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Mapping the rise of Authoritarian Populism and language in Post-Apartheid South Africa

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AA -Affirmative Action

ANC - African National Congress

ACDP - African Christian Democratic Party

BBBEE - Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment

BJP - Bharatiya Janata Party

DA - Democratic Alliance

EFF - Economic Freedom Fighters

GNU – Government of National Unity

NDR - National Democratic Revolution

PA – Patriotic Alliance

LPM – Landless People's Movement

PT – Workers Party

MK - uMkhonto we Sizwe

RDP – Reconstruction Development Programme

GEAR – Growth, Employment and Redistribution

NLP – Natural Language Processing

VF+ - Freedom Front Plus

Abstract

South Africa is currently in the nascent emergence of authoritarian populism. Drawing on writings by Stuart Hall, Raymond Williams, Antonio Gramsci as well as theories of sociolinguistics, this project tracks the emergence of an ideological language associated with authoritarian populism and how this ideology language has come to construct the Other, the People and the ways in which the Other is responsible for a lack of development for the People. This emergence is situated at the conjuncture of an entrenched socio-economic crisis as well as an unravelling ANC hegemony. This hegemony, which has characterized post-apartheid South Africa has seen significant shifts and declines in the past decade. Through historical processes of nation building which took place at the end of apartheid, notions of belonging and nationality have been baked into post-ANC politics, often manifesting in xenophobia. This forms a crucial part of the rise to prominence of a political ecosystem. This ecosystem has increasingly drawn on exclusionary and violent politics to give direction to a new hegemonic project in the country, using ideological language to construct a crisis with the Other at the centre. This study takes a mixed-methods approach, drawing on the use of Natural Language Processing and a systematic review in order to map the emergence of language of authoritarian populism.

Key words: Authoritarian Populism, South Africa, Hegemony, Crisis, Stuart Hall, Nationality, Xenophobia, Ideological Language

The author, whose name appears on the title page of this dissertation, has obtained the required research ethics approval/exemption for the research described in this work. The author declares that they have observed the ethical standards required in terms of the University of Pretoria's Code of ethics for scholarly activities.

Introductory Chapters

Chapter 1:
Introduction and Literature Review

South Africa is currently standing at the precipice of a great change. With the results of the 2024 general elections recently announced at the time of writing, the African National Congress (ANC) has fallen below 50% of the vote for the first time in post-apartheid South Africa. The party received 40.18% with the closest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA) receiving 21.81% of the vote (Independent Electoral Commission, 2024). The newly formed MK replaced the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) as the third largest party, garnering 14.58% with the EFF decreasing to 9.52%. Finally, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the Patriotic Alliance (PA) received 3.85% and 2.06% respectively (Independent Electoral Commission, 2024). These results represent a definitive change in the status quo of the country for several reasons. Firstly, it represents the moment that the ANC's electoral hegemony, one which once defined and dominated social and political life in South Africa, was broken. Secondly, the results indicate that there is a shift within the South African electorate to a more radical and fringe political alignment. Although it would be easy to state that this shift could only be transient with the political status quo returning in subsequent election cycles, I argue that these results have followed a pattern that has been observed in the electorate throughout the last five years and represent a definitive turn to a more pejorative and dangerous politics.

With by-elections across the country in the past years as well as results from the 2021 Local Government Elections (LGE), an ever-creeping shift was observed from the political establishment of the ANC, DA and EFF to often smaller and fringe right-wing parties in particular. At the same time, there has been an increase in prominence of community organisations and other groupings which have acted as de facto 'lobby groups,' seeking to advance certain policy positions and gain power within the political establishment. These 'lobby groups' often have ties or share direct policy alignment with the right-wing fringe political parties, therefore further advancing the move to the right of political discourse. Clear examples of this would be the relationship between the Freedom Font Plus (VF+) and Afriforum and the

Patriotic Alliance and Operation Dudula. These groups have come to form a political ecosystem, acting to further embolden and increase the prominence of one another. The emergence of these groups represents a moment in which a fundamental shift in South African politics has taken place. As this gradual shift crystalises, right-wing populism becomes more prominent in the country. In the South African context, this emergence of right-wing populism has been conceptualised as the rise of authoritarian populism.

1.1 Authoritarian Populism in the Global South

Importantly, the swing toward right-wing politics is a pattern that is observed across countries in the global South, including India, the Philippines, Argentina, and Brazil. Indeed, across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, right-wing populism has become a political force to be reckoned with in recent years. Although these global South contexts are different and should be analysed and treated as much, there are interconnections and often shared histories which should be acknowledged. As Hart, (2020:234) states, specific cases of authoritarian populism in the global South should be viewed "as connected yet spatio-historical specific nodes in globally interconnected historical geographies – and as sites in the production of worldwide processes, not just recipients of them." Shared histories around colonialism, oppression, liberation and the unraveling of the consensus on which this liberation was brought about all link much of the global South in the similarities of right-wing populism (Hart, 2020). What differs often between these contexts is the trajectory in which they are found. In this sense, South Africa is following the trajectory of many other postcolonial Southern democracies, albeit with a temporal lag in the progress of this swing. More specifically, South Africa is currently witnessing the nascent emergence of authoritarian populism, in the context a deep crisis of neoliberal capitalism, which is coeval with and connected to the unravelling of the post-apartheid hegemony of the ANC. This must be reflected in the theoretical approach that we adopt to study authoritarian populism in the South African case. This notion is built on by Przeworski (2021), who states that viewing and analyzing populism and the emergence of populism, both right-wing and left-wing, as a monolith is disingenuous. Each context in which populism emerges is rooted and structured in

different economic, social and historical contexts and these needs to be treated as such. I now turn to outlining two examples of writings on authoritarian populism in the global South before in order to provide a foundation of literature which has been used in authoritarian populist understandings.

1.1.1. Brazil: Jair Bolsonaro was elected in the context of a severe economic crisis as well as the impeachment of former present, Dilma Rousseff. As Akgemci (2022:40) elaborates, "The severe economic crisis occurred alongside the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff, who was accused of violating Brazil's fiscal responsibility law, and the subsequent political polarization paved the way for the rise of Bolsonaro." Bolsonaro centered the developmental policies of the Workers Party (PT) and president at the time, Lula Da Silva as responsible for the economic crisis and recession and well as the corruption which was seen to be plaguing the government. Further to this, Bolsonaro drew on nativist ideology to construct a discourse around the political elites prioritising immigrants and the Other over the People in the country and that he, as leader would prioritise the People over the Other. This sort of language can be defined in the conceptualisation which Akgemci (2022:43) unpacks "nativist populists accuse the elite of "destroying the welfare state to incorporate the immigrants, their alleged new electorate" and demand "a welfare state for their 'own people' first." In contrast to this, authoritarian populists always state that they will put the People first "in order to protect the nation (Akgemci, 2022:44). As Nilsen (2024) elaborates, in Brazil, this notion of the People vs. the Other was constructed as "virtuous, hardworking, law-abiding people against the criminal vagabond as their Other." This construction of the Other also had stark racial, sexist and homophobic undertones with Afro-Brazilians and LGBTQIA+ individuals being heavily targeted (da Silva & Larkins, 2019). Bolsonaro was therefore able to capitalise on and appeal to voters in the intersection of multiple crises of "street crime, corruption and socio-economic turmoil (Winter, 2018)." As Winter (2018) goes on to state, "Bolsonaro has linked corruption with rising street crime under a broad umbrella of rule of law. It's a message that resonates in a country with more than 60,000 homicides per year and an economy that has shrunk 10 percent on a per-capita basis since 2014. He tells young people, 'You're gonna

have a job with me, a gun with me, you're gonna be able to walk the streets at night.'" It is through this construction of first, linking the corruption seen under PT to a broader narrative of a breakdown of law and order and crime and linking the Other to this breakdown as well as capitalising on a broader economic crisis which boosted his appeal. Nilsen (2024) succinctly captures this in his essay by stating, "While the Workers' Party boosted consumption among the urban working poor, the economic crisis that hit the country during the mid-2010s eroded many of these gains. This combined with heightened levels of violent crime to spur anxiety and disillusionment among groups that had benefited from moderate social mobility since the early 2000s."

Throughout his campaign, Bolsonaro stated that, if elected, he would use the power of the state in order to ensure the threat of the Other was effectively addressed. As da Silva & Larkins (2019:1) outline, "on the second day, Bolsonaro attacked the programs that fostered upward mobility for millions of Afro-Brazilians, calling them damaging to national unity. Racial strife in Brazil, he suggested, stemmed not from his rise to political prominence but from policies enacted under the centre-left Workers" Bolsonaro's period in power was also characterised by a large increase in police violence against afro-Brazilians, in part spurred on by Bolsonaro's rhetoric and his promises to bring street crime to an end (Winter, 2019). In addition to this, despite the economic crises which Bolsonaro capitalised on and linked his rhetoric too, he embraced an unfettered version of neoliberalism during his government. "Neoliberalism," argues Akgemci. (2022:41), "emerged in its most radical form in Brazil under the Bolsonaro government, dismantling social policies, making labour legislation more flexible, and advancing privatizations of state-owned enterprises."

The election of Bolsonaro therefore represents an advanced case of authoritarian populism in the global South. His term in office was characterised by large amount of police violence, and the crystallisation of a widespread anti-black sentiment and continued economic crisis linked to his rhetoric and constructions of who constituted the enemies of Brazilians (Akgemci, 2022). In 2022, Bolsonaro lost the Brazilian election to ex-president, Lula da Silva. Much like the election loss of Donald Trump

in 2020, Bolsonaro and his allies warned that if he were to lose the election, it would be due to election fraud (Nicas, 2022). Despite some violence after the election, there was a reluctant acceptance of the results.

1.1.2. India: "Scholarly analysis has pointed out the constrained space for dissent under the BJP government and Modi's personalistic, centralised, technocratic style of leadership (Chacko 2018:2)." India is a further case in the global South which has seen the emergence of right-wing authoritarian populism in the past decade, this case with the rise of Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Modi rose to power in 2014 on what was seen as the new "central point of reference of the Indian polity (Vanaik 2017: 343)." Throughout his time as Chief Minister of Gujarat, a state in India, Modi styled himself as market-friendly politician who was key in Gugurat's development in economic success (Nielsen & Nilsen, 2021). Although India, under the government of United Progressive Alliance (UPA), did see economic growth, this did not necessarily translate to increased economic opportunities and employment. As Nilsen (2021:117) outlines, "economic growth never translated into job opportunities; on the contrary, unemployment continued to rise during the decade that Congress and the UPA ruled India. This fostered a sense of frustrated aspirations among India's subaltern citizens that made it possible for the BJP to extend its sway downward in the Indian socio-economic pyramid." Specifically, Modi drew on his styling in Gugarat as a politician that would bring about large-scale development and employment and applied that notion to the entire country, asserting that he would bring about the same change (Nilsen, 2024). This assertion dramatically expanded support for the BJP from lower caste and poorer voters (Nilsen, 2024).
Baked into this construction of a politician of development, Modi also asserted very similar rhetoric that of Bolsonaro. Namely, that he was fighting to rid India of the corrupt elites who had run the country and were not in touch with the realities that on the ground which affected many Indians (Nilsen, 2021). This took the form of an "opposition to the dynastic politics of the Congress party (Nilsen, 2021:118)."

Of course, key to authoritarian populism is the centring of an Other to distinguish the 'true people' from the 'outsider.' India is no different in this regard. In the Indian

context, this took on the form of a majoritarianism centred on Hindu nationalism as well as Hindu nationalist statecraft (Nielsen & Nilsen, 2021). This Hindu nationalism "crystallised around issues such as cow protection, the communal policing of interreligious love and of women's sexuality, the rewriting of school textbooks to bring them in line with Hindutva historiography (Nilsen, 2021:119)." A key example of this is the cow protection laws which the Modi government advocated for. Cow protection in India is a "tactic to assert Hindu identity and has deep roots among Hindu reform groups from the latter half of the nineteenth century and was one of the core issues of the BJP's predecessor (Nielsen & Nilsen, 2021:96)." The enhancement of cow protection laws acts to embolden "cow protection vigilantism" and the associate attacks on individuals who are seen to ne harming cows (Jakobsen & Nielsen, 2021:116). These victims are often Muslims who are accused of harming and eating cows (Chacko, 2018). Much as with Bolsonaro, the rhetoric which is espoused by Modi aims to create a clear distinction between the true people and citizens of India versus the Other and those who are the true people's enemies (Nielsen & Nilsen, 2021). Crucially though, as Nilsen (2021:119) states, this Other "is not just the Muslim or the Dalit, but also the political dissident who dares to question and challenge a government that is acting in the interest of the people." It is through grounding in this contradiction between the Other and the authentic Indian people which allows Modi to continue espousing rhetoric that India will be a Hindu country which will "complete its rise to an economic and political power in the world system (Nilsen, 2024.)"

In contrast to Brazil, the case of India represents a context in which an authoritarian populist leader is still in power. Despite the similarities, both contexts are rooted in different historical and socio-economic contexts. Although both analysis of the rise of authoritarian populism in each country are situated in a context of crisis, the lines in which they and construct their hegemony differ and are rooted in different historical processes.

1.2 Populism in South Africa

1.2.1. Left-wing Populism: Much of the literature around populism in South Africa has focused on the emergence of left-wing populism in the country. Chief amongst this is Sithembile Mbete's writings on the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). Mbete (2015:36) has argued that the EFF "fits into the global pattern of populism in electoral politics." As Tormey (2014:3) further argues, the combative style which the EFF is the primary focus with its politics "being secondary." The EFF was founded on the socialist principles and the leaders stated, "that the party 'draws inspiration from the radical, working-class interpretation of the Freedom Charter (Mbete 2015:39).' The party centred nationalisation of land without compensation, nationalisation of mines and the reserve bank, free education, housing and healthcare (Hurt & Kusima, 2016). Further to this, through their first manifesto and rhetoric, the EFF was "far more explicit in its focus on black struggles and the need for black economic emancipation and empowerment (Mbete 2014:40)." Crucially, the EFF did not only attract support from the electorate amongst economically disenfranchised black youth but also from "young black middle class (Mbete 2015:41)." These supporters often found themselves exposed, whether in places such as university or places of employment, to the inequality that dominants South African society and therefore the rhetoric of the EFF appealed to them (Hurt & Kusima, 2016; Mbete, 2015).

Applying conception populism, the EFF's appeal to 'the people' was to primarily black working-class voters who felt as if democratic South Africa was not fulfilling the promises made to them and were still economically unequal and disadvantaged in the country (Satgar, 2019). As Mbete (2015:42) outlines, "the EFF's diagnosis of South Africa after 1994 is that black South Africans have become a 'voting, but powerless majority' because true economic and social power still resides in white hands." In the place of the Other, the EFF constructed two forces. Firstly, the white monopoly capitalists who still controlled much of the economy and prevented true liberation for the black majority. Secondly, the black elite who "sold out" the black majority in the end of apartheid negations." A clear representation of this belief was

the wearing of miner's uniforms or domestic worker uniforms by MPs and members of the EFF (Hurt & Kusima, 2016). The wearing of these uniforms was meant to act as a direct connection to the working-class (Mbete 2015).

1.2.2. White Minority Populism: Of course, literature around populism in South Africa is not limited to conceptualisations of the EFF. Van Zyl -Hermann (2018) has written extensively on white minority populism and specifically, Afrikaans populism. This specific type of white minority populism, borne out of the rise of Solidarity, a trade union and Afriforum, a self-styled civil rights organisation, acts in "driving a national populist reinvigoration of ethnic and racial identity politics (Van Zyl -Hermann (2018:2)." Through its rhetoric, Solidarity is acted to "recast history" and position much of Afrikaans history in South Africa as a story of victimisation and rebellion rather than of white supremacy and racism (Van Zyl -Hermann, 2018:6). As Van Zyl-Hermann (2018:7) succinctly states, "this discursive strategy remoulded the past to obscure racial privilege and white supremacy." This rhetoric acted to construct a shared history of the Afrikaans people, one which saw the destiny of where the universal Afrikaans people should be aimed at. Solidarity came to centre itself as the defender of this destiny and the defender of the Afrikaans people, their shared past and shared destiny (Van Zyl -Hermann, 2018; van der Westhuizen, 2018). It is through this framing of the universality of the Afrikaans experience that Solidarity was able to construct itself as a voice of 'the people.'

As Van Zyl-Hermann (2018:10) goes on to state, "the historical narrative was reinforced by powerful ideological distinctions which constructed a polarized opposition between the Movement, Afrikaners and whites, and their "constitutive enemies," the ruling ANC elite and the African majority." The ruling ANC were constructed as being unable to govern effectively and through the introduction of policies such as Affirmative Action and Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) were seen to be further marginalising whiteness in South Africa (van der Westhuizen, 2018). Crucially, this construction also drew on historical polarisation. Specifically, the polarisation between a tradition rooted in Christian traditions versus a tradition rooted in trade unions and socialism (van der

Westhuizen, 2007). Van Zyl -Hermann (2018:10) expands on this by stating, "the Movement identified itself as rooted in the Christian tradition of trade unionism, alongside Belgian, German and Dutch trade unions. This was juxtaposed with "the other main tradition of trade unionism" of socialism, which drew on Marxist convictions, and characterized the predominantly black unions organized in the Confederation of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), an alliance partner of the ANC." Crucially, for Solidarity and the movement, this notion of the Christian heritage and it's link to the present also encompassed English Speaking South Africans (Van Zyl -Hermann 2018). This appeal to both English speaking and Afrikaans speaking white South Africans "reflects Laulau's (2005) observations on the imprecision of populist discourse, intent on encompassing a heterogenous social reality in its construction of a simple insider/outsider dichotomy (Van Zyl-Hermann 2018:11). This movement, along with other Afrikaans centred organisations such as AfriForum have dramatically increased their support and members in recent years. This formation and the support which it wields goes directly against the idea that whiteness in South Africa is fractured (Van der Westhuizen, 2018). Rather, it represents a moment which "demonstrate how, in a multicultural context, national populist political logics need not operate in the formal political sphere to gain support and momentum for alternative forms of autonomy from the state (Van Zyl-Hermann 2018:15)."

1.2.3. Right-Wing Populism: As Benjamin Fogel says in his (2019) Mail & Guardian article, "the spectre of populism haunts South Africa… But what if the real danger facing South Africa is an emerging far-right populism that has mass appeal? What if this election marks a shift towards the development of our own Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil or Donald Trump in the United States? "It is within this question in which I locate this project. The electoral emergence of the political parties outlined above as well as the emergence of organisations and community movements all represents a 'political ecosystem' of authoritarian populism. These various parts of the ecosystem act to embolden and increase the prominence of each member. This is part of a larger crystallisation of authoritarian populism in South Africa which

centres immigration as a key concern in the country, often manifesting in xenophobia.

Throughout its history, South Africa has had a long history of xenophobia and associate violence. This has crystalised in three sustained periods of violence in the past decade and a half, namely, in 2008, 2014 and 2019. The worst of these, the 2008 violence, spread out of Alexandra, Gauteng to multiple urban areas throughout South Africa, including Durban and parts of the Western Cape. After days of violence, 62 individuals – mostly undocumented immigrants – had been killed with nearly a hundred thousand displaced and forced out of their shops and homes (Hickel, 2014). Similar outbreaks of violence in 2014 saw immigrants killed and forcibly removed from areas in Gauteng with their shops and businesses forcibly closed. As Fogel (2019) stated, "one of the few things most South Africans seem to agree on is that foreigners — particularly other Africans — are a problem and must be dealt with in one way or another." As will be discussed in detail throughout this project, this xenophobia and the violence which accompanies it is the crux on which the emergence of an authoritarian populism and ideological language of authoritarian populism has emerged.

Chapter 2:
Theorizing Southern Authoritarian Populism and its Ideological Language

2.1. Introduction

"Removing illegal foreigners minimise crime, makes more jobs available, reduce waiting at health care facilities, partly alleviate strain on grid, more housing available, totally opening local economy, tax dollars get used exclusively for South Africans etc (McKenzie, 2024a)"

The above text is a tweet by leader of the Patriotic Alliance and Minister of Arts and Culture, Gayton Mckenzie. It is a clear example of the type of language which has come to characterise an environment of an increasing swing to right-wing populism in South Africa. Secondly, it also represents a characterisation, through language, of current social realities in South Africa, which has been popularised and disseminated to grassroots and the political establishment and acts as a tool of mobilisation.

This chapter will unpack how hegemony, ideology and language are understood and contextualized for this study. I argue that hegemony is best understood through Gramscian theoretical approaches. Based off these arguments, hegemony is understood as a consistently changing "field of force" which is consistently under negotiation by subaltern groups and dominant groups in order for subaltern groups to lend consent for this hegemonic project to dominant groups (Gramsci, 1977). Ideology and how it is spread through language is a key facet of this. This chapter then moves on and incorporates Stuart Hall's analyses of ideology and ideological conflict through language specifically as a site of contestation in hegemony. After unpacking this contestation of hegemony through ideology, this chapter moves on to unpacking authoritarian populism as written about by Hall as the framework for this study. The link between Hall's writing on hegemony and ideology and the corresponding emphasis on unraveling hegemony in a time of crisis as outlined in his writing on authoritarian populism is the guiding thread which gives this study its theoretical underpinnings and understandings.

2.2 Ideology and hegemony

In order to analyse the way in which authoritarian populism in particular will be applied to this context, it is first very necessary to briefly unpack the concept of hegemony and how it is understood for the context of this study. This is especially so as South Africa is currently witnessing the unravelling of ANC hegemony and the rise of with competing hegemonic projects, which aim to give direction to a new politics in South Africa. Unpacking hegemony and how ideology intersects with hegemony is therefore crucial.

2.2.1 Unpacking Hegemony

In its simplest terms, hegemony can be understood as a system in which worldviews and ideologies espoused by dominant groups in society come to be viewed as the 'common good' and are viewed, by different groups in society, as representing the universal interest. Crucially, the making of hegemony by dominant groups in a society is not about creating a 'false consciousness,' but is rather aimed at gaining consent from subaltern groups for the direction of the hegemonic project. Gaining this consent is therefore, as Gramsci (1971:182) states "'a continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria … between the interests of the fundamental group and those of the subordinate groups."

Building on this, Williams, (1981:110) states, "hegemony is then not only the articulate upper level of 'ideology', nor are its forms of control only those ordinarily seen as 'manipulation' or 'indoctrination." Through ensuring that a hegemonic project has consent from subaltern groups, legitimacy is lent to this hegemonic project and to the dominant groups who espouse it. At the same time, a hegemonic configuration encounters its limit in popular resistance precisely because dominant groups need to consistently shape and reshape the hegemony based off the subaltern group. As Williams, (1981:111) states, "Moreover, it does not just passively exist as a form of dominance." Gramsci (1977), of course, was very clear about this: he viewed hegemony as a fluid and "constantly changing field of force." Subaltern groups therefore do not passively give consent and uniformly share the ideology espoused

by dominant groups but rather play active rolls in reshaping and engaging with it. Dominant groups must be responsive to demands by subaltern groups through means such as economic or social policy reform. As Williams, (1981:112) elaborates on this, " It has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended, and modified. It is also continually resisted, limited, altered, challenged by pressures not at all its own." Building on this, Nilsen (2015) states that hegemony is not an achieved state of affairs. On the contrary, it is a form of power that has to be constantly negotiated and renewed as a result of the fact that subaltern groups organize and mobilize collective action around demands for change. However, these compromises which ensure the need to consistently remake hegemony never fundamentally threaten dominant groups as the very concessions that are made by dominant groups continue to ensure consent for the hegemonic project (Nilsen, 2015).

Furthermore, alternative hegemonic projects consistently rise up to challenge regnant hegemonic formations. As Williams (1981:113) argues around this point, while a hegemonic formation "is always dominant, it is never either total or exclusive. At any time , forms of alternative or directly appositional politics and culture exist as significant elements in the society." Dominant hegemonic formations therefore need to be responsive not only to demands by subalterns but also to alternative hegemonic projects in society. More often than not, these two facets are interlinked with concessions being made to supporters of other alternative hegemonies in order to sustain the dominant hegemony.

One of the key mechanisms in which dominant hegemonies are spread as well as resisted is through ideology. As Hall, (1978) states, ideological conflict is central to the struggle of hegemony in society. Ideology acts to give hegemonic projects their direction and articulation. It is also through this ideology that hegemonic projects become more diffuse throughout societies. I therefore turn, in the next section, to a detailed discussion of the relationship between ideology, hegemony, and language.

2.2.2 Ideology, Hegemony, and Language

In his analysis of Louis Althusser's work titled "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," Hall (1983) reflects on how to adequately offer an explanation for how

ideology operates in modern societies. For Hall, ideology is a set of beliefs which shape how individuals perceive certain aspects of society, how they relate to these aspects of society, and how they interact with them. As Hall (1983:131) states "Ideologies are the frameworks of thinking and calculation about the world—the "ideas" with which people figure out how the social world works, what their place is in it, and what they *ought* to do." Importantly, Hall unpacks the distinction which is made between ideological state apparatus and repressive state apparatus. For Althusser and Hall, ideological state apparatuses consist of structures such as "churches, trade unions and the media which are not directly organised by the state (Hall, 1983:133)." On the other hand, repressive state apparatuses include structures such as the "police and army". To an extent, the latter apparatuses come to reinforce the ideology which is perpetuated by the dominant group as well as the indirectly or directly disseminated through the ideological state apparatuses (Hall, 1983:134).

2.2.2.1 Dissemination of ideology

Hall raises an important point when questioning the dissemination of ideology by language through 'ideological apparatuses.' Namely, how does ideology reproduce itself within private institutions. The question is important when analysing how ideology linked with right-wing populism as spread through many so-named 'liberal democracies,' including South Africa. As Hall (1983:132) states, "But the far more pertinent, but difficult, question is how a society *allows* the relative freedom of civil institutions to operate in the ideological field, day after day, without direction or compulsion by the State; and why the consequence of that "free play" of civil society, through a very complex reproductive process, nevertheless consistently reconstitutes ideology as a "structure in dominance (Hall, 1983)." This question is particularly pertinent when examining the role the media plays in the dissemination of often dangerous and exclusionary ideologies. In short, Hall criticizes Althusser's explanation of this and the role that civil society and media plays in ideology to be too simplistic. For Hall, civil society is too complex with complicated processes and interplays which the concept of 'ideological apparatuses' does not adequately explain (Hall, 1983).

In further works on ideology which Hall (1983) unpacks, Althusser defines ideology as "systems of representations." For Althusser, these representations are informed by "concepts, ideas, myths and images" and are essentially "imaginary relations to the real conditions of existence (Hall, 1983)." As Hall outlines, this position on ideology allows us to view ideology as systems of meaning in which individuals represent the world to both themselves and to others (Hall, 1983). Hall (1983:136) states, "Systems of representation are the systems of meaning through which we represent the world to ourselves and one another. It acknowledges that ideological knowledge is the result of specific practices—the practices involved in the production of meaning." These ideas and meanings which are attached to them materialise and inform social practices which is an interplay between meaning and representation. It is within these representations that differences in practices are observed. Specifically, Hall states that some practices contain elements of ideology but they are not solely defined by a particular ideology. Further to this, there are some practices which are wholly focused on disseminating certain ideologies and the associated beliefs of this ideology (Hall, 1983). The media, as an example, are involved in the creation of work that has the ability to shape, move, structure and disseminate ideologies and so the media's relationship with ideology is different from that of workers at a factory who – although fleetingly engaging with ideology – do not play and active role in it (as per Hall's example).

Therefore, if ideology is defined as a "systems of representations" in which different facets of society interact and produce practices in different manners, questions still remain as to the role which private aspects of civil society plays in shaping state ideology. This is – in part – answerable with two separate yet linked points. Media, for example, operates within the confines of capitalist ideology, with economic interests often at the heart of this. This framework tends to incentivise the media to ensure their best interests are met and disseminate ideology which can shape hegemony in line with their interests. Media will therefore act to legitimise power structures and ensure that hegemony, which serves their interests is maintained (Hall, 1983; Hall, 1978).

Finally, it is necessary to turn to the point in competing ideologies and how this acts to shape hegemony which is crucial for this project. The notion that there is a single ideology which operates in a given society is false. Rather, there are constantly competing and contesting ideologies which try and give shape to the hegemony within society. As Hall (1983:137) states, "The notion of *the* dominant ideology and *the* subordinated ideology is an inadequate way of representing the complex interplay of different ideological discourses and formations in any modern developed society … They contest one another, often drawing on a common, shared repertoire of concepts, rearticulating and disarticulating them within different systems of difference or equivalence." Ideologies are therefore a complex interplay of beliefs, images and myths, all represented in different manners and practiced and interacted with in different methods. Ideologies – constantly in conflict – come to shape hegemony and crucially, challenge existing hegemonies.

2.2.2.2 Language

Importantly though, the question of how so called 'ideological thoughts' correspond to actions remains a question. As Hall (1983:131) states when talking about Althusser, "the places the emphasis on where ideas appear, where mental events register or are realised, as social phenomena. That is principally, of course, in language (understood in the sense of signifying practices involving the use of signs; in the semiotic domain, the domain of meaning and representation); equally important, in the rituals and practices of social action or behaviour, in which ideologies imprint or inscribe themselves." The assertion by Althusser and Hall that language is one of the key drivers of shifting "mental events" to social phenomena is backed up by Thompson (1986) who states that language acts to structure, perpetuate and reinforce certain beliefs and understandings of the current and "hoped for realities (Thompson, 1986)." This use of language takes on meaning through the type of language used, the method in which it is conveyed, the syntax that is used, and the context in which it takes place. Although ideology can be conveyed through other means such as images, monuments, and actions, language serves as the primary tool in terms of how individuals are mobilized and themselves come to mobilise and spread ideology within everyday contexts. Language also provides an important facet

to the ways in which ideologies shape and change as they spread. These everyday contexts and the way in which beliefs and ideology are spread act to build on and shape ideologies themselves. Ideologies and the way in which they are spread in everyday therefore have a *bi-directional relationship* (Thompson, 1987). As ideologies are spread in everyday contexts, they are altered and built on. This change at the ground level often then feeds back up to those perpetuating this ideology at a higher level and so is changed and remains fluid (Thompson, 1987).

What is key in this function of language in ideology is the ways in which language allows for the contestation and spread of ideologies and through extrapolation, contestation of hegemony. This contestation of hegemony is key to Hall's further writings on authoritarian populism and the emergence of this unique, right-wing politics in a society. Naturally, Hall's writings on right-wing populism become uniquely pertinent for understanding right-wing populism in varying contexts. Before moving on to outlining the full method in which it is possible to build authoritarian populism in the South African context, I will first outline the ways in which Hall conceptualised it for the British context.

2.3 Authoritarian Populism:

2.3.1 Hall on Thatcherism as Authoritarian Populism

In a 1979 article entitled 'The Great Moving Right Show', Hall wrote the following about the shift to the right that was ongoing at the time in British politics: "It no longer looks like a temporary swing in political fortunes, a short-term shift in the balance of forces. It has been well installed – an on-going concern – since the latter part of the 1960s" (Hall, 1979:172). Specifically, Hall coined the term 'authoritarian populism' to unpack the election of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom (UK) during her election victory in 1979, and the wider shift in hegemonic configurations that underpinned this victory.

In the 1978 book *Policing the Crisis*, Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke and Roberts describe a fundamental shift in the dominant hegemony within the UK from the post-

war consensus to the construction of a new hegemony espoused by Thatcher. Post-war Britain was dominated by the consensus around Keynesian capitalism with the state as a consistent and major actor within the economy. As Hall, (1979:179) states; "Keynesianism was the lynchpin of theoretical ideologies of state intervention throughout the post-war period, assuming almost the status of sacred orthodoxy." In short, the post-war consensus was built on Keynesianism and an extensive welfare state apparatus. Crucially, this consensus was not limited to one part of society but cut across both right and left."

The form of social democracy which constituted much of this post-war consensus contained inherent contradictions which ultimately allowed Thatcher to capitalise on this weakness and effectively replace the post-war consensus and guise the UK toward a conservative hegemony. Specifically, as Hall outlines, in order for a social-democratic formation to win power, it needs to be able to clearly set out methods which shows that they are able to control and manage crises as well as representing working-class interests within this control and throughout all processes of government. In simple terms, a social democratic government needs to be seen to be the "principal representation of the class (Hall, 1979)." The contradiction lies within this representation within government. Once in government, these social-democratic formations exert control over crises in conjunction with capital. Following from this, the "rhetoric of national interest" is drawn upon to explain actions undertaken as part of the government. Following this logic, the socially democratic formation is often at odds with the classes that are meant to represent. As Hall (1979:178, 179) states "the rhetoric of 'national interest' which is the principle ideological form in which a succession of defeats has been imposed on the working class by social democracy in power" and "it sets Labour, at key moments of struggle, be definition on the 'side of the nation' against 'sectional interests' such as trade union power."

Coupled with this, the period leading up to Thatcher's election was marred by economic crisis and stagnation, as well as large-scale strikes facilitated by trade unions across the country (Jessop, Bromley & Ling, 1984). This progressive unravelling of the post-war consensus is the conjuncture in which Thatcher and the

Conservative Party were able to locate her attacks against the post-war consensus and build her own hegemonic project in order to shift Britain toward this new version. Thatcher sought to shift the consensus through several avenues. Firstly, she attacked the welfare state and the rights that had been won by workers in previous generations. As Hall (1979:179) states, Thatcher sought to bring back "the restoration of competition and personal responsibility for effort and reward against the image of the over-taxed individual, enervated by welfare codling." Secondly, she centred trade unions and the country wide strikes that had dominated much of post-war Britain as threats the country's security and economy and 'against the national interest of the country' and a threat the prosperity of 'ordinary' British people. It is within these attacks that Hall locates the analysis of the rise of Thatcher as the rise of authoritarian populism in the country (Hall, 1979).

Through this ideology, Thatcher constructed rhetoric around the authentic British people who were being threatened by the other (Hall, 1978). The grouping of the other was constructed along racialised lines, grouping together immigrants, people of colour, those who opposed her ideology and trade unionists all as being a threat to the authentic British people. The construction of the authentic British people versus the other allowed Thatcher to mobilise on two fronts: firstly, the construction allowed her to gain consent for her hegemonic project, across the political and class sphere with people grouped under the authentic and good British citizens being attracted to her project; secondly, and importantly for the context of authoritarian populism, it gave legitimacy for the need to 'protect' the authentic British people by means of disciplinary and authoritarian measures by the state against the constructed 'other' (Hall, 1978).

The new political consensus which Thatcher was shaping was structured around banishing Keynesianism from the British state and ensuring that deregulation, privatisation and individualism was at the core of addressing the economic decline of the country. Secondly, the Conservative party and Thatcher ensured that the need for law and order was at the centre of their ideology, attempting to quell fears that were both held by much of the British population and played into by Thatcher in her

construction of 'the other.' Critically, this new consensus which Thatcher and the Conservative party became the new 'common sense,' thus effectively replacing the post-war consensus (Jessop, Bromley & Ling, 1984; Hall, 1978).

2.3.2 Authoritarian Populism in the South African context

There are several reasons why Hall's writings on authoritarian populism as outlined above are relevant and can be applied to the current conjuncture in South African politics.

Firstly, Hall's emphasis on the rise of authoritarian populism in a time of economic and social crisis in the time of a declining hegemony resonates with the current conjuncture in South Africa. On Hall's reading, the rise of authoritarian populism as a distinctive right-wing political project had to be understood as an attempt to be in a position to give shape to the ongoing transition from one hegemonic project to another. Simply stated, in the South African context, this would situate this project in the context of an unravelling of ANC hegemony that is coeval with and connected to a worsening crisis of neoliberal capitalism, and an attempt by right-wing actors to give direction to the future of the country and construct a new hegemony.

Secondly, with Hall's emphasis on the construction of the 'people' versus the 'Other' and this constructed 'Other' centered as a cause of a crisis in the country, it is very relevant to the contemporary South African moment (Fogel, 2019). This is particularly relevant with the construction of the 'good people' versus 'the other' used to justify discipline from the state in order to manage the others. Much like Thatcher's war on unions, immigrants and dissenters, South Africa is currently in the context of increased dangerous rhetoric around law and order and the economic crisis being linked to immigration within the country.

The politics of authoritarian populism in the South African context plays out on the site of meaning and belonging in post-apartheid South Africa. This point is central in understanding the framework of analysis and is outlined in detail below. In the conjuncture of economic crisis and an inability of the ANC to sustain consent for its

hegemonic project, this politics of belonging and citizenship and the weaponization of the crises tied with belonging forms the framework on authoritarian populism and how it is utilized within the South African context. Although Hall constructed his framework of authoritarian populism for the British context and therefore needs to be tailored to other contexts, it possible to extrapolate this framework within the South African context (Hall, 1983; Nilsen, 2018). Namely, authoritarian populism manifests in South Africa under the guise of development for the black majority and addressing their frustrations which the ruling hegemony has not been able to do (Hall, 1983; Nilsen, 2018). This is infused with a xenophobia and more specifically, Afrophobia around which claims of crime, drugs, employment and other aspects are all projected on to. This construction of a new common sense understanding of measures needed for development of the black majority opens the door for a state sanctioned majoritarianism and a policing of those who do not subscribe to this new common sense.

2.4 A framework for analysis

2.4.1 Crisis & the people versus the other.

Crucial to Hall's unpacking of authoritarian populism is the centering of the context in which it has emerged in the South African context. Much like the UK context of crisis in which Hall situated his writings on authoritarian populism, South Africa is currently in the context of economic stagnation, persistent poverty and weakened hegemony. Similar to the Conservative party and Thatcher in the UK, this crisis of neoliberalism and unravelling of an existing and long-established hegemony has ensured that political actors have emerged in an attempt to guide this crisis into a new hegemony within the country (Hall, 1979). The politics of belonging are crucial to this context and the site of this crisis. Similar to Hall's outline of Thatcher and her rise to power, the nascent emergence of authoritarian populism in South Africa has taken on the form of the people versus the other and the consequential discipline of the 'the other' to gain legitimacy and consent for the new hegemonic project. Although the politics of belonging are central to both authoritarian populism in the UK context as written about by Hall, the way in which this politics of belonging

manifests in South Africa versus the UK cuts across different lines. Whereas Thatcher centered dissenters, trade unions, immigrants into the UK and the members of the left as her constructed 'other,' this politics of belonging cuts across nationality in South Africa. Specifically, the rise of xenophobia and to a much larger extent, Afrophobia has continued to be the point on which the other is constructed on in South Africa's swing to right-wing populism. Therefore, the majoritarian distinction which is made cuts across 'South Africans' versus the other. To this constructed other, notions of law and order and ensuring law and order by disciplining the other becoming the 'common sense narrative' are also tied as way of gaining legitimacy from subaltern groups for a new hegemonic project and sanctioning state violence.

2.4.2 Ideological language

Finally, and crucial for this project is the use of ideological language to guide and give shape to this nascent hegemony. As outlined by both Hall and Thompson above, language provided the means to turn the thought processes often associated with ideology into "physical processes" (Thompson, 1984:112). Importantly, as language is spread, it is imbued with certain ideologies. As language is disseminated, this ideology will constantly change and be shaped in different ways as it is passed through groups in society. Ideological language therefore has two facets.

I. Firstly, the language which is spread is imbued with myths, beliefs and ideas associated with a certain construction of the world and is constantly changing and evolving from both grassroots levels and through the influence of political actors.

II. Secondly, an importantly, ideological language acts to mobilize individuals around a certain set of beliefs. Importantly, the aforementioned fluidity of ideology to change and adapt acts as a powerful tool of mobilisation to individuals who may not share a similar 'interpretation' of the social world but who expect to see change in society (Mumby, 1989).

This second point directly leads into one of the criticisms which is often made against conceptions of ideology, namely the disagreement over whether ideologies are a social cement of sorts that bind groups together. Rather, according to Zaidi (1997), ideologies mobilise meaning in a lot more complex methods than simply holding groups together in a shared set of discrete beliefs. The lack of true consensus and oppositional attitudes that exist within groups are in fact a key mobilising force across and within groups in society (Zaidi, 1997; Thompson, 1984). The fluidity of language to reshape and alter ideologies provides, therefore, a much more complex understanding of the way ideological language can move through society.

In the South African context, this ideological language acts to shape and shift representations of 'the other' and give direction to the type of state discipline that is required to address the constructed societal problems which the other has caused. Crucially therefore, this ideological language has acted to guide South Africa within its current conjuncture toward a new hegemony in the context outlined earlier. Studying this ideological language as a component of this framework of authoritarian populism is important in providing a holistic analysis on the way in which an ideology associated with authoritarian populism has developed and has acted as a tool of construction around the framework of authoritarian populism and mobilization around it. This is also key to Hall's writings on the contestation of hegemony through ideology and how it plays out through language. This component therefore provides a critical piece understanding the current South African context.

Practically, this study draws on sociolinguistics to ground the component of ideological language in the framework of authoritarian populism. As Spolsky (1988: 333) states, "sociolinguistics is a field that studies the relation between language and society and the social structures of the users of this language." Importantly for this study, there are multiple examples in which ideological language has been used as the basis of examination through sociolinguistics into right-wing ideologies, most prominently in Platt & Williams (2002) analysis of segregationist ideology. In their research on segregationist ideology in the United States, Platt and Williams (2002) analysed documents – namely letters – written to Dr Martin Luther King Jnr by

segregationists who opposed American society integrating. Platt & Williams (2002) situated these letters within the socio-historical context and material conditions in which they took place. These letters shared many beliefs that were commonly held yet were also constructed as distinct ideologies. Those who wrote the letters had constructed their ideological conceptions and opinions of the civil rights movement often interpreted their "structural, circumstantial and cultural influences*"* in different ways but yet held the commonly held belief that the civil rights movement was wrong, itself an ideological construction (Platt & Williams, 2002). These distinct beliefs included the religious construction of segregation, historical practices, threats of communism and languages which all influences their opinions against integration. As Platt & Williams (2002:34) outline, "the ideologies they constructed acted to mobilise their counter movement participation." The grounding which sociolinguistics provides for examination of ideological language in this context is therefore utilised in the methodology of this study.

Based off what has been outlined above, a skeleton framework of authoritarian populism for this study is as follows:

I. Situating the rise of authoritarian populism in a time of crisis. Namely the unravelling of one hegemonic framework to another and the use of authoritarian populism to construct and guide a new one.
   I) The centering of an 'Other' in guiding this shift and using authoritarian measures of the state to discipline this 'Other.'
   II) The grounding of 'common sense' law and order discourse in relation to the other.
   III) The appeal to the construction of 'the people' as a way of mobilizing support for this new hegemonic project.
   IV) The use of ideology and language to construct this hegemony.

Chapter 3:
Research Questions and Methodology

3.1 Problem Statement

South Africa is currently seeing the nascent emergence of authoritarian populism which has crystalised in the development of an ideological language of authoritarian populism.

3.2 Research Questions & Objectives

As is suggested by the overall problem statement, this project sets out to map the nascent emergence of an ecosystem of right-wing populism in South Africa. Using Stuart Hall's writings on authoritarian populism as a theoretical framework, this project will map the performance of this right-wing populism in this distinctive political style. In particular, the project analyses the ideological language of authoritarian populism and how this language has become increasingly resonant in South Africa's political sphere. More specifically, this project aims to address the following central research question:

> *What are the major features of authoritarian populism as a political ecosystem in contemporary South Africa?*

I approach this research question through a set of sub-questions:

1. What are the key characteristics of the political and economic context in which authoritarian populism has emerged in South Africa, and how has this context shaped the politics of authoritarian populism?
2. Which actors make up the political ecosystem of authoritarian populism in South Africa and how do they construct ideologies around 'the people' and the 'Other?'
3. How has ideological language surrounding authoritarian populism been constructed and developed in South Africa? How has this ideological language acted as a mobilisation tool in authoritarian populism?

By answering these research questions, the project aims to meet the following key objectives:

1. Providing a substantial and in-detail discussion regarding authoritarian populism and hegemony as set out by Stuart Hall and others.
2. Examining how different components of the 'ecosystem' of authoritarian populism feed into and contribute toward one another.
3. Tracking – in detail - and examining how an ideological language of authoritarian populism has emerged and what forms this takes in post-apartheid South Africa.
4. Situating the rise of authoritarian populism in South Africa in historical processes and examining how this has fed into authoritarian populism in South Africa.

3.3 Rationale

Despite a large body of scholarly work existing which has conceptualised the rise of right-wing populism in the global North, very little work has been done in the South African context. As Van Zyl-Hermann (2018:3) states, "Critical scholarship on the current populist conjuncture has overwhelmingly concentrated on the north Atlantic and northern European world and the dramatic developments surrounding Brexit, Trumpism and the populist right-wing parties increasingly making their presence in countries like France, The Netherlands, Germany and Austria." As outlined, much work on populism in the South African context has focused on left-wing populism (see Mbete, 2014) and only fleetingly on the emergence of a sustained and national right-wing populism. Writings on authoritarian populism itself have been utilised, mainly be Nilsen in the Indian context as well as other global South contexts such as Brazil and the Philippines, to a slightly lessor extent (see Nilsen, 2018, 2019, 2024; Azevedo & Robertson, 2022; Juego, 2017). South Africa's emerging eco-system of right-wing populism, however, has been largely ignored in both extant academic literature and mainstream media. This dissertation sets out to fill some of this gap. A key motivation for doing so is the fact that the erosion of democratic institutions as

well as the exclusionary policies and often state sanctioned violence which accompanies this right-wing populism, compels critical intellectual work towards a fuller conceptualisation of authoritarian populism as a nascent hegemonic project in the South African context.

3.4 Research Design

This study takes the form of a mixed-methods approach, utilising both elements of qualitative and quantitative research in order to provide analysis. Both elements and how they fit into this project are outlined below:

I. According to both Christensen et al., (2015) and Scott, (2021), qualitative research is best suited to studies which do not aim to be generalisable and reproducible to general society. Rather, it is best utilised in order to outline rich analysis around a particular social phenomenon. This approach is therefore best suited for this study as this project aims to provide an in-depth analysis and explanation for right-wing populism in South Africa. Although this is a mixed-methods study, the qualitative aspect is the dominant approach and is best suited in outlining authoritarian populism in South African society and the roles which it plays.

II. For the purposes of this project, the quantitative component is meant to bolster and reinforce that which is being analysed qualitatively in the systematic review. Specifically, a large part of this project involves a textual analysis in order to unpack the ideological language which has come to characterise the swing to authoritarian populism in the country. In order analyse a large corpus of text, natural-language processing (NLP) was used in order to facilitate this analysis. This NLP was utilised through the statistical programme, *R*. It is this facet which gives this project a mixed-methods design. The use of a statistical programme is meant to ensure efficiency and accuracy within the language analysis which will then be analysed quantitively. It should however also be noted that there is a small range of debate which argues that the use of natural language processing, even if completed through a statical programme is still qualitative rather than

quantitative. However, this project also makes use of descriptive and inferential statistics in order to ground and give context to certain literature. Given this, and despite the debate outlined, this project still has an identifiable quantitative element.

3.5 Study Setting

The entirety of this research project was completed via a desktop analysis. All resources – in the form of journal articles, texts and other resources – were accessed online on sites that were within the public domain and accessible through the internet.

3.6 Sampling, Data Collection & Analysis

As mentioned above, one of the main focal points of this study is the ideological language in authoritarian populism. It becomes necessary to examine the language that builds and perpetuates the imaginaries that sustain authoritarian populism as an ideology. Specifically, I set out to investigate how language is being used by political actors to create a narrative of crisis, and to mobilise constituencies around the imperative of 'addressing' this crisis and the construction of state abilities to manage this crisis. In the South African context, this language is used to construct an alternative to a declining ANC hegemony, and to create a new 'common sense' to sustain such an alternative hegemony in South African society.

In order to map this ideological language in South Africa, a textual analysis was conducted using Natural-Language Processing (NLP) as the medium of analysis. NLP can either be facilitated through the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) or through statistical programmes, such as *R*. NLP is therefore a tool which allows for the examination of a large corpus of text to facilitate analysis on the sentiment of text, parts of speech, patterns within text over time, frequency of identified words as well as word associations, amongst others (Chowdhary & Chowdhary, 2020). As texts are imbued with beliefs, opinions, social alliances and constructions of the social world, the analysis of ideology through text is necessary to conceptualise the rise of a language of authoritarian populism in South Africa (Thompson, 1984;

Chowdhary & Chowdhary, 2020).. NLP, conducted through *R,* allows for the examination of a large corpus of text as well as the fine patterns and changes in language that a manual analysis would not be able to adequately yield. In this data collection and analysis section, I outline the methods which informed both the desktop analysis component of this study as well as the NLP component.

3.6.1 Desktop analysis/Systematic Review

In order to bolster and support the results of the NLP analysis, I conducted a systematic review. This stage primarily made use of journal articles and other media publications in relation to the analysis of authoritarian populism in South Africa. Since the emergence of right-wing populism has been largely neglected within formal academic articles, this study made extensive use of news articles published within the Daily Maverick, Mail & Guardian, Sunday Times, Financial Times, Business Day, Independent Online (IOL), and News24. Articles sourced from these outlets were within the scope outlined by the research questions and theoretical framework of this study. Academic articles that were utilised for this study were sources from EPSCO Host, Google Scholar, JSTOR and Taylor & Francis. No limitation of publication date was implemented for this study although much of literature around post-apartheid South Africa was naturally written after 1994 (inclusive). Finally, several books were used for this study. These were sourced from Exclusive Books as well as Google Books.

3.6.2 Natural Language Processing

This component of collection and analysis had several steps:

I. **Sourcing of texts to be used:** Informed by the scoping completed both in the proposal and methodology of this project, identified texts used for this analysis were as follows.
    - Manifestos of political parties including the ANC, DA, EFF, PA, VF+, ACDP, IFP, ActionSA.

- Media releases of both political parties and identified community/civil organisations, including AfriForum, Solidarity, Operation Dudula, #PutSouthAfricansFirst and political parties as outlined above.
- Policy positions (including existing legislation and proposed white papers).
- Transcribed extracts of speeches of relevant political and community actors.
- Social media press releases
- Political Statements on Social Media

All texts sourced were available in the public domain – including party and organisation websites, social media sites such as Facebook, X and YouTube as well as archived texts sourced via Google Scholar, EpscoHost and other academic search engines.

From these sources, a singular corpus was built comprising these various texts from across the identified sources. After this, this singular corpus was sorted according into three separate 'themes' based off the outline of the proposed authoritarian populism theoretical framework for this project. Specifically, texts were sorted into two sub-corpora, namely (I) Construction of the crisis South Africa faces and constructions of the 'other' and the 'people' (II) Constructions of the power of the state to exert control over this crisis. Based off this, the following table outlines the number of words analysed in each sub-corpus:

Corpus 1: Construction of Crisis	36 322 words
Corpus 2: Addressing the Crisis	53 598 words

2. 'Cleaning' of text: In order for the NLP analysis to take place, the various corpora of text were 'cleaned' in order to facilitate the analysis. This involved a process of removing all 'stop words' from the text. Simply stated, 'stop words' are words within

text that carry very little inherent meaning within sentences. Examples of these words include prepositions such as “a,” “the” or “is.” By removing these words from the text, it aids in facilitating the analysis of the identified parts of speech, words associations and the like. The removal of stop words is a common practice within NLP analysis and also aids in reducing the overall word count of the text to be analysed, thus making the analysis process more efficient and accurate.

Once stop words were removed, a process called ‘tokenization’ took place. Tokenization refers to the process whereby each word in a text is sorted into its individual part. As an example, the sentence “the toad jumped over the hoop” would read “toad” “jumped” “over” “hoop” once both the processes of tokenization and removing of stop words occurred.

3. Analysis of text: Once removal of stop words and tokenization was completed. The analysis was then facilitated within multiple stages:

- **Corpus 1:** Adjectives, Nouns and noun pairs were analysed. In addition to this, common words associations were also mapped as well as changes in sentiment (e.g. mass & detention often found together). These were also mapped over a number of years in order to map possible changes.
- **Corpus 2:** Whereas corpus 1 mainly focused on adjectives, nouns and noun-pairs, corpus 2 included the use of verbs and verb pairs in this analysis. Once again, word associations, verb, adjective and noun frequency was also analysed.
- **Graphs/charts:** Based of the results of the above three stages were created in order to facilitate the discussion.

Based off the results from this analysis of texts, it will be possible to extend this analysis in order build an understanding of the emergence of an ideological language of authoritarian populism. This is where the systematic review is of importance. It is through the systematic review that the language analysis will gain context and be fleshed out fully in order to provide an understanding of the way in which a construction around the framework of authoritarian populism is formed.

3.7 Ethical Considerations

3.7.1 Positionality: As outlined by Fisher & Anshuko (2012) as well as Scott (2021), the main principles of ethical research are justice, beneficence and respect. Although all are relevant to a smaller or larger degree, the main principle which is applicable to this research is that of beneficence. Specifically, Fisher & Anshuko (2012) outline that research which is produced should aim to benefit not only academia but also the community which the research is being written about. This project contains analysis and engagement with contexts and language which specifically affects minorities and violence against minorities in South Africa. This project therefore has the potential to bring attention and awareness toward this and should be used in such a way.

Secondly, my positionality as a researcher should also be taken into account. Namely, I am a white male who is conducting a research project on the rise of rhetoric which centres individuals who often face violence and discrimination in the country. This positionality inherently comes with certain privileges which need to be acknowledged as coming to inform my writings on the lived experiences of vulnerable groups in South Africa. For example, I have never been labelled as an undocumented immigrant into the South Africa and threatened based off this identity. This will inherently affect my writing and conceptualisations of violence against these groups.
Finally, as a representative of the University of Pretoria and by extension, the Sociology department and academic supervisor, this project should be an accurate representation and analysis of the social phenomenon under analysis.

3.7.2 Sourcing of data: As corroborated by Suri (2020), a systematic review methodology does not capture any personal information. Given the fact that this project used no participants, the concern around informed consent is not relevant to this project. In addition to this, and in line best practice principles around management of data, all potential identifying linkages in data utilised were eliminated in this project. In addition to this, and as stated, all texts that were used in both the NLP analysis and systematic review were available and accessible in the public domain and therefore no permission is required to access this data.

3.7.3 Ethical Clearance: In order to proceed with this project, an application for ethical clearance was made to the Humanities Faculty, University of Pretoria in September 2022. This project received ethical clearance with no revisions in October 2022.

Chapters of Analysis

Chapter 4:
Conjuncture of Crisis and Hegemony: The Emergence of a Political Ecosystem

4.1: Introduction

One of the key components in the analysis of authoritarian populism is the conjunction between and worsening socio-economic conditions, rooted in a crisis of neoliberal capitalism, as well as a declining dominant ANC hegemony, both politically and socially. This chapter seeks to outline this context, mapping the socio-economic history and conditions of post-apartheid South Africa as well as the decline of ANC hegemony and its political consequences.

My central argument in this chapter is that socioeconomic decline, rooted in the crisis of neoliberal capitalism, has both propelled and converged with the decline of ANC hegemony, to create the political and economic context in which authoritarian populism has emerged in contemporary South Africa. Crucially, I also outline the ideology of 'belonging' and nationality which post-apartheid was South Africa built on. The political consequences of socio-economic decline cannot be understood without understanding and centring the ideology of belonging that South Africa's post-apartheid construction was built on.

4.2: Neoliberal Crisis and the Unravelling of ANC Hegemony

4.2.1: Neoliberalism and belonging in the post-apartheid South Africa

The inference that the ANC was coerced by Europe and the United States into adopting a neoliberal structure in building post-apartheid South Africa is false. Rather than only being a transition therefore to democracy, the transition was also a clear move to a neoliberal form of capitalism. This choice of economic policy to pursue within this transition would come to only deepen the racialised structures of economic inequality in the country and create a very limited space for the emergence of a black economic elite and largely failing to lift the black majority out of poverty (Bhorat, 2004).

In 1993, black South Africans earned around 9% of what white South Africans did with between 35% to 45% of black South Africans living below the poverty line with

inadequate access to health services, housing and education (Bhorat, 2004). Compounded on this, as a result of both the Group Areas Act of 1955 and Land Act of 1913, access to land was also unequal. Only 13.8% of all land in the country was reserved for black South Africans, which were known as 'Bantustans.' In order for a fully redistributive programme to be implemented, these spatial-historical injustices would need to be undone by the democratic government (Sebaka 2017). However, the constitution itself inscribed significant limitations on the redistribution from the white minority to the black majority (Von Holdt, 2013). This economic and spatial inequality was therefore entrenched in the decisions that were made in the move to democracy after apartheid, primarily through the economic direction that the country was positioned to follow and the consequent inherent limitations on redistribution. (Bhorat, 2004). It is worth exploring each of these economic directions in order to show the inherent weakness in each of them in addressing the socio-economic conditions of apartheid.

In 1994, the ANC introduced the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) (Carmody, 2002). With a focus on creating jobs, reducing inequality, and widening the welfare net for many black South Africans living below the poverty line as well as building infrastructure, RDP was seen as the first necessary step in reducing the inequalities of the past (Carmody, 2002). RDP was seen therefore as a 'socially democratic' solution that would ensure redistribution and greater equality in South African society (Hart, 2013). In doing so, the RDP programme tapped into many of the aspirations that the ANC of liberation and before the end of apartheid had in mind for a governing version of the party post-apartheid. This emphasis on the hope for redistribution was key to the ANC's ability to maintain legitimacy in their early years of their governance (Hart, 2013)
Despite this hope, after implementation, the RDP policy suite was criticised on two fronts:

I. From business and capital in the country for not being financially viable or practical. During this same period, the RDP programme was criticised by economists for unwittingly perpetuating many of the social

divisions that were present in apartheid South Africa (Adelzadeh, 1996). This was said to be further driving a wedge between rural black South Africans and urban black South Africans due to redistribution policies, including BBBEE and other policies acting to benefit only urban black South Africans (Adelzadeh, 1996, Sebaka, 2017). Rooted structural change was not present in these policies to radically lift rural black South Africans out of poverty.

II. Conversely, from trade unions who asserted that the RDP in practice was merely a watered-down version of the original policy proposals that COSATU created for the ANC's post-apartheid governance programme and was therefore largely ineffective in addressing the structural change needed (Adelzadeh, 1996).

These criticisms eventually won out and were successful in shaping the post-apartheid policy regime in the country. After this, the ANC government U-turned and introduced the Growth, Employment & Redistribution (GEAR) (Adelzadeh, 1996). GEAR was a clear neoliberal successor to the RDP and signalled a complete move in a new direction of economic policy (Hart, 2013; Adelzadeh, 1996). GEAR was aimed at creating around 400 000 per annum and aimed at a growth rate of around 6% per annum leading up to the year 2000 (Streak, 2004). The plan – which stressed the importance of private investment and the free market – aimed to create stable policy decisions, a further reduced budget deficit and, importantly, government spending based on redistribution (Bhorat, 2004; Streak, 2004).

GEAR was framed as an economic direction that would stabilise and grow the South African economy. Despite such promises, through the period 1996 – 2000, Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) documented still an increase in poverty for black South Africans, with inequality levels still sitting at a Gini coefficient between 0.56 – 0.57 (Carmody, 2002). Just as with the RDP policy suite, GEAR acted to improve the economy and the perception of the economy for the sake of 'the markets' and private investment into the country. Although GEAR and other policies succeeded, to an

extent, in creating a black middle class, the majority of black South Africans saw little structural and sustained change during this period (Hart & Padayachee, 2013). Rather, GEAR's policies constituted a clear shift toward the kind of neoliberal economic framework that was dominant on a global scale at this point. In addition to this, it went against principles of radical redistribution which we envisioned by the ANC before the end of apartheid. As Sebaka (2017:32) argues, "from the leftist policy perspective, the private sector had more powers to dictate to the public sector and take economic control and power in the interest of capital and in the expense of the poorest of the poor." In fact, many considered this shift as a rebuttal of the neo-Keynesian precepts of the RDP with GEAR that threatened to move South Africa "from a racial apartheid to a class apartheid" (Sebaka, 2017:33).

Crucially, the move to GEAR did not simply represent a shift to a new economic policy. As Hart (2013:161) argues, GEAR went a step further than simple economic policy but rather represents a "redefinition of the NDR in terms of re-articulation of race, class and nationalism, along with assertion of new technologies of rule." GEAR therefore constituted a fundamental reestablishment of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR). The NDR, the central ideology constituting how the ANC sees the future of South Africa and how to move toward this vision, also provides a clear direction in terms of the policy suite that would need to be implemented to realise this vision. Phiri (2013) outlines that the NDR "aims to build a South Africa that is free from discrimination. A South Africa that is democratic and prosperous. The path to achieving this vision is empowering the historically marginalised black majority in general, specifically Africans in particular." And so, in short, the move from neo-Keynesianism (RDP) to neoliberalism (GEAR) was rooted in how the ANC government chose to manage the contradictions within its post-liberation hegemony as well as the different ruling blocs that are present within the party (Hart, 2013). More than this, GEAR was also seen as a method by varying ruling blocs within the ANC to ensure the dominance of a "transnationally connected technocratic elite over mass mobilisation and action." This method therefore acted to contain and manage working-class revolt and to ensure that the 'nation' was constructed on the hegemony and position of the ANC (Hart 2013:162).

Viewing the move to GEAR as a fundamental reestablishment and rethinking of the NDR is crucial to understand the linkage between belonging/nationality and the current conjuncture that is being seen in South African politics.

Post-apartheid South Africa and the promises it encompassed was constructed on the inclusion of black South Africans into the 'nation state' as well as exclusion of other groups from the nation state. This so-called inclusion and exclusion criteria was closely tied to the economic entitlements which defined the building of a post-apartheid South Africa (Neocosmos, 2010). This articulation, therefore, of what it meant to 'belong' to South Africa is vital to the ability of the ANC to maintain control over its own hegemony and ensure it perpetuates and maintains popular consent for its power (Marais, 2011; Hart, 2013). The project of nation building and nationality that the ANC facilitated was informed and facilitated by both the neo-Keynesian economic framework as well as the subsequent shift to a neoliberal framework (Marais, 2011).

With the introduction of RDP, state discourse of belonging became closely aligned with the RDP policy suite. The notion of belonging to South Africa and therefore to both economic and political rights became reduced to citizenship of South Africa (Hart & Padayachee, 2013). This was in line with the redistribution emphasised by the RDP plan (Hart & Padayachee, 2013). In short, to be a citizen of the new South Africa meant upward mobility for the black majority which would be gained partly, at this point, through redistribution (Marais, 2011). The ideology of 'belonging' to the country therefore fused and was defined by elements of neoliberalism and neo-Keynesianism but who could expect this upward mobility was limited by the principles of nationality. This is an important point. Success was constructed as a hallmark of post-apartheid South Africa, just not success for all. Who comprised that was defined by nationality. This merging of economic aspirations and success to nationality and belonging was practically facilitated through two methods (Marais, 2011). Firstly, the rhetorical construction of the 'rights and responsibilities of citizens' in the new South Africa and secondly, the introduction of legislation informing the rights of non-citizens in the country and how they differ from citizens (Reddy, 2012).

A clear example to elaborate on these processes is the case of migrant labour and the ways in which the view on migrant labour have shifted. To be specific, migrant labour was one of the key economic drivers in apartheid South Africa. Thousands of individuals from across the continent and the country moved to Gauteng and other provinces in order to seek employment on the sprawling mines which characterised the province (Crush, 1992). In democratic South Africa, this labour migrancy became heavily targeted by the state and certain ANC aligned trade unions. Within this adopted neoliberal approach, the core assumption of the state became that migrant labour is a negative thing and should be limited in the transition to a 'new South Africa as the ANC tried to facilitate economic wealth generation for black South Africans (Sebaka, 2017). The notion of providing employment to those that weren't 'South African' became dismissed as it was deemed less important than creating economic opportunities for citizens. As outlined by Mosselson, (2010:132), "the understanding of citizenship in the country became informed by state prescriptions rather than popular ones." In short, economic 'rights' were linked to the accumulation of wealth which was still predominantly in the hands of the white minority. Accumulation of wealth and success was seen as an inevitability for the black South African majority. In short, race was no longer the indicator of success as it was in apartheid South Africa, citizenship was constructed to be this indicator (Mosselson, 2010). And critically, as stated above, this construction was directly informed by the dominant economic policy and redistributive narratives that surrounded it. (Hart, 2013; Marais, 2011)

Naturally, as a consequence of this construction around nationality and economic success, immigration and those the question of 'who did not belong' to this constructed version of attainable success became a debated issue throughout the RDP and GEAR years. This question was, in a sense answered and influenced by two parallel processes.

- Firstly, with the introduction of GEAR, the "free market" came to be constituted as the central arena in which people could ensure upward social

mobility (Neocosmos 2008). In a development orientation that emphasises the 'free market,' the market itself is seen as a clear representation of the 'will of the people.' As the market 'acts' on behalf of the 'people,' citizens within the country become disempowered and demobilised, and are essentially relegated to being responsible for navigating their own way through the market place. (Neocosmos, 2008; Mosselson, 2010; Reddy, 2012). Citizens are therefore left without a direct path to clear redistributive programmes as promised, given that the free market is viewed as dictating the will of the people and individual agency is valued over principles of redistribution. This in turn prevented the black majority from creating the structural change needed to effect redistributive programmes as the political means to do so were in themselves diminished (Mosselson, 2010).

- The second process was the development of a black bourgeoisie and a more differentiated class structure among the black population (Iheduru 2002). Working through state programmes such as BBBEE as well as personal links with the governing ANC, a black capitalist class broke away from the black majority. They came, in their own right, to form a new class within the country (Von Holdt, 2013; Southall, 2004). The wealth of this class has continued to grow in contrast to the majority of black citizens, who had become economically worse off. Within this construction of belonging to South Africa as outlined above, this black bourgeoisie was viewed as having attained 'true' citizenship and nationality within South Africa – the type of success and upward mobility that was promised to them at the end of apartheid. As argued by Iheduru (2002:52), this black capitalist class was seen as the de facto 'saviour' for the poorer black majority who would ensure that the wealth that they accumulated would benefited all black South Africans (Iheduru, 2002; Tirivangasi & Mugambiwa, 2016). However, as this material reality did not manifest, the inability for the black majority to access this 'full citizenship' and belonging to the country was blamed on 'outsiders' as the reason for hindering their development (Iheduru, 2002). As this black bourgeoisie continued to expand its wealth, the influx of migration into the

South Africa from other parts of the continent is centred by both the government and this black bourgeoisie to hide these growing class lines and to ensure that a clear scapegoat emerges for the state to leverage power over in order to shift blame (Tirivangasi & Mugambiwa, 2016).

4.2.2 Rearticulation of Hegemony

Facing rising unemployment, increased poverty and inequality levels as well as very little structural change, the ANC government introduced the National Development Plan 2030 (NDP) in 2011 (Sebeka, 2017). The official rationale for the introduction of this plan was that it would succeed in overcoming the shortfalls of GEAR and bringing about sorely needed change (Naidoo & Mare, 2015). Many analysts, at the time, saw the NDP as an opportunity to increase the economic opportunities of the informal economy and black South Africans in particular. This would hopefully address the exclusion of the black majority from the economy (Naidoo & Mare, 2015).

This shift from GEAR to the NDP represented another fundamental rethinking of the way in which the ANC continued to attempt to hold on to and perpetuate its hegemony. As Hart (2013:148) outlines this by saying that the move to the NDP represented a different power bloc within the ANC attempting to reshape both the ANCs own internal hegemony and external hegemony over the country according to its own beliefs (Hart, 2013:197). This reshaping would ensure that the ANC contained its state power and was able to exert this power of civil society. As the inherent contradictions within the ANC's own hegemony played out and as their project of nation building started to unravel, populist politics increasingly became a method that is drawn on to reverse this decline. As Hart (2013:166) states "while articulations of the nation and liberation are vitally important to the ANC's hegemonic power, they are simultaneously a source of weakness and instability because they are vulnerable to counter claims of betrayal…these instabilities and fragilities are increasingly prevalent in the increasingly dangerous populist policies that have developed over the long decade of the 2000s."

Despite this rethinking of economic policies and rearticulation of the 'nation', very little positive socio-economic change was seen between 2011 to 2023. The below graph outlines poverty rates in South Africa between 2018 - 2023:

Graph 1: Poverty Rates in South Africa (Statistics South Africa, 2024)



Source: Statistics South Africa (2024b)

Poverty rates have seen very little decline during this period and have in fact, increased. In addition to this, South Africa's unemployment rates currently sits at 32.9% (Statistics South Africa, 2024b). Unemployment, poverty and inequality became entrenched characteristics of the South African economy that have worsened over time. This continued crisis of neoliberalism and the crisis of nation building resulting from this is but one part of the conjuncture that has led to the emergence of authoritarian populism in the country As this crisis deepened, the ANC's hegemony, both electorally and their ability to wield influence over civil society has decreased. In this vacuum, we have seen the project of nation building concretely move to a more exclusionary and extreme position as the ANC attempts to manage their own gradual decline in hegemony.

4.3: ANC hegemony and its unravelling: Electoral Trajectories

Hart (2013:166) importantly outlines that, "articulations of the nation, liberation and the NDR are central to the ANC's hegemonic project." However, drawing on notions of liberation and an oppressive past to construct a hegemonic project in South Africa leaves this hegemony open to inherent contradictions which would leave it vulnerable.

Drawing on Booysen (2011:10) and her writings on ANC hegemony, as well as Hart (2013), we can conceptualise the construction of ANC hegemony in the following way:

Internal Hegemony	Power gained through	Smooth Transition of Leadership, Perceived Stability of the Party, Unity amongst National Executive Committee & Stable Rearticulation of the Hegemonic Project.
External Hegemony	Power gained through	Electoral growth, Notions of Liberation, Lack of Popular Uprising.

4.3.1: Electoral Trajectories: Constructing Hegemony

It is important to fully understand how this external hegemony in particular has been shaped by electoral trajectories since the end of apartheid and how these vast electoral victories allowed the ANC to not only position itself as the governing party but rather as the state itself, therefore diffusing its hegemony and influence throughout civil society. In fact, much of South Africa's political trajectory has been fundamentally shaped by the hegemony of the ANC.

Thirty years ago, in 1994, the ANC received 62.65% of the vote in the first democratic election of post-apartheid South Africa, and fell just short of a two-thirds majority. Buoyed by societal goodwill and the widespread feeling of confidence in

Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki, the party further increased its majority in the 1999 national election, taking 66.35% of the vote. This further solidified its control of the state and boosted its external hegemony (Booysen, 2011:53). Internally, the ANC at a national level was united behind its new position in government. This organisational unity was crucial for the way in which the ANC constructed its power and hegemony over South African society (Booysen, 2018). Organisationally, it was perceived to be far stronger than any opposition party and therefore more stable and more capable of governing the country (Twala, 2014). It was also well resourced and had extensive financial networks, largely secret to the public (Twala, 2014). This allowed the party to push back against opposition party advancement and ensure the brand "ANC" remained strong (Booysen, 2018).

Other parties were not able to counter the ANC's hegemony and its 'brand' during this period. The only sustained opposition that the ANC faced during its first election was the National Party (NP) and IFP. In 1994, the NP garnered 20.39% of the vote, largely from white and coloured voters in the country who saw the NP as the only party that would represent minority interest (Mottiar, 2015). Together with the IFP – who gained 10.54% in 1994 – these two parties together represented the only real opposition to the ANC government (Mottiar, 2015). Between the election of 1994 to 1999, the Democratic Party (DP), under the leadership of Tony Leon, began to appeal to conservative and minority voters within the country (Calland, 20013. Leon largely abandoned the liberal underpinnings of the DP and attempted to appeal to centre and right-wing voters as well as coloured and Indian voters in the country (Mottiar, 2015). His famous slogan in the 1999 election, "fight back" was a direct appeal to the base of white and coloured voters to fight back against a still- growing-in-power ANC and the perceived danger to minorities that this power posed (Calland, 2013). Capitalising on anger over issues such as BBBEE & Affirmative Action DP was able to grow and become the largest opposition party after the 1999 election, gaining 9.56% of the vote and supplanting the NP (Calland, 2013).

During this period, the only non-electoral substantive challenge to the ANC's hegemony came in the form of social movements such as the Landless People's Movement (LPM) which centred themselves as opposed to the creeping neo-

liberalism that the ANC was embracing between 1999 – 2008 in particular (Von Holdt & Naidoo, 2021). Despite this opposition, the ANC was able to ensure that these movements did not pose any real threat to its hegemony and ensured that criticism against it was defined and characterised in a very specific manner, that is, as being opposed to the liberation party and what it represents. As Hart (2016:168) states, "what is significant here is how the NDR takes on a new and threatening language through the languages of contention through which hegemonic processes operate."

Despite the ANC asserting their hegemonic control, protests against the government began to increase as basic service delivery as well as structural change for the black majority showed no sign is ticking forward (Runciman, 2016). Often violent community protest has come to define pushback and resistance against the ANC government who had largely failed to create economic transformation within the country (Von Holdt, 2013). Although around 50% of protests before 2007 had violent undertones, this percentage has risen to over 90% between the period 2007 – 2010 (Lancaster & Mulaudzi, 2020). In addition, whereas these service delivery protests were in the past characterised by being led by community organisations, many current protests are unorganised and fluid with dissatisfied community members no longer wishing to be associated with the ANC, even at a community organisation level (Lancaster & Mulaudzi, 2020). As Sinwell (2011:363) articulates, although many of these service delivery protests were directed at local government, they encompassed and represented much broader and more significant concerns that were not fully grasped. Through this process and under intensifying public protest and internal party politics, the ruling bloc in the ANC headed by Thabo Mbeki lost control over its articulation of hegemony and idea of the state and was replaced by a new ruling bloc, under the guise of Jacob Zuma (Booysen, 2011).

For many within the ANC as well as their allies and citizens, Zuma represented an opposition to many of the grievances that were diffused throughout the country at the time, but were being systematically contained by the hegemonic ruling bloc of Thabo Mbeki (Hart, 2013). Zuma was able to capitalise on the failings of Mbeki, styling

himself as a traditionalist a man of the people against the 'elite (Booysen, 2011).' Crucially, it was Zuma's ability to reconcile and rearticulate the ANC's hegemonic project in his form. Specifically, Hart (2013:49) states "Zuma's capacity to connect with and speak to the painful articulations of race, class, gender and sexuality in the everyday lives of many poor black South Africans is closely linked with his wrestling ownership of the liberation struggle from the Mbeki faction – and in the process, redefining the hegemonic languages of contention."

Gunner (2009) goes on to argue that Zuma's well known song "Umshini Wami" is a key representation of this new rearticulation of ANC hegemony under the Zuma bloc. As Gunner (2009:5) argues, "the song resonate deeply with memories, meanings, experiences and practices in the multiple arenas of everyday life, meshing together to solidify a common sense understanding of Zuma as a powerful and compassionate leader." Through his construction of hegemony, Zuma enabled more citizens into the debate of what constituted belonging to and engaging in the new democracy. This was a far cry from the isolation seen under the often technocratic ruling bloc of Mbeki (Hart, 2013; Gunner, 2009). This point is also clearly where the notion of belonging once again intersects with ANC hegemony. As a new articulation of ANC hegemony was formed, it also constructed methods against which antagonism to this new project is neutralised and scapegoated by the ANC. Hart (2013:180) notes, "… the outbreak of xenophobic attacks in May 2008 was a hideous manifestation of how…the anger of the poor can go in many directions."

4.3.2: Electoral Trajectories: Belonging and/in the Maintenance of hegemony

As mentioned before, the nature of 'belonging' in South Africa under the ruling bloc of Mbeki was closely tied to upward mobility and economic entitlements. As Zuma reformed and rearticulated the ANC's hegemony under his terms, neutralising antagonism to this new project was closely linked with belonging and nationalism once more. Crucially, centring certain groups of individuals as 'scapegoats' for a lack of structural progress as part of those who were seen to be hindering this new project of the ANC. As is pointed out in Gunner (2009) much of the widespread

xenophobic attacks seen in 2008 can be viewed by the militaristic nationalism that was encouraged and perpetuated under Zuma.

This centring of immigration as a scapegoat can be viewed therefore as a method of neutralising antagonism to the ruling bloc under Zuma's hegemonic project (Hart, 2013; Gunner, 2009; Reddy, 2012).. This centring was closely informed and influenced by South African immigration legislation that had been introduced since the end of apartheid (Hart, 2013). Namely, the legislation which governs immigration into South Africa is a mix of apartheid era laws combined with new ones introduced by the ANC government. As Klots, (2012:190) states, "such studies do not offer an analytical framework that captures the cross-racial and cross-class nature of xenophobia as a political phenomenon or the complexities of migration as a multi-dimensional policy issue."

Since 1994, structural xenophobia is commonplace in much of South Africa's laws around immigration (Klotz, 2012). For example, in 1995, amendments were introduced to the existing immigration act. This was done by the ANC government in order to bring this apartheid-era legislation in line with the recently introduced constitution in the country (Crush, 2014). During this time when a 'government of national unity' governed the country, many prominent ministers and members of parliament from across party lines asserted that these amendments did not go far enough to address immigration problem into the country and rather, a complete overhaul of existing legislation was needed (Crush, 2014). Also, at the time and immediately following 1994, one of the main aims of the government of national unity was to "to dampen internal ethnic strife in South Africa and reinforce the legitimacy of the new democracy (Klots, 2012:192)." Within this context, the burgeoning issue around immigration became a convenient guise to give legitimacy to the new South Africa with many MPs describing immigrants putting pressure on the social services at the expense of our citizens (Klots, 2012:192)."

As a result of this consistent assertion that immigration laws needed an overhaul, in 2002, the 'Immigration Act 13 of 2002' was passed. This act emphasized "deterring, detecting, detaining and deporting" unwanted immigrants into the country, and as a

consequence, a clear line was drawn between those who legitimately belong - South African nationals - and those who don't, namely immigrants to the country (Ngozi, 2017). With this act, the police were also given increased powers, further stretching the power of the state into the policing of immigration. Law enforcement were given the power to search any individual they suspected of being an unwanted immigrant into the country (Ngozi, 2017). This would often result in detainment and prosecution for this individual (Ngozi, 2017). During this same period, prominent ANC politicians in communities across Johannesburg sewed suspicion around the status of all immigrants in the country – both legal or not – stating that the majority of those that had documentation had fraudulent documentation. This doubt around the legality of all immigrants status' in the country has been consistently been utilised a method of sewing doubt around quote unquote 'rightful belonging' in the minds of South Africans (Ngozi, 2017). One of the main results of this was that the top-down constructions, informed partly through immigrations laws became merged with existing construction of immigrants as grassroots level. This influence which the government now directly had over construction of immigration was utilised by the ruling bloc of the ANC in order to neutralise any challenge to the ANC hegemony at the time and to ensure that the hegemony was continued.

4.3.3: Electoral Trajectories: Unravelling Hegemony

The 2009 election was a major milestone in South Africa's electoral history. For the first time, ANC electoral support dropped from the previous election with the party getting 65.9% of the vote (Independent Electoral Commission, 2023b). Part of this drop has been ascribed to the breakdown of the ANC's own internal hegemony (Booysen, 2011). Specifically, in 2008, after the recall of Thabo Mbeki and the rise of Jacob Zuma, a group of ANC members split from the party and formed the Congress of the People (COPE). This group cited the presidency of Zuma to the ANC and a feeling of concern on the direction that he would take the ANC and the country as well as disagreements around the methods on which his appeal was built (Ferreira, 2008). This represented the first moment in which there was a clear break from the ANC and the direction it was heading in (Ferrerira, 2008).

The opposition continued its upward trajectory with the DA, now under the leadership of Helen Zille, obtaining 16.66% of the vote and the newly formed COPE obtaining 7.42% of the vote (Independent Electoral Commission, 2023). The performance of COPE signalled that there were many black South African voters that were yearning for a party to represent them that was not the ANC (Sarakinsky, 2015). At this point, the DA was still seen to be a party for primarily white and coloured voters. This perception and a slow unravelling a public goodwill in the ANC created a vacuum for many black South Africans and, in particular, the youth of the country who were still disproportionately affected by high unemployment and a lack of structural change (Sarakinsky, 2015).

However, both 2012 and 2013 represent the moment in which the ANC's hegemony began to irreversibly unravel. Resistance and protest against the ANC in the Zuma years were exemplified by the Marikana protests of 2012. During these protests which took place across mining villages and mines in the North West province, thirty-four striking miners were killed by police after days of protest in what would go on to be a major breaking point in opposition to the ANC and the perception of the ANC in government (Von Holdt & Naidoo, 2021). This series of protests was one of the largest and more sustained protest movements against the state since the end of apartheid. What is of particular importance here is that during these protests, the mineworkers chose to break away from COSATU and other trade unions and thus, by extension the Tripartite alliance which included the ANC. It therefore also represents a moment in which workers no longer saw themselves being represented by the former liberation. Rather, the ANC was viewed as one of the obstacles and in partnership with business and the very mines the workers were striking against (Von Holdt & Naidoo, 2021). It also represents the moment in which the state was seen to be openly antagonistic and brutally violent against those striking workers who they claimed to represent. Further to this, as pointed out by (Von Holdt & Naidoo, 2021), these sustained protests and the fallout from the violence which characterised them signalled the first definitive outward weakening of the ANC's hegemony in post-apartheid South Africa.

The emergence of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), a left-wing populist party that saw itself as the radical alternative to the ANC, was a key sign of this (Mbete, 2015). The EFF represented the second major party to be formed from breaks within the ANC (Mbete, 2015). As Hart (2013:180) points out, "the rise of Julius Malema and his challenge to Zuma can be seen as another manifestation of the dangers that accompany strategies to develop but contain popular antagonisms." The EFF appealed specifically to the youth of the country and spoke to issues around land expropriation, nationalisation of mines and banks, and radical economic transformation (Mbete, 2015). Further to this, Malema's challenge represented a re-articulation of the nationalism of the ANC, away from the concept of the 'rainbow nation' toward a nationalism that was constructed across racial lines and specifically, white control over the economy (Mbete, 2015; Hart, 2013). This re-articulation is key in the message of the EFF's and Malema's message that only through directly addressing white minority control of the economy could structural change be obtained for black South Africans. The aftermath of the Marikana massacre presented Malema with the perfect opportunity to link his re-articulation of nationalism to the suffering and exploitation of black workers under the white minority (Hart, 2016).

The challenge of Malema to ANC hegemony as well as a strengthening opposition party and DA combined the rise of populist parties represented the inherent contradictions on which the ANC built its hegemony starting to unravel that very hegemony. The past five years in particular have represented an acceleration of this unravelling with the ANC declining to 57% in the 2019 national election and subsequently to 40% in the recent 2024 election. Secondly, the ANC's internal hegemony has rapidly declined with competing ruling blocs fighting for control over the party, leading to disunity and a fractured party. Further, the very notions of nationalism that the ANC has built much of its hegemony on has left it vulnerable to claims of betrayal of this very nationalism. The ANC therefore no longer has control of the construction of its own hegemony with populist parties such as the Patriotic Alliance, ActionSA, and the EFF directly using this the ANC's articulation of the 'nation' against them and gaining prominence in the country through the claims that

were built into ANC hegemony. It is in this context which we have seen the rise of a political ecosystem of authoritarian populism with the concept of nationality at the centre.

4.4 Unravelled Hegemony: The Emergence of a political ecosystem

The emergence of authoritarian populism and an ideological language of authoritarian populism is not limited to one party or organization. Rather, it can be viewed as part of an interconnected political ecosystem which has its emergence and rise to prominence centered in an ANC with unravelling hegemony. Viewing it through this lens has a distinct advantage. Namely, it does not limit analysis to political parties, social movements, churches or the like. Rather, it views each of these players as an interwoven political system which is contributing to the emergence of this unique type of right-wing politics. For the purposes of this project, these various players all contribute to a growing crystallization of a language of authoritarian populism, one that centers and advances pejorative conceptualizations of an Other and what needs to be done in order to address this Other. Each player within this political ecosystem seeks to guide the crisis toward their own hegemony, competing with one another, yet emboldening and furthering each other's interest. And this is a key point. It is not simply just that parts of this ecosystem have managed to scale up to the national level and gain prominence, but that in doing so, the construction of the Other, manifesting in xenophobia has been woven into the deep structure of a post-ANC politics in SA. This point is also a second key advantage authoritarian populism as a political ecosystem. Namely, the notion that extreme parties in this ecosystem act to move the discourse around certain ideas to the right. Due to the symbiotic nature of this ecosystem, this acts to move other organizations and parties to the right in order to both gain legitimacy with the electorate as well as to ensure the continuation of their hegemonic project. I will now provide a brief overview of parts of this ecosystem. A full exploration of how they have operated will take place in chapters 5 and 6 of this project.

4.4.1 Reactionary Community Organizations: Operation Dudula was formed in 2021 in Alexandra, Gauteng (Tarisayi, 2024). The group is a direct split off of another community organisation, #PutSouthAfricansFirst. Critically, Nhemachena, Mawere & Mtapuri, (2022:162) outline "Operation Dudula is a branch cell of the Put South Africans First protest gang, an organisation which popularise and re-popularised pro-government movements on Facebook and Twitter before manifesting on the streets." Critically, both of these organisations have their formation and ideals rooted in xenophobia and xenophobic discourse (Tarisayi, 2024). Operation Dudula's self-stated goal was framed as ensuring that economic and business opportunities go only to South Africans and not undocumented immigrants as well as ensuring that they removed drugs in the communities in which they operated (Tarisayi, 2024). In a context in which political players in both the political establishment and emergent parties have constructed a narrative around the Other and linked this construction to immigrants, Operation Dudula has acted to capitalise on this weaving of xenophobia into post-ANC politics. The informal sites in which organisation such as Operation Dudula and #PutSouthAfricansFirst are sites of persistent and entrenched poverty and are sites in which violence and crime often thrives. Both these organisations have spread from these informal sites and has mobilised individuals across Gauteng in particular under the banner or 'taking a stand against illegal immigrants.'

The emergence of groups such as #PutSouthAfricansFirst and Operation Dudula are part of a worrying trend of organised mob justice that embraces xenophobia and violence. As Nhemachena, Mawere & Mtapuri, (2022:164) build on this by stating that "several academics have noted the increasing proportions of mob justice in South Africa with African people encountering antagonism and brutality daily." More than this, the emergence of these groups to the national stage "are typical of a pattern of increasing right-wing vigilante violence that is gaining favour at a time of economic recession (Nhemachena, Mawere & Mtapuri, 2022:162).

4.4.2 White Minority Groups: A further integral part of this political ecosystem is the increasing prominence of groups such as AfriForum, an Afrikaans 'civil rights

organisation.' The organisation has seen a substantial growth in the past decade. From approximately 3000 members in 2014, it has grown to over 300 000 paying members in 2024 (Afriforum, 2024a). It saw this immense growth through mainly two mechanisms, firstly, rather than limiting itself through the representation of the 'the people' as a homogenous group of supporters (i.e. just white South Africans), the organisation has emphasised how its members and supporters are a diverse range of minorities who have been failed by the ANC government (Van Zyl-Hermann, 2018). Secondly, whereas Solidarity (as outlined in chapter 1) was successful in reshaping Afrikaans history and creating a universality around a shared experience and shared People, Afriforum has been successful at harnessing this growth and unity for an immense influence over parliamentary politics, attracting larger groups of white South Africans, both Afrikaans and English speaking who would not usually join such a group (Modiri, 2019).

As stated by Love (2022), "originally seen as a fringe movement concerned mainly with the rights of an Afrikaaner minority, the perception has now shifted." In the past five years, AfriForum has wielded immense political influence over formal parliamentary politics in the country (Modiri, 2019). The prominence of Afriforum is an important example of the functioning of this political ecosystem in South Africa. Afriforum does not centre immigration or undocumented immigrants as one of its primary concerns. Rather, it centres issues which are important to minorities in the countries such as bringing awareness to the perceived threat of farm murders, fighting against land redistribution without compensation and providing security services and the like (Love, 2022). However, and importantly, it still fits into a broader narrative which is "key in perpetuating increasingly mainstream, right-wing populism." (Love, 2022) It remains, at its core, a conservative Afrikaans organisation which, with its growing prominence, is able to direct influence over the electorate. And so, even though the organisation does not centre immigration as one its founding concerns, Afriforum has not been absent in debates over immigration and has perpetuated much of the same rhetoric which has come to define xenophobia in South Africa. This point will be further expanded on in chapters 5 and 6. And so, as stated by Love (2022), "the rise of Afriforum and its brand of right-wing populism cannot be viewed in a vacuum. It is symptomatic of the rise of reactionary politics in

general" which fits into the political ecosystem of authoritarian populism in the country.

4.4.3 Religious Organisations: As Fogel (2019) outlines, "the key mobilising force behind the victories of both Trump and Bolsonaro were the vast, rich and organised evangelical blocs. Evangelicals constitute a political bloc and a social movement that can mobilise millions of believers in support of political causes, control a voting bloc in legislatures and have money to burn." South Africa does not have a singular Christian voting bloc – per se. It is largely fractured with many white and coloured Christian voters voting for either the DA or the VF+. In contrast to this, many black Christian voters have historically voted for the ANC (Kuperus, 2011). Historically, the ANC used religion in ambiguous yet effective ways. The party often invokes Christianity and religion in speeches and rhetoric but ensures that it maintains a secular manner of internal party governance and country governance. In many coloured and African households, the church hold immense importance and therefore influence over its members (Kuperus, 2011). Emergent political parties such as the PA, ACDP and African Transformation Movement (ATM) have successfully drawn on and utilised churches to grow their support through invoking outward support and identification with Christian ideals such as the PA stating that they "will put God back into schools (Patriotic Alliance, 2024a)". Through partnerships with emergent political parties, the site of the church itself has become a strong potential mobilisation tool in the fortunes of political parties (Kuperus, 2011).

4.4.4 Emergent Political Parties: Emergent political parties are a key part of this political ecosystem, especially in the form of formal parliamentary politics. Chief amongst these are the Patriotic Alliance and ActionSA. The Patriotic Alliance is far right party which has its roots in coloured nationalism. In the 2014 national election, the party only garnered 0.07% of the vote, not allowing it enough votes for a seat in either the National Assembly or National Council of Provinces (Independent Electoral Commission, 2024b). However, as xenophobic discourse has become common place in the ANC's hegemonic decline, the PA found increased its constituency and therefore no longer simply limiting itself to a self-proclaimed

coloured nationalism (Ndlovu, 2024). The PA, and its leader, Gayton McKenzie have consistently centred undocumented immigrants to the country as the single greatest concern for South Africans. The PA has arguably captured this post-ANC discourse around immigration in the most salient manner and has been able to attract a diverse range of voters due to this (Ndlovu, 2024). Although the PA only garnered 2.06% in the 2024 election thus gaining nine Members of Parliament (MPs), they have formed a crucial part of the newly formed, 'Government of National Unity' with McKenzie being appointed the National Minister of Sports, Arts & Culture. ActionSA is a further political party which has crystallised much of its rhetoric around immigration. Leader of ActionSA and former Mayor of the City of Johannesburg, Herman Mashaba has had a long history of xenophobic remarks and actions (see Bornman, 2019; Chaskalson, 2017). ActionSA has been a prominent political players in the Gauteng province in particular, becoming the third largest political party in the City of Johannesburg in the 2021 local government election. In the 2024 national election, ActionSA garnered 1.2% of the vote, gaining six MPs in the National Assembly (Independent Electoral Commission, 2024b). More details around the roles of each of these in perpetuating a language of authoritarian populism will be outlined in chapters six and seven.

Although both Mashaba and McKenzie have been the most salient and have garnered the most media attention for their extreme discourse, each of these groups outlined have been key in the construction and crystallisation of a language of authoritarian populism. It is through this language which they have come to construct a crisis and methods of addressing that crisis in post-ANC dominant politics. The common thread throughout the mapping of this conjuncture of economic crisis and declining ANC hegemony has been the way in which nationality and by extension, immigration has been the issue on which much of this emergence of authoritarian populism rests. Subsequent chapters will explore how a language constructing this crisis has emerged with the Other at the centre and how, through addressing this crisis, this political ecosystem and the individual players within it attempt to gain legitimacy and consent for their new hegemony.

Conclusion Through this section, I have showed the thread which, in the conjuncture of a socio-economic crisis as well unravelling ANC hegemony, concerns over nationality and immigration have become an entrenched feature of post-ANC politics. ANC hegemony has persisted for three decades because - in part – it has been able to reassert and rearticulate its hegemonic control in order to neutralise popular antagonism against it. However, each rearticulation of the NDR and reassertion of varying versions of ANC hegemony have further entrenched the seeds for authoritarian populism to emerge with nationality and belonging and centre of this emergence. This inability for the ANC to maintain consent over its hegemonic project, combined with the socio-economic crisis is the crux in which fights to guide South Africa to a new hegemony take place. It is the site which informs constructions of the Other, constructions of how to discipline the Other and constructions of a future without the ANC. This chapter has also shown the emergence of a political ecosystem, feeing into the broader emergence of authoritarian populism in South Africa. Subsequent chapters will detail how a language of authoritarian populism has emerged with a construction of the Other at the centre of this new hegemonic project.

Chapter 5:
Constructing a Rhetorical Crisis

This section will both outline the results and offer discussion around the analysis of ideological language using NLP. As stated in the methodology section, both the systematic review and the analysis of language are viewed together as one complete form of analysis. Therefore, sections of the systematic review will be presented and outlined to bolster and expand on results from the analysis of ideological language. Secondly, this section directly presents the results and discussion in the exact skeleton framework as outlined in previous chapters, namely the framework of authoritarian populism. Practically, the presentation of the results and discussion through this method directly follows the methodology outlined in the analysis of language through NLP and the way in which various corpora of texts were broken up for analysis. Finally, the structure of this analysis takes the form of two separate chapters, the chapter part being 'Constructing the Crisis' and the second chapter being 'Addressing the Crisis.' Critically, this chapter centres the context and contextualisation chapter outlined above. Essentially, both parts and the ideological language and discussion which informs them takes place within the context as outlined.

5.1 Introduction: Constructing the Crisis

In a recent essay, Nilsen (2024) argues that authoritarian populism shares certain "political vocabularies" across regional and national context: "The coercive power of the state, these vocabularies assert, must be deployed to defend the people against their nemeses, while strongman leaders guide the nation to its prosperity." In Chapter 5, I outline how these "vocabularies" inform the construction of a crisis. The subsequent Chapter 6 will be centred on the way in which language has been constructed to address this crisis. As Nilsen (2024) states, "across democracies in the global South, authoritarian populism has managed to harness complex structures of feeling that permeate precarious subaltern lifeworlds." The emergence of this distinctive political style in the South African context is no different. Both political actors and other parts of this ecosystem have tapped into the acute precarious context in which many subaltern groups live in contemporary South Africa, and have

constructed a rhetorical crisis around this, and in this rhetorical crisis, a distinctive conception of the Other figures centrally as a purported cause of this crisis.

As Nilsen argues, the Other that the political vocabularies of authoritarian populism pivot on, is constituted in different ways and from different markers of otherness in different contexts. In South Africa, it is above all nationality that defines the Other of an emergent authoritarian populist vocabulary. This is manifest in a deep Afrophobia, which constitutes undocumented migrants from other African countries as the main Other and enemy of the South African people. Underscoring all of the analysis below is the notion of 'invaders.' Throughout each of the sub-narratives in which ideological language is used to construct various conceptualisations, the notion of the Other being an invader into South Africa runs parallel to each of them. Each sub-narrative builds on this concept of invasion. A simplified version of the way this is associated is found here.

Word Association Graph 1: Links to the phrase 'Coming here.'



As stated, this phrase of 'coming here' underpins each construction and was found to be in many of the speeches in particular analysed. An example of this could be "coming here and taking jobs, coming here and selling drugs." As stated, this implies a sense of invasion and being taken over by the Other, and of the Other taking something that rightfully belongs to South African citizens (jobs) and/or inserting something harmful (drugs) into South African society. The following sub-narratives outline each of these sub-narratives while attempting to provide some theoretical underpinnings for each of them, as well as offering contextual examples of how these constructions have manifested in the past five years in particular. Each of these sub-narratives and the ideological language that accompanies them contributes to the notion of a 'crisis' context with the Other at the centre. As stated, numerous times, this construction is critical when attempting to gain consent for a new political hegemony and to de-legitimise the existing one.

5.1 The Other as Responsible for Precarity

I now turn to a broader ideological language around the narrative of "illegals are stealing jobs meant for us" which has been consistently drawn on and weaponised by prominent political players and community organisations alike. When examining the transcript of speeches by leaders and members of ActionSA, the Patriotic Alliance, ACDP, Operation Dudula, #PutSouthAfricansFirst and others, as well as media releases and manifesto documents from these parties and groups, a pattern of common phrases and a common language begins to emerge. These are found in the graph below and it is worth examining the most prominent of these in detail in order to see how a language around this prevailing narrative emerges and is sustained.

Word Frequency Graph 1: Common Phrases Related to the Economic Impact of Immigration



Secondly, the word cloud below shows the most common words used within this text



5.2.1 "Stealing/taking jobs" These two phrases have been used consistently in speeches and media releases and are the most prominent phrases related to this narrative across the collected text. This is shown in the following extracts:

*It should be noted that all extracts quoted are only a small portion of the total text collected for this project and are meant to act as salient examples to illustrate the point being made

- "The 2024 election is about wanting illegal foreigners to go or to stay. Vote for parties that wants to mass-deport them and not those encouraging these terrorist, drug dealers, job takers and killers of South Africans to remain here (McKenzie, 2024b)."

And again

- "South Africa can no longer be a job market or crime haven for job stealers. Mass deportation must happen (McKenzie, 2024c)."

And once more

- "What is concerning is the growing anger directed at foreign nationals – many of whom are undocumented – that are seen as competition for a limited number of jobs. The feeling of resentment is particularly prevalent in sectors that provide unskilled or semi-skilled employment opportunities, as there is no justifiable reason why these positions could not be filled by South Africans (ActionSA, 2021a)."

As pointed out by Reddy (2012:7), a critical feature of the xenophobia that has characterised much of post-apartheid South Africa is "the central accusation by South Africans that 'foreigners' were monopolising trade and getting better jobs, indicating competition over scarce resources." This point is bolstered by the sites of contestation in which violence often erupts. According to statistics sourced from Xenowatch, the majority of xenophobic attacks which have characterised much of post-apartheid South Africa has their genesis in areas of extreme precarity (Xenowatch, 2024). This is reinforced by Reddy (2012) who states that much of the violence which characterised the 2008 and 2015 widespread xenophobic attacks was at its worst in areas such as Soweto and Alexandra in Gauteng and Du Noon and informal settlements throughout the Western Cape. As Reddy (2012:8) states, "Du Noon, a relatively new settlement, where housing and jobs are desperately desired,

illustrates the point about scarce resources. As is the case in the older sprawling townships of Gugulethu and Langa, and the semi-formal housing of Khayelitsha." These are often sites of extreme poverty, a lack of employment, with crime rates being high. Just after the 2008 xenophobic riots, a study conducted in several of the sites in which this violence erupted found that up to 73% of those sampled believed that jobs were going to 'illegals' that were meant for South Africans (Everatt, 2011:5). This perceived competition between immigrants and South Africans goes directly against the sense of belonging and citizenship to South Africa, which was constructed, in short, as the ability for success and upward mobility for black South Africans (Mosselson, 2010).

These narratives are sustained and built on by political actors, both at grassroots levels and national/provincial levels, as well as through community organisations. A clear example of this is once again can be seen in the 2008 xenophobic attacks in Alexandra which were initiated by local political leaders such as members of the IFP as well as community policing forums (CPF) (Everatt, 2011). In this microcosm, these structures drew on and perpetuated dominant narratives around immigrants which were found at the grassroots level. This was done, in part, as Misago &Landau (2009:1622) outline, "to earn a community's trust and establish themselves and their organisations as prominent political players." In an effort to draw on this growing discontent, the ANC itself has consistently added fuel to this fire in an effort to protect their own legitimacy and grasp over this issue. In short, the ANC government also perpetuated the narrative of "for every job a migrant has, a South African loses (Reddy, 2012)." The state constructed their role as ensuring that these migrants would not take the place of South Africans and that safeguards needed to be put in place to ensure this. They constructed their role as ensuring that only the ruling government would be able to do this and therefore protect South Africans. (Milton, Wasserman & Garman, 2013).

More recently, both Gayton McKenzie, Herman Mashaba, and Operation Dudula in particular have weaponised this narrative as a way of both centring undocumented immigrants as responsible for taking the scarce resources as well as attacking the ANC for their failure to curb the influx of undocumented migrants to South Africa.

Analysis of the common associations found in both McKenzie's and Mashaba rhetoric around this point show how they link this crisis to failures of the ANC. The function of this phrasing of 'job stealers/takers' is therefore a dual purpose. It acts to both centre the creation of the Other as the crux of this crisis which is pervasive in South Africa. The words 'stealers/takers' are more intentional and subtle than initial analysis would point to as pointed out by a further analysis of associations to this phrase. It directly feeds into the construction of belonging as outlined in previous chapters and the widespread belief that a post-apartheid South Africa would mean success for black South Africans. However, this success is being stolen from them by "illegals" (Mckenzie, 2024a) into the country. Secondly, failures of the existing hegemon, namely the ANC government, have directly led to immigrants being able to "steal" jobs. This can be observed in the word association below:

Word Association Graph 2: ANC Failure



And is also borne out in the following speech extracts.

- "While I fully appreciate the anger felt by communities over the lack of jobs, this anger must be directed towards the correct target, and in the right way. The problem is *not* the foreign nationals, but the ANC government and its

failure to secure our borders and create a prosperous economy (ActionSA, 2021a)."

- "The chronic mismanagement of our border security over the past two decades has left us with a immigration crisis. The old adage says that prevention is better than cure; the ANC has failed spectacularly to prevent this crisis. It is understandable, but not acceptable, that South Africans now want to resort to vigilantism (Democratic Alliance, 2018a)."

- "What the MEC failed to be quite as honest about, however, is the share of the blame the ANC must carry for the state of our country and borders today (ActionSA, 2022b)."

Through this language, the ANC is being constructed as being both a failure and corrupt for the "porous" borders which have come to define this crisis. Cleverly, the ANC and its decisions are not being directly labelled as responsible for the jobs crisis but rather the broader problem of the porous borders which has led to the 'job takers' being allowed into South Africa. This formulation keeps the constructed Other as the immigrants into the country whilst ensuring that the ANC is seen as responsible for this failure. In short, undocumented immigrants are responsible for taking the jobs meant for South Africans but the current hegemon, the ANC government, is enabling them. This construction is part of the overall narrative surrounding the notion that this is a crisis which the current government is not able to effectively manage. This point can be clearly observed in the word cloud in which 'crisis' (see word cloud 1) is one of the most common words which is harnessed and applied across the matters which are being spoken about. The frequent use of the term crisis allows both political and non-political actors to create a rhetorical situation and context to which multiple situations can be ascribed to further define said crisis (for example, a crisis of law and order, a crisis of foreign owned shops, a crisis at the border etc).

5.2.2 "Undercutting, Harmful Trade, Selling Cheap Goods" Closely linked with the narratives that immigrants into the country are stealing jobs is the notion that

South Africans are being undercut by immigrants selling often defective goods within 'spaza' shops in mostly informal areas. As Piper & Charman (2016:333) outline, "in the last ten years, the spaza sector has witnessed the rise of foreign ownership, principally by migrants from the rest of Africa, but also by Bangladeshi and other South Asian migrants." This increase in the number of foreign owned shops, often in areas of precarity, have led to the narrative that these shop owners are undercutting South Africans by having deliberately lower prices and therefore undercutting South Africans and taking away their business opportunities in areas where there is a large amount of competition. Language around this particular sub-narrative has emerged as both political actors and non-political actors assert that they will ensure that immigrants in these areas will no longer have access to these markets and they will ensure they are reserved only for South Africans. This is once again borne out through both media releases and speeches as shown in the following extracts:

- "We promised our voters that we will deal with illegal immigration and illegal shops, our voters believed us and they voted us into power-sharing positions in different municipalities. We will never betray our voters, you can call us xenophobic, we simply don't care (McKenzie 2022)."

- "There will be no more new spazas in Soweto by foreign nationals, what's left of the spaza economy belongs to South Africans (Soweto Parliament 2021)."

- "... The message is simple, the message is loud and clear. Whoever doesn't respect South African laws, will not exist in Soweto (Soweto Parliament 2021)."

Interestingly, a further sub-narrative is often linked to this which states that one of the principles reasons why immigrants are able to undercut South Africans and take business away from them is because they are selling defective and often harmful goods. Therefore, according to this narrative, not only is the existence of these

'foreign-owned' spaza shops taking business away from South Africans but they are also harming the people and often, South African children who buy from them.

Word Association Graph 3: Illegal Stores selling harmful goods



An example to illustrate how these association are observed can be seen in this media release by ActionSA.

- "Furthermore, ActionSA urges the Minister of Home Affairs, Dr. Leon Schreiber, to conduct a comprehensive audit of citizenship in South Africa and to standardize immigration enforcement raids across the country. These measures are essential to protect our communities from the devastating impact of illegal immigration, which has led to the proliferation of unregistered and illegal businesses, posing a significant threat to the health, safety, and livelihoods of South Africans. We believe that the township economy should be owned and driven by local residents, and we therefore call for a total reform of spaza shop ownership. Empowering local

> entrepreneurs is essential for the sustainable development and economic prosperity of our communities, which is the core message of our *#Spaza4Locals* campaign, led by ActionSA (ActionSA 2024a)."

These shops often become a prime target for vigilantes in South African townships. Once again, the most striking example of this was in the 2008 and 2012 xenophobic violence in which up to 40 foreign traders were killed in the several sites in the Western Cape with hundreds of shops subsequently burned down (Reddy, 2012). More recently, members of both the community organisation, Operation Dudula as well as the Patriotic Alliance led a campaign in Soweto to raid and shut down 'foreign owned shops.' This campaign is part of a consistent effort by Operation Dudula in particular to ensure that the spaza shop industry is only reserved for South Africans. These campaigns are often joined by a large contingents of members of the community who see this campaign as essential for reclaiming their success (Reddy, 2012; Hickel, 2014).

Of course, Hickel (2014) provides an expansive analysis on this sense of community vigilantism which is fed into and exacerbated by community organisation an political actors through language. Through his research on an informal site in Cato Manor, Durban, he found that members of community viewed immigrants as "anti-social agents that disable productive and reproductive processes (Hickel, 2014:108). A lack of employment, living in poverty or the lack of success of a shop is viewed – in these communities – as a 'misfortune.' Further to this, this misfortune is viewed as being orchestrated by "specific human agents" (Hickel, 2014:109). As foreign owned shops are often viewed as being better performing economically than South African ones, the owners of these shops are viewed as exhibiting "morally questionable economic behaviour." In addition, these owners are viewed as not exhibiting any behaviours of social production such as "life-cycle rituals such as nubility rites, marriages, and funerals, which build kinship" (Hickel, 2014:109). In short, this directly plays into the notion that these 'foreign owners' are the "specific human agents" (the economically immoral) which are responsible for the misfortune that many South Africans in these areas are experiencing.

Mobilised through these ideas and the top-down language which feeds into them, the community and the political actors come into direct social conflict with these shop owners. The aforementioned violent attacks which characterise campaigns against foreign shop owners are often fed into and motivated by a discourse which "blames a group for an individuals alleged crimes and are seen as the collective (Piper & Charman, 2016:334)." As pointed out by Piper & Charman, (2016:346), there no clear evidence exists which shows that foreign shops outperform South African shops. Nevertheless, a clear language has been constructed around the opposite. A language which assigns the role of the "economically immoral" to immigrants who are selling harmful goods and accumulating wealth at the expense of South Africans. This characterisation is increasingly prevalent in media statements released by major parties such as the ANC and ActionSA who are drawing on the type of language used by Operation Dudula and the PA before.

5.3 The Other as responsible for the breakdown of law and order

South Africa consistently ranks amongst the countries with the highest murder and violent crime rates. These statistics are, of course, skewed spatially. The areas with the highest rates of crime are located in informal settlements and poorer areas. This is naturally not a new point to make. None the less, it remains important for how these areas directly relate to the rhetorical crisis created around this point versus how other areas relate to this point. As Malatji & Rakubu (2023:330) point out, "black African migrants and refugees, common stereotypes include allegations that African migrants import diseases and crime." This narrative is one of the most effectively and consistently utilised and built on across the political landscape in South Africa. This is represented in the following analysis.

Word Association Graph 4: The link between Immigrants and Crime



Word Frequency Graph 1: Frequency of words describing Immigrants as criminals



Critically, this is also shown in the following manifesto, speech and media release extracts.

- "The impact of porous borders and an ineffective, mostly corrupt Department of Home Affairs (DHA) has created a situation where we are completely unaware of the number of people who come in and out of the country. That has profound consequences on the efforts against cross-border crime such as human and drug trafficking (Democratic Alliance, 2018b)."

- "The high crime rate in South Africa can directly be attributed to illegal foreigners, some of them are on a crime spree here, drugs, fraud, kidnappings, cable theft, terrorism etc, jail is full of illegal foreigners, this is a fact. I wonder about the many that don't get caught (Mckenzie, 2024d)."

- "South Africa can no longer be a job market or crime haven for job takers. Mass deportation must happen (McKenzie, 2024e)."

- "This is unacceptable, immoral and illegal. The blame squarely on the Department of Home Affairs under the ANC administration. They have

> allowed our country to be a playground for international crime syndicates (Mashaba, 2024a)."

The use of this language and associations aligns the notion that the crime which is being experienced in these areas is as a result of the border crisis that is being constructed. The examples quoted above are directed primarily at black individuals living in informal areas where high crime is experienced the most. They tap directly into fears or drug use, murder, and falling victim to an Other which is running rampant. Immigrants are characterised as being responsible for crime syndicates which prey on community members, flooding communities with drugs, and not being held accountable at all by the ruling government before this. This is corroborated by Malatji & Rakubu (2023: 332), who outline that community members will often feel as if they are helpless in these situations and the government does not have ability to deal with the rampant crime in these communities.

This rhetoric also draws on children as being particularly vulnerable to this breakdown of law and order. This is shown through an example extract here. "It is an established fact that it is primarily illegal immigrants involved in profoundly damaging activities such as illegal mining, which is hollowing out our towns and cities from under our feet, and zama zamas are now as well armed as a private army, funded by our mineral wealth, which is meant to be owned by us as citizens and which should be funding our own sovereign wealth fund. Illegal migrants are stealing our children's future, literally (Kunene 2024a)." The invoking of children's future is one that is commonly used in this sub-narrative and the boarder construction of this crisis as a whole. A clear link is being made between the presence of immigrants and these immigrants stealing the future of black children in the country. Either the link is made between immigrants stealing jobs and economic opportunities as outlined earlier or that children are dying as a result of drugs and crime which immigrants are seen to be perpetuating in these communities. The narrative which therefore emerges here is 'illegal immigrants are not only stealing from you now but are also stealing the future from your children and the future from black South Africans.'

Hickel (2014) can once again be drawn on here to show how dominant conceptualisations at the grassroots level can be influenced by this language with the construction of crime at the centre of this crisis. As Hickel (2014) states, immigrants are often viewed as being involved in the drug trade and flooding these communities with drugs. Crucially, this belief ties in with the 'economically immoral' conceptualisation as outlined earlier. As Hickel, (2014:112) elaborates "they are regarded as shadowy masters of the black market, capable of marshalling arcane techniques to secure wealth from hidden sources." This belief is directly built on through phrases such as this speech extract by McKenzie (2023), "Kunene was Acting Mayor for two days, he took on the arrogance & criminality of illegal foreigners. He demolished places used for drugs selling by rich Nigerians, he caught cable thieves and raided their hideouts." Here, McKenzie is acting to create the image of an invader into South Africa who flouts laws and floods community streets with drugs and gets rich through this. This very specific phraseology – unintentionally or intentionally – once again plays into the very important idea that, through the perceived activity of hoarding wealth through immoral means, these immigrants not participating in the social reproduction practices that are present in many of these communities.

As both Hickel (2014) and Onah (2008) point out, these communities are not necessarily concerned with notions of purity of citizenship and ensuring that strict boundaries are adhered to. More so, they are concerned with the perceived chaos which is being placed on communities as social reproduction is halted for South Africans by those who, as conceptualised above, are seen to be economically immoral. As Onah (2008) points out, the flooding of communities with drugs which are seen to be harming children are also seen to be disrupting these social reproduction process for the future of communities and are therefore having a long-term effect. As Hickel (2014:121) states, "we might say the figure of the immigrant represents the ideal neoliberal subject: individualized, kinless, uprooted, cheap, flexible, enterprising, maximizing, and risk-taking. Residents of Cato Manor refuse to celebrate this kind of personhood, and cast it as cultureless, dangerous, unstable, and destructive; in sum, as bare life, devoid of the characteristics that make a person

fully human." The vocabularies which political actors wield to define the Other directly plays into this notion. The notion of crime and a breakdown of law and order is one part of how the construction as the "dangerous, unstable and destructive" fits into the broader narrative.

5.3.2 Appealing across race: It would be both an incomplete and naïve analysis to position this language and conceptualisation around law and order to only be effective in areas of extreme precarity. The ideological language used around this also plays into deeply held anxieties around crime held by white South Africans. As Kynoch (2013: 428) succinctly states, "While white nostalgia for the relative safety of the past is a consistent theme throughout much of the material under discussion, this should not blind us to the fact that there is an historical discourse that focuses explicitly on the threat of black criminality." Indeed, the very nature of the construction of apartheid was built on this sense of white fear for the encroaching danger of the black majority and the violence and breakdown of law and order that they perceived to be associated with this. The transition to democracy instilled, in many white South Africans, this fear on a permanent basis as an increase in violence is what "ideologues of apartheid had long warned would be one of the consequences of African rule (Shaw & Gastrow, 2001: 235). There is an important point in this which needs to be emphasized. A fear, not of only black South Africans, but Africans as a whole came to dominant the psyche of white, particularly Afrikaans, South Africans. Kynoch (2013:430) can once again be drawn on here to elaborate on this point. As she states, "nothing drives white fear more than the stories that circulate about the excessive violence associated with crime. It is not crime per se that so horrifies whites and feeds the trope of black savagery but the abuse and even torture often associated with black criminals." This fear is directly tapped into by language such as "the devil sent other devils here to this country to come and sell drugs to our children, to come and sell body parts of our people (McKenzie, 2024f)." The image of 'black savagery' in effectively harnessed through this speech extract to play directly into this anxiety held by white South Africans.

Further to this, the loss of dominance from apartheid to post-apartheid South Africa has also instilled a fear of helplessness in white South Africans which is easily capitalised on. In this transition, the white minority began to see themselves through the frame of victimhood. Through both policy (as outlined in previous chapters) and anxieties around law and order, a feeling emerged that their rights were being trampled and were in danger (Steyn, 2004). Of course, the perceived issue of farm murders is critical in exploring this notion. One of the most widespread anxieties held by the Afrikaans white population in particular is the threat of farm murders. This has bene buoyed by EFF leader Julius Malema singing the struggle song 'Dubul'ibhunu (Kill the Boer),' which Afrikaans South Africans believed to be a direct call for the murder of white farmers. This long held anxiety by white, Afrikaans South Africans has been effectively used in the construction of immigrants as the Other. Language such as, "farmers are being murdered by illegal foreigners, in this era of multiple farm murders which right thinking farmer still keeps a lot of undocumented foreigners on their premises. Some were ex-soldiers and wanted criminals and their mere presence in SA is a crime" and "I met local farmers and told them illegal foreigners are behind many farm murders and violence (McKenzie, 2022b)" directly appeal to these anxieties and ensure a broader appeal of this ideological language and the myths it is imbued with.

This notion is also fed into by organisations such as AfriForum (2022) who are perceived to be protecting white minority rights who have stated, "You really cannot understand how bad the situation is until you see it for yourself, and that's exactly what this film aims to do. With this film we take the viewer there with us to experience the chaos. Our border areas have turned into the Wild West, where it's every man for himself. Communities have no choice but to take responsibility for their own safety, given the absolute disinterest by government to successfully police these areas."
Statements such as these once again feed into the notion that there is a foreign invader that is partly responsible for the breakdown of law and order in the country thus appealing to an existing anxiety. It is also once again showing – just as I have

elaborated on above – that the ruling hegemony is not able to protect South Africans in any way.

5.4 The Other as responsible for stealing resources

The final narrative to which I would like to turn is the construction that immigrants are stealing resources that are meant for South Africans. This has mainly taken the form of new major sub-narratives. Firstly, that immigrants are an increasing burden on the health care system and are receiving preference at the expense of South Africans and secondly that children of immigrants are taking places in schools which South African children are being deprived of. Before outlining the methods that this has been constructed, it is first necessary to provide a brief overview of the health care system in the country.

South Africa's health care system is plagued by social disparities, a lack of nurses and doctors and constantly changing nature of disease. Crucially, the contrast between the public health care system and the private health care system is stark. Specifically, only around 30% of doctors in the country are found in the public sector, which serves over 40 million – mostly black – South Africans (see Mayosi & Benatar, 2014). Coupled with this, around 84% of South Africa's population is not insured leading the overwhelming majority needing to access the public health care system (Coovadia et al., 2009). This public hospital system is underfunded, often lacks consistent access to sanitation, vaccines, and proper equipment (Coovadia et al., 2009). Poor infrastructure within the public system often leads to clinics and hospitals not being able to offer services or being completely closed (Mayosi & Benatar, 2014). Much like the public health system, the public education system in South Africa compared to the private is vastly unequal. Investment by private corporations is once again concentrated in the private sector with public sector education often being characterised by corruption, failing infrastructure, a lack of trained teachers and few learning materials (McKeever, 2017). Many of the same educational inequalities that characterised apartheid era education still persist in many South African schools.

Analysis has showed that both health care and education are mentioned numerous times across speeches, media releases, social media statements and manifestos. This is represented by the graph below which shows the count of the times health care and education were mentioned in corpus 1, specifically in relation to immigration. As can be observed, the mentions of health care and education is relation to immigration have increased in recent years.

Graph 3: Count of the terms 'healthcare and education' in relation to immigration



**These values show the count in the collected text of the corpus and therefore would be significantly more if expanded across all speeches/ media releases.*

The full nature of the way in which this has been constructed through ideological language is shown in the following speech, media release and manifesto extracts.

- "As a first principle, the attractiveness of South Africa as a destination for illegal migration must be vastly diminished. Currently, illegal migrants are effectively rewarded for breaking the law since they are able to seek work

and other opportunities, including for education, healthcare and other social services, while they are here (Patriotic Alliance 2024)."

- "There are very few countries, if any, where a foreign national with no legal documentation can expect to receive the same level of healthcare treatment as a citizen of that country. It is a simple fact that illegal immigrants are placing all services of government under enormous strain (Mashaba 2022b)."
- "Nowhere on this earth is it allowed for undocumented illegal immigrants to have unfettered access to the services deemed for citizens such as we have in this country, and to do so without any repercussions as we have currently. Our health system is bursting at the seams with medical supply shortages a living reality for our communities everywhere (ActionSA 2022)."

- "When people in communities do not have the confidence in our immigration system to accept that foreign nationals who are here, are here legally, it creates mistrust which fosters violence. There is a real threat that people believe they are competing for basic services such as housing and healthcare (Democratic Alliance 2018a)."

The conceptualisation used here is very similar to that used in the section outlined on jobs and economic opportunities. Both health care and education are being characterised as being scarce resources which are once again being exploited by immigrants and their children. This is further compounded, as outlined in the introduction of this chapter, be the belief that immigrants are being further disease into the country. As Steenkamp, (2009:439) elaborates, "Foreigners in South Africa are typically accused of committing crimes; bringing disease (particularly HIV/Aids)." Therefore, not only are immigrants conceptualised as causing a decay of the public system with their presence but also that they are spreading disease in South African communities as well as seeking help in South Africa when they should do so in their own countries. This attitude was crystalised in a very public incident in

2022 in which then Limpopo MEC for health Dr Phophi Ramathuba accused a Zimbabwean patient of "killing my health care system" and that she should seek treatment in her own country and not South Africa. This exchange was capitalised on by ActionSA, the Patriotic Alliance, ACDP and Operation Dudula as a means of giving further legitimacy to their claims of the health care system taking strain because of immigration.

The beliefs perpetuated by Dr Ramathuba and is part of a broader and structural issue of medical xenophobia. According to Crush & Tawodzera (2023:665), "since the end of apartheid, migrants in South Africa have routinely been denied the health care to which they are entitled by the South African Constitution. Most South Africans—and most health workers —seem to feel that they should not be entitled to anything. Zimbabwean migrants continue to be denied treatment on the grounds that they are not South African or cannot show the 'correct' documentation (correctness being variously and inconsistently defined)."

Conclusion: This emphasise on a health care system that is breaking with 'immigrant' usage is once again part of the broader discussion on crafting a rhetorical crisis around each of these separate issues. Words such as "threat," "competing" and "strain" are applied across constructions this crisis in relation to economic opportunities, to law and order and to basic services. These words in particular are cutting across all the sections outlined above, simply tailored to each particular scenario.

Word Association 5: Overall Links



The construction of an overall crisis allows each player within this ecosystem to position themselves and themselves only as being able to address this crisis with the Other at the centre of this crisis. Equally important, each of these constructions directly draw on dominant conceptions which are found at grassroots level and directly influences and builds on these conceptions. Importantly, and as elaborated on, these constructions cut across race with parts of the political ecosystem directly appealing to issues seen to be historically associated with white South Africans. Crucially, both these issues and broader issues experienced by the black majority are constructed as part of this overall crisis perpetuated by the Other. This therefore lends a heterogenous support to addressing this crisis and by extension, addressing the Other.

Chapter 6:
Addressing a Constructed Crisis

"All illegal foreigners that are here illegally must be mass deported. Those that are here legally and have a job that requires a special skill, and they do not have a special skill, we will make sure that they lose their job (McKenzie, 2023)."

The above quote encapsulates the ways in which discipling the Other is conceptualised in relation to the construction of a rhetorical crisis as outlined in the previous chapter.

Bearing this in mind, I now turn to the second part of the quote by Nilsen (2024) who outlines how the state "must be deployed to defend the people against their nemeses, while strongman leaders guide the nation to its prosperity" (Nilsen, 2024). With the construction of the Other at the centre, the ideological language associated with authoritarian populism acts to clearly articulate how "strongman" leaders will defend the people. In this case, the true South Africans and those who belong in the country. Through this chapter, I outline the language which is used to define how the Other will be disciplined by the state and how these leaders have come to construct a version of the nation state without the Other. As is shown by the opening quote by Gayton McKenzie, throughout much of the language which has come to characterise the Other is an associate language of how to discipline the other. This method of 'addressing the crisis through the discipling of the other' is the method in which consent is gained from the electorate and how the new hegemonic project is given legitimacy in society.

6.1 Disciplining the Other Through Enforcement

It would be a mischaracterisation to state that all or most of the rhetoric around addressing the crisis brought on by the Other espouses violent methods of addressing the crisis. However, this is certainly a significant aspect, and I will discuss it subsequent sections. Part of what defines the ecosystem of authoritarian populism in South Africa as outlined in chapter 5 is the fact that it does not simply comprise of organisations and parties which are strictly on the right. Rather, it is how those more

extreme right-wing parties come to influence, embolden and guide other members of this ecosystem toward a more exclusionary rhetoric. As a clear example, the DA has not taken a violent and extreme position on addressing the Other. Rather, it has favoured measures which align more with its liberal leanings, such as introducing stricter border control and more strict legislation. These are seen as the more 'official' means addressing the crisis. Of course, this 'official' method of addressing the crisis is also influenced and used by the more extreme right in order to gain themselves legitimacy within the legislative field of this issue.

6.1.1 Securing borders: Before outlining how a language has evolved around securing borders, it is necessary to provide an overview of the ways in which borders are described and spoken about. Some of the most common words (mostly adjectives) associated with describing borders are represented below.

Word Association Plot 6: Common Associations with the word, 'border.'



Just as with constructions of the Other, the notion of a crisis which needs addressing is being invoked once more. This needs to be kept in mind when outlining the way in

which a language of securing borders has evolved and emerged. In short, it once again takes place in the backdrop of a crisis which urgently needs addressing and protecting. Through language such as "frankly, the government's unwillingness to secure our porous borders is allowing criminal elements to enter the country and act with impunity" (ActionSA, 2023), the image of this border being one of the last boundaries able to stop an invasion of criminality. It is a phrasing and ideology that draws on the historical underpinnings of what came to define borders in South Africa and how this emphasis on the border as a method of protection from an 'invader' is still invoked in contemporary South Africa. As Sichone (2020: 5-6) asserts, "in South Africa, both the new global apartheid and old colonial legacy combine to create a system which goes against the country's liberal constitution as well as the Rainbow Nation ideology that was created by the makers of the miraculous transition out of apartheid." Of course, the demarcation of these borders which have come to represent the separation of the continent are rooted in the colonial legacy of the country and this should be noted. As Sichone (2020: 6) elaborates, "colonial legacies still linger on in the institutionalised spatial, social and mental divides." Much of the current borders which have come to define contemporary South Africa are as a result of British colonisation in the region which sought to divide up Southern Africa into various separate countries and thus redefined 'boundaries of citizenship" (Klotz 2016:182). These boundaries which came to encompass the four previous colonial territories of the Cape, Natal, Transvaal, and Orange Free State and came to separate many communities and peoples are still present today. Through the boundaries imposed by colonial administrators and the distinct citizenship they imposed, these lines became "in-between spaces through which the meanings of cultural and political authority are negotiated" (Klotz, 2016:182).

We can link this 'meaning' of these borders to migration and the crossing of these borders. As Klotz (2016:160) elaborates, "responses to migration are intricately linked to the demarcation of borders and hence separate citizenships." This, in part, goes back to chapter 4 of this project and the notion of who belongs in post-apartheid South Africa. The idea of the Rainbow Nation and removing race as a central tenant of citizenship of post-apartheid South Africa saw the complex question of 'who are

the people?' emerge. This is a question which I have attempted to answer in chapter 4 through understandings of belonging, though this assertion of belonging and what defines the state cannot provide a full understanding of the importance which borders have played in the forming of the country. Klotz (2016:182) can be brought in here to articulate this. As she states, "While helpful for directing attention to democratisation, especially electoral competition, as a factor that can spur violence, these autochthony arguments miss a crucial component: the state's territorial jurisdiction, from which citizenship derives. Responses to migration are intricately linked to the demarcation of national boundaries through formal institutions, from constitutional law to everyday legal paperwork, not just the social imaginary." These borders provide the psychical assertion of citizenship needed to distinguish from the Other and from the People. Critically, Klotz (2016:182) states, "border control policies can be simultaneously ineffective at stopping people yet effective at bolstering the state's legitimacy." And so, an open or porous border acts to delegitimise the state. Those who claim to be able to protect and defend the border can act to claim this legitimacy. This is the line in which much of this claim for legitimacy in protecting the borders is fought and where an ideological language around this has crystallised.

Much of the rhetoric which is used around borders can therefore be viewed as an act of gaining and securing legitimacy in an effort to control a narrative around 'we can be trusted to look after the borders and therefore the country.' Through analysis, two main verbs were found to be associated with borders These are shown in the frequency graph below. Therefore, the adjectives such as 'porous,' and 'open' were used to describe the state of the borders whilst the following verbs were used to describe what can be done about this description.

Graph 4: Frequency of verbs associated with 'borders.'



There is a slight bit of nuance in this, which the data presented does not show. Although 'secure' and 'protect' are the most common verbs used, other words such as 'guard,' 'tighten' and 'defend' are also used. Anecdotally and with reference to the data used, it seems that there is a slight skew in this. 'Secure' in particular is drawn out and used in manifestos and media statements/releases used by organisations and parties. However, 'protect,' 'guard' and 'defend' are drawn out more in speeches rather than written statements. In order for this patterns to be confirmed, a much larger corpus of data is needed. This is also shown in some of the following manifesto and media release extracts.

- "No country in the world can afford to not secure their borders precisely because uncontrolled immigration violates the rights of both nationals of a given country and those foreign nationals who seek to be legally recognised (Democratic Alliance, 2019b)."

- "The Department of Home Affairs is unable to effectively guard South Africa's borders to prevent illegal immigration and the smuggling of goods across the border (Freedom Front Plus, 2013)."

- "The failure of the national government to secure our borders by running our border management systems efficiently and the collapse of border security means that we do not have reliable numbers of immigrants entering the country (Democratic Alliance, 2019)."

- "Most importantly, an expanded military service will secure the country's borders (Patriotic Alliance, 2024a)."

- "This is why ActionSA believes that in addition to securing our physical borders, an important part of dealing with our immigration crisis is streamlining the processes at Home Affairs and dealing with corrupt elements in the Department that attempt to extort law-abiding foreign nationals for their personal gain (ActionSA, 2024)."

If we centre the notion that the ability to 'secure' and 'protect' South Africa's borders as an attempt to gain legitimacy in the fracturing of the ANC's ability to maintain this legitimacy, then there is an important piece which is missing in this analysis. Namely, the pattern that can be observed of emergent political parties and organisations in particular acting to 'take back state functions' as a method of gaining public support and legitimacy for their rhetoric as well as guiding their hegemony. These 'state functions' include aspects such as policing and border control which the ANC is characterised as failing to protect and enforce. This notion of ANC failures being directly related to a breakdown in borders once again crops up across speeches, media releases and policy positions. Common associated adjectives used to describe this failure are detailed below.

Word Association Plot 7: ANC Failure and Border Control



It is also shown in the text extracts below.

- "It remains ActionSA's steadfast belief that the failure and chronic mismanagement of our immigration system must be laid at the feet of the grossly incompetent ANC-led government." (ActionSA, 2023)

- "The impact of porous borders and an ineffective, mostly corrupt Department of Home Affairs (DHA) has created a situation where we are completely unaware of the number of people who come in and out of the country." (Democratic Alliance, 2022c)

- "The ANC has failed to secure our borders, under its watch the Department of Home Affairs is crippled by corruption and inefficiency to a point where it actively contributes to illegal immigration, and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has not been afforded the human and technical

> resources it needs to patrol our borders and secure them." (Democratic Alliance, 2022c).

These examples of a pattern of emergent parties and organisations acting to 'take back state functions' therefore acts to practically elaborate on the associated rhetoric that the ANC has failed in its duty to protect South Africans. Based off this, it can be characterised as a direct attempt to claim that legitimacy which the ANC possesses to a lesser extent.

Toward the end of 2023 and again in January 2024, the Patriotic Alliance began what was termed an operation to "rescue South Africa" (SABC, 2024a). Throughout this period, party leaders and members patrolled the Limpopo River in an effort to "deport illegal foreigners themselves (Moichela, 2024)." Videos emerged during this period of party leader, Gayton McKenzie and Deputy president of the Patriotic Alliance, Kenny Kunene, running through the banks of the Limpopo River chasing away individuals who were attempting to cross into South Africa. This operation attracted a large amount of both social media and media attention. In an interview which took place on the banks of Limpopo River with the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC:2024), Kunene stated, "guns are being transported which are meant to kill South Africans. So, we are serious about dealing with the issue of illegal immigration. We are not just talking. We want to show South Africans that we are serious about this, as a matter of our manifesto policy that we must mass deport all illegal immigrants" (SABC, 2024). This vigilante-esque border patrol also followed the example of Afriforum who in 2022 launched a border watch initiative to patrol the border in an effort to prevent individuals moving through. This border patrol initiative was also characterised as ensuring that safety of farmers living areas close to the border and in general to ensure more security for South Africa. This action of creating a border patrol to protect is a clear link to the characterisation of the Other as responsible for the breakdown of law and order as outlined in the previous chapter. Although the notion of the border and border security is centred in these actions, they follow a previous pattern by both Operation

Dudula and #PutSouthAfricansFirst who engaged in efforts to do what the ANC was constructed as not being able to do in communities.

Throughout 2021 and 2022, Operation Dudula engaged in operations across Gauteng in order to take back state functions. Specifically, in 2021, Operation Dudula staged what they termed a 'clean up' throughout Soweto. In the days leading up to the march, there was widespread fear that this march would turn violent with rhetoric coming out of the movement saying that they would be removing any foreign nationals from shops by force (Mahlatsi, 2022). Again in 2022, drugs raids were carried out in townships across Gauteng. Operation Dudula stated that 'foreigners' were responsible for the drug problems in many South African townships and that they were 'stealing' the futures of the youth by crossing the borders illegally (Mncube, 2022). Finally, Operation Dudula marched on the Alexandra township and forcibly closed two shops which they had previously identified as hiring non-South Africans. These shops were closed under the pretence that they would only be allowed to re-open when only South Africans were hired.

The DA and ActionSA's approach in particular to securing and protecting borders take a more conventional approach than the examples above. Rather than attempt to claim functions from the state, both the DA and ActionSA directly link the removing of ANC from government to being able to fix the breakdown of the borders. Phrases such as "this combined with the endemic corruption and inefficiency at all levels in our immigration system means that the fair and timeous finalisation of visa and asylum applications is almost impossible. This inefficiency is precisely what makes the government complicit in creating the issue of illegal immigration" (Democratic Alliance 2022b), implies that through removing the ANC, the DA will be able to fix borders and the problem of illegal immigration. Of course, the ANC itself has also placed emphasis on securing borders in an attempt to regain their lost legitimacy around this issue. In 2022 and 2023, the ANC government started to deploy more guards to the Beitbridge Border Post in an effort to secure and protect borders. This was characterised by the ANC as a way of strengthening up the country's Border

Management Authority (BMA) in an effort to ensure stronger borders with fewer undocumented crossings and therefore protecting South Africans.

6.1.2 Deportation: I now turn to the sub-narrative which has been popularised and pushed specifically by the extreme emergent right-wing political parties and organisations, namely, the threat of deportation. Two of the most common verbs associated with the term 'illegal foreigners' is 'deport' and 'mass deport.' These results are represented below and are also represented in the speech and manifesto extracts found underneath.

Graph 5: Frequency of the terms "deport' and 'mass deport.'



**It should be noted that when presenting these results, 'deport' and 'deportation' were coded as the same phrase.*

- "South Africa faces a migration crisis, and illegal migrants must be mass deported. A person within South Africa's borders who did not cross the border legally is a criminal and needs to be treated as such. As a

consequence, South Africa will need mass detention camps to which illegal foreigners must be taken for processing and deportation." (Patriotic Alliance, 2024b).

- "The powers and obligations of Home Affairs must be vastly strengthened and expanded to afford Immigration Officers the rights and duties to deport the millions of illegal migrants that are busy choking South Africa from its poorest fringes inwards." (Patriotic Alliance, 2024).

- "The PA is promising a return to God, the return of the death penalty, the mass deportation of illegal foreigners and a hard line on law and order throughout society." (Patriotic Alliance, 2024)

- "They open illegal businesses and get fake documentation. So, now we are tired. We want to go there and show our anger and tell them that we want mass deportation." (Operation Dudula, 2022a)

Drotbohm (2013:1183) points out that deportation "has served throughout history as a key means of dividing insiders from outsiders, the wanted from the unwanted, the deserving from the undeserving. Just like other practices of expulsion and transfer of population groups, deportation has thus always been intrinsically tied to the establishment and preservation of boundaries of belonging and, ultimately, to the definition of citizenship." Advocating for mass deportation is therefore once again a method of asserting nationality and belonging over the Other.

Of course, in the South African context, this takes on multiple meanings. Mass deportation is characterised, not only as a method of asserting nationality, but also as creating a South Africa where lawlessness, those taking jobs and those harming the future of South Africans are expelled. Deportation is therefore almost characterised as a method of taking back that future. In addition to this, the threat of mass deportation is a method of disciplining the Other which has a dual function. As Drotbohm (2013:3) articulates, "these approaches underline the impact of

deportation as a disciplinary practice, which not only forces thousands of noncitizens to leave a certain state territory, but also sows anxiety and terror in those who manage to stay." Linked to this is the assertion that the rights of immigrants should not be taken into account when deporting them. Phrases such as "human rights should not mean that citizenship rights and responsibilities are completely ignored" (Patriotic Alliance, 2024b) act to strip away any rights from the Other and render them as almost without an identity in South Africa.

The case of deportation is a clear example of one of the premises of this project. That is, the inclusion of extreme right-wing parties and organisations in an eco-system of authoritarian populism acts to push other parties to the right. An example of this is the ANC government being pushed more to the extreme in its rhetoric on immigration legislation and deportation. Specifically, in 2023, the ANC introduced the 'White Paper on Citizenship, Immigration and Refugees.' This white paper was positioned as "a comprehensive overhaul of South Africa's legislation governing citizenship, immigration and refugee protection, saying it is pressing, given the country's evolving challenges" (Crouth, 2024). The white paper outlined the strengthening of deportation efforts of those who cross the border illegally. Crucially, the White Paper also set out plans to withdraw South Africa from two United Nations agreements on refugee protection. As Crouth (2024) sets out, "worryingly, the White Paper proposes that South Africa temporarily withdraw from two international agreements on refugee protection — the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention and the 1967 UN Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees — because the country does not have the resources to grant the socioeconomic rights to refugees."

Up until this point, the legislation that governed immigration into South Africa was a mix of apartheid era laws combined with ones introduced by the ANC in the form of 'The Immigration Act of 2002' as outlined earlier. The white paper introduced in 2023 was largely criticised as simply a populist move in an effort to consolidate voters ahead of the 2024 national election. As Crouth (2024) elaborates, "it is a "populist, political rant" that seeks to scapegoat migrants for governmental failings,

that HSF said was a ploy often used during election campaigning with the hope of winning votes in the upcoming elections."

6.2 Disciplining the Other through Fear

In previous sections, I have outlined the violence which has characterised xenophobia in South Africa. Although this is, of course, teased out in the rhetoric analysed, it is often attached to other factors and issues as outlined and analysed above. For example, violence which has erupted after Operation Dudula went to shut down 'illegal' shops are violence erupting after members of the community embarked on a quote unquote 'clean up.' The prevailing and intimate attitudes of communities are not necessarily captured in media releases/statements, speeches and manifestos and therefore, this underlying threat of everyday violence is not necessarily borne out in the text analysed.

That being said, I will now turn to a rhetoric which has emerged that seeks to discard the rights of immigrants into the county. There are two aspects to note in this sub-narrative. Firstly, the fear which I speak about is not a fear of physical violence. Rather, it refers to narratives which have emerged which try to instil a sense of domination over immigrants through the discarding of their rights – that is, a type of mental violence and discipline. So, although fear does underly the section on enforcement, the sub-narrative I now outline consist of often shocking statements meant to instil a sense of immediate and sustained fear. Secondly, this sub-narrative has not characterised large portions of the text analysed. It has been specifically located in the extreme right-wing rhetoric espoused by the Patriotic Alliance and leader Gayton McKenzie, as well as Operation Dudula and #PutSouthAfricansFirst, to a lesser extent.

This is borne out in the examples below:

- "As a consequence, South Africa will need mass detention camps to which illegal foreigners must be taken for processing and deportation (SABC, 2024a)."

- "After we have been sworn in, I am going straight to Rahima Moosa hospital where we are going to switch off the oxygen of illegal foreigners." (SABC, 2023b).

- "This is for the people calling me to find out if I indeed uttered the words, I mean every word, no illegal foreigners should be getting treated at our hospitals whilst South Africans are dying in the lines. We put South Africans first all day every day." (McKenzie 2022).

- "Our country is a joke, I will construct the biggest wall ever, we really have no choice, it's free for all to enter our country." (McKenzie, 2024f)

- "All children of illegal foreigners shouldn't be allowed in our schools in South Africa, Home Affairs should visit all schools before we do, this is nonsense, we must now explain to South African parents why they children cannot be placed in schools, we warned you." (Operation Dudula, 2022b).

As touched on by Niessel (2017:539), the act of instilling fear in migrants can be a form of social control in itself. As stated, "for those immigrants without legal status or criminal records, the uncertainty and fear generated is intended to result in self-deportation." This fear which is perpetuated in the use of extreme language can act both act to prevent immigrants from coming into the country - especially those with children – as well as resulting in the "self-deportation" as pointed out by Niessel (2017). As Park (2018:1880) states, "self-deportation" refers to an indirect method for removing from a jurisdiction a group not desired as part of the polity." This fear which is manufactured by statements and discourse such as those quoted lead to the result of this 'self-deportation.' Of course, this is also fed into by the physical violence that characterises a lot of xenophobia in the country and lived reality of a large portion of immigrants into the country. This fear also has a clear negative effect on immigrants themselves. As Becerra (2016:111) elaborates "the fear of mass deportation has also been associated with negative social, emotional, and mental health outcomes such as social isolation, stress, anxiety, and depression." Of course, this fear of deportation and violence can also lead to immigrant workers being

exploited by employers who would threaten to turn them over to authorities should they not accept the harsh working conditions.

Finally, and importantly, this fear though also extends into the ability for immigrants to access the rights in a country such as the right to medical assistance which they should be guaranteed. A fear of being denied medical assistance – as outlined in the previous chapter – due to the medical xenophobia which is pervasive in South Africa will often lead to immigrants not accessing this health care and thus having more adverse health determinants (Becerra, 2016). This fear is exacerbated by statements such as those quoted above and indirectly causes the rights of undocumented immigrants to be infringed on. Therefore, this type of shock language serves two purposes. It acts to instil a fear in immigrants themselves as method of disciplining them through this fear. Secondly, it is once again, just as with these other methods of discipline outlined in previous sub-narratives, a direct appeal to the electorate and attempt to gain legitimacy through extreme measures. It is an effort to quote unquote 'outflank' other actors within the ecosystem in an effort to gain greater publicity and to attract more to the new hegemonic project. In addition to this, it once again acts to increase the rhetoric around the Other and move it further to the right.

Conclusion Outlining ways in which the Other will be disciplined is key in gaining consent for a new hegemonic project. It also represents ways in which the emergent political ecosystem is seen to be reclaiming state functions from the government as a method to further gaining a sense of legitimacy to further appeal to the electorate. Both chapters five and six have therefore detailed a key part of the framework of authoritarian populism. Namely, how the Other is defined as being a cause of crime, drugs, a lack of economic opportunities as well as invading the country. It also sets out of the authentic People are constructed in relation to the Other, namely as victims of the Other, either in terms of crime or stealing economic opportunities, and crucially, having their future stolen by the Other. And crucially, it defines how state formations – through the emergent political ecosystem – are able to discipline the Other.

Chapter 7:
Conclusion

7.1 Beliefs of development

As this project has outlined, there can be little doubt that South Africa is in the emergence of authoritarian populism. ANC hegemony, which has come to define post-apartheid South Africa, has deteriorated. Combined with that, an entrenched socio-economic crisis has taken root in South Africa, leaving much of the country in a precarious economic state. Informed by historical processes of nation building and nationality which came to define post-apartheid South Africa, it is in this complex space the emergence of a political ecosystem of authoritarian populism has manifested. Decades of attempts to neutralise antagonisms against the ruling hegemony of the ANC, informed by processes of nation building and historical roots of xenophobia, have led to the centring of immigrants in South Africa as responsible for a constructed rhetorical crisis. Emergent political parties draw on this in an attempt to guide South Africa to a new hegemonic dispensation and gain popular consent for this project.

Critically, it is through language imbued with an ideology which constructs the Other and constructs a future without the Other in which this authoritarian populism acts to spread constructions of the Other and importantly, acts as a tool of mobilisation toward this new hegemony and new future. Through this language and construction of the future, beliefs of development for South Africa are present. Emergent parties in particular in the political ecosystem construct a future in which the removal of the Other will solve South Africa's problems and ensure the type of development that was promised at the end of apartheid is reached. Through their constructions around disciplining the Other, these parties attempt to style themselves as the ones to bring about this change and development. This has been practically displayed in some of the methods which have been drawn on by the political ecosystem such as the notion of taking back state practices in order to gain legitimacy.

The central theme of this project has been that the emergence of an ideological language of authoritarian populism, constructed and perpetuated by an emergent

political ecosystem, will come to drastically influence the political landscape and move it further to the right as the political establishment acts to try and counter the emergent political parties in this ecosystem. This influences the way in which the current conjuncture of crisis is constructed and understood in relation to the Other, how failures of a dominant ANC feed into this and what a constructed future will look like with the Other no longer present. Though this project, I have shown examples of this manifesting and a movement of established political parties attempting to gain legitimacy within this moment.

7.2 Trajectories: Implications for the future

7.2.1 Immediate Future

As stated in earlier chapters, I do not believe, nor does the electoral evidence currently show that one of the emergent political parties – the Patriotic Alliance, ActionSA – or one of the others will gain complete electoral victory within the next election cycle. However, as we have already seen with the Patriotic Alliance at a national government level and ActionSA at a local government level, these parties have the ability to wield power and influence over coalition governments at these respective levels. Two events have taken place in 2024 which could be used to give us an understanding of the possible future of coalition politics, with these parties at the centre. Firstly, when entering the Government of National Unity (GNU) after the 2024 election, Gayton McKenzie lobbied for the position of Minister of Home Affairs with the pretence that if he should get it, on the first day, he would embark on a mass deportation drive (Mashamaite, 2024). Although the Patriotic Alliance was not a large enough partner within the GNU to warrant, and was given the position of Minister of Sports, Arts Culture, more electoral succusses and therefore, more influence, might warrant a more powerful position. Secondly, when Patriotic Alliance Deputy President, Kenny Kunene was made Acting Mayor in the City of Johannesburg for a period of two days, he embarked on an operation to remove all undocumented foreigners from buildings in the Johannesburg inner city (Mashamaite, 2024).

Both of these examples could signal a future of South African politics – at both the national and local level – should parties such as the Patriotic Alliance and ActionSA continue to grow and play a crucial part of South African politics, post-ANC dominance. The above is, of course, the direct influence that emergent parties can have on formal parliamentary politics. However, as the political ecosystem, with constructions of the Other at the centre continues to crystalise and expand, South African society will carry on moving to a new 'common sense' understanding of the nation. As the right-wing political ecosystem continues to influence and guide established parties toward a new hegemony, a fundamental rethinking of the South African nation might emerge with an achieved rethinking resembling the ideas of the right-wing political ecosystem as established political parties have been forced to assimilate and move to the right.

7.2.2 Long-term future

In terms of the long-term future of South African politics, there are two main options which need to be considered. The first is the possibility of a left-wing resurgence. Currently, the South African left is fractured. There is no clear example of a left leaning organisation, community movement or political party which is able to create a sustained grass roots movement. The EFF, the only prominent left-wing resembling party in South Africa has largely been unable to create sustained momentum. New entries such as the MK party have damaged the EFF and further fractured the electorate. Should a progressive, left-wing party with grassroots and popular support be able to breakthrough, there might be a shift in the future of South African politics. However, the danger with this is the immense influence the right-wing political ecosystem is wielding over the South African electorate in terms of how it construct the Other and what development should look like. A left-wing resurgence would require a similar political ecosystem, one which fundamentally rethinks the nature of the state, is able to wield influence and is able to create a sustained movement through this.

However, if this does not manifest, there is the danger that South Africa's current fractured voting bloc will coalesce around an authoritarian populist political party

which is able to attract a heterogenous grouping of voters and gain complete control over formal parliamentary politics. As the swing to the right takes place through incremental and slow steps at times, there is a distinct possibility that the nature of South African politics will look fundamentally different in a decade or more time.

7.3 Recommendations going forward

There are several recommendations for future research within the emergence of a language of authoritarian populism:

- This project has focused specifically on mapping an emergence of language using text that has been available in the public domain and is within the political ecosystem. This is therefore inherently limited by the text which political parties, community organisations and their leaders put out. Future research should seek to map the way in which individuals on the ground construct these same issues. From constructions around the Other, to constructions around addressing the Other and the future of South Africa, the language which these individuals - across race- use will fundamentally bolster this exploration of ideological language.

- The scope of this project also has large amounts of room for expansion. Both in the text which is gathered as well as the smaller organisations that are mapped and analysed. In addition to this, new political entrants such as the MK party and others should be included in a future analysis. Although some text was included in this analysis, it was limited by the time in which MK's emergence took place.

Chapter 8:

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Appendix A: Declaration of Originality

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA

The Department of Sociology places great emphasis upon integrity and ethical conduct in the preparation of all written work submitted for academic evaluation.

While academic staff teach you about referencing techniques and how to avoid plagiarism, you too have a responsibility in this regard. If you are at any stage uncertain as to what is required, you should speak to your lecturer before any written work is submitted.

You are guilty of plagiarism if you copy something from another author's work (eg a book, an article or a website) without acknowledging the source and pass it off as your own. In effect you are stealing something that belongs to someone else. This is not only the case when you copy work word-for-word (verbatim), but also when you submit someone else's work in a slightly altered form (paraphrase) or use a line of argument without acknowledging it. You are not allowed to use work previously produced by another student. You are also not allowed to let anybody copy your work with the intention of passing if off as his/her work.

Students who commit plagiarism will not be given any credit for plagiarised work. The matter may also be referred to the Disciplinary Committee (Students) for a ruling. Plagiarism is regarded as a serious contravention of the University's rules and can lead to expulsion from the University.

The declaration which follows must accompany all written work submitted while you are a student of the Department of Sociology. No written work will be accepted unless the declaration has been completed and attached.
****YOU CAN COPY AND ATTACH THE FOLLOWING BELOW AND ADD IT TO YOUR ASSINGNMENT****

Declaration of own work

Full names: Jason Love

Student number: 21734314

Assignment: Masters Dissertation

By completing this declaration:

1. I understand what plagiarism is and am aware of the University's policy in this regard.

2. I declare that this assignment is my own original work. Where other people's work has been used (either from a printed source, Internet or any other source), this has been properly acknowledged and referenced in accordance with departmental requirements.

3. I have not used work previously produced by another student or any other person to hand in as my own.

4. I have not allowed, and will not allow, anyone to copy my work with the intention of passing it off as his or her own work.