, 1866–1942: Architect of Apartheid." *The Journal of Ethnic Studies* 11, no. 1 (Spring 1983): 23–30.
- Monama, F. "Marshalling a splintered society: Censorship, publicity and propaganda in South Africa during the Second World War." *Historia* 67, no. 2 (2022): 28–58.

- Mouton, F. A. "'Beyond the Pale': Oswald Pirow, sir Oswald Mosley, the enemies of the Soviet Union and Apartheid, 1948–1959." *Journal for Contemporary History* 43, no. 2 (2018): 15–32.
- . "'Fascist or opportunist?': The political career of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1943." *Historia* 63, no. 2 (2018): 93–111.
- O'Meara, D. "The 1946 African mine workers' strike and the political economy of South Africa." *The Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 13, no. 2 (1975).
- Peers, D. M. "Gunpowder empires and the Garrison State: Modernity, hybridity, and the political economy of colonial India, circa 1750–1860." *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27, no. 2 (2007): 245–258.
- Perlmutter, A. "The making of Israeli militarism." *Middle East Journal* 54, no. 1 (2000): 23–45.
- Pirow, O. "How far is the Union interested in the continent of Africa?" *Journal of the Royal African Society* 36, no. 144 (July 1937): 317–320.
- Posel, D. "The meaning of Apartheid before 1948: Conflicting interests and forces within the Afrikaner nationalist alliance." *Journal of Southern African Studies* 14, no. 1 (1987).
- Roos, N. "Work colonies and South African historiography." *Social History* 36, no. 1 (2011): 54–76.
- Rubinson, E. "Measuring Garrison States in international politics: Towards a new 'Garrison Index'." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 47, no. 10 (2024).
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2024.2347881>.
- Sanders, M. "'Problems of Europe': N. P. van Wyk Louw, the intellectual and Apartheid." *Journal of Southern African Studies* 25, no. 4 (1999): 607–631.
- Seekings, J. "The Carnegie Commission and the backlash against welfare state-building in South Africa, 1931–1937." *Journal of Southern African Studies* 34, no. 3 (2008): 515–537.
- Shimoni, G. "Jan Christiaan Smuts and Zionism." *Jewish Social Studies* 39, no. 4 (September 1977): 269–298. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4466970>.
- Snelders, S., and T. Pieters. "Speed in the Third Reich: Metamphetamine (pervitin) use and a drug history from below." *Social History of Medicine* 24, no. 3 (2011): 686–699.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/shm/hkq101>. <https://doi.org/10.1093/shm/hkq101>.

- Stanley, J. "Harold Lasswell and the idea of the Garrison State." *Society* 33, no. 6 (1996): 46–52.
- Tothill, F. D. "The South African general election of 1943." *Historia* 34, no. 1 (1989): 77–94.
- Touška, M. "Divided union: South African nationalist opposition from 1939 to 1943." *Prague Papers on the History of International Relations* 2 (2019): 73–92.
- Van der Waag, I. "Van Ryneveld vs Blaine: The UDFI as a civil-military relations football, 1939–1945." *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies* 30, no. 1 (2000): 33–43.
- van Wyk, J. "Die Unieverdedigingsmagte op die vooraand van die tweede Wêreldoorlog (1934–1939)." *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies* 6, no. 4 (1976): 24–32.
- Visser, K., and K. Du Pisani. "Die vestiging van Skanskopeiland besproeiingnederstelling as mylpaal in selfwerksame armoedeverligting." *Historia* 57, no. 1 (2012): 103–126.
- Wessels, A. "South Africa and World War II: The decisive first two years on the home front." *Journal for Contemporary History* 24, no. 2 (1999): 1–24.
- Wright, H. "Imperialism: The word and its meaning." *Social Research* 34, no. 4 (1967): 660–674.

Newspaper Articles

- Anon. *Ons Vaderland*, 1925.
- Anon. "Gen. Smuts issues stirring call to nation." *Rand Daily Mail*, 6 July 1943.
- Anon. "Nation's pulse is firm after 4 years of war." *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 July 1943.
- Anon. "New South African Cabinet." *Rand Daily Mail*, 4 June 1948.
- Anon. "State of Emergency: Proclamation 201." *Government Gazette* (The Union of South Africa), 14 September 1939.
- Anon. "Union polls today in vital election." *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 July 1943.
- Anon. "UP majority over all parties." *Rand Daily Mail*, 30 July 1943.
- Anon. "War or neutrality the only issue." *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 July 1943.
- Anon. "The march of militarism." *Financial Mail*, 23 June 1978.
- — —. "The South African election." *The Spectator Archive*, 1 July 1943, 1–10.
<http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/2nd-july-1943/1/the-south-african-election>.

Hofmeyr, J. H. "South Africa should remain on gold unless the price becomes too heavy."
Rand Daily Mail, 12 February 1932.

Theses

- Cohen, M. "Anti-Jewish manifestations in the Union of South Africa during the 1930s." Unpublished honours research report, University of Cape Town, 1968.
- Cowlin, J. "Pathways to understanding white poverty in South Africa 1902 to 1948." Unpublished master's dissertation, Stellenbosch University, 2018.
- Dains, R. N. "Lasswell's Garrison State reconsidered: Exploring a paradigm shift in US civil-military relations research." PhD diss., University of Alabama, 2004. DTIC (ADA429969).
- Hains, R. "The opposition to General J.B.M. Hertzog's Segregation Bills, 1925–1936: A study in extra-parliamentary protest." Unpublished master's dissertation, University of Natal, 1978.
- Kirsten, F. "A critical analysis of the relationship between the South African defence force and the South African media from 1975–83." Unpublished master's dissertation, Rhodes University, 2015.
- Korf, L. "D. F. Malan: A political biography." Unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 2010.
- Rubin, M. "The Jewish community of Johannesburg 1886–1939: Landscapes of reality and imagination." Unpublished master's dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2004.

Web pages

- "Garrison State project." The Graduate Institute Geneva, 2020, accessed 1 December 2021, <https://www.garrisonstateproject.com/>
- "The truth legion: A search for the ... truth ... legion!" The Observation Post: South African Military History, Updated 20 May, No date, accessed 19 December 2023, <https://samilhistory.com/tag/the-truth-legion/>.
- "Bureaucracy and race native administration in South Africa." 1997, accessed 24 September 2024, <https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft2n39n7f2&chunk.id=s1.2.9&toc.id=s1.2.9&brand=ucpress>.

"Racial legislation 1846–1947." No date, accessed 00 Month 0000, Padraig O'Malley, "Racial Legislation 1846-1947" Nelson Mandela Foundation, Accessed September 24, 2024, <https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv01538/04lv01646/05lv01808.htm>.

"Our vision and mission." Not dated, accessed 25 August 2024, <https://www.royalcwsociety.org/vision-and-mission>.

"History." 2023, accessed 22 January 2023, <https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/about-us/history>.

"National Socialism." 2023, accessed 19 December 2023, <https://collections.yadvashem.org/en/about/o5941>.

"Africans' claims in South Africa 14 December 1943." African National Congress (ANC), 2025, accessed 00 Month 0000, <https://www.anc1912.org.za/africans-claims-in-south-africa/>.